UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BONNIE PROSPER,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 20-2279 (TJK) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ANTI- GUA AND BARBUDA et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Starting in 1994, Bonnie Prosper worked in several administrative roles in Washington,
D.C. for the embassies of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, and Dominica. In 2017, she was laid off by these embassies. Proceeding pro
se, Prosper sued them, asserting several claims related to her termination. The Saint Kitts and
Nevis embassy settled with Prosper. The other four embassies move to dismiss the case for failure
to state a claim. For the following reasons, the Court will grant in part and deny in part these
motions and dismiss all but three of Prosper’s claims.
I. Background
According to the complaint, in 1994, Prosper—a national of Antigua and Barbuda who
became a U.S. citizen in 2010 and has resided in Maryland at all relevant times—began working
as a receptionist and administrative assistant for the embassies of Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint
Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica in the Organisation
of Eastern Caribbean States (“OECS”) Building in Washington, D.C. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 4–5, 9, 32; ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 20; ECF No. 1-2 at 1. 1 Her “Letter of Appointment” listed her salary, warned
her that taxes would not be withheld from her salary but were her responsibility to pay, mentioned
the healthcare coverage the embassies would provide for her, stated that she would begin work
with a “three month[] probationary period,” and described her job duties. ECF No. 1-1 at 1; ECF
No. 1 ¶ 6. The Letter of Appointment was silent on the duration of Prosper’s employment or
protections against termination, and besides healthcare coverage it did not mention employment-
related benefits she would receive. See ECF No. 1-1 at 1; ECF No. 1 ¶ 4.
Over time, Prosper’s workplace responsibilities allegedly “dramatically increased,” and
she periodically requested and received salary increases. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 6; ECF No. 1-1 at 3–5,
13, 15. In 2009, Prosper wrote the embassies to ask them for a “definitive answer” about receiving
“entitlement[]” benefits such as social-security- and pension-related benefits. See ECF No. 1
¶¶ 17–18; ECF No. 1-1 at 10–11. In this letter, she requested that they “mak[e] the necessary
provisions” to provide these benefits for her. ECF No. 1-1 at 11.
In January 2010, the embassies responded. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 19; ECF No. 1-1 at 12. They
told her that they would work on having her become an employee of the OECS Secretariat—how
they would provide these benefits—said that they would pay her an “interim monthly allowance”
of $250 until her “employment status” was “rectified,” and “pledge[d] to have these issues resolved
as quickly as possible.” ECF No. 1-1 at 12; see also ECF No. 19 at 5–6; ECF No. 32 at 4, 7.
Apparently, that did not happen. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 20–21; ECF No. 1-1 at 13–16. Instead,
Prosper’s employers allegedly acted repeatedly to “frustrate” and “embarrass[]” her in the
1 At this stage, the Court construes Prosper’s complaint liberally and considers all her filings in doing so, accepts her factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. Barr, No. 15-cv-896 (TJK), 2019 WL 5579968, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 29, 2019).
2 performance of her duties. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22–24. Matters came to a head in July 2017, when
Prosper received a “notice of separation of service” from the embassies informing her that she was
being laid off effective August 31, 2017 because of a prospective sale of the OECS Building that
rendered her “current post” redundant. Id. ¶ 25; ECF No. 1-1 at 17. The embassies offered Prosper
a $35,000 severance package but said nothing about addressing the entitlement-related issues they
had pledged before to resolve. ECF No. 1-1 at 17. Prosper responded, telling them that terminating
her “without fulfilling their obligations to provide social security and other benefits would be a
breach of contract” and that the severance-package offer was lower than what she was entitled to
under the “severance laws in the OECS countries.” See ECF No. 1 ¶ 27. The embassies replied
on August 23, reiterating that Prosper would be laid off effective August 31 and offering her
$45,000 as a “once-for-all payment of appreciation.” ECF No. 32-1 at 1. Prosper eventually was
laid off on August 31 “with no compensation.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 28.
Prosper’s termination and subsequent events allegedly left her anxious, stressed, “severely
depressed,” and “emotionally drained.” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28, 36, 42. She first sought unemployment
benefits but was informed that she was ineligible because her employers made no such contribu-
tions on her behalf. Id. ¶ 28. It took her about eight months to find a new job. Id. ¶ 29. Through
an attorney, she tried to negotiate with the embassies to resolve her nascent claims, but they did
not respond. Id. ¶ 33. Prosper then sued the embassies in Antigua and Barbuda, which prompted
the embassies to tell her that they were mulling an “amicable proposed settlement.” Id. ¶ 34. But
they later “abandoned the idea” and successfully got Prosper’s Antigua and Barbuda lawsuit dis-
missed on jurisdictional grounds in June 2019. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36, 38–40; ECF No. 1-1 at 18–19. After
that, Prosper again attempted to settle her claims amicably. ECF No. 1 ¶ 41. The embassies pro-
posed that Prosper sign a release in exchange for $60,000. Id.; ECF No. 1-1 at 20–21. In January
3 2020, she counteroffered for $90,000, and she reiterated this counteroffer in February 2020 after
not hearing back about it. See ECF No. 1-1 at 22; ECF No. 32-1 at 2.
Prosper ultimately did not settle with them, and she sued on August 14, 2020. See ECF
No. 1; ECF No. 22 at 1. 2 The Saint Kitts and Nevis embassy then settled with Prosper, while the
other four embassies (“Defendants”) moved to dismiss for insufficient service and for failure to
state a claim. See ECF No. 9; ECF No. 9-1; ECF No. 15; ECF No. 15-1; ECF No. 18. The Court
denied those motions without prejudice, agreeing that Prosper’s attempts at service were insuffi-
cient but allowing her to perfect service. See ECF No. 22. Prosper then re-served Defendants.
See ECF No. 28. Now Defendants once more move to dismiss—the Saint Lucia embassy by itself;
and the embassies of Antigua and Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Dominica
jointly—this time arguing only that Prosper has failed to state a claim. ECF No. 29; ECF No. 29-
1; ECF No. 30; ECF No. 30-1. 3
II. Legal Standards
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s
complaint. See Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2017). To overcome such a
2 Prosper named as defendants the attorneys general of each country, but she sued them in their capacity as official-capacity representatives of each country’s ambassador and foreign-affairs min- ister. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10–14. Thus, consistent with Defendants’ understanding, the Court con- strues Prosper’s claims as against the embassies. See ECF No. 29-1 at 6 & n.1; ECF No. 30 at 1. 3 Prosper filed two oppositions, ECF No. 32; ECF No. 33, Defendants filed two replies, ECF No. 34; ECF No. 35, and Prosper filed two surreplies, ECF No. 36; ECF No. 37. Generally, “[b]efore filing a surreply,” the party must seek leave to file it and show why granting such leave is war- ranted. See Longwood Vill. Rest., Ltd. v. Ashcroft, 157 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68 n.3 (D.D.C. 2001); Rushing v. Leavitt, No. 03-cv-1969 (CKK), 2005 WL 555415, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2005). Prosper did not seek leave to file her surreplies. That said, Defendants have not opposed them. Considering that, as well as Prosper’s pro se status, the Court deems the surreplies properly filed and will consider them. See, e.g., Olds v. Natsios, No. 04-cv-1048 (JGP), 2006 WL 416157, at *2 n.4 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2006).
4 motion, the plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Doing so requires alleging sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In considering
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must treat a complaint’s factual allega-
tions as true and grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can flow from the facts alleged.
See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cleaned up). Further,
when a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the Court must construe the complaint “liberally.” See Untalasco
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 249 F. Supp. 3d 318, 322 (D.D.C. 2017). And the Court typically
“should look to all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to dismiss, to discern whether
the [pro se] plaintiff has nudged her claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” See
Mehrbach v. Citibank, N.A., 316 F. Supp. 3d 264, 268 (D.D.C. 2018) (cleaned up). That said, the
“complaint must still present a claim on which the Court can grant relief.” See Untalasco, 249
F. Supp. 3d at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in assessing this, the Court need not
accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual
allegations. See Peavey v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 3d 85, 93 (D.D.C. 2015).
III. Analysis
Construing her complaint liberally and considering it through the lens of her other filings,
the Court discerns that Prosper has asserted four sets of claims. First, she asserts three distinct
breach-of-contract claims. Second, she brings a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy. Third, she alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). And fourth, she
asserts several related claims for violating social-security-, severance-pay-, and pension-related
5 legal obligations (“Entitlement Claims”). 4 Defendants move to dismiss all of Prosper’s claims for
failure to state a claim. For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss all of them except two
of her breach-of-contract claims and her severance-pay Entitlement Claim.
A. The Court Will Dismiss One of Prosper’s Breach-of-Contract Claims but Per- mit the Other Two to Proceed
As best the Court can tell, Prosper alleges that Defendants breached two different contracts
they had with her—a general employment contract as well as a contract embodied in the embas-
sies’ January 2010 letter to Prosper—in three different ways. As for the general employment
contract, Prosper alleges that Defendants violated it in laying her off because she was not an at-
will employee (“At-Will Claim”). See ECF No. 1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 32 at 8. As for the January 2010
contract, Prosper alleges that Defendants violated it both by laying her off without first rectifying
her employment status to ensure she would receive social-security- and pension-related benefits
(“Rectification Claim”) as well as by failing to keep paying her the $250 monthly “allowance”
until her employment status was rectified (“Allowance Claim”). ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 19–20, 27, 44.
Defendants argue that Prosper failed to state a claim as to any of these, contending that each claim
is barred by the statute of limitations and otherwise fails as a matter of law. ECF No. 29-1 at 9–
14; ECF No. 30-1 at 15–16. As explained below, District of Columbia law governs these claims,
the applicable statute of limitations does not bar them, Prosper has failed to allege sufficient facts
to make plausible her At-Will Claim, and Prosper has alleged sufficient facts to make plausible
the Rectification Claim and Allowance Claim. Thus, the Court will dismiss the At-Will Claim but
allow the other two to proceed.
4 Some of Prosper’s allegations could be read to assert an employment-discrimination claim of some kind, but Prosper has explicitly disclaimed that she has brought such a claim. Compare ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 16, 32, and ECF No. 1-1 at 22, with ECF No. 19 at 7, and ECF No. 32 at 8.
6 1. District of Columbia Law Governs These Claims
Because Prosper sues several foreign embassies, this case is governed by the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). See Virtual Defense & Dev. Int’l, Inc. v. Republic of Moldova,
133 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15 (D.D.C. 2001). 5 Under the FSIA, a foreign-state entity that is subject to suit
“shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like cir-
cumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 1606. This provision is a “‘pass-through’ to the substantive law that
would govern a similar suit between private individuals,” including the choice-of-law rules that
would ordinarily apply in the suit. Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 142 S. Ct.
1502, 1508 (2022). Prosper’s breach-of-contract claims are state-law claims, so the Court must
apply District of Columbia choice-of-law rules to determine the governing substantive law. See,
e.g., Lanny J. Davis & Assocs. LLC v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, 962 F. Supp. 2d 152, 162
(D.D.C. 2013) (citing Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 F.3d 835, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
As pertinent to these claims, the “District of Columbia employs a modified governmental
interest analysis” for its choice-of-law rule, “under which the court evaluates the governmental
policies underlying the applicable laws and determines which jurisdiction’s policy would be most
5 Ordinarily, foreign states and their instrumentalities have sovereign immunity—which is juris- dictional, see Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 485 n.5, 489 n.14, 493 n.20 (1983)—but the FSIA waives that immunity in some cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604–07. As rele- vant here, foreign-state entities are not immune from suit “in any case . . . in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2); see also id. § 1603(d). Prosper’s claims are based on her employment as a recep- tionist and administrative assistant by Defendants in Washington, D.C. Thus, this case fits within the commercial-activity exception. See, e.g., Youssef v. Embassy of United Arab Emirates, No. 17-cv-2638 (KBJ), 2021 WL 3722742, at *6–10 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2021); Jouanny v. Embassy of France in the U.S., No. 16-cv-135 (APM), 2017 WL 2455023, at *2 n.2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2017). Defendants do not argue otherwise. Cf. Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he [FSIA] defendant bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff’s allegations do not bring its case within a statutory exception to immunity.”).
7 advanced by having its laws applied to the facts in the case.” Chandler v. W.E. Welch & Assocs.,
Inc., 533 F. Supp. 2d 94, 104 (D.D.C. 2008) (cleaned up). 6 “For breach of employment contract
claims,” this analysis generally dictates applying “the law of the state in which the alleged contract
was breached because that state has the greatest interest in protecting the rights of its employees.”
See id.; see also Lanny J. Davis Assocs., 962 F. Supp. 2d at 161–62. In this case, that is the District
of Columbia. See, e.g., Hyman v. First Union Corp., 982 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1997). For this
reason, the Court applies District of Columbia law to Prosper’s breach-of-contract claims. See
Virtual Defense & Dev. Int’l, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
2. These Claims Are Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations
Defendants argue that all of Prosper’s breach-of-contract claims are barred by the applica-
ble statute of limitations because the July 2017 separation notice started the clock and the time
expired before Prosper filed suit in August 2020. Not so.
In the District of Columbia, a three-year statute of limitations governs breach-of-contract
claims like Prosper’s. See D.C. Code § 12-301(7); Prouty v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 200, 205 (D.D.C. 1983). Thus, Prosper had to bring these claims “within three years” fol-
lowing their “accrual.” Ehrenhaft v. Malcolm Price, Inc., 483 A.2d 1192, 1198 (D.C. 1984). “It
is settled that ‘a cause of action for breach of contract accrues, and the statute of limitations begins
to run, at the time of the breach.’” Billups v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 233 F. Supp. 3d 20, 23 (D.D.C.
6 Typically, before undertaking this analysis, the Court must “first determine whether there is a conflict between the laws of the relevant jurisdictions.” See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins., 764 F.2d 876, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344, 348 (D.C. 1970)). But the parties did not brief the “nuances” of any other relevant jurisdiction’s laws, so the Court assumes that a conflict exists here and elsewhere. See Lanny J. Davis & Assocs., 962 F. Supp. 2d at 162 n.4. Also, District of Columbia courts generally give effect to choice-of-law terms in contracts. See, e.g., Kroger v. Legalbill.com, 436 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D.D.C. 2006). But no such choice- of-law term exists here. See ECF No. 1-1 at 1–2, 12.
8 2017) (brackets omitted) (quoting Eastbanc, Inc. v. Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d
996, 1004 (D.C. 2008)). And a breach occurs “when a party fails to perform an obligation the
contract imposes” when such performance is due. See Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 96-
cv-2708 (RMU/JMF), 2001 WL 214212, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2001); Eastbanc, 940 A.2d at 1004.
Here, the relevant performances were due when Prosper was terminated on August 31,
2017. That is, by that day, Defendants had to perform their purported duties to not terminate
Prosper given her non-at-will employment status, to rectify her entitlement-related issues, and to
keep paying her the $250 allowance until they did so. When Defendants still went ahead and laid
her off and stopped paying the $250 allowance, they breached the alleged contracts. Thus, these
claims accrued on August 31, 2017. Because Prosper filed suit on August 14, 2020, these claims
are timely by a few weeks.
In contending otherwise, Defendants argue, in effect, that the breach occurred for statute-
of-limitations purposes in July 2017, when Prosper received the separation notice. Although this
position is not without some footing in decisions from this District, the Court disagrees.
In Eastbanc, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed when a breach-of-con-
tract claim accrues in circumstances like this, when the plaintiff has notice that the other party to
the contract plans to breach it before the actual breach. See 940 A.2d at 1004–08. In that case, the
defendants argued that the three-year statute of limitations started to run on the date that they
anticipatorily repudiated the contract, which preceded when performance was due. Id. at 1001,
1004–06. The court rejected this argument, emphasizing that “for purposes of applying the statute
of limitations, there is a crucial difference between repudiating a contract and breaching it.” Id. at
1006. And it reasoned that, generally, an “actual breach” is required to start running the statute-
9 of-limitations clock, regardless of the plaintiff’s “knowledge of a repudiation” before the breach.
See id. at 1007–08. 7
Eastbanc did not involve an employment contract, but the Court sees no reason why it
would not apply in this context given that “[e]mployment contracts are governed by the same rules
as other contracts.” See 19 Williston on Contracts § 54:9, n.1 & accompanying text, Westlaw (4th
ed. updated May 2022); cf. Medhin v. Hailu, 26 A.3d 307, 309–10 (D.C. 2011) (following East-
banc where the contract at issue was a realtor-brokerage agreement). Under Eastbanc, Prosper’s
breach-of-contract claims accrued when the actual breach occurred—August 31, 2017—regardless
of her knowledge in July 2017 that Defendants planned to breach at that time.
That said, Defendants rely on several cases from this District holding that a breach-of-
contract claim accrued under District of Columbia law on the date that the plaintiff received notice
of the breach, even though the notice preceded the conduct constituting the breach. See Gauer v.
Gallaudet Univ., 915 F. Supp. 2d 145, 147–48 (D.D.C. 2013); LoPiccolo v. Am. Univ., 840 F.
Supp. 2d 71, 77–79 (D.D.C. 2012); Allison v. Howard Univ., 209 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59–60 (D.D.C.
2002). But to so hold, these cases each relied on distinguishable precedent—cases that either did
not involve breach-of-contract claims, or else simply recognized that a breach-of-contract claim
accrued when or after the breach occurred. 8 Moreover, none of these cases that came after
7 The clock can begin to run before the breach, but typically this is so only when the plaintiff elects to “treat the anticipatory repudiation as a present breach,” such as by suing immediately. See Glenn v. Fay, 281 F. Supp. 3d 130, 139 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Eastbanc, 940 A.2d at 1004); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Lexington Ins., 357 F. Supp. 2d 287, 294–95 (D.D.C. 2005). On the allegations currently before the Court, that did not happen here. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 27; ECF No. 32- 1 at 1. 8 See Leftwich v. Gallaudet Univ., 878 F. Supp. 2d 81, 95–97 (D.D.C. 2012) (addressing when employment-discrimination claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act accrue); Harris v. Ladner, 828 A.2d 203, 206 (D.C. 2003) (per curiam) (holding that a breach-of-contract claim accrued when the plaintiff learned of the breach after it occurred); Stephenson v. Am. Dental
10 Eastbanc cited or discussed it. Of course, the Court must follow Eastbanc rather than these district
court decisions.
Defendants also invoke the District of Columbia’s “discovery rule,” under which the stat-
ute of limitations “begins to run when a party becomes aware that he has suffered harm which has
been caused by another.” See LoPiccolo, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (citing Diamond v. Davis, 680
A.2d 364, 372 (D.C. 1996)). The “discovery rule,” however, is “generally applied to toll a statute
of limitations.” Azoroh v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 200 F. Supp. 3d 127, 130
(D.D.C. 2016) (emphasis added) (citing Doe v. Medlantic Health Care Grp., Inc., 814 A.2d 939,
945 (D.C. 2003)); see also Ehrenhaft, 483 A.2d at 1201–03. Defendants would turn the rule on
its head by applying it to start running the statute-of-limitations clock before the breach occurred
and thus before the clock would otherwise begin. Such a holding appears irreconcilable with East-
banc’s rule that a breach typically does not accrue until it occurs regardless of a party’s aware-
ness—or “discovery”—in advance that it is coming. See also Material Supply Int’l, Inc. v. Sun-
match Indus. Co., 146 F.3d 983, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[O]bviously a party can discover a breach
only when it occurs or later.”). The Court thus declines the invitation to hold otherwise. 9
Ass’n, 789 A.2d 1248, 1251–52 (D.C. 2002) (deciding when a common-law wrongful-discharge claim accrues); Medhin, 26 A.3d at 308, 311 (finding that a breach-of-contract claim accrued when the breach occurred); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 261 (1980) (addressing when employment-discrimination claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 accrue). 9 Apart from their notice-as-breach argument, Defendants do not contend that any of the purported duties underlying these claims were “first breached” at any time before August 31, 2017. See Commonwealth Land Title Ins. v. KCI Techs., Inc., 922 F.3d 459, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Lieberman v. Aldon Constr. Co., 125 A.2d 517, 518 (D.C. 1956)).
11 3. Prosper Failed to Adequately Plead Her At-Will Claim
Prosper alleges that her August 31, 2017 termination breached her employment contract
because she was “not an ‘at-will’ employee” who could be laid off for the reasons Defendants
gave. ECF No. 32 at 8–10; see also ECF No. 1 ¶ 4. She has failed to state this claim.
“In the District of Columbia, employees are presumed to be at-will employees.” Harley
v. Covington & Burling, LLC, No. 18-cv-2633 (RBW), 2020 WL 2514660, at *5 (D.D.C. May 15,
2020). Such employees “can be fired for any reason or no reason.” Le Fande v. District of Co-
lumbia, 864 F. Supp. 2d 44, 48 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Wemhoff v. Investors Mgmt. Corp., 528 A.2d
1205, 1208 n.3 (D.C. 1987)). To overcome this presumption at the pleading stage, the plaintiff
generally must allege facts making it plausible either that the parties “intended to contract for a
fixed period of employment” or “that the agreed-upon employment can only be terminated upon
specific preconditions.” See id. (citing Nickens v. Labor Agency of Metro. Wash., 600 A.2d 813,
816 (D.C. 1991)). But allegations that make plausible only an “expectation of continuing employ-
ment” are not enough. See Herron, 861 F.3d at 171–72.
Prosper’s complaint lacks any allegation that makes it plausible that she was not an at-will
employee. And some of her other filings undercut any such allegation, had one been made. For
instance, Prosper’s Letter of Appointment does not mention either a fixed period of employment
or preconditions on her termination. See ECF No. 1-1 at 1–2. Thus, even giving Prosper every
benefit-of-the-doubt that the Court must, the Court finds that she has failed to state this claim.
To resist this conclusion, Prosper argues that her Letter of Appointment does not specify
that her employment was at-will. ECF No. 32 at 8. That is of no moment because under District
of Columbia law her employment was presumptively at-will. Prosper also points out that she
began her employment on a three-month probationary period, and she claims that once she
12 completed that period she became a “permanent employee.” See ECF No. 1 ¶ 4; ECF No. 32 at 8.
But without more, such as allegations that a “permanent employee” could be terminated only for
specific reasons, this is not enough to plausibly overcome the at-will presumption. Compare
Dunaway v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 310 F.3d 758, 766–67 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and Choate v. TRW,
Inc., 14 F.3d 74, 76–77 (D.C. Cir. 1994), with United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard University,
153 F.3d 731, 745–46 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Prosper also asserts that she was “hired under an A-2
visa.” ECF No. 32 at 8; see also ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 9. 10 But she does not explain the legal relevance
of this fact, and the Court fails to see how it makes her At-Will Claim plausible. See, e.g., Sullivan
v. Heritage Found., 399 A.2d 856, 858, 860–61 (D.C. 1979) (finding that an employee was termi-
nable at will even though, among other things, he had moved from Boston to take the job).
Thus, the Court will dismiss Prosper’s At-Will Claim.
4. Prosper Adequately Pleaded Her Rectification Claim
Prosper also alleges that Defendants breached the contract embodied in the January 2010
letter by failing to rectify her employment status before termination to ensure that she would re-
ceive social-security- and pension-related benefits. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 19–20, 27; see also ECF No.
1-1 at 12. Prosper has adequately pleaded this Rectification Claim.
To sufficiently state this claim, Prosper had to plausibly allege “four necessary elements”:
“‘(1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a
breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.’” Ihebereme v. Capital One, N.A., 730 F.
10 A-2 visas are provided to “[d]iplomats and other foreign government officials traveling to the United States to engage solely in official duties or activities of their national government.” See U.S. Dep’t of State—Bureau of Consular Affairs, “Visas for Diplomats and Foreign Government Officials,” Travel.State.Gov, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/other-visa-catego- ries/visas-diplomats.html (last accessed Sept. 1, 2022).
13 Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C.
2009)). Here, granting Prosper the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can flow from the facts
alleged or are otherwise apparent in her filings, the Court finds all four elements present.
First, in exchange for her ongoing work for Defendants, Prosper asked them to make “the
necessary provisions” to modify her “status as an employee” to ensure that she would receive
social-security- and pension-related benefits. See ECF No. 1-1 at 10–11. In response, Defendants
told her that they would take steps to “rectif[y]” her “employment status” and “pledge[d] to . . .
resolve[]” these issues. Id. at 12. This exchange plausibly gave rise to a valid contract—Prosper
would keep working for Defendants, and Defendants would provide social-security- and pension-
related benefits for her. See Pearsall v. Alexander, 572 A.2d 113, 117–18 (D.C. 1990); 3 Williston
on Contracts § 7:39, nn.9–10 & accompanying text, Westlaw (4th ed. updated May 2022). Sec-
ond, by its own terms and when read in the context of Prosper’s 2009 letter, the January 2010 letter
plausibly obligated the embassies to “rectif[y]” and “resolve[]” Prosper’s social-security- and pen-
sion-related “issues.” See ECF No. 1-1 at 11–12; see also 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs.
of Am., Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 205 (D.C. 1984) (noting that a contract’s “meaning must be ascertained
in light of all the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was made”). Third,
Defendants breached this obligation by not rectifying these issues before terminating Prosper. See,
e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27–28, 30, 44. Fourth, Prosper has suffered damages in losing out on these
monetary benefits. See, e.g., id. at 15. Thus, Prosper has adequately pleaded this claim.
In arguing otherwise, Defendants contend that Prosper did not allege this claim in her com-
plaint. See ECF No. 34 at 2. That is incorrect. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 17, 27; see also ECF No. 1-1 at
11–12. They also argue that the January 2010 letter “does not include a single reference” to Pros-
per’s social-security- and pension-related issues and so cannot give rise to obligations related to
14 them. See ECF No. 35 at 3; see also ECF No. 29-1 at 13 n.7; ECF No. 30-1 at 12 & n.3. But
“these issues” in the January 2010 letter seems to be just such a reference, and in any event at this
stage the Court must grant Prosper the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be gleaned from
the text and context of that letter. See ECF No. 1-1 at 11–12. 11
5. Prosper Adequately Pleaded Her Allowance Claim
Prosper further alleges that Defendants breached the contract embodied in the January 2010
letter by failing to keep paying her the $250 monthly allowance post-termination despite not hav-
ing rectified her social-security- and pension-related issues. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 20. Prosper
has adequately pleaded this claim as well.
As the Court noted above, Prosper had to plausibly allege four elements to state this claim.
And at this stage, the Court finds that she has done so. First, the relevant exchange—Prosper’s
work from 2010 to 2017 for Defendants’ payment of the interim allowance—plausibly gave rise
to a valid contract. See Persall, 572 A.2d at 117–18; 3 Williston on Contracts § 7:39, nn.9–10 &
accompanying text. Second, by the January 2010 letter’s own terms, Defendants’ obligation was
to pay her the $250 allowance “until” they “rectified” her social-security- and pension-related is-
sues. ECF No. 1-1 at 12. Third, Defendants breached this obligation by stopping payment of this
allowance upon terminating Prosper, even though they had not “rectified” those issues at that time.
See ECF No. 1 ¶ 20. Fourth, Prosper has suffered damages in not receiving this monthly $250
11 This claim might fail if, as Prosper also alleges, Defendants had a non-contractual legal obliga- tion to provide these benefits. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27, 30, 44–45; id. at 15. If true, then Defendants’ promise to provide these benefits cannot give rise to an enforceable contract. See Eastbamc, 940 A.2d at 1003; Stafford v. George Washington Univ., No. 18-cv-2789 (CRC), 2019 WL 13160063, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2019); Braude & Margulies, P.C. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 468 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D.D.C. 2007). But Defendants do not argue this point. And Prosper is allowed to plead inconsistent claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3).
15 allowance since she was terminated. See id. at 15. Thus, Prosper has adequately pleaded her
Allowance Claim.
Defendants argue that this obligation is unenforceable because it is not “sufficiently defi-
nite” such that “the promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably cer-
tain.” See Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted); ECF
No. 29-1 at 13. The Court fails to see how, at least at this stage of the proceedings. Defendants
allegedly had to pay Prosper a precise amount of money every month until particular benefits-
related “issues” Prosper had brought to their attention were “rectified.” See ECF No. 1-1 at 12.
Defendants also argue that the January 2010 letter cannot be read to impose an obligation
that would survive Prosper’s termination. See ECF No. 29-1 at 13; ECF No. 30-1 at 15–16. To
be sure, in interpreting the January 2010 letter, the Court must determine “what a reasonable person
in the position of the parties would have thought” it meant in light of its own terms as well as “all
the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time the contract was made.” See 1010 Potomac
Assocs., 485 A.2d at 205. Of course, the Court does not have “all the circumstances” before it
now to decide conclusively whether the letter required Defendants to keep paying the allowance
post-termination. At this stage, however, it is at least plausible that it did. After all, Defendants’
promise to pay Prosper $250 a month allegedly lasted “until” the issues she raised were “recti-
fied”—the letter says nothing about this payment ending upon termination regardless of those is-
sues getting rectified. See ECF No. 1-1 at 12. And plausibly, it is reasonable to understand this
obligation as surviving termination, given that the allowance was a substitute for social-security-
and pension-related benefits—benefits that ordinarily get paid post-employment.
Finally, Defendants argue that interpreting the January 2010 letter in this way reads a per-
petual obligation into it. See ECF No. 29-1 at 13; ECF No. 30-1 at 15. Granted, “perpetual
16 contracts are disfavored.” 17B C.J.S. Contracts § 608, n.11, Westlaw (updated Aug. 2022). But
a contractual obligation is not impermissibly perpetual “where an objective event triggers termi-
nation.” See id. That is allegedly the case here—the $250 monthly allowance would end once
Prosper had been provided social-security- and pension-related benefits.
B. The Court Will Dismiss Prosper’s Wrongful-Discharge Claim
Prosper also alleges that she was “wrongfully terminated” by Defendants in that they laid
her off to avoid having to fulfill those social-security- and pension-related obligations to her. See,
e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 33, 42; id. at 15; ECF No. 32 at 9–10. The Court construes this as a state-law
claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The Court will dismiss it because it is
barred by the statute of limitations.
Because District of Columbia choice-of-law rules applicable to Prosper’s state-law claims
require a “choice of law analysis for each distinct issue being adjudicated,” the Court again must
determine the substantive law governing this claim under District of Columbia choice-of-law rules.
See Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 877 F. Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1995). The Court must “apply the
tort law of the jurisdiction that has the ‘most significant relationship’ to the dispute,” which turns
on (1) where the injury occurred; (2) where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (3) the dom-
icile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (4) the
place where the relationship is centered. Wu v. Stomber, 750 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(quoting Washkoviak v. Student Loan Marketing Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168, 180 (D.C. 2006)). Here, all
but the third factor unequivocally favor the District of Columbia, and the third factor itself points
in different directions. Thus, the Court applies District of Columbia law to this claim. See id.
The District of Columbia recognizes the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy. See, e.g., Davis v. Cmty. Alternatives of Wash., D.C., Inc., 74 A.3d 707, 709 (D.C. 2013).
17 A three-year statute of limitations governs it. See Stephenson v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 789 A.2d 1248,
1249 (D.C. 2002) (citing D.C. Code § 12-301(8)). Unlike for breach-of-contract claims, this tort
claim accrues “the moment” the plaintiff has unequivocal notice—whether actual or construc-
tive—of the wrongful termination, even if the termination happens later. See id. at 1251–52 (citing
Diamond, 680 A.2d at 372).
According to her own allegations, Prosper had unequivocal notice that she was being laid
off for an allegedly wrongful reason in July 2017 when she received the separation notice. See
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25–27; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 16–17. Thus, her claim accrued at that time. That
her “last day of work was to be [about forty-five] days after notice of termination” does not alter
this conclusion. Stephenson, 789 A.2d at 1252. Because Prosper waited until August 2020 to
bring this claim, it is time-barred. 12
12 Although Prosper does not explicitly raise any tolling argument, some of her assertions about settlement negotiations with Defendants could be construed as arguing for equitable tolling. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34, 41, 43; ECF No. 1-1 at 22; ECF No. 32 at 2–3, 8, 10–11; see also Mizell v SunTrust Bank, 26 F. Supp. 3d 80, 87 (D.D.C. 2014). “District of Columbia courts recognize a restricted equitable tolling doctrine, which allows a plaintiff to initiate an action beyond the statute of limitations” if, as relevant here, the defendant affirmatively acted in a way that “lulled” the plaintiff into delaying filing suit until after the deadline passed. See Kiwanuka v. Bakilana, 844 F. Supp. 2d 107, 119 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up); see also East v. Graphic Arts Indus. Joint Pension Tr., 718 A.2d 153, 156–57 (D.C. 1998). This “lulling doctrine” is applied “narrowly.” See East, 718 A.2d at 157; Chase v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 669 A.2d 1264, 1269 (D.C. 1995). In essence, for the doctrine to apply in circumstances like those Prosper alleges here, the defendant must admit liability on the claim and agree to settle or otherwise resolve it, causing the plaintiff to reasonably believe that the claim will be resolved without the need for litigation until after the statute of limitations has run. See Bailey v. Greenberg, 516 A.2d 934, 937 n.4, 937–40 (D.C. 1986); Bakeir v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 926 F. Supp. 2d 320, 336 (D.D.C. 2013). Nor does the doctrine apply if “ample time to file suit within the statutory period exists after the circum- stances inducing the delay have ceased.” Property 10-F, Inc. v. Pack & Process, Inc., 265 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C. 1970). Here, what Prosper has asserted suggests, at most, that “negotiations look- ing toward an amicable settlement” happened at several points before she sued, which is “not enough” to trigger the doctrine. See Howard University v. Cassell, 126 F.2d 6, 10–12 (D.C. Cir. 1941); see also Glennan v. Lincoln Inv. Corp., 110 F.2d 130, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (per curiam). In any event, as her lawsuit in Antigua and Barbuda shows, Prosper had “ample time and oppor- tunity to bring [t]his suit before the bar of the statute fell” despite those settlement negotiations, so
18 C. The Court Will Dismiss Prosper’s IIED Claim
Prosper also asserts a state-law IIED claim based on her “wrongful termination,” its effects
on her, and Defendants’ subsequent decision to litigate rather than settle. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28–
29; ECF No. 32 at 10–11; ECF No 33 at 4. Prosper has failed to state such a claim.
To state an IIED claim under District of Columbia law, Prosper had to allege sufficient
facts to make it plausible that Defendants engaged in (1) “extreme and outrageous conduct” that
(2) “intentionally or recklessly” (3) caused her to suffer “severe emotional distress.” See Hinton
v. Rudasill, 624 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Kotsch v. District of Columbia, 924
A.2d 1040, 1045 (D.C. 2007)). 13 As for the first element, “the conduct alleged must be ‘so extreme
in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’” Id. (quoting Kotsch, 924 A.2d at 1045–46). As that
suggests, “the bar for pleading this tort . . . has been set very high.” Hollis v. Rosa Mexicano DC,
LLC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26 (D.D.C. 2008). Thus, for example, even allegations of blatant racial
discrimination and of physical violence in the workplace have fallen short of stating an IIED claim.
See, e.g., id. at 26–27 (collecting authorities).
Prosper’s allegations fall short of plausibly alleging that Defendants’ actions were “ex-
treme and outrageous.” Defendants’ decisions to lay Prosper off without providing social-security-
it is “out of the question to say that anything [Defendants] did lulled [Prosper] into inaction until after the limitation period.” See Howard University, 126 F.2d at 12; Brown v. Lamb, 414 F.2d 1210, 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam). 13 The applicable choice-of-law factors for this state-law tort claim yield more mixed results here compared to Prosper’s wrongful-discharge claim because some of the relevant actions took place after Prosper was no longer employed in the District of Columbia. See Wu, 750 F.3d at 949. Even so, where, as here, it is “uncertain” which law the “balance of factors” favors, the Court applies District of Columbia law. See id.
19 and pension-related benefits for her, and to refuse to settle her claims, are the sort of “insults” and
“indignities” that are not actionable in an IIED claim under District of Columbia law. See Hollis,
582 F. Supp. 2d at 26–27 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hancock v. Washington
Hosp. Ctr., 908 F. Supp. 2d 18, 27–29 (D.D.C. 2012).
D. The Court Will Dismiss All of Prosper’s Entitlement Claims Except Her Sev- erance-Pay Claim
Finally, Prosper alleges that, by failing to provide social-security- and pension-related ben-
efits for her as well as by failing to pay her severance, Defendants violated their ostensible obliga-
tions under “the laws governing” them. See ECF No. 1 at 15; see also id. ¶¶ 9, 15, 18, 27, 30, 44;
ECF No. 32 at 3–7. And although in discussing these claims she references U.S. federal law in a
few places, she later clarifies that the “laws” she means are “the laws of [Defendants’] respective
countries.” Compare ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 9, 30, with ECF No. 32 at 6–7. For the following reasons, the
Court will dismiss Prosper’s social-security- and pension-related Entitlement Claims but allow her
severance-pay Entitlement Claim to proceed for now.
1. At This Stage, the Court Concludes That “the Laws of the Respective Countries” Can Apply in This Case
Generally, under the FSIA, a plaintiff “may sue . . . under any cause of action arising from
common law, foreign law, or federal statute.” See Dodge v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 03-cv-
252 (TPJ), 2004 WL 5353873, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2004); accord Dammarell v. Islamic Re-
public of Iran, No. 01-cv-2224 (JDB), 2005 WL 756090, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005). Thus, that
Prosper asserts these claims under the laws of each Defendant’s country need not necessarily cause
them to fail.
Defendants contend otherwise, viewing this as a choice-of-law issue governed by District
of Columbia choice-of-law principles and arguing that District of Columbia law applies under
20 those principles. See ECF No. 29-1 at 10 n.5; ECF No. 30-1 at 12–15; ECF No. 34 at 2. But, at
least for now, the Court finds their premise flawed. Without question, a “federal court assessing
state-law claims under the FSIA must apply the choice-of-law rules of the forum.” Roberts v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 581 F. Supp. 3d 152, 173 (D.D.C. 2022) (emphasis added) (citing
Oveissi, 573 F.3d at 841); see also Virtual Def. & Dev. Int’l, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 15. But these are
not state-law claims—they are foreign-law claims. Thus, District of Columbia choice-of-law prin-
ciples are inapt. Indeed, this does not appear to be a choice-of-law issue at all but simply a question
of whether the asserted foreign law is actionable in this Court. Cf. Indus. Piping, Inc. v. Wei Xia,
No. 4:15-cv-00450-EJL-CWD, 2018 WL 10517190, at *6 (D. Idaho May 30, 2018) (recognizing
that where causes of action arise under another state’s statutes, “the issue is not choice of law” but
“whether there is a reason not to permit Plaintiff to enforce these foreign statutory causes of action”
in the state (cleaned up)). And again, generally, such law is actionable in an FSIA case such as
this one. See Dodge, 2004 WL 5353873, at *4. Thus, with no other reason at this point to decide
otherwise, the Court finds that the foreign laws on which Prosper relies for these claims can apply
here.
2. The Court Will Dismiss Prosper’s Social-Security- and Pension-Re- lated Entitlement Claims
That said, Prosper has not adequately identified the foreign-law basis for her social-secu-
rity- and pension-related Entitlement Claims. So the Court will dismiss these claims.
Typically, the party “seeking the application of foreign law has the burden of proving the
relevant legal principles thereof.” Heng Ren Invs. LP v. Sinovac Biotech Ltd., 542 F. Supp. 3d 59,
67 (D. Mass. 2021) (collecting authorities); see also 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
9A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2447, n.1 & accompanying text, Westlaw (3d ed. updated Apr. 2022)
(collecting authorities). This burden includes showing that she “has a good cause of action” under
21 the foreign law invoked. See Adams v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 8 F.3d 25 (Table), 1993 WL 384568,
at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 28, 1993) (per curiam) (citing Esso Standard Oil S.A. v. S.S. Gasbras Sul, 387
F.2d 573, 581 (2d Cir. 1967)). If the party relying on foreign law fails to carry this burden, courts
tend to take one of two approaches. See 3 Litig. of Int’l Disputes in U.S. Cts. § 18:14, nn. 2–3 &
accompanying text, n.5 & accompanying text, Westlaw (updated Aug. 2022). Some courts apply
analogous domestic law instead of the foreign law. See Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 606 F. Supp.
38, 42–43 (D.D.C. 1984); Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite (Pty) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 440–41 (3d Cir. 1999);
In re Parmalat Secs. Litig., 377 F. Supp. 2d 390, 421 & n.211 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Other courts
simply dismiss a claim arising under the “unproven” foreign law. See Ancile Inv. Co. v. Archer
Daniels Midland Co., No. 08 CV 9492 (KMW), 2012 WL 6098729, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,
2012); Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1958) (discussing Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222
U.S. 473 (1912)).
Despite having several opportunities now to show that she has a viable foreign-law basis
for her social-security- and pension-related claims—in her complaint as well as in two rounds of
motion-to-dismiss proceedings—Prosper has not done so. The only foreign law that she has called
the Court’s attention to that seemingly has any relevance for these claims is “Section 5(b) of the
Pension Act Cap. 310.” See ECF No. 1 ¶ 15. 14 This provision of Antiguan and Barbudan law
specifies certain “[c]ircumstances in which pension may be granted” to government employees,
14 Prosper has identified provisions in two international agreements that purportedly support these claims; specifically, Article 33(1)–(2) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Articles 4.1 and 23 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre, and Article 12 of the Protocol of the Eastern Car- ibbean Economic Union of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre. See ECF No. 19 at 2; ECF No. 21 at 2–4; ECF No. 32 at 1, 3, 5–7; ECF No. 37 at 1–3. But even assuming these have any bearing here, they appear relevant only as pass-throughs to the laws of Defendants’ countries. See Vienna Con- vention on Diplomatic Rels. Art. 33(2)(b); see also ECF No. 32 at 6–7; ECF No. 37 at 1–4. Thus, in themselves, they do not provide Prosper with a viable foreign-law basis for these claims.
22 one of which seemingly applies to Prosper’s situation. See Laws of Ant. & Barb., ch. 310, § 5(b)
& Interpretation Note (emphasis added); see also ECF No. 30-1 at 13 n.4. But the Court fails to
see how this provision gives Prosper a right to a pension, let alone one that she can sue to enforce.
This is all the more so because the immediately preceding section of this law says that “[n]o em-
ployee shall have the absolute right . . . to pension.” See Laws of Ant. & Barb., ch. 310, § 4(1).
Thus, Prosper has not carried her burden of proffering the relevant foreign-law principles to show
that her social-security- and pension-related claims are viable.
Thus, consistent with the above, the Court has two options: apply analogous domestic law
or dismiss these claims. But either approach yields the same result here. Even if the Court applied
analogous domestic law, Prosper’s claims would fail because she lacks a private right of action
under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act and related statutes that govern these sorts of enti-
tlements in the United States. See Donnelly v. Sebelius, 851 F. Supp. 2d 109, 121 n.5 (D.D.C.
2012); Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 65–66 (3d Cir. 2008); McDonald v. S.
Farm Bureau Life Ins., 291 F.3d 718, 721–26 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court will dismiss Pros-
per’s social-security- and pension-related Entitlement Claims.
3. The Court Will Not Dismiss Prosper’s Severance-Pay Entitlement Claim
At this stage, however, Prosper has shown a foreign-law basis for her severance-pay Enti-
tlement Claim. Thus, the Court will not dismiss it for now.
Prosper has identified four separate statutes ostensibly furnishing a basis for this claim—
the Antigua and Barbuda Labour Code; the Dominica Protection of Employment Act; the Saint
Lucia Labour Code; and the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Protection of Employment Act. See
ECF No. 19 at 3; ECF No. 32 at 6. At least one seems to do the trick. Under the Antiguan and
Barbudan statute, employees like Prosper are “entitled” to a specified amount in severance pay
23 from their employer if terminated for redundancy. Ant. & Barb. Labour Code, ch. 27, §§ C3, C40,
C41. Further, the employer “shall” pay this severance at termination. Id. § C42. And an employee
has a private right of action to sue for severance pay owed. See id. § C55(1). Altogether, then,
Prosper’s severance-pay Entitlement Claim appears well-founded on this statute.
Defendants’ sole argument against this claim is simply that foreign law does not govern
it—an argument that the Court rejected above, at least for the time being. But, the Court observes,
there may be other reasons why this statute is not a viable basis for Prosper’s severance-pay Enti-
tlement Claim. And even if it is, there may be reasons why this statute provides only a limited
basis for this claim—for instance, it may allow Prosper to sue only the embassy of Antigua and
Barbuda rather than the other Defendants. But these issues have not yet been briefed. Thus, for
now, the Court will allow this claim to proceed.
IV. Conclusion and Order
For all these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Defendant the Attorney General of Saint Lucia’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint, ECF No. 29, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
2. Defendants the Embassies of the Governments of Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent
and the Grenadines, and Dominica’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 30, is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART;
3. The parties shall file a joint status report by September 28, 2022, addressing how
they would like to proceed with the remaining claims in this case.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly TIMOTHY J. KELLY United States District Judge
Date: September 12, 2022