Prophit v. Commissioner
This text of 57 T.C. 507 (Prophit v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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OPINION
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency of $283 in the petitioner’s Federal income tax for the taxable year 1968. The petition was properly filed pursuant to section 74631 and Rule 36 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice, but on the parties’ joint motion leave was granted to withdraw the case from consideration as a small tax case and to resubmit it as a fully stipulated case under Rule 30.
As petitioner does not challenge the Commissioner’s disallowance of claimed deductions for certain employee business expenses incurred as a salesman for LaSalle Extension University of Chicago, less than the entire amount of the deficiency is in controversy. The sole issue for our determination is whether petitioner is entitled to dependency exemptions for his two minor children.
All of facts are stipulated and are so found.
David A. Prophit is a single individual who resided in Baton Rouge, La., when the petition was filed. He filed an individual Federal income tax return for the calendar year 1968 with the district director of internal revenue, New Orleans, La.
In September 1963 petitioner married Ursula Dahn in West Germany and resided in that country with her until their separation in April 1967. Thereupon petitioner returned to the United States. Two children, Thomas and Susanna, were born of the marriage. In June 1968 petitioner’s wife obtained from a West German court a decree of divorce which provided for payments by petitioner for child support in the amounts of $40 per child per month commencing July 1, 1968. Ursula had custody of the children throughout 1968, and neither the children nor their mother have ever been in the United States.
In 1968 each contributor of support gave an equal amount for the support of each child. The total expended for the support of each child that year was $813.50:
Source Amount
West German Social Office-$108. 50
Ursula Dalm PropMt- 0
Petitioner’s relatives_¡- 100.00
Parents of Ursula Dalm Propliit_¡- 60.00
Miscellaneous _ 12.50
281.00
Petitioner_ 532.50
813. 50
Petitioner jclaimed Thomas and Susanna as dependents in his Federal income tax return for the year 1968. The children were not claimed as dependents on any individual United States Federal income tax return for 1968 other than that filed by petitioner. The German decree of divorce had no provision concerning entitlement to a deduction under sections 151 and 152(e) (2) (A) (i).
On its facts, and under section 152(a) (1) before its amendment in 1967 which added section 152(e) ,2 this would be a simple case involving dependency exemptions. Here it is stipulated by the parties directly involved in this litigation that petitioner furnished more than half the support of his minor children whom he claimed as dependents. Clearly, under section 152(a) (1) 'before 1967 this would call for allowance of the claimed exemption, i.e., petitioner had furnished more than half of the support of his children.
This leaves for consideration the effect of the amendment added by section 152(e) entitled “Support Test in Case of Child of Divorced Parents Et Cetera.” This added section provides that children of divorced parents in the custody of the parent (in this case the wife) other than the petitioner shall be treated as dependents of the custodial parent.
This section, if applicable, apparently would deny the husband the deductions because he neither provided at least $600 for the support of either of his children nor $1,200 or more for both. Neither did the decree of divorce provide that he should be entitled to any deduction. But we are concerned with whether the agreed-on facts here necessarily call section 152(e) into play at all.
Petitioner in his pro se brief asks us to consider “the intent of the law, and not the ‘letter’ of it to use the words of the apostle Paul.” In sum, he argues that under the law prior to January 1,1967, he would have been entitled to the exemptions in these circumstances and that Congress did not mean a different result where it is agreed that petitioner provided more than one-half the actual support of his children. We agree.
From the legislative history set forth in footnote 3 below and our note thereto the provisions of section 152(e) were not too long ago incorporated in the Eevenne Code to ameliorate troublesome controversies between competing taxpayers, each claiming the same dependents as exemptions. In such circumstances there is a serious question as to which claimant actually furnished more than half the support and the new section of the Code attempted to establish pragmatic rules by which such disputes could be decided.
Certainly here there is no such controversy. Petitioner alone is claiming the exemptions. His divorced wife who had custody of the children made no such claim. The Commissioner has agreed that petitioner furnished more than half the support. In these particular circumstances we think the reasons for the enactment of section 152 (e) are not present. Accordingly it is not necessary to call on its provisions to decide the case.
In so concluding we have perhaps given heed to petitioner’s request that we consider his case in the words of the Apostle Paul referred to above. We assume he refers to 2 Corinthians iii: 6: “Not of the letter, but of the spirit; for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”
Reviewed by the Court.
Decision will l>e entered under Bule 50.
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57 T.C. 507, 1972 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prophit-v-commissioner-tax-1972.