Pronto Market No. 1, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board

61 Cal. App. 3d 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. 236, 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1833
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 26, 1976
DocketCiv. 48746
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 61 Cal. App. 3d 545 (Pronto Market No. 1, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pronto Market No. 1, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 61 Cal. App. 3d 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. 236, 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinion

Opinion

FORD, P. J.

Pronto Market No. 1, Inc., seeks review of a decision of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (hereinafter designated as Board) denying petitioner’s application for a type 9 beer and wine importer’s license.

The issue presented in this matter is whether the tied-house restrictions contained in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (Bus. & *547 Prof. Code, § 25500 et seq.) 1 prohibit issuance of a type 9 beer and wine importer’s license (§ 23320, subd. (9)) to petitioner because petitioner already holds a winegrower’s license (§ 23320, subd. (2)) and an off-sale general license (§ 23320, subd. (21)).

Section 25502, upon which the Board primarily relied in denying petitioner’s application, provides in pertinent part as follows: “No manufacturer, winegrower, . . . importer, or wholesaler, or any officer, director, or agent of any such person, shall, except as authorized by this division: (a) Hold the ownership, directly or indirectly, of any interest in an off-sale general license....”

The purposes for and historical development of the tied-house restrictions were discussed by our Supreme Court in the case of California Beer Wholesalers Assn., Inc. v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd., 5 Cal.3d 402 [96 Cal.Rptr. 297, 487 P.2d 745], wherein the court stated (pp. 407-408): “Following repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, the vast majority of states, including California, enacted alcoholic beverage control laws. These statutes sought to forestall the generation of such evils and excesses as intemperance and disorderly marketing conditions that had plagued the public and the alcoholic beverage industry prior to prohibition. [Citations.] By enacting prohibitions against ‘tied-house’ arrangements, state legislatures aimed to prevent two particular dangers: the ability and potentiality of large firms to dominate local markets through vertical and horizontal integration [citation] and the excessive sales of alcoholic beverages produced by the overly aggressive marketing techniques of larger alcoholic beverage concerns [citations].7 [Fn. 7 is as follows: “ ‘Underlying the tied-house prohibition is the assumption that the retail market for alcoholic beverages is elastic and that price cutting, aggressive marketing techniques, and similar practices tend to increase consumption and threaten the legislative goal of temperance.’ [Citations.]”] [H] The principal method utilized by state legislatures to avoid these anti-social developments was the establishment of a triple-tiered distribution and licensing scheme. [Citations.] Manufacturing interests were to be separated from wholesale interests; wholesale interests were to be segregated from retail interests. In short, business endeavors engaged in the production, handling, and final sale of alcoholic beverages were to be kept ‘distinct and apart.’ (25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 288, 289 (1955).) [H] In the era when most tied-house statutes were *548 enacted, state legislatures confronted an inability on the part of small retailers to cope with pressures exerted by larger manufacturing or wholesale interests.8 [Citations.] [Fn. 8 is as follows: “The purpose of tied-house prohibitions was ‘to prevent the integration of retail and wholesale outlets and to remove retail dealer [j/c] in intoxicating liquors from financial or business obligations to the wholesaler, with the exception of ordinary commercial credit for liquors sold.’ (Pickerill v. Schott (Fla. 1951) 55 So.2d 716, 718 (quoting from 48 C.J.S., § 197, at p. 329).) ‘[T]he prohibition ... exists primarily to remove the influence by the manufacturer over the wholesaler and the wholesaler over the . retailer, a practice which might result in preference for the manufacturer’s or wholesaler’s product. . . .’ 32 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 75, 76 (1958).”]”

In California Beer Wholesalers Assn., Inc., supra, our Supreme Court further stated (5 Cal.3d at p. 408): “Consequently, most of the statutes enacted during this period (1930-1940) manifested a legislative policy of controlling large wholesalers; the statutes were drafted in sufficiently broad terms, moreover, to insure the accomplishment of the primary objective of the establishment of a triple-tiered system. All levels of the alcoholic beverage industry were to remain segregated; firms operating at one level of distribution were to remain free from involvement in, or influence over, any other level. Thus, although the most significant development in the industry since the 1950’s has been the growth of large retail chains, the alcoholic beverage statutes enacted in the 1950’s are sufficiently broad to control industiy-wide domination by large retail chains as well. [Fn. omitted.] [If] In addition, most statutes placed more stringent requirements on interests dealing in distilled spirits than on those dealing exclusively in beer and wine. Legislatures were especially concerned with the prevention of intemperance in the consumption of distilled spirits, since distilled spirits, of course, contain a significantly higher alcoholic content than beer and wine. Further, since distilled spirits may not deteriorate as rapidly as some beer and wine, legislatures were particularly fearful of the possibility that wholesalers of distilled spirits would foist even greater inventories upon local retailers. (Cf. Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Reimel (1968) 69 Cal.2d 172, 186, fn. 1 [70 Cal.Rptr. 407, 444 P.2d 79] (dissenting opn. of Burke, J.).)”

Despite the manifest purpose of the tied-house restrictions to prohibit integration of retail and wholesale outlets, an exception to that policy *549 was allowed by the Legislature in favor of California winegrowers and brandy manufacturers when it enacted section 23362, which provides as follows: “Notwithstanding any other provisions of this division [division 9], a licensed winegrower or brandy manufacturer may be issued and may hold an offsale general license. ...” An off-sale general license allows the holder to sell beer, wine and distilled spirits “to consumers only and not for resale” for consumption off the premises where sold, (§§ 23393, 23394.)

The concept that a winegrower may also have an off-sale general license may evoke a picture of a simple stand beside the vineyard where the winegrower sells his bottled product to consumers. Analysis of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, however, makes it clear that a winegrower with an off-sale general license may purchase any amount of wine or brandy from any winegrower, brandy manufacturer or importer and sell it along with his own wine to consumers without the necessity of dealing with a wholesaler. Under section 23356 a winegrower may produce wine, export wine whether it is produced by him or any other person, and sell only such alcoholic beverages as are packaged by or for him and only to wholesalers, manufacturers, other winegrowers, et cetera.

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61 Cal. App. 3d 545, 132 Cal. Rptr. 236, 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1833, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pronto-market-no-1-inc-v-alcoholic-beverage-control-appeals-board-calctapp-1976.