Promedev LLC v. Wilson

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided August 20, 2024·No. 2:22-cv-01063·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

PROMEDEV, LLC, CASE NO. C22-1063JLR Plaintiff, ORDER v. ROBY WILSON, et al., Defendants.

Before the court is Plaintiff Promedev, LLC’s (“Promedev”) amended motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Mot. (Dkt. # 141).) Defendant MaXXiMedia Advertising Co. (“MaXXiMedia”) opposes the motion. (Resp. (Dkt. # 144).) The court has considered the parties’ submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the applicable law. //

//

// Being fully advised,1 the court GRANTS in part Promedev’s amended request for attorneys’ fees and costs.

The court assumes the reader is familiar with its April 1, 2024 summary judgment order (4/1/24 Order (Dkt. # 93)), April 11, 2024 Order issuing Rule 11 sanctions against Defendants’ attorneys (4/11/24 Order (Dkt. # 110)), and June 18, 2024 order granting in part and denying in part Promedev’s initial motion for attorneys’ fees and costs (6/18/24 Order (Dkt. # 139)). In the June 18 order, the court “determined that Promedev is

entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs reasonably incurred in connection with defending against [MaXXiMedia’s] copyright infringement counterclaim” (the “Copyright Claim”). (6/18/24 Order at 13.) Although the court approved Promedev’s hourly rates, which ranged from $180 to $850 per hour, the court declined to issue an award because Promedev had not segregated the fees and costs incurred in connection with the

Copyright Claim from those incurred in relation to other claims. (Id. at 14-15.) The court ordered Promedev to file an amended motion that included only the fees and costs it reasonably incurred in defending against the Copyright Claim. (Id. at 16.) Promedev now purports to have “segregated its time spent on the Copyright Claim, resulting in an amended request for $658,940.20 in fees and $7,580.78 in costs.”

(Mot. at 1.) Promedev states that it has (1) “removed additional time from its time entries //

1 Neither party requests oral argument (see Mot. at 1; Resp. at 1), and the court concludes that oral argument would not aid in its disposition of Promedev’s motion, see Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4). for activities relating to the non-copyright claims”; (2) “reviewed all of the transcripts from the depositions taken in this case and identified the pages of those transcripts that

relate to the Copyright Claim (i.e., questions that would have been asked even if the Copyright Claim was the sole claim in this case)”; and (3) “used the average total percentage (51.44%) of pages relating to the Copyright [C]laim for all depositions as a general metric, and applied that percentage to all remaining non-excluded time entries, using that percentage as an estimate for the amount of time Promedev would have incurred defending the Copyright [C]laim alone.” (Id. at 1-2.) Promedev argues that this

is a “conservative estimate of the time spent defending the Copyright Claim because many of these remaining tasks relate exclusively to the Copyright Claim.” (See id. at 2.) As a result, because Promedev did not expressly identify the time entries related to the Copyright Claim, it has applied 48.56 percent discount to all of its remaining time entries, including those relating exclusively to the Copyright Claim. In response, MaXXiMedia

asks the court to reduce the fee amount Promedev seeks in its amended motion. A. Legal Standard To determine whether counsel’s requested fees are reasonable, the court applies the “lodestar” method. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir.

2008). The court calculates the lodestar by multiplying “the number of hours . . . reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 n.4 (9th Cir. 2001)). Although the resulting figure is presumptively reasonable, the court may adjust the lodestar figure up or down based on additional factors that were not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation. Id. at 982. These factors, known as the “Kerr factors,” are:

(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar cases.

Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the court need not consider the Kerr factors unless necessary to support the reasonableness of the award). Because the court has already approved Promedev’s requested billing rates (see 6/18/24 Order at 14-15), it must now determine the number of hours Promedev reasonably expended on MaXXiMedia’s Copyright Claim. “The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended in the litigation and must submit evidence in support of those hours worked.” United States v. $28,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 802 F.3d 1100, 1107 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)). A fee applicant who prevailed on some, but not all, claims “bears the burden of segregating her attorneys’ fees between the successful claim and the unrelated, unsuccessful claims.” Melland v. Cornerstone Dental, PC, 691 F. App’x 354, 354 (9th Cir. 2017). The hours claimed may be reduced by the court if the “documentation of the hours is inadequate”; “the case was overstaffed and hours are duplicated”; or “the hours expended are deemed excessive or otherwise unnecessary.” Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Klein v. Kim, No. C20-1628BJR, 2023 WL 2017978, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 15, 2023) (“Plaintiffs are not entitled to a

generous assumption with respect to ambiguities that their lack of diligence created.”). Where “an ‘hour-by-hour analysis’ is impractical,” “the court may make ‘across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure’ to exclude non-compensable hours in the application.” Black Lives Matter Seattle-King Cnty. v. City of Seattle, 516 F. Supp. 3d 1202, 1214 (W.D. Wash. 2021 (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2013)); see also Gates, 987 F.2d at 1399

(noting that the court has the “authority to make across-the-board percentage cuts either in the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure ‘as a practical means of trimming the fat from a fee application.’” (quoting N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Child. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983))). B. Reasonable Hours Expended

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