In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-23-00344-CV ________________
PROLINE ENERGY RESOURCES, INC., Appellant
V.
GORDY OIL COMPANY, Appellee ________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 75th District Court Liberty County, Texas Trial Cause No. 23DC-CV-00668 ________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Gordy Oil Company (“Gordy”) sued Proline Energy Resources, Inc.
(“Proline”) for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment claiming
Proline owed it money under an oil and gas contract. The trial court granted Gordy’s
Motion for Default Judgment and awarded Gordy more than a million dollars in
economic damages, attorney’s fees, contingent appellate attorney’s fees, court costs,
and pre- and post-judgment interest. Proline filed a Motion for New Trial, which the
trial court determined was untimely, and thus, it lacked plenary power to consider
1 the Motion. In a single issue, Proline asks whether the trial court erred in denying
without considering its Motion for New Trial because it no longer had plenary power,
so it lacked jurisdiction. We hold Proline’s Motion for New Trial was timely under
Rule 21(f)(5) where it transmitted the Motion to its electronic filing service provider
before midnight on the due date, thus the trial court erred when it refused to consider
Proline’s Motion for New Trial based on a lack of plenary power. See Tex. R. Civ.
P. 21(f)(5). Therefore, we will reverse and remand for the reasons discussed below.
BACKGROUND
Original Petition and Default Judgment
On May 2, 2023, Gordy filed its Original Petition naming Proline as a
defendant. Gordy asserted causes of action for breach of contract, quantum meruit,
and unjust enrichment claiming Proline owed money under an oil and gas operating
agreement. On July 3, 2023, Gordy served Proline through its registered agent via
certified mail, which made Proline’s answer due on July 24, 2023. See generally id.
99(b) (noting general deadline to answer in civil suits is the first Monday after the
expiration of twenty days). On July 7, 2023, Gordy filed the citation and proof of
service.
When Proline failed to timely file an answer, on August 8, 2023, Gordy filed
its Motion for Default Judgment supported by evidence. On August 9, 2023, the trial
court signed the Order Granting Default Judgment. The Default Judgment awarded
2 Gordy the following damages: $1,379,281.69 in economic damages; $15,476.50 in
attorney’s fees; $861.40 in court costs; prejudgment interest; $30,000 in conditional
attorney’s fees if appealed to the court of appeals; $30,000 conditional attorney’s
fees if appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas; and post-judgment interest.
Motions for New Trial and Hearing
Proline’s Motion for New Trial and [to] Set Aside Default Judgment was file-
stamped September 11, 2023. Proline supported its Motion for New Trial with
evidence and counsel’s declaration. In the Motion for New Trial, Proline argued that
it met its burden under Craddock as to all three elements, so the default judgment
should be set aside. Proline also argued that Peri Petroleum, LLC is the lessee under
the applicable agreement rather than Proline Energy Resources, Inc.
In addition, although the Motion for New Trial was file-stamped after the
filing deadline, in subsequent filings, the record shows that Proline argued the
Motion for New Trial was timely. In its Amended Motion for New Trial, Proline
explained to the trial court that it originally sent its Motion for New Trial to the
electronic service provider on the deadline of Friday, September 8, 2023. Proline
noted the documentation showed it “did, in fact, timely submit for e-filing and e-
service its motion for new trial within the time allowed.” Proline stated that this “e-
file submission was returned as failed due to ‘error.’” Proline described its additional
attempts to re-file the Motion for New Trial, and “the e-filing was successfully
3 submitted in the early hours of the following morning.” Thereafter, on Monday,
September 11, Proline’s counsel received an email notification that the Clerk’s
Office rejected the filing “for the sole reason that ‘exhibits must be [e-filed as] part
of the lead document.’” Per the District Clerk’s instructions, Proline “re-filed its
motion for new trial in the exact same form and with the same exhibits” except that
the “exhibits were e-filed as part of the lead document,” and the filing was accepted.
Proline asserted that its Motion for New trial was timely, and the trial court retained
jurisdiction.
On October 19, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on Proline’s Motion
for New Trial, where it addressed the filing timeline. The trial court noted it entered
the Default Judgment on August 9, 2023, and the Motion for New trial was due thirty
days from that, which was September 8, 2023. The trial court stated that Proline did
not file the Motion for New Trial until September 11, 2023, and did not file the
Amended Motion for New Trial until September 15, 2023. The trial court reasoned
it could not consider the Amended Motion for New Trial, because the original
Motion for New Trial was untimely. The trial court said it did not have authority to
extend the motion for new trial deadline, because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5
prohibits it. The trial court explained that the amended motion was a nullity, because
Proline filed the original motion for new trial late. The trial court determined that it
could not consider the Motion for New Trial or Craddock factors, and it was not
4 technically “denied” since it did not have plenary power to do so. See Craddock v.
Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. Com. App. 1939); see also
Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. 2009).
Proline’s Motion for Reconsideration
On October 26, 2023, after the hearing but before the trial court signed an
Order on the Motion for New Trial, Proline filed its “Motion for Reconsideration of
and Motion to Deem Timely Defendant Proline Energy Resources, Inc.’s Motion for
New Trial.” Proline supported its Motion for Reconsideration with exhibits,
including, among other things: the e-filing envelopes for its original Motion for New
Trial; communications from Proline to the trial court’s manager detailing the e-filing
steps with the e-filing support documentation; and the transcript from the hearing on
the Motion for New Trial.
In its Motion for Reconsideration, Proline outlined its e-filing attempts and
explained that it transmitted its Motion for New Trial to the electronic filing service
provider (“EFSP”) at 11:55 p.m., which was before midnight in the trial court’s time
zone on Friday, September 8, 2023. Proline explained that at 11:58 p.m. on
September 8, 2023, its attorney received an email from the EFSP notifying it of a
“submission failure” with the filing under Envelope No. 79378166. Proline attached
the e-filing documents supporting these contentions as exhibits to the Motion for
Reconsideration and showed that Proline indeed sent the Motion for New Trial to
5 the EFSP at 11:55 p.m. on September 8, 2023, and it was returned three minutes
later. The Motion for Reconsideration and exhibits also showed that Proline
attempted to re-submit the Motion for New Trial to the EFSP two more times shortly
after midnight and in the early morning hours of September 9, 2023. The Motion for
New Trial was successfully submitted to the clerk’s office at 1:11 a.m. under Filing
Envelope No. 79378236. On Monday, September 11, 2023, at 8:12 a.m., Proline
received an email from the District Clerk’s Office through the EFSP notifying it the
filing was again returned and stating, “Exhibits must be part of the lead document.”
Finally, after re-submitting the Motion for New Trial again on September 11, 2023,
at 10:17 a.m., Proline received an email notification under Envelope No. 79394393
showing the Motion for New Trial was successfully filed.
Proline contended that it timely filed the Motion for New trial under Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(5) since it transmitted the motion timely to the EFSP.
Alternatively, Proline argued that the trial court should deem it timely filed under
Rule 21(f)(6), which allows for an extension if a document is untimely because of a
technical failure or system outage. Proline asserted in the Motion for
Reconsideration that since the Motion for New Trial was timely, the trial court
retained plenary power to hear and grant its Motion for New Trial. Proline contended
that given the timely-filed Motion for New Trial, under Rule 329(b), if the trial court
does not rule, the motion is deemed overruled by operation of law seventy-five days
6 after the judgment was signed, which would have been October 23, 2023. Proline
also noted that under Rule 329(e), the trial court retained plenary power for another
thirty days after the motion was overruled by operation of law, which meant it
retained plenary power until November 22, 2023. Proline asserted that based on this,
the trial court retained plenary power to consider the contents of the Amended
Motion for New Trial.
Trial Court’s Order on Motion for New Trial
On October 30, 2023, the trial court signed an Order Denying Defendant’s
Motion for New Trial, which stated, “The Court no longer possesses jurisdiction to
rule on any relief as the Court’s plenary power has lapsed. Accordingly, the Court is
unable to rule on Defendant’s requested relief[,] and Defendant’s Motion for New
Trial is DENIED for such reason.” Proline timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parties cite the standard of review as an abuse of discretion for a trial
court’s denial of a motion for new trial. We agree that if the issue were simply the
denial of a motion for new trial, we would review for an abuse of discretion. See
Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
That said, the issue before us is whether the trial court erroneously concluded it
lacked plenary power to consider Proline’s Motion for New Trial, a decision that
impacts subject-matter jurisdiction. See Smalley v. Smalley, 436 S.W.3d 801, 806
7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citation omitted) (explaining that
“[i]f no party files a motion extending the trial court’s plenary power, the trial court
loses subject matter jurisdiction thirty days after the judgment is signed[]”). “After
a trial court loses plenary power over a final judgment, it lacks jurisdiction to alter
that judgment[.]” Estate of Brazda, 582 S.W.3d 717, 731 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (citing Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231 (Tex. 1986))
(other citation omitted). We review a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
determination de novo. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d
217, 228 (Tex. 2004) (“Appellate courts reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction review the trial court’s ruling de novo.”).
ANALYSIS
In its sole issue, Proline contends the trial court erred by denying its Motion
for New Trial without considering its Motion, based on the erroneous belief that its
plenary power had lapsed, and it no longer possessed jurisdiction. In support of this
issue, Proline argues that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(5) its Motion
for New Trial was timely, and under Rule 21(f)(6) the trial court should have deemed
it timely. Gordy responds that because the error was with password-protected PDF
exhibits, the problem was a pre-transmission problem on Proline’s part rather than a
“technical failure,” so the Motion for New Trial was untimely.
8 Generally, a trial court’s plenary power runs for thirty days after it signs a
judgment. See Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips
Chem. Co., L.P., 540 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. 2018); see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(d).
A party may extend the time the trial court retains plenary power by timely filing a
motion for new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a) (requiring motion for new trial to
be filed within thirty days of the judgment being signed); see also In re Moran, 635
S.W.3d 394, 401 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2021, orig. proceeding). When a party
timely files a motion for new trial, the trial court retains plenary power to grant a
new trial or vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty days after all
such timely-filed motions are overruled by order or operation of law. Tex. R. Civ. P.
329b(e). If a trial court does not rule on a motion for new trial within seventy-five
days, it is overruled by operation of law. See id. 329(c).
Since the plain language of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(5) is
dispositive in this case, that is where we focus our analysis. Rule 21(f)(5) provides,
Timely Filing. Unless a document must be filed by a certain time of day, a document is considered timely filed if it is electronically filed at any time before midnight (in the court’s time zone) on the filing deadline. An electronically filed document is deemed filed when transmitted to the filing party’s electronic filing service provider, except: (A) if a document is transmitted on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, it is deemed filed on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday[.]
9 Id. 21(f)(5). The Rule then outlines another exception, which is inapplicable here.
See id.
“In construing procedural rules, we ‘apply[] the same rules of construction
that govern the interpretation of statutes.’” In re Millwork, 631 S.W.3d 706, 711
(Tex. 2021, orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222
S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. 2007)); see also Note Inv. Grp., Inc. v. Assocs. First Capital
Corp., 476 S.W.3d 463, 476 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2015, no pet.). When a
procedural rule is clear and unambiguous, we construe the rule’s language according
to the plain or literal meaning by applying grammatical rules and considering
context. See In re Millwork, 631 S.W.3d at 711–12 (citing In re Christus Spohn
Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d at 437; Crosstex Energy Servs., L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc.,
430 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. 2014)). Where terms are undefined, “we construe those
words in accordance with their ordinary and commonly understood meaning[,]” and
may look to their dictionary definitions. See Note Inv. Grp., 476 S.W.3d at 477
(explaining same and looking to dictionary definitions to interpret Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 167). We will not judicially amend the rule to add words. See Jones
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 745 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex. 1988) (stating same in context
of statutory construction). Thus, we examine the chosen words in the context of the
statute as a whole and do not consider words or parts of the statute in isolation. See
10 Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009)
(explaining in the context of statutory construction).
Rule 21(f)(5) does not define “transmitted.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(5).
When a term is undefined in a rule or statute, we begin with its ordinary dictionary
meaning. See In re Millwork, 631 S.W.3d at 711–12; Note Inv. Grp., 476 S.W.3d at
477. “Transmitted” is defined as “to send or convey from one person or place to
another.” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transmit (last visited Oct. 2,
2025). Rule 21(f)(5) also does not include a requirement that the electronic filing
service provider accept the filing. Looking elsewhere in Rule 21, it provides that
“[t]he clerk may not refuse to file a document that fails to conform with this rule.
But the clerk may identify the error to be corrected and state a deadline for the party
to resubmit the document in a conforming format.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(11).
In addressing Rule 21(f)(5), other courts “have referred to this as the
‘electronic equivalent of the mailbox rule[.]’” Allstate Fire and Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Dollard, 679 S.W.3d 279, 285 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, no pet.) (quoting
Cummings v. Billman, 629 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2020, op. and
order), op. on merits, 634 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.) (mem.
op.)). “[L]ike the hard-copy mailbox rule, the timeliness of an e-filing is based on
when the party transmits the document to the e-filing system—the electronic
equivalent of dropping the document into the mailbox.” Id. (citation omitted).
11 Consistent with the Rule 21(f)(5)’s plain language, other courts have focused on
“transmission” as the “dispositive act” and the effective date, regardless of the
clerk’s file stamped date. See id. (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(5); Jamar v. Patterson,
868 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex. 1993); Rawls v. La Fogata Mexican Grill, 658 S.W.3d
898, 901 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied)). Likewise, “whether the clerk
received and rejected the document is not dispositive.” NA Land Co. v. State, 624
S.W.3d 671, 675 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.) (citing Tex R.
Civ. P. 21(f)(5)) (other citations omitted). Additionally, resubmitting an otherwise
timely filed document through the electronic filing system in accordance with the
clerk’s instructions does not render the filing of the document untimely, and the
original transmission date is the effective date regardless of the clerk’s stamp. See
Rawls, 658 S.W.3d at 901; Nevarez Law Firm, P.C. v. Investor Land Servs., L.L.C.,
610 S.W.3d 567, 570 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.) (discussing 21(f)(5) and
21(f)(6)).
As mentioned above, and congruent with Rule 21(f)(5)’s plain language,
several of our sister courts have focused on “transmitted” as the dispositive factor in
whether the document was timely filed. See, e.g., Whitelock v. Stewart, 661 S.W.3d
583, 594 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied) (holding e-filed motion for new
trial was timely although clerk rejected filing for formatting noncompliance); Hall
v. Lewis, 639 S.W.3d 197, 207–08 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, no
12 pet.) (concluding e-filed petition was timely when it was transmitted on the last day
of limitations despite later receiving two emails noting the filing was returned and
rejected by clerk); Cummings, 629 S.W.3d at 300, 302 (holding that appellants’
motion to reinstate was deemed filed when transmitted, even though appellants later
canceled the transaction); Nevarez Law Firm, 610 S.W.3d at 570–71 (concluding e-
filed motion for new trial was timely despite initial rejection and being routed to
wrong clerk); In re Barr, No. 05-19-00511-CV, 2019 WL 2082468, at *1–2 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 13, 2019, orig. proceeding) (holding e-filed motion for new trial
was timely when “transmitted to [the] electronic filing service provider” before
deadline despite clerk’s rejecting it for insufficient fees and noncompliance).
We agree that simply uploading a document is not enough where, for example,
a party discovers a corrupted file after navigating to the EFSP’s website; doing so
without sending the document “does not transform the corrupted file into a
transmitted related issue.” Dollard, 679 S.W.3d at 289 (explaining that party
discovered its motion for new trial was corrupted and did not even attempt to send
it before the deadline, so the motion was untimely). Here, however, Proline did not
simply upload the motion, it “transmitted”—in other words, sent—the motion to the
EFSP before midnight on the due date. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(5). The returned e-
file envelope Proline received stated that the electronic filing service provider “could
not accept” it, noting the “Date/Time Submitted” as “9/8/23 11:55 PM CST” and
13 asked that Proline “resubmit” the document. This established that Proline
“transmitted” the document to the EFSP at 11:55 PM CST on September 8, 2023,
and it is deemed filed at that time. See id.; see also Cummings, 629 S.W.3d at 300
(noting under Rule 21(f)(5), document was deemed filed at the moment it was
transmitted).
In essence, Gordy wants to add another requirement into the Rule before a
document is deemed timely filed, which is that it be accepted by the electronic filing
service provider. Yet, the express language of Rule 21(f)(5) does not require that the
electronic filing service provider accept the document, only that the document be
transmitted—i.e., sent—before midnight on the due date. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
21(f)(5). We will not judicially amend the rule to add the word “accepted.” See
Jones, 745 S.W.2d at 902.
Gordy relies on this not being a “technical failure” or “technical error” under
21(f)(6). Gordy asserts the motion’s rejection was the result of a “pre-transmission
problem” and Proline’s submitting the document with a password-protected PDF
exhibit was Proline’s fault for failing to comply with the rules. Rule 21(f)(6)
provides relief for parties where “a document is untimely due to a technical failure
or a system outage[,]” and allows the filing party to “be given a reasonable extension
of time to complete the filing.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(6). We find it unnecessary to
reach that argument or the potential interplay it has with Rule 5’s prohibition on
14 extending the deadline to file a motion for new trial, since the “transmitted” language
in 21(f)(5) is dispositive.
We hold Proline’s Motion for New Trial was timely under Rule 21(f)(5) where
it transmitted the Motion to its electronic filing service provider before midnight on
the due date, thus the trial court erred when it refused to consider Proline’s Motion
for New Trial on the basis that it lacked plenary power. We sustain Proline’s sole
issue.
REMITTITUR
Gordy recently filed a Motion for Remittitur with this Court. We do not reach
the merits of that Motion in this appeal. Given our resolution of Proline’s sole issue,
and since the trial court will consider the merits of Proline’s Motion for New Trial
for the first time upon remand, the trial court can likewise address Gordy’s Motion
for Remittitur then.
CONCLUSION
Having sustained Proline’s sole issue, we reverse this matter and remand it to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice
Submitted on July 11, 2025 Opinion Delivered October 23, 2025 Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.