Proctor v. Commissioner of Social Security

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedAugust 29, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-05099
StatusUnknown

This text of Proctor v. Commissioner of Social Security (Proctor v. Commissioner of Social Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Proctor v. Commissioner of Social Security, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 CATHERINE L. P., CASE NO. 3:24-CV-5099-DWC 11 Plaintiff, v. ORDER AFFIRMING DEFENDANT’S 12 DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 13 SECURITY, 14 Defendant.

15 Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of Defendant’s 16 denial of her applications for supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”) and disability 17 insurance benefits (“DIB”).1 After considering the record, the Court finds Plaintiff has not shown 18 that the rebuttal evidence submitted by her counsel constituted “significant probative evidence” 19 of an inconsistency requiring resolution. Therefore, the Court concludes the Administrative Law 20 Judge (“ALJ”) did not err in finding that Plaintiff was not disabled and affirms the decision of 21 the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) to deny benefits. 22 23 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, and Local Rule MJR 13, the parties have 24 consented to have this matter heard by the undersigned Magistrate Judge. See Dkt. 5. 1 I. Factual and Procedural History 2 Plaintiff filed claims for DIB and SSI on September 30, 2021, alleging disability 3 beginning on April 1, 2010. Dkt. 7, Administrative Record (“AR”) 213–35. Her applications 4 were denied at the initial level and on reconsideration. AR 64–73. She requested a hearing before

5 an ALJ, which took place on March 8, 2024. AR 36–57, 133–37. Plaintiff was represented by 6 counsel at the hearing. See AR 36. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision denying benefits, and 7 Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision. AR 7–8, 14–35, 208–09. 8 Plaintiff challenged the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) regarding job number estimates 9 and submitted rebuttal evidence obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel showing lower job numbers. AR 10 376–84. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision 11 the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1–6. Plaintiff appealed to this Court. See Dkts. 1, 3. 12 II. Standard of Review 13 When reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court 14 may set aside the denial of social security benefits if the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error

15 or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 16 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). Substantial 17 evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 18 conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 19 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 20 III. Discussion 21 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred at step five of the sequential evaluation by accepting 22 testimony from the VE that was not supported by substantial evidence. Dkt. 9 at 3. Defendant 23

24 1 does not dispute that Plaintiff adequately preserved this challenge by raising the rebuttal of the 2 job numbers before the Appeals Council. Dkt. 13 at 5. 3 If, over the first four steps of the sequential evaluation, a claimant establishes that she 4 suffers from severe impairments that prevent her from doing any work she has done in the past,

5 she “has made a prima facie showing of disability.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100 (9th 6 Cir. 1999). At step five, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show that, given 7 Plaintiff’s age, educational and vocational background, and residual functional capacity, Plaintiff 8 can perform substantial gainful work in the national economy. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 9 844 (9th Cir. 2001). 10 To make this determination, an ALJ may rely on the testimony of a VE—a professional 11 “who, through their training and experience, [has] ‘expertise and current knowledge of working 12 conditions and physical demands of various jobs; knowledge of the existence and numbers of 13 those jobs in the national economy; and involvement in or knowledge of placing adult workers 14 with disabilities into jobs.’” Kilpatrick v. Kijakazi, 35 F.4th 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting

15 Biestek, 587 U.S. at 100). Because “‘[a] VE's recognized expertise provides the necessary 16 foundation for his or her testimony[,]’ . . . at least in the absence of any contrary evidence, a VE's 17 testimony is one type of job information that is regarded as inherently reliable[.]” Buck v. 18 Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1051 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218). “Given its 19 inherent reliability, a qualified vocational expert's testimony as to the number of jobs existing in 20 the national economy that a claimant can perform is ordinarily sufficient by itself to support an 21 ALJ's step-five finding.” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1160 (9th Cir. 2020). 22 But “VE testimony is not incontestable.” Buck, 869 F.3d at 1051. The Ninth Circuit has 23 “held that—as with any other inconsistency in record evidence—the ALJ may have a duty to

24 1 address” a conflict between the VE’s job number estimates and the claimant’s job number 2 estimates “where the purportedly inconsistent evidence is both significant and probative, as 3 opposed to ‘meritless or immaterial.’” Wischmann v. Kijakazi, 68 F.4th 498, 505 (9th Cir. 2023) 4 (quoting Kilpatrick, 35 F.4th at 1193–94).

5 In Buck, the Ninth Circuit held the ALJ had an obligation to resolve a dispute over the 6 number of representative jobs the claimant could perform when “the vast discrepancy between 7 the VE's job numbers and those tendered by Buck, presumably from the same source, [was] 8 simply too striking to be ignored.” 869 F.3d at 1052. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found remand 9 was appropriate when a plaintiff, “using a data source and methodology frequently relied on by 10 the SSA” and “the same methodology as that used by the VE[,]” produced “job estimates [that] 11 differed substantially from those of the VE.” White v. Kijakazi, 44 F.4th 828, 837 (9th Cir. 12 2022). 13 However, the Ninth Circuit has found that conflicting job numbers did not constitute 14 “significant probative evidence” when plaintiff’s counsel “did not replicate the VE’s same

15 methodology[,]” “had no identified expertise in calculating job figures in the national 16 economy[,]” and used obviously questionable methodology to produce the estimates. Kilpatrick, 17 35 F.4th at 1194.

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Proctor v. Commissioner of Social Security, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/proctor-v-commissioner-of-social-security-wawd-2024.