Process Gas Consumers Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

712 F.2d 483, 229 U.S. App. D.C. 169, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 26654
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedJune 17, 1983
DocketNo. 82-1999
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 712 F.2d 483 (Process Gas Consumers Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Process Gas Consumers Group v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 712 F.2d 483, 229 U.S. App. D.C. 169, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 26654 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKEY.

WILKEY, Circuit Judge:

This case involves a challenge to a final rule issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “the Commission”). The rule defines the extent to which certain agricultural users of natural gas will have priority access to gas in times of shortage. Petitioners are two associations of industrial consumers of natural gas who challenge the rule on a variety of substantive grounds. We affirm the Commission.

I.Background

Title IV of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)1 establishes priorities of service to be applied by interstate natural gas pipelines in curtailing gas service to pipeline customers during periods of shortage. Section 401(a) provides that the last group to have service curtailed will be certain “high-priority users,”2 defined to include residences, small commercial establishments, and schools, hospitals, or similar institutions.3

Second in line to the pump are “essential agricultural uses.” Under section 401(b), these agricultural uses have priority over all except “high-priority users” unless FERC “in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, determines, by rule or order, that use of a fuel (other than natural gas) is economically practicable and that the fuel is reasonably available as an alternative for any agricultural use of natural gas ....”4

Section 402(b) of the NGPA gives third place to “essential industrial process and feedstock uses.” These uses receive priority over all but “high-priority users” and “essential agricultural uses” provided that “the Commission determines that use of a fuel (other than natural gas) is not economically practicable and that no fuel is reasonably available as an alternative for such use.”5 All remaining gas uses, including those agricultural and industrial process and feedstock uses which do not qualify for their respective priorities, fall below priority three.6

Pursuant to its mandate under section 401(b), FERC engaged in a variety of rule-making proceedings, culminating in a final rule issued on 11 August 1980 as Order No. 55-B.7 The Commission held that both coal and residual (No. 6) fuel oil are reasonably available and economically practicable alternate fuels for essential agricultural uses of gas. Those agricultural uses which have already installed capacity to use either of those fuels are considered to have alternate fuel capability and are, thus, not entitled to the natural gas priority of section 401. Agricultural uses without the capacity to burn those fuels, even if that capacity could be installed economically, are not considered to have alternate fuel capability.

The Commission also held that middle distillate (No. 2) fuel oil is too expensive to be considered an “economically practicable” alternative to natural gas for essential agricultural uses. Thus, agricultural uses with [171]*171the capacity to burn No. 2 oil, but not coal or No. 6 oil, will not lose their natural gas priority.

Applications for rehearing were filed by a number of parties to the proceedings. In Order No. 55-C, FERC denied all issues raised on rehearing.8 This suit followed.

Petitioners claim to find four flaws in the final rule. First, FERC. misinterpreted the term “economically practicable” as used in section 401(b) and, thereby, failed to follow the explicit standard intended by Congress. Second, FERC arbitrarily and capriciously failed to articulate the standard it actually applied to determine when a fuel is an economically practicable alternative to natural gas for agricultural uses. Third, No. 2 fuel oil is an economically practicable alternative to natural gas for agricultural uses, and FERC acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing so to find. Finally, FERC arbitrarily and capriciously limited its exclusion from the essential agricultural use priority only to those uses with already installed capacity to use coal or No. 6 oil. The Commission should also have excluded those agricultural uses for whom it is economically practicable to install capacity to use these alternate fuels.

II. Discussion

A. No. 2 Oil

Petitioners’ first three contentions revolve around a single point: FERC’s failure to classify No. 2 oil as an economically practicable alternative to natural gas for agricultural uses will allow those uses capable of burning No. 2 oil to burn natural gas during times of shortage even if that consumption directly results in the partial or total curtailment of gas to industrial process or feedstock uses having no capacity to use an alternate fuel. In other words, to save money with lower cost fuel, agricultural uses will be able to force industrial process or feedstock uses to go partially or even completely without necessary natural gas.

Petitioners allege that this possibility is directly contrary to Congress’ intent in providing an “economically practicable” exception to the essential agricultural use priority of section 401. According to petitioners, Congress wanted to insure that “those gas uses which could use an alternate fuel would be curtailed before gas uses protected by either Sections 401 or 402.”9

The lynchpin of petitioners’ argument is that both sections 401 and 402 use the term “economically practicable.” The Conference Report on section 402 explains that “[t]he term economically practicable is intended to have the same meaning as the Commission’s standard of economic feasibility under extra-ordinary relief in curtailment cases.”10 According to petitioners, the Commission’s traditional standard in “extra-ordinary relief in curtailment cases” focuses only on whether a natural gas use either has the capacity to burn an alternate fuel or could economically develop that capacity. It does not consider the cost of the alternate fuel itself. “In determining when an alternative fuel ‘could have been utilized,’ the Commission has traditionally applied a ‘cost of conversion’ test — i.e., it has looked to the relative cost to the user of converting its gas-burning equipment to be able to use a non-gaseous fuel.”11 The cost of the non-gaseous fuel itself is left out of account.

Petitioners rely on the general presumption that when Congress uses the same term in two parts of a statute the term has the same meaning in both places.12 Since [172]*172Congress apparently meant to rely on FERC’s prior practice in defining “economically practicable” in section 402(b),13 petitioners conclude that FERC was wrong in relying on the high cost of No. 2 oil in deciding that No. 2 oil is not an economically practicable alternate fuel for essential agricultural uses under section 401(b).

The initial flaw in this argument is apparent simply from reading the two sections. Both do contain the term “economically practicable.” But the two contexts are different. Section 401(b) emphasizes that the priority applies automatically to essential agricultural uses unless FERC affirmatively determines that the use of an alternate fuel is economically practicable.

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Bluebook (online)
712 F.2d 483, 229 U.S. App. D.C. 169, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 26654, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/process-gas-consumers-group-v-federal-energy-regulatory-commission-cadc-1983.