DAY, J.
This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals reversing an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Honorable John G. Bartholomew, presiding, that dismissed all claims against the Archdiocese of Milwaukee (Archdiocese) and the Reverend [307]*307Father John Donovan (Fr. Donovan) arising out of a relationship that was alleged to have occurred between Fr. Donovan and Ms. Judith M. Pritzlaff from 1959 to 1965 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and because the claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Section 802.06, Stats. (1993-94). We conclude that to allow the claim to proceed against the Archdiocese based on Ms. Pritzlaff s allegation concerning Fr. Donovan despite the passage of twenty-seven years since the end of the alleged relationship would be contrary to the public policy of the State. We also conclude that the claims of negligent hiring, retaining, training and supervision are barred by the First Amendment in this case. We therefore reverse that portion of the decision of the court of appeals which remanded the case for a trial of the negligent hiring, training and supervision claim against the Archdiocese.
Ms. Pritzlaff first filed a complaint against Fr. Donovan and the Archdiocese on November 12, 1992. The relevant allegations from her complaint are as follows:
4. That at all times material, defendant Donovan was a Roman Catholic priest and an agent/representative of the defendant Archdiocese.
5. That defendant Donovan first met the plaintiff while she was a high school student in the late 1950's.
6. That thereafter, while acting in his capacity as a priest, defendant Donovan used said position to develop a friend like relationship with the plaintiff.
7. That defendant Donovan continued said relationship with the plaintiff.
[308]*3088. That defendant Donovan did in fact use said relationship and his position as a priest to coerce the plaintiff to have a sexual relationship with him.
9. That as a result of the actions of defendant Donovan, the plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer from severe emotional distress, causing and contributing to the break-up of her marriage, separation from her children, loss of jobs and other difficulties.
11. That at all times the defendant Archdiocese knew or should have known the type of conduct being pursued by Donovan and should have taken steps to stop same.
Five days later, on November 17, 1992, Fr. Donovan filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, asserting among other things that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. On December 28, 1992, the Archdiocese also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim which asserted that the alleged conduct of Fr. Donovan was not tortious, that the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and that the Archdiocese was not responsible as a matter of law for the alleged conduct of Fr. Donovan.
In apparent response to the defendants' motions, on January 20, 1993, Ms. Pritzlaff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint was divided into two causes of action. The first cause of action was against Fr. Donovan for his alleged actions. The second cause of action was against the Archdiocese and incorporated by reference all of the allegations against Fr. Donovan. The amended complaint reasserted most of the allegations made above and added the following relevant allegations:
[309]*3099. That defendant DONOVAN did in fact use said relationship and his position as a priest to force and coerce the plaintiff to have a sexual relationship with him without her consent.
10. That Defendant DONOVAN caused Plaintiff «JUDITH M. PRITZLAFF, to suffer and continues to suffer from severe emotional distress, causing and contributing to the break-up of her marriage, separation from her children and serious personal injuries, including but not limited to severe and painful psychological injuries, which injuries are permanent in nature and have caused her to incur pain, suffering, humiliation, disability, loss of earning capacity and a loss of an ability to enjoy life and expenses for medical and psychological treatment.
11. As a result of the psychological distress caused by the sexual advances and the coping mechanisms which were subsequently developed by «JUDITH M. PRITZLAFF, she has suppressed and been unable to perceive the existence, nature or cause of her psychological and emotional injuries until approximately April, 1992.
15. That upon information and belief, and at all times material hereto, the ARCHDIOCESE was responsible for the training and placement and supervision of archdiocesan priests and the assignment of those priests into archdiocesan's schools and church parishes within the Milwaukee Archdiocese.
16. The ARCHDIOCESE had a duty to admit only qualified candidates into the priesthood, properly test and screen candidates for the priesthood and priests to ascertain if such persons had an illness or sexual inclination which caused a priest to be sexually attracted to teenage girls/young women, . . . [310]*310prior to placing a priest in to the community, to make appropriate placements of priest considering all relevant factors, supervise the priests which the archdiocese placed into the community, to counsel and guide priests in dealing with issues of celibacy and human sexuality and to supervise the operation of the various parishes located within the Archdiocese, including but not limited to all parishes at which DONOVAN served.
20. The ARCHDIOCESE knew or should have known that DONOVAN had a sexual problem prior to 1959 and acted willfully, intentionally and in wanton and reckless disregard, of the rights and safety of plaintiff by failing to remove DONOVAN from serving as a priest....
On February 8, 1993 and February 26, 1993, Fr. Donovan and the Archdiocese again filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In addition to the reasons stated in their first motions to dismiss, the Archdiocese asserted that the negligent süpervision claim was inadequately pleaded and that First Amendment precluded a court from finding any liability on the part of the Archdiocese for negligent supervision. Ms. Pritzlaff did not respond to the defendants' motion to dismiss until March 31, 1993. The Archdiocese asserted that this failure to file a timely brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss was also a ground for dismissing the complaint.
On April 26, 1993, the circuit court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court held that the Archdiocese was not responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior since the alleged actions of Fr. Donovan could not have been in the scope of his employment, that there is no basis to hold the Archdio[311]*311cese liable on a theory of negligence, and that the statute of limitations bars the claims both because the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in discovering her claim and because "to allow this action to proceed after a passage of 27 years would be fundamentally wrong and in clear violation of sound public policy." Ms. Pritzlaff appealed the circuit court order.
On August 23,1994, the court of appeals held that the claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. It also held that the circuit court erred when it declined to recognize the claim of negligent supervision. However, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's conclusion that the Archdiocese was not liable on a theory of respondeat superior. The Archdiocese, but not Fr. Donovan, petitioned this court for review of the court of appeals' decision. We granted that petition for review.1
Ms. Pritzlaff did not file a cross-petition seeking review of the court of appeals decision that the Archdiocese could not be held liable on a theory of respondeat superior. That issue is therefore not before this court.
This case requires this court to review the pleadings to determine if they state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When undertaking such a review, this court liberally construes the pleadings, and accepts the allegations in the pleadings as true. Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 635-36, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994). Further, this court will dismiss [312]*312claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted only if "it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover." Id. at 636.
A threshold question when reviewing a complaint is whether the complaint has been timely filed, because an otherwise sufficient claim will be dismissed if that claim is time barred. Section 802.06, Stats. (1993-94). Since we conclude that Ms. Pritzlaffs twenty-seven year old claim is time barred, we reverse that portion of the decision of the court of appeals which remanded the claim against the Archdiocese for negligent supervision.
The relevant statute of limitations for actions against the Archdiocese is three years. See sec. 330.205, Stats. (1963), and its successor, sec. 893.54, Stats. (1993-94). The three year period begins on the same date that the cause of action accrued against Fr. Donovan. Thus, unless the statute of limitations was tolled, Ms. Pritzlaff filed her claims well past the time allowed by statute. However, under some circumstances, public policy dictates that the date that a cause of action accrues be well after the date of the act that caused harm. Those circumstances are outlined in the judicially created "discovery rule." We assume, without deciding, that the discovery rule applies to the Archdiocese.2
[313]*313The first Wisconsin case to approve the discovery rule was Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). In that case, the plaintiff was allegedly injured by a "Daikon Shield" intrauterine device manufactured by the defendant and inserted into her uterus in 1974. Id. at 552. She began to suffer symptoms some time just prior to June 13, 1978, and sought medical care on June 16,1978. Id. However, her doctor told her she was in good health and noted that she had no symptoms on that day. Id. The symptoms returned, and on June 26, 1978, the plaintiff went to another doctor. Id. at 553. That doctor removed the Daikon Shield and correctly diagnosed her condition as pelvic inflammatory disease. Id. She filed suit on June 24,1981. Id. This court, in rejecting the statute of limitations defense asserted by A.H. Robins, Inc., held that the cause of action accrued on the date the injury was discovered or with reasonable diligence should be discovered, not on the date of the act that resulted in the injury. Id. at 560. Therefore, since the plaintiff discovered the injury on June 26, 1978 and commenced her action on June 24, 1981, the action was not barred by the three year statute of limitations. Id. at 561.
[314]*314Three years later, this court expanded the scope of the discovery rule in Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986). There, the defendant installed a furnace in the plaintiffs home in December 1977. Id. at 400. On December 29, 1977, the plaintiff complained to the defendant in a letter that her previous furnace problems were worse with the new furnace and also complained of an odor from the furnace, respiratory problems and headaches. Id. She consulted three physicians, all of whom told her that her complaints could not, with any degree of certainty, be attributed to the furnace. Id. at 401. She was hospitalized on February 5, 1979. Id. at 401-02. When she returned to her home on February 20,1979, she found flat surfaces covered with a red dust. Id. at 402. She asserted that she then knew that the furnace was the cause of her illness. Id. However, on March 12, 1979, she consulted another doctor who said he did not believe that her symptoms were related to the furnace. Id. Finally, in October 1979, she consulted an occupational medicine specialist who concluded that her symptoms were a result of metal fume fever caused by the furnace. Id. at 402-03. She filed her complaint in November 1981. Id. at 403. "Accordingly, we are confronted by a situation where a complainant was injured more than three years before the filing of the complaint and almost contemporaneously with that injury formed her own layperson's subjective opinion that the furnace was the cause. Yet at every turn, she was told by professionals, . . . that the furnace fume problem was irrelevant." Id. at 403-04. "A person who has used reasonable diligence to secure medical advice should be given the protection of one who is 'blamelessly ignorant.' " Id. at 414. This court held that "cause of action does not accrue until the nature of the injury and the [315]*315cause — or at least a relationship between the event and the injury — is or ought to have been known to the claimant." Id. at 406-07.
Ms. Pritzlaff argues that her claim is saved by the discovery rule because "she has suppressed and been unable to perceive the existence, nature or cause of her psychological and emotional injuries until approximately April, 1992." Therefore, she argues that her suit, commenced November 12,1992, is timely.
We conclude that Ms. Pritzlaffs claim does not qualify for the tolling of the statute of limitations provided by the discovery rule because Ms. Pritzlaff knew of all of the elements of her underlying claim against Fr. Donovan, at the latest, by the time the relationship between the two ended.
It is well settled that a cause of action accrues when there exists a claim capable of enforcement, a suitable party against whom it may be enforced, and a party with a present right to enforce it. Meracle v. Children's Serv. Socy., 149 Wis. 2d 19, 437 N.W.2d 532 (1989); Barry v. Minahan, 127 Wis. 570, 573, 107 N.W. 488 (1906). A party has a present right to enforce a claim when the plaintiff has suffered actual damage, defined as harm that has already occurred or is reasonably certain to occur in the future. Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 152, 465 N.W.2d 812 (1991). The discovery rule does not change these basic propositions, it simply defines some of the elements. That is, the discovery rule is so named because it tolls thé statute of limitations until the plaintiff discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered that he or she has suffered actual damage due to wrongs committed by a particular, identified person. Until that time, plaintiffs are not capable of enforcing their claims [316]*316either because they do not know that they have been wronged, see Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 550, or because they do not know the identity of the person who has wronged them, see Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 406 — 07. Accordingly, " ’[djiscovery1 in most cases is implicit in the circumstances immediately surrounding the original misconduct." Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 404-05 n.2.
Given this understanding of the discovery rule, we conclude that the rule does not save Ms. Pritzlaffs claim. At oral argument, counsel for Ms. Pritzlaff admitted that the following statement, taken from the Archdiocese brief, was a correct statement of Ms. Prit-zlaff s claim:
[ T]he plaintiff has claimed that despite the awareness of the tortfeasor and the alleged tortious acts, despite this awareness, she was unable to connect her knowledge of the acts with her emotional harm, that it wasn't until '92 that she connected her psychological, emotional difficulties.
Taking this allegation as true,3 as we must for the purposes of this case, Ms. Pritzlaff still does not prevail. Ms. Pritzlaff, by her own admission, knew the identity of the tortfeasor and the conduct by the tortfeasor. Further, she claims that the sexual relation[317]*317ship was "without her consent" and was a result of "force and coercion]Of course, she must allege this as fact because a consensual sexual relationship between two adults is no longer actionable in Wisconsin. See Sec. 768.01, Stats.;4 Koestler v. Pollard, 162 Wis. 2d 797, 802-04, 471 N.W.2d 7 (1991) (abolition of claims under sec. 768.01, Stats, evinces a legislative intent that "dictates that courts should not administer heart balm in the form of civil liability"). However, if in fact the sexual acts were a product of "force and coercion]", then the contact was immediately actionable as either a civil battery or an offensive bodily contact. See Wis. JI-Civil 2005; Wis. JI-Civil 2010 (approved 1960); see also Marsha V. v. Gardner, 231 Cal. App. 3d 265, 272-73 (Cal. App., 1991); Doe v. R.D., 417 S.E.2d 541, 542 (S.C. 1992). Therefore, assuming her allegations are true, Ms, Pritzlaff could have alleged a complete cause of action against Pr. Donovan by the time the six year relationship ended.5 That Ms. Pritzlaff was unaware of additional harm ("severe emotional distress") only created uncertainty as to the amount of damages and did not toll the period of limitations. See Marsha V., 231 Cal. App. 3d at 273.
[318]*318In support of her claim that the discovery rule should apply, Ms. Pritzlaff relies primarily on Byrne v. Bercker, 176 Wis. 2d 1037, 501 N.W.2d 402 (1993). There, this court held that tho plaintiffs claim was barred because, "it is undisputed, indeed it is acknowledged in plaintiffs brief, that plaintiff was aware by mid-1986 [more than two years before she commenced her action] that her difficulties stemmed from incestuous abuse by her father and that she had been told that she was the victim of the abuse and was not the perpetrator." Byrne, 176 Wis. 2d at 1046.
However, the Byrne court also stated its approval of the holding of the court of appeals in Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App.), rev. denied, 144 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23. (1987). Often cited nationally,6 Hammer put the Wisconsin courts at the forefront of allowing claims of incest to proceed to trial long after the alleged events.7
In Hammer, a woman alleged that she was sexually abused by her father from the age five to age of fourteen (1969-78). Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d at 261. She reported the activity to her mother in 1978, but both her father and mother denied the conduct and trivialized it. Id. "He convinced Laura that she was not injured by the conduct but that she was at fault for her problems and for the family’s problems." Id. The plain[319]*319tiff "alleged that during the course of the abuse,... she was unable to perceive or know the existence or nature of her psychological and emotional injuries. These manifestations continued to operate on her long after the incidents, . . . preventing her from perceiving her psychological and emotional injuries and their connection to her father's earlier acts." Id. at 261-62. She commenced suit in 1985. The court of appeals held "that a cause of action for incestuous abuse will not accrue until the victim discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the fact and cause of the injury." Id. at 264.
The Hammer decision was codified in 1987. Section 893.587, Stats. (1993-94) provides:
893.587 Incest; limitation. An action to recover damages for injury caused by incest shall be commenced within 2 years after the plaintiff discovers the fact and the probable cause, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the fact and the probable cause, of the injury, whichever occurs first.
Thus, in cases alleging incest, a plaintiff may rely on the discovery rule to avoid a motion to dismiss on the pleadings where she alleges that she was unable to forge a connection between the abuse and her latent emotional injuries despite the exercise of reasonable diligence, even though the plaintiff does not allege that she repressed all memories of the abuse.
One aspect of Hammer gives us pause. The defendant in Hammer asserted that the statute of limitations should have begun to run because the plaintiff in that case discovered, or should have discovered, the injury when the abuse ended after she [320]*320reported it to her mother. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d at 261, 267. The court of appeals dismissed this argument with one sentence, stating that a "claimant has leeway to not start an action until she knows more about the injury and its probable cause." Id. at 267 (citing Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 420). However, the Hammer court took this statement by the Borello court out of context.
The Borello court cited this statement in explaining that the discovery rule had been informally recognized in at least one case prior to Hansen. Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 420. That case was Wisconsin Natural Gas v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Construction Corp., 96 Wis. 2d 314, 291 N.W.2d 825 (1980). There the plaintiff discovered a "casing short" in a pipeline installed by the defendant more than six years (the applicable statute of limitations) prior to commencing suit. Id. at 318-19. Based on testimony that such shorts are a "usual phenomena" and may result from factors other than improper pipeline installation, this court held that a single "casing short" did not give the plaintiff sufficient knowledge that the defendant had committed a tortious act, thus the statute of limitations did not begin to run at that point. Id. at 325. Instead, the statute of limitations began to run when the evidence of injury was "sufficiently significant to alert the injured party to the possibility of a defect." Id. Thus, the statement in Borello that a "claimant ha[s] leeway to not start action until it knows more about the injury and its probable cause," Borello, 130 Wis. 2d at 420, does not mean that a plaintiff can delay action until the extent of the injury is known, but only, consistent with the explanation of the discovery rule above, that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the [321]*321plaintiff has sufficient evidence that a wrong has indeed been committed by an identified person.8
Moreover, the Hammer decision and its subsequent codification are best viewed as a specialized discovery rule applicable only to cases of incest. The rule focuses on the unique harms and relationships between the tortfeasor and victims which exist in cases of incest. For example, what is unfortunately a fairly typical fact scenario in incest cases was described in Hammer. There, the conduct occurred in secret and was accompanied by threats that harm would come to the victim if she ever told anyone about it and the victim was repeatedly told that she had caused the acts and that they were her fault. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d at 261; see also Note, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Civil Suits Brought by Adult Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse: A Simple Solution, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 417, 421 (1994). Further, because of these relationships and types of factual situations, and because of the age of the victims, oftentimes victims do not realize the wrongfulness of the acts. Note, Forging the Causal Link: Reasonable Delay in Commencing Action for Childhood Sexual Abuse, 27 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 749, 760 n.55 (1993). Thus, for reasons of public policy, a special discovery rule has been created for these cases in an effort to provide adequate protection to children who "have been harmed because of a 'most egregious violation of the parent/child relationship.1" Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d [322]*322at 267 (iquoting Comment, Tort Remedies for Incestuous Abuse, 13 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 609, 631 (1983)).
But here sound public policy requires that the discovery rule should not save a claim under the facts of this case. This court has stated that the discovery rule will apply only when allowing meritorious claims outweighs the threat of stale or fraudulent actions. Hansen, 113 Wis. 2d at 559. Extending the discovery rule to this case would cause unfairness to a defendant who is forced to attempt to defend a suit for emotional and psychological injuries in which the alleged conduct took place over twenty-seven years ago and increase the potential for fraud.
Any time a claim is raised many years after the injury occurred, the potential for fraud is exacerbated. However, in most cases that potential is at least limited by the fact that the plaintiff is suffering from physical symptoms that a jury can see evidence of and which can be directly traced to the tortious conduct. For example, the IUD in Hansen caused pelvic inflammatory disease, and the furnace in Borello caused a myriad of respiratory problems. But here the alleged damages are all "emotional" and "psychological," with the plaintiffs experts claiming that damage exists and was caused by the defendant, and the defendant left in the position of attempting to prove either that the plaintiff is not "emotionally damaged" or that he is not the cause of that damage. "While some courts may have blind faith in all phases of psychiatry, this court does not." Steele v. State, 97 Wis. 2d 72, 97, 294 N.W.2d 2 (1980). "Nor are we convinced that even careful cross-examination in this esoteric and largely unproved field is likely to reveal the truth." Id.
[323]*323Such circumstances are ripe for fraudulent claims even when the alleged cause of the injury occurred only weeks prior to the initiation of suit. When one adds to this that "this court has frequently been dismayed by the examination of trial court records which showed a marked propensity of those who purport to have psychiatric expertise to tailor their testimony to the particular client whom they represent," id., fraud becomes a distinct possibility. Thus, unlike in Hansen, allowing what could be meritorious claims of this nature does not outweigh the threat of stale or fraudulent actions.
Although not relied upon by Ms. Pritzlaff, we feel it is necessary in order to fully explain the law related to this subject to distinguish this case from the closely analogous conduct prohibited by the sexual exploitation by a therapist statutes. Those statutes, enacted in 1985, provide in part:
895.70 Sexual exploitation by a therapist. (1) DEFINITIONS. . . . (e) "Therapist" means a . . . member of the clergy ... who performs or purports to perform psychotherapy.
(2) CAUSE OF ACTION (a) Any person who suffers, directly or indirectly, a physical, mental or emotional injury caused by, resulting from or arising out of sexual contact with a therapist who is rendering or has rendered to that person psychotherapy, . . . has a civil cause of action against the psychotherapist_
893.585 Sexual exploitation by a therapist. (1)... an action under s. 895.70 for damages shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred.
[324]*324(2) If a person entitled to bring an action under s. 895.70 is unable to bring the action due to the effects of the sexual contact or due to any threats... from the therapist, the period of inability is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, except that this subsection shall not extend the time limitation by more than 15 years.
These statutes may be somewhat in conflict with the discovery rule as described above. One possible reason for this is that this statute, like the incest statute, is designed to protect a class of persons who the legislature feels need special protection. People who consult therapists generally do so because they perceive that they have a mental or psychological problem and hope that the therapist has the means and the method to help them. The therapists have been the exponents of the theory that sexual exploitation can result in suppression of memory of such acts and psychological problems arising out of feelings of guilt that are suppressed and buried. The assumed fact that therapists are aware of such potential results leaves them with no excuse for using their professional position to obtain sexual gratification from their vulnerable patients. Thus, there is a rational basis for subjecting therapists to special statutory provisions in an attempt to reduce or eliminate such exploitation of their patients. Regardless of the reason for the statute, the limited scope of the statute supports the explanation of the discovery rule above. The legislature enacted the provision well after the discovery rule had been announced by this court. Therefore, its enactment demonstrates that the legislature concluded that the discovery rule would not apply to sexual exploitation by therapists absent legislative action.
[325]*325Since we conclude that Ms. Pritzlaffs claim is time barred, we could end our analysis at this point. However, the question of whether a religious governing body is liable for negligence in hiring, retaining, training or supervising their "employees" (clergymen) who commit acts which are outside the scope of their employment is a matter of great public importance and has been fully briefed by the parties. See In Matter of Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis. 2d 53, 66, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992) (issues of great public importance may be decided even if moot). Moreover, the decision of the court of appeals in this case is in conflict with a decision issued the same day by a different panel of the court of appeals. Compare Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Appeal No. 93-1846 (Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994) with Jane Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, Appeal No. 93-2074 (Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1994). Further, a number of cases of this sort are pending, both at circuit courts and at the court of appeals. See In Matter of Guardianship of L.W., 167 Wis. 2d at 67 (issue may be decided although moot where the issue is likely to arise again and should be resolved by the court to avoid uncertainty). Thus, although the point is moot in this particular case, it is an issue which led this court to grant review in this case. Therefore, a decision is appropriate.
We conclude that even if Ms. Pritzlaffs claim were not time barred, it would still fail to state a claim against the Archdiocese upon which relief could be granted. Ms. Pritzlaff alleges that the Archdiocese was negligent in the hiring, training and supervision of Fr. Donovan. This court has not determined whether such a cause of action exists in Wisconsin. See Midwest Knitting Mills, Inc. v. U.S., 950 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir., 1991). However, for purposes of this case we assume, [326]*326but do not decide, that it does,9 and we look to other courts for the elements of the claim.
To establish a claim for negligent hiring or retention, Ms. Pritzlaff would have to establish that the Archdiocese was negligent in hiring or retaining Fr. Donovan because he was incompetent or otherwise unfit. Id. But, we conclude that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the courts of this state from determining what makes one competent to serve as a Catholic priest since such a determination would require interpretation of church canons and internal church policies and practices. Therefore, Ms. Pritzlaffs claim against the Archdiocese is not capable of enforcement by the courts.
The rationale for this rule was recently aptly summarized by a pair of commentators as follows:
Examining the ministerial selection policy, which is 'infused with the religious tenets of the particular sect,' entangles the court in qualitative evaluation of religious norms. Negligence requires the court to create a 'reasonable bishop' norm. Beliefs in penance, admonition and reconciliation as a sacramental response to sin may be the point of attack by a challenger who wants a court to probe the tort-law reasonableness of the church's mercy toward the offender .... The tort of negligent selection of unsuitable teachers has been recognized in [327]*327civil courts. If negligent selection of a potential pedophile for the religious office of priest, minister or rabbi is a tort as to future child victims, will civil courts also hear Title VII challenges by the non-selected seminarian against the theological seminary that declines to ordain a plaintiff into ministry because of his psychological profile? How far shall the courts' qualitative entanglement with religious selectivity extend?
O'Reilly & Strasser, supra, at 47 (footnotes omitted).
Our conclusion is consistent with the principles enunciated by our founders as well as with nearly a century of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1808, the government is "interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious institutions, their doctrines, discipline or exercises." O'Reilly & Strasser, supra, at 44 (quoting Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Reverend Samuel Miller (Jan. 23, 1808), in 5 Phillip Kurland & Ralph Lerner, The Founders' Constitution 98 (1987)). As early as 1929 the United States Supreme Court held that it is the function of church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a clergy person are and whether the candidate possesses them. Gonzalez. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). More recently, the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[fireedom to select the clergy . . . must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as part of the free exercise of religion against state interference." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian O. Ch., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); see also Rayburn v. General Conf. of Seventh Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1167-68 (4th Cir., 1985), cert. denied 478 U.S. 1020 (1986) (the right to choose clergy without government restriction underlies [328]*328the well-being of the religious community), but see Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 320, 328 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2153 (1994) (First Amendment did not preclude negligent hiring claim where Diocese knew of priest's problems of depression, low self-esteem, and his struggle with his sexual identity).
Recent decisions of the courts of this state also support our conclusion that negligent hiring and retention claims cannot be heard by courts in this state for constitutional reasons. See Olston v. Hallock, 55 Wis. 2d 687, 696-97, 201 N.W.2d 35 (1972) (court could not constitutionally review a religious institution's decision to terminate a minister); Black v. St. Bernadette Congregation, 121 Wis. 2d 560, 565-66, 360 N.W.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1984) (matters of internal church government are at the core of ecclesiastical affairs and as such are beyond the province of judicial review); see also Isley, 880 F.Supp. at 1150-51 (E.D. Mich. applying Wisconsin law).
Although state inquiry into the training and supervision of clergy is a closer issue than inquiry into hiring and retention practices because under some limited circumstances such questions might be able to be decided without determining questions of church law and policies, it is nonetheless prohibited by the First Amendment under most if not all circumstances.10 As [329]*329one court stated in refusing to allow a claim for negligent supervision:
[ A]ny inquiry into the policies and practices of the church Defendants in hiring or supervising their clergy raises the same kinds of First Amendment problems of entanglement discussed above, which might involve the court in making sensitive judgments about the propriety of the church Defendants' supervision in light of their religious beliefs.... The traditional denominations each have their own intricate principles of governance, as to which the state has no right of visitation. Church governance is founded in scripture, modified by reformers over almost two millennia.
It would therefore also be inappropriate and unconstitutional for this Court to determine after the fact that the ecclesiastical authorities negligently supervised or retained the defendant Bishop. Any award of damages would have a chilling effect leading indirectly to state control over the future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination, a result violative of the text and history of the establishment clause.
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y., 1991); see also Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1994) (quoting the United States Supreme Court decision in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 729, 20 L. Ed. 666 (1871)) (recognizing the threat of harassing lawsuits and a potential for a "chilling effect" on the free exercise of religion if the courts are to determine after the fact that ecclesiastical authorities negligently supervised or retained a member of the clergy).
[330]*330We are aware of the fact that several courts have recently held that a religious governing body could be held liable for negligent supervision where the plaintiff alleges that the body knew that the individual clergyman was potentially dangerous. See O'Reilly & Strasser, supra, at 49-51 (collecting cases from New York, Colorado and Ohio). The rationale of these courts is summarized by the following quote from the Ohio Supreme Court, "even the most liberal construction of the First Amendment will not protect a religious organization's decision to hire someone who it knows is likely to commit criminal or tortious acts." Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 590 (Ohio, 1991). However, we find these cases unpersuasive, at least given the facts of this case.
Further, one state that recognizes the tort of negligent supervision provides that employers do not have a duty to supervise when the employees are off-duty or not working. See Tichenor, 32 F.3d at 960 (explaining Miss. law). Problems of excessive entanglement seem inevitable if the court is asked to determine whether a priest, minister or rabbi was on or off duty when he engaged in conduct that was against the laws of the religious denomination and beyond the scope of his employment.
In conclusion, our holding is limited to the following issues. We hold that Ms. Pritzlaff s claim against the Archdiocese is time barred. We further hold that, assuming they exist at all, the tort of negligent hiring and retention may not be maintained against a religious governing body due to concerns of excessive entanglement, and that the tort of negligent training or supervision cannot be successfully asserted in this case because it would require an inquiry into church laws, practices and policies. Therefore, we reverse that portion of the decision of the court of appeals which [331]*331remanded the case for a trial on the negligent supervision claim against the Archdiocese.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals which remanded the case against the Archdiocese for a trial on the negligent supervision claim is reversed.
Justice Janine P. Geske took no part.