Principal Mut. Ins. v. Progress. Mtn. Ins.

27 P.3d 343
CourtSupreme Court of Colorado
DecidedApril 30, 2001
Docket99SC836
StatusPublished

This text of 27 P.3d 343 (Principal Mut. Ins. v. Progress. Mtn. Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Principal Mut. Ins. v. Progress. Mtn. Ins., 27 P.3d 343 (Colo. 2001).

Opinion

27 P.3d 343 (2001)

PRINCIPAL MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; and City Market, Inc., a Colorado corporation, Petitioners,
v.
PROGRESSIVE MOUNTAIN INSURANCE COMPANY, a Colorado corporation, Respondent.

No. 99SC836.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

April 30, 2001.

Antonio Bates Bernard, P.C., John L. Wheeler, Denver, CO, Attorney for Petitioners.

White and Steele, P.C., Frederick W. Klann, Keith R. Olivera, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice HOBBS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act (No-Fault Act) permits auto insurers to offer a "named driver exclusion" on certain insurance policies. Where an individual's driving record justifies the cancellation or nonrenewal of a policy, the insurer shall instead offer to exclude that individual from all *344 coverage on the policy and retain coverage for the remaining drivers. See § 10-4-721, 3 C.R.S. (2000). We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Progressive Mountain Insurance Co., 1 P.3d 250 (Colo.App.1999), to determine whether a named driver exclusion pursuant to section 10-4-721 precludes a resident relative of a named insured from collecting personal injury protection (PIP) benefits for injuries sustained in an accident involving an excluded driver.[1] We hold that when a named insured's policy expressly excludes coverage when a certain driver operates or uses a motor vehicle otherwise covered under the policy, the named insured's resident relatives are not entitled to PIP benefits for injuries arising out of the excluded driver's use or operation of the vehicle.

I.

The facts in this case are undisputed. Bonnie Wancura (Bonnie) insured her pickup truck with Progressive Mountain Insurance Company (Progressive), in accordance with the No-Fault Act. Her policy covered the period from August 22, 1995 to January 28, 1996. Pursuant to section 10-4-721, Bonnie signed an endorsement excluding her husband, Mark Wancura (Mark), from coverage on her policy. The endorsement provided:

In consideration of the premium charged for the policy to which this endorsement is attached, it is agreed that [Progressive] shall not be liable for damages, losses, or claims arising out of operation or use of your insured car or any other automobile to which the terms of this policy are extended..., either with or without the expressed or implied permission of the named insured(s), by the drivers listed below as excluded.
The named insured(s) further agrees that Progressive shall not be liable and no liability or obligation of any kind shall attach to Progressive for any negligence which may be imputed by law to the named insured(s) arising out of the maintenance, operation or use of a motor vehicle by the drivers listed below.

On November 2, 1995, while backing up the truck in their driveway, Mark struck and injured their infant daughter, Miranda. Because Mark was an excluded driver under the policy, Progressive denied PIP coverage for Miranda's injuries.

Bonnie was an employee of City Market, Inc. (City Market) at the time of the accident. City Market provided comprehensive medical expense coverage to Bonnie and Miranda (as a dependant) through Principal Mutual Life Insurance Company (Principal). Principal paid Miranda's medical and rehabilitation expenses resulting from the accident.

Principal subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action under C.R.C.P. 57(a), seeking recovery of the medical expenses by subrogation from Progressive. Both parties stipulated to the facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In June 1998, the trial court issued an order directing Progressive to reimburse Principal for Miranda's medical and rehabilitation expenses. The trial court construed the No-Fault Act to provide PIP coverage for resident relatives of a named insured for all vehicle-related accidents except in narrow circumstances that were not applicable to the instant case.

The court of appeals reversed. First, the court held that section 10-4-721 "unambiguously authorizes an insurer to exclude from coverage all liability for any insurance coverage on an insured vehicle operated by a named person excluded from coverage." Principal, 1 P.3d at 253. The court of appeals then determined that the provision of the No-Fault Act authorizing payment of benefits to resident relatives of the insured, section 10-4-707(1)(b), 3 C.R.S. (2000), was subject to the limitation in section 10-4-721. Principal, 1 P.3d at 255. The court of appeals concluded that this result was acceptable even though it left no available remedy, *345 because the General Assembly has recognized that compensation for auto accidents involves competing social goals, and that furtherance of certain goals may mean that in some circumstances, a victim is left with no remedy. See id. at 255-56.

We granted certiorari, and affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

II.

We hold that when a named insured's policy expressly excludes coverage when a certain driver operates or uses a motor vehicle otherwise covered under the policy, the named insured's resident relatives are not entitled to PIP benefits for injuries arising out of the excluded driver's operation or use of the vehicle.

A.

Scope and Purpose of the No-Fault Act

Colorado enacted the No-Fault Act in 1973 as part of a nationwide trend toward statutory no-fault insurance schemes. See ch. 94, sec. 1, §§ 13-25-1 to -23, 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 334; Allstate Ins. Co. v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 947 P.2d 341, 344 (Colo.1997). The No-Fault Act requires all registered owners of motor vehicles operated in Colorado to obtain insurance policies that carry liability and no-fault insurance coverage. See § 10-4-706, 3 C.R.S. (2000); Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689 P.2d 585, 588 (Colo.1984). The legislative intent behind the No-Fault Act is to maximize insurance coverage and to ensure that persons injured in automobile accidents are fully compensated for their injuries. See § 10-4-702, 3 C.R.S. (2000); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 902 P.2d 1386, 1387-88 (Colo.1995); Meyer, 689 P.2d at 588.

Under the no-fault scheme, insurers provide PIP benefits for injuries sustained by their own policy holders, without regard to fault. See § 10-4-706(1)(b)(I); 2 James K. Hammitt, Automobile Accident Compensation 1 (1985). These benefits cover medical and rehabilitation costs, loss of income, and death benefits. See generally § 10-4-706. In this case, we face a limitation on the PIP coverage normally afforded to resident relatives under the No-Fault Act. We examine this limitation both with an eye to the statutory text and with an appreciation of the Act's remedial and beneficent purposes. See Regional Transp. Dist. v. Voss, 890 P.2d 663, 669 (Colo.1995);

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Bluebook (online)
27 P.3d 343, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/principal-mut-ins-v-progress-mtn-ins-colo-2001.