Prince v. Liberty Mutual Insurance

106 So. 2d 736, 1958 La. App. LEXIS 747
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 21, 1958
DocketNo. 4672
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 106 So. 2d 736 (Prince v. Liberty Mutual Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prince v. Liberty Mutual Insurance, 106 So. 2d 736, 1958 La. App. LEXIS 747 (La. Ct. App. 1958).

Opinion

LOTTINGER, Judge.

This is a tort action wherein the plaintiff, Patricia Prince, seeks damages in the amount of $1,476.10 for personal injuries and property damage sustained in an automobile accident which occurred in the Parish of Pointe Coupee on November 29, 1953. In her original petition the plaintiff alleged that just previous to the accident [737]*737she was driving east on U. S. Highway No. 190 in the aforesaid parish when the car preceding her came to a sudden stop because of an accident which had occurred somewhere beyond that vehicle’s path of travel; that she applied her brakes and came to a stop when she was suddenly struck from the rear by a car driven by defendant’s assured, Noah Bohrer. By way of amended petition plaintiff charged Bohrer with specific acts of negligence, namely, driving too fast, failing to keep his vehicle under control, not keeping a proper lookout and operating his vehicle with improper brakes.

The answer, after generally denying the allegations of the original and supplemental petitions, alleged that just previous to the collision the plaintiff had lost control of her vehicle which skidded into the automobile of Bohrer. Contributory negligence was pleaded as an alternative defense.

The matter was duly tried in the Lower Court and is before us on an appeal taken by the plaintiff from a judgment which dismissed her demands.

The record shows that on the day of the accident the plaintiff was returning to Louisiana State University from her home where she had spent the Thanksgiving Holidays. Riding with her were two passengers, James Edward Keegan and Mrs. Mabel Renard. According to the plaintiff’s testimony, the accident occurred between 5:00 and 5:30 P.M. when it was dark enough to require headlights. All witnesses agreed that prior to and at the time of the accident a light rain was falling.

The pertinent part of the plaintiff’s testimony is as follows:

“Q. Immediately prior to the accident that is the first collision you were involved in, did you pass an automobile, or more than one automobile, just west of the place where the accident happened? A. I don’t recall.
“Q. You just don’t remember whether you did or didn’t? A. No.
“Q. Would you recall whether or not you had just pulled back into the traffic lane for traveling East immediately prior to noticing that the car traveling in front of you, which you ultimately struck in the rear, was beginning to stop ? A. No.
“Q. If another witness were to testify that you had just passed an automobile and were returning to the traffic lane, traffic traveling towards Baton Rouge at the time the car traveling ahead of you began to stop you wouldn’t deny that would you? A. Well, I don’t specifically remember whether I would or not. I ccm’t an-szver that.
******
“Q. Miss Prince, you have testified that when Mr. Bohrer’s car struck your automobile, that your car was at approximately a forty-five degree angle with the highway. Is that correct? A. Yes.
“Q. When you came in contact with the car in front of you, what was the position of your car on the highway? A. I had pulled back in, it probably was at an angle then.
“Q. About what degree? A. I can’t specifically say to what degree, but I had pulled back in, and the front of my car in more than the back.
“Q. You say the front of your car was in more than the back? A. Yes.
“Q. Of course, you are my witness and I don’t want to argue with you, but I don’t understand how the rear of your car was out more than the front of your car, if you were going straight ahead? A. I had pulled back in.
i|í í(í íjí íjí 5|c
“Q. Did you come in contact with the car in front of you as you pulled back to the right? A. Yes.
“Q. What part of the car in front of you did you come in contact with?
[738]*738A. I came in contact with the left side of the bumper.
“Q. That is the left side of the rear bumper? A. Thafs right.
“Q. I understand before you were able to bring your car to a stop behind the Alabama car, (the car in front of plaintiff) you did pull out in front of the Alabama car? A. Yes.
* * * * * *
“Q. Were the two cars touching each other when they came to rest after the collision between your car and Mr. Bohrer’s car? A. No, Mr. Bohrer’s car glanced off mine and got off the side of the road and rolled down into the ditch.
“Q. Mr. Bohrer’s car didn’t come in contact with the front? A. Not directly, but he came all the way to the light.
“Q. His car didn’t come into contact with your car? A. Not directly.
“Q. Mr. Keegan got the license number because it was felt at that time that car may have been connected with the accident, is that right ? A. That’s right.
“Q. If you had continued towards Baton Rouge, instead of trying to pass the car in front of you, do you think this accident would have happened? A. As far as Mr. Bohrer’s car hitting me?
“Q. No. Suppose you had not been 'trying to pass the car and drive on, would the accident have happened if you had not tried to pass the car? Would you have an opinion on that? A. I don’t know. If I hadn’t pulled out and tried to get back in the lane?
“Q. Yes. A. Yes.
“Q. Do you know why ? A. All of the cars had stopped and I went back in. I had to stop. I don’t believe I got far enough out to have too much effect.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Noah Bohrer gave the following as his version of how the accident occurred:

“Q. Will you describe what she did in that respect? A. She attempted to pass the car, (Alabama car) and I could see it jerk, and after the car pulled away from the impact of it, she was in the middle of the highway, and I tried to get out of her way, but couldn’t do anything, and I took to the right.
“What led you to believe she was fixing to go around the car? A. Going around the blackline.
“Q. Isn’t that what she did? A. A. No, not my belief. She wanted to pass the car.
“Q. Did she pull over to her left lane of traffic? A. Just to pass the car.
“Q. Is it your testimony when she struck the car in front of her, as you say she did, that her car turned around the other way? A. Yes.
“Q. She had ceased traveling east and started traveling back west? A. She was in the highway.
“Q. Then tell the Court how her car was pointed? A. Her car was pointed opposite the way she was traveling.
“Q.

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Bluebook (online)
106 So. 2d 736, 1958 La. App. LEXIS 747, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prince-v-liberty-mutual-insurance-lactapp-1958.