[1115]*1115Opinion
BAXTER, J.
Plaintiff Marta Priebe, a commercial kennel worker, brought this action against defendant Russell Nelson for personal injuries suffered when she was bitten and seriously injured by Nelson’s dog while it was boarded at the kennel that employed her. Priebe appealed from the trial court’s order denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the defense verdict, arguing a directed verdict should have been entered in her favor on her strict liability claim brought under Civil Code section 3342 (section 3342), commonly referred to as the “dog bite statute.” Section 3342 makes the owner of any dog “liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog . . . regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.” (§ 3342, subd. (a).)
Nelson countered that the so-called veterinarian’s rule absolved him of any potential liability for injuries inflicted on Priebe by his dog while it was boarded at the kennel. Under that rule, which is a recognized application of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, a dog owner who contracts with a veterinarian to treat his or her dog is generally exempt from liability should the dog bite or injure the veterinarian or veterinarian’s assistant during such medical treatment. (See Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 709, 710 [211 Cal.Rptr. 668] (Nelson).)
The narrow question presented here is whether the veterinarian’s rule should likewise bar a kennel worker’s strict liability claim against a dog owner under section 3342 for injuries sustained from a dog bite or attack while the worker was caring for the owner’s dog boarded at the kennel. The Court of Appeal concluded the doctrine should apply, finding Priebe assumed the risk of being bitten by dogs boarded at the kennel by virtue of the nature of her occupation as a kennel worker. We find the Court of Appeal’s analysis sound and shall affirm its judgment.
Our holding with regard to the dog bite statute does not, however, mark the end of the road for plaintiff. A common law strict liability cause of action may also be maintained if the owner of a domestic animal that bites or injures another person knew or had reason to know of the animal’s vicious propensities. (BAJI No. 6.66; see also Judicial Council of Cal. Civ. Jury Instas. (2003-2004) CACI No. 462.) If Nelson knew or should have known of his dog’s vicious propensities and failed to inform Priebe of such facts, he could be found to have exposed Priebe to an unknown risk and thereby be held strictly liable at common law for her injuries. (See Lipson v. Superior Court [1116]*1116(1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 371 [182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644 P.2d 822] (Lipson); cf. Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 715, fn. 4.) Under such circumstances, the defense of primary assumption of risk would not bar Priebe’s claim since she could not be found to have assumed a risk of which she was unaware. (Ibid.)
Whether Nelson knew or had reason to know his dog had vicious propensities, and if so, whether he adequately communicated that fact to Priebe or others at the kennel when the dog was surrendered for boarding, were matters sharply contested at trial. The Court of Appeal recognized the distinction between the elements of Priebe’s statutory strict liability claim under section 3342, and her remaining common law claims, affirming the trial court’s order granting her a new trial on those latter claims. Since that aspect of the Court of Appeal’s holding has not been directly challenged on review, Priebe will be afforded an opportunity to pursue those common law claims on retrial.
Facts and Procedural Background
In the fall of 2000, defendant Russell Nelson was scheduled for out-of-town surgery and boarded “Mugsey,” his 75-pound Staffordshire terrier, also known as a pit bull, at a kennel while he was away. Mugsey was “dog aggressive” and had gotten into fights with other dogs in the past. On one occasion a year earlier, Mugsey had also bitten Nelson and another dog owner moments after the two men pulled their dogs apart to avoid a fight. Nelson required several stitches in his hand as a result of the incident.
At least one kennel would not accept Mugsey for boarding when Nelson informed them the dog was hard to control around other dogs. Nelson then spoke with Peter Clusener, an acquaintance who worked at the Areata Animal Hospital (Areata), a small veterinary hospital with a kennel connected to the facility at which dogs are accepted for boarding even when no medical treatment is required. Clusener was familiar with Mugsey and knew him to be dog aggressive. He checked with the Areata veterinarian staff and informed Nelson that Mugsey could be boarded there.
Nelson claimed he visited Areata several times prior to boarding Mugsey at the facility out of concern over his dog-aggressive behavior. Nelson testified that during one such visit he told someone that Mugsey had once bitten him on the arm. On September 14, 2000, the day he dropped off Mugsey for boarding, he failed to mention that he had been bitten by the dog one year earlier. Marlena Folden, the receptionist who conducted the intake, did not recall Nelson mentioning either that Mugsey had once bitten him or that he was dog aggressive.
[1117]*1117Dr. Oliphant, a veterinarian and owner of the facility, testified Priebe’s training as a “kennel technician” would have included the basics of dog walking, including checking a boarded dog’s kennel card to make sure there was no reason not to walk it, how to put a leash and collar on properly, how to greet the dog, and “to be careful of the other dogs and be aware of the dog that you’re walking.” Her duties included “caring for the patients and the boarders, feeding, walking, cleaning, laundry, helping hold animals, assisting the veterinarians and the technicians holding animals. We examine them, give vaccines . . . greeting clients, to bring animals back for vaccines when the technicians were doing booster vaccines . . . autoclaving [instrument sterilization], clean surgical packs, instruments, things like that. Lots of varied duties.”
Dr. Oliphant had occasion to observe Mugsey in the kennel while he was boarded there and recalled that “[h]e always appeared friendly. He was a very outgoing, friendly dog.” Prior to his attacking Priebe, Mugsey showed no signs of being “human aggressive.” Dr. Oliphant was, however, aware that Mugsey was dog aggressive: “It was written on his record and on the cage pen.” Mugsey’s intake record also reflected that he had been administered 37 milligrams of apromocine, a sedative, on the day he was accepted for boarding, in likelihood due to his excitement and excessive barking. Dr. Oliphant testified there are some risks associated with walking dogs at the kennel. When asked whether being attacked or bitten by a dog while walking it is one such risk, Dr. Oliphant replied, “Well, sure. That’s possible.”
Dr. Oliphant testified further that when walking a dog-aggressive dog, “[t]here would be a danger that it might attack another dog.” When asked if there was a risk that a person breaking up a dogfight could get bitten, she replied, “Oh, yes, definitely.” When asked, “If after you talked with [your] receptionist someone had mentioned something that triggered her concern, you met with an owner, and the owner had told you that, for example, he got nipped on his arm when he was breaking up a dog fight, is that something that would have concerned you and kept you from keeping the dog?,” Dr. Oliphant replied, “Not necessarily. It would depend on the dog and the owner and the circumstances, because breaking up a dogfight is a very risky thing to do, and it’s common to get bit when you break up a dog fight.” Dr. Oliphant testified she would not have accepted a dog for boarding who had attacked and bitten its owner after a dogfight because it would be “too much of a risk” for the staff. In such an instance, she would possibly refer the dog to the North Bank Kennel facility since “they have inside-outside runs, so they don’t need to walk dogs; so we often refer aggressive dogs to them.”
[1118]*1118Priebe testified she had been working as a kennel worker or technician at Areata for about four weeks when she met Nelson and Mugsey on September 14, 2000. They walked back to the kennels together. Nelson told Priebe that Mugsey needed to be walked with his metal-pronged pinch collar. He also told her that “if anyone hurt Mugsey[,] that he may hurt them, and that if someone kicked Mugsey, that he may bite them.” Priebe assured Nelson that no one would hurt or kick his dog.
At some point Priebe became aware Mugsey was dog aggressive. She posted a note on his kennel card and the employee memo board warning of that fact. Priebe also raised the issue with Dr. Oliphant, who suggested she walk Mugsey before and after clients came in and out of the building, to minimize contact with other dogs. Priebe also received instructions from Clusener, her coworker who knew and had himself walked Mugsey, on how to use the pinch collar and harness setup to restrain the dog. Thereafter, Priebe walked Mugsey twice a day for two weeks without incident.
On the morning of September 28, 2000, while taking Mugsey for his morning walk, Priebe heard a dog barking in the back of a pickup truck in the parking lot. Mugsey began barking and becoming agitated. Priebe decided to turn around and return to the kennel. As she was doing so Mugsey grabbed her foot, knocking her down while mauling her foot and ankle. It took several onlookers to subdue the dog and get him to let go of Priebe’s foot. Priebe was taken by ambulance to a local hospital. She suffered numerous bites to her foot and ankle as well as serious nerve injuries that required her to undergo physical therapy and will cause her pain for the rest of her life.
Priebe filed suit against Nelson in February 2001, asserting causes of action for statutory and common law strict liability, negligence, and tortious misrepresentation. Initially the trial court permitted Priebe to proceed on a theory of statutory strict liability pursuant to section 3342. At the close of evidence, however, the court reversed itself, concluding that given the nature of Priebe’s occupation and employment as a kennel worker, she had, as a matter of law, assumed the risk of being bitten by dogs boarded at the kennel where she worked. Over Priebe’s objection, the court denied her request for instructions on strict liability under section 3342, and refused her request for instructions on common law strict liability as well. (BAJI No. 6.66; CACI No. 462.) The case was submitted to the jury on a negligence theory of liability. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant Nelson.
Priebe moved for judgment notwithstanding the defense verdict on her statutory strict liability claim, which motion was denied. She also made a [1119]*1119motion for a new trial which the trial court granted, concluding that, “Plaintiff’s counsel was unfairly required to try a case on one theory [statutory strict liability], which theory was then disallowed by the court at the close of evidence.”
Nelson appealed from the trial court’s order granting Priebe a new trial. Priebe in turn appealed from the order denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on her statutory strict liability cause of action. She further argued the jury should have been instructed on common law strict liability in accordance with BAJI No. 6.66 (owning or keeping an animal with vicious propensities).
The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Priebe a new trial, a holding from which Nelson did not seek review. The court went on to affirm the trial court’s order denying Priebe’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on her statutory strict liability claim, from which holding Priebe sought review.
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the strict liability dog bite statute (§ 3342) is inapplicable on these facts by virtue of the veterinarian’s rule, an offshoot of the “fireman’s rule,” which rules are also sometimes collectively referred to as “occupational assumption of the risk.” (See Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 538 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 630, 882 P.2d 347] (Neighbarger) [fireman’s or firefighter’s rule]; Cohen v. McIntyre (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 650, 654-655 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 143] (Cohen) [veterinarian’s rule]; Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at pp. 713-715 [veterinarian’s rule applied to veterinary assistant].) The Court of Appeal concluded the veterinarian’s rule should logically be extended to commercial kennel workers such as Priebe who, the court reasoned, regularly assume the risk of being bitten by dogs boarded at the kennels where they work as an inherent risk of their occupation.
The Court of Appeal went on to hold that Priebe was entitled to an instruction on common law strict liability on the theory that the owner of a domestic animal who knows or has reason to know of its vicious propensities is strictly liable for injuries caused by the animal. (BAJI No. 6.66; CACI No. 462.)
We granted Priebe’s petition for review, limited to the question whether the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, as embodied in the veterinarian’s rule, bars the strict liability claim of a kennel worker under the dog bite statute.
[1120]*1120Discussion
In Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696] (Knight), we explained that “[a]s a general rule, persons have a duty to use due care to avoid injury to others, and may be held liable if their careless conduct injures another person. (See Civ. Code, § 1714.)” (Id. at p. 315; see also Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 538.) The question whether Nelson can be held liable in tort for the injuries inflicted on Priebe by his dog while it was boarded at the kennel and under her care is also primarily one of duty. In particular, we are concerned with Nelson’s duty of care under the strict liability dog bite statute. Section 3342 provides, in pertinent part, “The owner of any dog is liable for the damages suffered by any person who is bitten by the dog while in a public place or lawfully in a private place, including the property of the owner of the dog, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owner’s knowledge of such viciousness.” (Id., subd. (a).)
Subdivision (a) of section 3342 has been recognized as imposing a duty of care on every dog owner to prevent his or her dog from biting persons in a public place or lawfully in a private place. (Davis v. Gaschler (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1399 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 679] (Davis).) Simply put, the statute is designed “to prevent dogs from becoming a hazard to the community” (ibid.) by holding dog owners to such a standard of care, and assigning strict liability for its breach.
Nelson contends that notwithstanding any duty of care imposed on him generally or specifically under the dog bite statute, because he relinquished custody and control of Mugsey to the Areata kennel, and because dog bites are an inherent risk of work at a dog kennel, the doctrine of primary assumption of risk must be applied to bar Priebe’s statutory strict liability claim.
The doctrine of assumption of risk, which is generally applicable in strict liability actions (Lipson, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 376; see Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 733 [144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162]), has long been recognized as a defense to a personal injury action brought pursuant to the dog bite statute (§ 3342) under appropriate facts. (See Gomes v. Byrne (1959) 51 Cal.2d 418, 420 [333 P.2d 754]; Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 713, and cases cited.)1 A finding that the doctrine of primary [1121]*1121assumption of risk applies in any given factual context is, in essence, a determination, reached as a matter of law, that the defendant should be excused from the usual duty of care based on some clear, overriding statutory or public policy. (Neighbarger, supra, Cal.4th at p. 537; see Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 112 [70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561].)
In Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, we characterized primary assumption of risk as “those instances in which the assumption of risk doctrine embodies a legal conclusion that there is ‘no duty’ on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk . . . .” (Id. at p. 308.) In primary assumption of risk cases, “the question whether the defendant owed a legal duty [of care] to protect the plaintiff from a particular risk of harm does not turn on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the plaintiff’s conduct, but rather on the nature of the activity or sport in which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport.” (Id. at p. 309, italics added.)
In Knight, the plaintiff brought an action for negligence and assault and battery for injuries she sustained when defendant knocked her over and stepped on her finger during an informal touch football game. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirmed, observing that defendant did not breach a legal duty of care owed to plaintiff when he injured her while both were voluntarily participating in the game because “defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself.” (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 315.) Plaintiff’s action was therefore found barred under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. (Id. at p. 321.)
The “venerable fireman’s [or firefighter’s] rule” is perhaps the most familiar example of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. (Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 202 [142 Cal.Rptr. 152, 571 P.2d 609] [applying rule to police officers injured in line of duty].) Although Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, involved the assumption of risks inherent in sports activities, we cited the firefighter’s rule in that case as another example of a proper application of the doctrine, observing that, “In addition to the sports setting, the primary assumption of risk doctrine also comes into play in the category of cases often described as involving the ‘firefighter’s rule.’ [Citation.] In its [1122]*1122most classic form, the firefighter’s rule involves the question whether a person who negligently has started a fire is liable for an injury sustained by a firefighter who is summoned to fight the fire; the rule provides that the person who started the fire is not liable under such circumstances. (See, e.g., Walters v. Sloan (1977) 20 Cal.3d 199, 202.) Although a number of theories have been cited to support this conclusion, the most persuasive explanation is that the party who negligently started the fire had no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very danger that the firefighter is employed to confront. (See, e.g., Baker v. Superior Court (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 710, 719-721 [181 Cal.Rptr. 311]; Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 709, 714 [211 Cal.Rptr. 668]. See generally 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 739, pp. 69-70 [discussing rule as one illustration of duty approach]; Anicet v. Gant (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991) 580 So.2d 273, 276 [‘a person specifically hired to encounter and combat particular dangers is owed no independent tort duty by those who have created those dangers . . . .’].) Because the defendant in such a case owes no duty to protect the firefighter from such risks, the firefighter has no cause of action even if the risk created by the fire was so great that a trier of fact could find it was unreasonable for the firefighter to choose to encounter the risk.” (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 309, fn. 5, italics added.)
The veterinarian’s rule, an offshoot of the firefighter’s rule, has also been recognized in past decisions of this court as yet another application of the doctrine of primary assumption of risk. (Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 544—546; Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 309, fn. 5.) The rule, first announced in Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 709, “has been held generally to exempt those who contract with veterinarians to treat their dogs from liability should the dog bite the veterinarian during treatment. (See Cohen v. McIntyre (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 650 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 143] [veterinarian]; Wittenberg v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 185 [229 Cal.Rptr. 625] [same]; Nelson v. Hall (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 709 [veterinary assistant].)” (Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 544—545.)
In Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 709, the plaintiff, a veterinary assistant, brought a strict liability action under the dog bite statute for injuries sustained when she was bitten while assisting a veterinarian in preparing a dog for minor surgery at the animal hospital where she worked. The dog was administered a sedative and lifted onto the treatment table. The plaintiff was standing alongside the table waiting for the sedative to take effect, her arms resting loosely on the dog. She was not restraining him, and he appeared calm. Without warning, he quickly turned and bit plaintiff in the face, causing severe injuries. The dog was known to the veterinary hospital staff as a dog that might attempt to bite while receiving medical treatment. On at least one prior occasion, he had attempted to bite his handlers, and a notation of [1123]*1123“careful” was written on his treatment card, although this fact was not communicated to the dog’s owners. The hospital also had a practice of using muzzles on dogs that were known to be vicious, but no muzzle was used on this occasion. (Id. at pp. 711-712.) The defendants, who were not aware their dog had any vicious propensities, contended plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from dog bites, arguing that strict liability for their dog’s actions under section 3342 “terminated when they delivered the dog to a qualified veterinarian and the veterinarian accepted employment.” (Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 711.)
The plaintiff in Nelson, the court observed, was aware of the risks involved in treating dogs; indeed she herself had been bitten several times in the past. (Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 714.)2 The veterinarian who employed the plaintiff testified that dog bites are an occupational hazard in the veterinary profession, and that it cannot be assumed a normally gentle dog will act gently while receiving medical treatment. The Nelson court concluded such a risk “logically extends to those who assist veterinarians in the treatment of dogs.” (Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 714.) The court concluded further that, “The risk of dog bites during treatment is a specific known hazard endemic to the very occupation in which plaintiff voluntarily engaged. Therefore, in voluntarily engaging in the occupation of assisting veterinarians in the medical treatment of dogs, plaintiff assumed the risk of being bitten during the course of treatment.” (Ibid.)
The Nelson court also addressed the question whether the dog’s owners could assert primary assumption of risk as a complete defense to the plaintiff’s statutory strict liability claim under section 3342. The court undertook a brief review of the principles underlying the firefighter’s rule, and concluded, “The same principles apply here. A veterinarian or a veterinary assistant who accepts employment for the medical treatment of a dog, aware of the risk that any dog, regardless of its previous nature, might bite while being treated, has assumed this risk as part of his or her occupation. [1124]*1124The veterinarian determines the method of treatment and handling of the dog. He or she is the person in possession and control of the dog and is in the best position to take necessary precautions and protective measures. The dog owner who has no knowledge of its particular vicious propensities has no control over what happens to the dog while being treated in a strange environment and cannot know how the dog will react to treatment. A dog owner who does no more than turn his or her dog over to a qualified veterinarian for medical treatment should not be held strictly liable when the dog bites a veterinarian or a veterinary assistant while being treated. [][] Accordingly, we hold that assumption of the risk is a complete defense to an action by a veterinary assistant against a dog owner for damages for injuries suffered from being bitten by the owner’s dog during the course of medical treatment.” (Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 715, fn. omitted.)
Ever since Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 709, was decided, the doctrine of primary assumption of risk as embodied in the veterinarian’s rule has been applied in California to bar recovery in personal injury actions brought under the dog bite statute by veterinarians and their assistants who are bitten or injured while treating dogs under their care. For example, in Cohen, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 650, the plaintiff, a county-employed veterinarian, was bitten several times by a dog brought into his clinic for a preneutering examination. The Cohen court concluded the case before it was “a classic situation where a defendant’s ordinary duty of care is negated due to the nature of the activity and the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 655, fn. & italics omitted.) The court explained that, “Cohen, a licensed veterinarian, was injured during the course of treating an animal under his control, an activity for which he was employed and compensated and one in which the risk of being attacked and bitten is well known.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Similarly, in Willenberg v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 185 [229 Cal.Rptr. 625] (Willenberg), decided one year after Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 709, the court applied the veterinarian’s rule to bar a personal injury claim by a veterinarian whose shoulder was injured when the dog he was about to examine suddenly leaped onto him from the examination table, forcing him to “ ‘wrestle her down.’ ” (Willenberg, at p. 186.) Quoting Nelson for the proposition that “ ‘[I]t is generally accepted in the veterinary profession that any animal may react strangely or dangerously while receiving treatment, regardless of its behavior in the home environment,’ ” the Willenberg court found Nelson dispositive on the facts before it, explaining that, “The point of the Nelson case is that a visit to the veterinarian’s office can bring about unpredictable behavior in a normally docile animal, and this is an inherent risk which every veterinarian assumes.” (Willenberg, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at pp. 186, 187, fn. omitted.)
[1125]*1125The Court of Appeal below concluded the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, as embodied in the veterinarian’s rule, must likewise be found to bar Priebe’s strict liability claim under the dog bite statute by virtue of her occupation as a kennel worker. The court drew an analogy between veterinarians and their assistants, who routinely risk being bitten while treating dogs in the unfamiliar environment of their office or examination room, and kennel workers like Priebe, who likewise routinely risk being bitten by dogs under their care in the unfamiliar surroundings of a boarding kennel.
A number of cases support the Court of Appeal’s conclusion. In two California decisions discussed by this court in connection with the veterinarian’s rule in Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th 532, the courts were arguably predisposed to extending the bar to recovery of damages in suits brought by those other than veterinarians who also cared for or handled dogs in a professional or commercial capacity, were it not for the fact that no contract for the services to be rendered had been entered into before the plaintiffs’ injuries were sustained, thereby precluding application of an assumption of risk defense. (Davis, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1401 [veterinarian’s rule inapplicable where dog owner had not contracted for services of plaintiff, an experienced dog breeder and handler]; Prays v. Perryman (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1133, 1137 [262 Cal.Rptr. 180] [veterinarian’s rule inapplicable where commercial dog groomer had not yet formally accepted defendant’s dog for grooming or entered into contractual grooming agreement]; see Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 545-546.)
Two additional sister-state court decisions have placed principal reliance on the California Court of Appeal decision in Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 709, concluding the rationale of Nelson’s veterinarian’s rule barred personal injury actions under those states’ respective strict liability dog bite statutes brought by individuals, other than veterinarians, who had contracted with dog owners to provide care or other services for their dogs.
In Jordan v. Lusby (Ky.Ct.App. 2002) 81 S.W.3d 523 (Jordan), the Kentucky Court of Appeal placed sole reliance on Nelson, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 709, for its conclusion that a dog groomer who was bitten by a dog she had accepted for grooming assumed the risk of being bitten by the animal and was thus barred from suing the dog owner under Kentucky’s strict liability dog bite statute. (Jordan, at pp. 524—525.) The Jordan court observed that, “The profession of dog grooming naturally entails a risk of being bitten by a client’s dog, as do other professions involving the care of animals such as kennel owner or veterinarian. Common sense dictates that a person who grooms dogs must be deemed to be aware of the risks involved in dealing [1126]*1126with any dog, not just a dog of a particular breed. While, of course, it makes sense for a groomer to ask questions relating to a dog’s propensity to bite for reasons of personal safety, it does not logically follow that a person who is in the business of grooming or otherwise caring for dogs does not assume the risk of being bitten by dogs.” (Jordan, supra, 81 S.W.3d at pp. 524—525.)
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Lancaster County Prison (1999) 325 NJ. Super. 298 [739 A.2d 413] (Reynolds), the New Jersey court placed principal reliance on Nelson, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 709, holding that the defense of primary assumption of risk, as embodied in Nelson’s veterinarian’s rule, barred recovery under New Jersey’s strict liability dog bite statute by an independent contractor who had been attacked and seriously injured by a dog he agreed to care for in connection with his employment as manager of a guard dog company. In that case, one of the defendants, the Lancaster County prison, had given one of its dogs, a 134-pound Rottweiler trained as an attack dog for prison control, to another defendant, Guard Dogs Unlimited, a private guard dog service company. Although the dog had bitten prison employees on five separate occasions in the past, the prison failed to disclose this fact when it turned the dog over to the guard dog company. Within two months, the dog attacked and seriously injured the company manager, an independent contractor. At trial, the jury found the guard dog company liable for its manager’s injuries under New Jersey’s strict liability dog bite statute, which is nearly identical to California’s dog bite statute (§ 3342).3 The guard dog company appealed, arguing the plaintiff had agreed to care for the dog in his capacity as company manager, and had thereby assumed the risk of being bitten by the dog. (Reynolds, supra, 739 A.2d at pp. 417-418.) The court was thus “called upon to determine the duty of a dog owner to an independent contractor who is bitten while carrying out his contractual obligation to care for the dog on the owner’s property.” (Id. at p. 426.)
The Reynolds court quoted Nelson, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d 709, at some length and declared its analysis “sound.” (Reynolds, supra, 739 A.2d at p. 427.) The court observed that, “In ordinary circumstances, when a dog is delivered for care to an independent contractor the owner is entitled to rely on the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk.” (Ibid.) Although concluding the doctrine, as embodied in Nelson’s veterinarian’s rule, barred recovery of damages under New Jersey’s strict liability dog bite statute, the court went on to affirm the plaintiff’s judgment on an alternate theory of liability on which the judgment was also based—common law negligence—for failure to [1127]*1127adequately investigate and warn of the dog’s history of viciousness under the “peculiar circumstances” of the case. (739 A.2d at p. 428.)
In two other sister-state decisions, the assumption of risk defense was specifically extended to bar recovery by a “kennel attendant” (Lundy v. Stuhr (1987) 185 Ga.App. 72 [363 S.E.2d 343, 344-346] [Georgia common law claim]), and a volunteer kennel worker (Khamis v. Everson (1993) 88 OhioApp.3d 220 [623 N.E.2d 683, 687] [Ohio statutory strict liability claim]), for injuries arising from a dog bite or attack sustained while performing various kennel duties. In Khamis, the Ohio appellate court explained that Ohio’s strict liability dog bite statute was “intended to protect those people who are not in a position to control the dog.” (Ibid.)4
In arguing that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk should not be applied as a bar to her statutory strict liability claim, Priebe urges us to focus on many of the facts peculiar to her case. It is undisputed that she was seriously injured as a result of Mugsey’s attack. She asserts Nelson’s dog was predisposed to become vicious and bite or attack people, pointing out that, unbeknownst to her, the dog had bitten Nelson and another individual in the past. She alleges Nelson failed to disclose this fact to her or anyone else at the kennel, suggesting she thus had no subjective appreciation of the risk she actually faced when caring for and walking this particular dog. She notes she had only been working at the kennel for approximately one month before the attack, and that although she received some general training as a kennel worker, and some specific advice from her colleague Clusener on how to harness, walk, and if need be, restrain Mugsey with his metal-pronged pinch collar, she received no special training on how to care for or manage a dog of his vicious and dangerous nature.
[1128]*1128Many of these facts, if established on retrial, could become relevant to Priebe’s common law strict liability claim on the theory that Nelson knowingly harbored a vicious dog and failed to disclose that fact to her or other Areata kennel personnel, thereby exposing them to an unknown risk of injury well beyond that normally associated with work at a dog kennel. As noted, the Court of Appeal held that, on retrial, Priebe will be entitled to pursue her common law strict liability claim (BAJI No. 6.66; CACI No. 462) denied her in the first trial, a ruling which has not been challenged on review.
The precise question here, however, and the only one on which Priebe sought review, is whether the Court of Appeal correctly concluded the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, as embodied in the veterinarian’s rule, serves as a bar to her strict liability claim against Nelson under the dog bite statute. (§ 3342). As Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, teaches, this is a question of law turning largely on objective factors, such as the relationship between kennel workers and dog owners with respect to the activity of caring for and walking dogs boarded at a commercial kennel pursuant to a boarding agreement, and any policy reasons favoring or disfavoring recognition of assumption of risk as a complete defense to a statutory strict liability action brought by a kennel worker for injuries sustained while on the job.
We have already considered the legislative intent and purpose behind California’s strict liability dog bite statute as it bears on the question whether assumption of risk should be recognized as a complete defense to a kennel worker’s claim for damages under its provisions. Priebe argues section 3342 “represents a fundamental determination of legal policy by the California Legislature that the risk of a dog unexpectedly biting a person is to be borne by the person who has chosen to own that dog and thus create that risk for society, even when the owner is not at fault in any way and has no reason to know that the dog is vicious.” We believe Priebe reads too much into the statute.
We have shown that subdivision (a) of section 3342 has been held to impose a duty of care on every dog owner to prevent his or her dog from biting persons in a public place or lawfully in a private place so as “to prevent dogs from becoming a hazard to the community.” (Davis, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399.) We see nothing in the language of the statute to suggest the Legislature ever contemplated or intended that such a duty of care, and imposition of strict liability for its breach, should apply in those situations where the care, custody, and control of a dog has been entrusted to trained professionals in exchange for compensation, as is the case when a dog is left with a veterinarian for medical treatment, or placed in a licensed commercial kennel for boarding.
[1129]*1129We agree with the observations of the Court of Appeal below, that “the business of kenneling is such that the kennel operators assume the care and handling of dogs entrusted to their professional care during the absence of their owners,” and that “[o]nce a dog has been accepted for kenneling and the owner leaves, the kennel staff are in charge of the dog, not the owner. They determine the best way to handle the dog while at the kennel, and what protective measures, if any, should be taken to ensure employee safety.” It seems counterintuitive to hold a dog owner strictly liable to a kennel worker for breach of the duty of care under section 3342 under circumstances where the dog owner has completely relinquished the care, custody, and control of his or her dog to a veterinarian or similar professional trained to care for and safely handle dogs, and the dog owner is therefore not in a position to supervise or prevent any conduct on the part of the dog.
Notwithstanding the general intent and purpose behind section 3342, we must also ask, is there is any clear public policy that would justify excusing the specific duty of care imposed on dog owners under the statute by extending the veterinarian’s rule as a bar to personal injury suits by kennel workers injured on the job by dogs left in their exclusive care and control? The pertinent case law identifies several relevant public policies.
We have examined the California cases, starting with Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d 709, as well as its progeny, that have applied the veterinarian’s rule in various factual settings. (E.g., Cohen, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th 650; Willenberg, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d 185; see Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 544-546.) We have also examined several out-of-state decisions that have considered the rationale for the veterinarian’s rule, including two decisions that placed express reliance on the Nelson decision in applying the rule in their states. (Jordan, supra, 81 S.W.3d 523 [Ky.]; Reynolds, supra, 739 A.2d 413 [N.J.].) And, as we have seen, several intermediate appellate court decisions, both within and outside of California, have already seen fit to extend the veterinarian’s rule to veterinary assistants (Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 714); dog groomers (Jordan, supra, 81 S.W.3d at pp. 524-525); and in some instances, to kennel technicians or kennel workers (Lundy v. Stuhr, supra, 363 S.E.2d at pp. 344-346; Khamis v. Everson, supra, 623 N.E.2d at p. 687) who are bitten or otherwise injured by a dog left in their charge and care.
One rationale given in these cases for excusing the dog owner’s usual duty of care under the veterinarian’s rule lies in “ ‘the nature of the activity’ ” that characterizes the veterinary profession. (Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 545; Cohen, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 655.) As the Nelson court [1130]*1130explained, “The risk of dog bites during treatment is a specific known hazard endemic to the very occupation in which plaintiff voluntarily engaged. Therefore, in voluntarily engaging in the occupation of assisting veterinarians in the medical treatment of dogs, plaintiff assumed the risk of being bitten during the course of treatment.” (Nelson, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at p. 714.) The Nelson court observed further, “A veterinarian or a veterinary assistant who accepts employment for the medical treatment of a dog, aware of the risk that any dog, regardless of its previous nature, might bite while being treated, has assumed this risk as part of his or her occupation. The veterinarian determines the method of treatment and handling of the dog. He or she is the person in possession and control of the dog and is in the best position to take necessary precautions and protective measures.” (Id. at p. 715.)
Hence, one public policy supportive of the veterinarian’s rule is the commonsense recognition that veterinarians, their trained assistants, and those in similarly situated professions (e.g., dog groomers, kennel technicians) are in the best position, and usually the only position, to take the necessary safety precautions and protective measures to avoid being bitten or otherwise injured by a dog left in their care and control. We believe that same policy reason supports extension of the veterinarian’s rule to kennel workers, such as Priebe, who are likewise trained to safely care for, walk, and handle dogs, and who are in the only position to look out for their own personal safety when working with dogs boarded at their kennels in the dog owners’ absence. From a public policy standpoint, it makes little sense to hold a dog owner strictly liable for the routine risk of dog bite injuries suffered by such trained and paid professionals.
A second rationale given in the case law for excusing the dog owner’s usual duty of care under the dog bite statute arises from the special nature of “the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff.” (Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 545; see Cohen, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 655.) It can be observed that in dog bite cases, unlike most other tort actions, the very instrumentality that causes the harm or injury to the plaintiff, i.e., the dog that bites or attacks, has oftentimes been physically separated from the custody and control of the supposed tortfeasor, i.e., the dog’s legal owner, and relinquished to the care, custody, and control of the plaintiff, most often pursuant to a contractual agreement providing compensation for services such as medical care, grooming, or boarding. That state of affairs arguably leaves little if anything left to be done on the part of the dog owner to make good on his specific duty of care under section 3342, once custody and care of his dog is relinquished to the professional. As one court put it, “where a person accepts responsibility for controlling an animal, she cannot maintain a cause of action for injuries resulting from her own failure to control the animal.” (Wilcoxen v. Paige (1988) 174 Ill.App.3d 541 [124 Ill.Dec. 213, 528 N.E.2d 1104].)
[1131]*1131Hence, a second public policy supportive of the veterinarian’s rule is the commonsense recognition that veterinarians, their trained assistants, and those in similarly situated professions (e.g., dog groomers, kennel technicians) enter into contractual relationships with dog owners and receive compensation for the services they provide, which services, by their very nature and design, include the safe care and handling of dogs left in their charge. Here again, we believe that same policy reason supports extension of the veterinarian’s rule to kennel workers, such as Priebe, who are also trained to safely walk and handle dogs left for boarding under their exclusive care and control, and who are compensated pursuant to a contractual agreement for providing those very services.
There is yet a another policy reason for extending the veterinarian’s rule to kennel workers such as Priebe, one perhaps best articulated by the Louisiana court in Dubois v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co. (La.Ct.App. 1998) 715 So.2d 131. In that case, a veterinary technician whose duties included “care of the kennel” was prevented from recovering for injuries suffered when a dog she was leading from a dog run by his collar bit her in the hand. (Id., 715 So.2d at p. 132.) The Louisiana strict liability dog bite statute there at issue (La. Civ. Code, art. 2321) provided only that “ ‘The owner of an animal is answerable for the damage caused by the animal.’ ” (Dubois v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., supra, 715 So.2d at p. 133, fn. omitted.) Applying the “risk-utility balancing test” applicable in Louisiana to determine whether the behavior of the dog “created or represented an unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff” (ibid.), the Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in favor of the dog’s owners, concluding that “the likelihood of injury resulting from such dog-like behavior” and “the gravity of the harm threatened by the behavior” were outweighed by “the utility of allowing dog owners to board their pets and have trained technicians care for the animal while the owner is out of town.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Extending the veterinarian’s rule as a bar to personal injury actions by kennel workers who are bitten or injured by a dog while on the job will therefore further serve the policy of encouraging dog owners to avail themselves of the services of licensed commercial dog kennels, without the threat of liability and lawsuits for injuries caused by their dogs’ conduct hanging over their heads, conduct they are in no position to guard against or control once the dog is surrendered to the kennel for boarding. Encouraging the use of secure kennel boarding facilities in turn serves the salutory purpose behind the dog bite statute—that of protecting members of the public from harm or injury by dogs not properly under their owners’ control and which they (the members of the public) themselves are in no position to control.
[1132]*1132We therefore conclude that Priebe, by virtue of the nature of her occupation as a kennel worker, assumed the risk of being bitten or otherwise injured by the dogs under her care and control while in the custody of the commercial kennel where she worked pursuant to a contractual boarding agreement. The Court of Appeal correctly concluded a strict liability cause of action under the dog bite statute (§ 3342) was therefore unavailable to Priebe.
As we have noted, the factual matters of whether Nelson knew or had reason to know of Mugsey’s vicious propensities, and whether he adequately warned Priebe or other Areata staff members of the fact that his dog had bitten him and another individual in the past, were contested below. On retrial, Priebe will have the opportunity to again seek to establish facts supportive of her common law strict liability claim against Nelson for knowingly keeping a domestic animal with vicious propensities. (BAJI No. 6.66; CACI No. 462.)
Conclusion
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed, and the matter remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
George, C. J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., Moreno, J., and Corrigan, J., concurred.