[Cite as Priddy v. Kline, 2025-Ohio-5718.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY
PAMELA PRIDDY, CASE NO. 2025-T-0031
Plaintiff-Appellee, Civil Appeal from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas
KENNETH KLINE, Trial Court No. 2023 CV 00627 Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: December 22, 2025 Judgment: Reversed
Andrew C. Stebbins, Christina N. Williams, and Emily M. Grigas, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.C., 1375 East Ninth Street, Suite 1700, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Ryan C. Spitzer and Brian M. Zets, Isaac Wiles Burkholder & Miller, L.L.C., Two Miranova Place, Suite 700, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Kenneth Kline, appeals the interlocutory order of the Trumbull
County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for summary judgment relating to his
claim of immunity, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. We reverse the trial court and enter
judgment in favor of Mr. Kline granting him immunity from the underlying claims.
{¶2} Appellee, Pamela Priddy, served as the Village Manager of Newton Falls
since 2021. All employment decisions related to Ms. Priddy’s position, inclusive of
decisions regarding termination, are governed by Village Council and require a majority of members of council for action. Mr. Kline was the Mayor of the Village of Newton Falls
when Ms. Priddy was first appointed Village Manager.
{¶3} In addition to managing the village’s various departments, the Village
Manager is required to keep Village Council advised of the financial condition and future
needs of the village and make recommendations to council concerning the affairs of the
city.
{¶4} In 2021, when Ms. Priddy became Village Manager, Newton Falls was in
significant financial distress due, in part, to funding issues related to the Village’s police
department. The police department contracted with Newton Falls School District (“the
District”) to place a village police department school resource officer (“SRO”) in the
school. In August 2022, the Newton Falls Village School District Board of Education (“the
Board”) and the Village of Newton Falls Police Department entered into an agreement
under which the police department would provide security for schools as SROs.
{¶5} Under the contract, the school district was responsible for the funds to pay
for the services of the SRO, which was an amount above what the village paid the police
department for police services. The evidence suggests, however, the agreement was
contingent upon the existence of the Newton Falls Police Department.
{¶6} Council disbanded the Village Police Department in November or
December 2022 following a levy failure amidst the village’s continued financial distress.
In January 2023, Ms. Priddy spoke with the school district’s Superintendent, Justin
Christopher, and explained the village could not afford to continue offering an SRO from
Newton Falls Police Department. As a result, the school district would have to pay for the
entire cost of an SRO. According to Ms. Priddy, Mr. Christopher was “okay with
PAGE 2 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 everything.” He apparently did not mind paying the additional charges, and Ms. Priddy
indicated he could have his choice of which SRO he wanted.
{¶7} No contractual amendment was made to the District’s SRO payment
obligations and Ms. Priddy did not “believe” the District canceled the contract.
{¶8} Ms. Priddy did not have any conversations with Mr. Christopher between
January 20, 2023 and March 15, 2023. On the latter date, the SRO was still on site at the
school, but no arrangements for the costs of the SRO had been made. Ms. Priddy
attempted to contact Mr. Christopher regarding the cost/payment issues regarding the
SRO; she did not receive a response. Accordingly, on March 16, 2023, Ms. Priddy notified
Mr. Christopher she would be “pulling” the acting SRO unless she heard back from him.
She maintained her tact was to compel Mr. Christopher to respond because the village
did not have the resources to pay for the officer (after the disbandment of the police
department).
{¶9} Mr. Christopher replied that he did not have the authority to approve any
amendment to the original SRO agreement without the approval of the Board. Later, at
approximately 6 p.m., March 16, 2023, Mr. Christopher emailed the Board. The email
stated, in part:
Today, the village manager threatened to pull the SRO from the school if we did not agree to pay the additional amount. I replied back . . . I vaguely recall having a conversation with you about added costs for having the SRO. As you know, I cannot solely act on approving any amendment to the original SRO agreement that we have without the Board of Education approving the authorization of funds. I would need something in writing from the Village outlining the additional costs and amendments to the contract. The school legal attorney would then need to review the contract amendments before I can make the recommendation to the board of education to approve the additional expenditure. The village manager sent
PAGE 3 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 an email this evening declaring that she is pulling the SRO from the school.
I reached out [to] the sheriff’s department this evening and spoke with Commander Villanueva about the situation and he assured me that the sheriff’s department will provide the school with an additional presence on the campus, sheriff deputy walkthroughs of the buildings and added patrol on the campus. I have a follow up phone call with him tomorrow to discuss a more permanent arrangement to get us through the remainder of the school year. Additionally, we discussed the need for SRO’s from the sheriff’s department for the next school year. I will keep you updated as this situation continues to unfold.
{¶10} As discussed below, the information in the email sent by Mr. Christopher
was made available to Mr. Kline.
{¶11} Notwithstanding the representations in the various emails, at no time did
Ms. Priddy state that she actually “pulled” the acting SRO. Indeed, Ms. Priddy attempted
to call Mr. Kline but could not reach him.
{¶12} Later, at 6:25 p.m., March 16, 2023, Mr. Kline sent Ms. Priddy a text asking
“where [sic] you calling about school resource officer? Tonya [Mr. Kline’s wife, who is on
the school board], got a[n] email about it and I told her I don’t know anything about it[.]”
Ms. Priddy responded, “Yes. Does Tonya know if they need him to report there
tomorrow?? I will have to let [the acting SRO] know because he drives in from Akron.” Mr.
Kline replied, “I’m not sure[,] Tonya is asking[.] [Mr. Christopher] told Tonya that they will
have [a] sheriff there tomorrow and are working on a permanent agreement. So it worked
out best for all involved. Thank you for the info.”
{¶13} Ms. Priddy subsequently contacted the acting SRO, and he indicated the
school had not communicated with him that day. Ms. Priddy replied, “OK. Well I have no
idea what they are doing. So I guess unless you hear otherwise from me. You don’t need
PAGE 4 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 to go to the school tomorrow.” The SRO replied, “So do not report?” Ms. Priddy
responded, “Not to the school. Apparently they have an agreement in place with the
sheriff. . . .”
{¶14} The following morning, on March 17, 2023, Ms. Priddy averred that she was
advised a sheriff’s deputy was not present as an SRO at the school. Ms. Priddy also
averred, however, she made arrangements to ensure “someone actually appeared
through communications with the Sheriff’s office.”
{¶15} On March 21, 2023, the public became aware of the issues surrounding the
presence (or lack of presence) of an SRO at Newton Falls School. Mr. Kline stated, “I got
phone calls, I got texts, I get residents stopping at my house, residents stopping me in
the bread aisle, the milk aisle, and the park and everything you can think of concerning
and wondering is that true what they’ve heard.”
{¶16} For instance, on March 21, 2023, a citizen, who shall remain unnamed, sent
an email directed to Mr. Kline regarding, inter alia, the SRO issue. The citizen stated:
First, I have to say that referring to you as the mayor is merely a formality. You don’t deserve the title.
With that said, you sir are the most ineffectual Mayor this village has ever elected. The level of cowardice[,] incompetence, and lack of intellect is absolutely staggering. The way you stand by and do nothing while the entire village circles the drain is mind blowing. You[’re] ability to stick your head into the sand and ignore idiotic decision after idiotic decision is almost impressive if it wasn’t so sad.
The most recent instance involving the removal of the contracted School Resource Officer should be the final nail in the coffin for you and colleagues, and for any future attempts at being public officials. As usual, none of you informed the public. The public had to find out on their own.
PAGE 5 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 You are the absolute worst representative for our village – but, that makes sense. You are right in line with the other embarrassments that “run” our administration and our council.
Liars, thieves, bullies, drunks, and morons. That’s the company you keep. To watch you all destroy this town day after day is absolutely heartbreaking. None of you actually care about the health or the future of the village or any of its residents. Your actions and failures speak louder than anything you could ever say or have said.
Resign.
Apologize to the residents for your failures and for ever thinking you could be mayor of this village.
{¶17} In a later email, an additional, agitated resident observed, “Considering your
wife is on the school board, I would think that you knew prior to this what was going on
and you let it slide. WE DESERVE BETTER.”
{¶18} Meanwhile, after receiving agitated messages and reactions from village
residents, Mr. Kline, on March 22, 2023, sent Ms. Priddy a text stating, “This whole
situation is a stinking mess. I am getting 59 million questions over and over that by now
my head is spinning and I wish you and [Mr. Christopher] had simpl[y] had a meeting on
it. I’m not pointing fingers at you or him. But just really losing my mind over this as it had
turned out exactly as I said it would.” Ms. Priddy responded, noting her frustration with
Mr. Christopher, who did not respond to her communications to address the issues. (“[A]s
of today[,] still no return phone calls. Even as of last Thursday [March 17, 2023] I was
trying to communicate with him and again crickets. You had to tell me that the sheriff
would be at school the next day.”).
{¶19} On the same day, March 22, 2023, a regularly scheduled school board
meeting occurred. In preparation for the meeting, Ms. Priddy collected various
PAGE 6 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 communications and documents that set forth what had transpired in the preceding
months regarding the increased costs for the SRO and her attempts to resolve the issues
prior to March 16, 2023. The packet included Ms. Priddy’s complete communications with
members of the school district from January 2023 through March 2023 with regard to the
increased cost of providing an SRO. Significantly, the packet included her email from
March 16, 2023, representing the SRO would have to be “pulled” if school officials did not
respond.
{¶20} The packet also included messages between Ms. Priddy and Mr. Kline on
the evening of March 16, 2023, regarding the SRO issues. Ms. Priddy redacted a portion
of the text message wherein Mr. Kline asked “w[]ere you calling about school resource
officer?” and “Tonya got a[n] email about it and I told her I don’t know anything about it.”
The remainder of the short text thread remained. Ms. Priddy made the packet available
to any individual who requested it but did not actively distribute the packet.
{¶21} After the meeting, on March 24, 2023, Mr. Kline sent an email to, among
others, Ms. Priddy and the members of Newton Falls City Council stating:
As the mayor of Newton Falls I am on this day, Friday March 24, 2023 asking for the resignation of Pam Priddy as City Manager.
This is based on her removing the SRO from the school, leaving the children unsafe and then attempting to falsify documents and distributing those falsified documents at a public school meeting.” (Sic throughout.)
{¶22} Ms. Priddy stated she was “completely shocked by allegations of
‘falsification’ and had no idea what [Mr. Kline] meant at first what documents he was
referring to. . . . The fact that [Mr. Kline] claimed that this alleged ‘falsification’ was enough
to demand my resignation was shocking and confusing.” She further asserted she
PAGE 7 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 “received an email from a reporter about 90 minutes after getting [Mr. Kline’s] ‘resignation’
email that asked only about the call for resignation and ‘falsification of documents.’”
{¶23} Ms. Priddy stated her belief was that Mr. Kline acted “in a malicious manner
when he made the allegations that [she] falsified documents, distributed falsified
documents, and had unilaterally removed the SRO [that] was removed. [Mr. Kline] simply
and falsely stated that I removed the SRO and left the Newton Falls School children
unsafe.”
{¶24} On April 19, 2023, Ms. Priddy filed claims of defamation and invasion of
privacy – false light against Mr. Kline. She alleged she suffered damages after the
incident(s) described above relating to the staffing of the SRO and the fallout relating to
the March 22, 2024 school board meeting. She maintained that Mr. Kline initiated a
defamatory campaign designed to smear her reputation and cause the termination of her
employment through false statements including allegations that, in the performance of
her duties as City Manager, she falsified documents, doctored documents, presented
such documents to the public with an intent to mislead and purposely spread false
information. She also asserted Mr. Kline’s statements implicated her in a crime and/or
criminal “cover-up” and generally lied to the public about matters impacting the citizens
of Newton Falls.
{¶25} On September 18, 2024, Mr. Kline moved for summary judgment and
outlined several arguments in support, including, and most germane to this appeal, that
he was immune from civil liability under Chapter R.C. 2744, and that Ms. Priddy was
unable to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding her claims of defamation
PAGE 8 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 and invasion of privacy – false light claims. Ms. Priddy duly opposed the motion, and Mr.
Kline filed a reply in support of his motion.
{¶26} On April 16, 2025, the trial court denied Mr. Kline’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding “there are genuine issues of material fact relating to whether [Mr.
Kline] is immune from [Ms. Priddy’s] claims and there also genuine issues of material fact
regarding the elements for defamation and invasion of privacy - false light.”
{¶27} Mr. Kline now appeals, assigning the following as error:
{¶28} “The trial court erred by denying appellant Kenneth Kline’s motion for
summary judgment asserting immunity under Ohio’s Political Subdivision Tort Liability
Act, codified within Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code.”
{¶29} Under this assignment of error, Mr. Kline asserts he is entitled to statutory
immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), which provides that an employee of a political
subdivision is immune from liability unless (1) the employee’s acts or omissions are
manifestly outside the scope of the employee’s employment; (2) the employee’s acts or
omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner;
or (3) civil liability is expressly imposed on the employee by a section of the Revised
Code. See Zoldan v. Lordstown, 2014-Ohio-5472, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.).
{¶30} A trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed by an
appellate court under a de novo standard of review. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 1996-
Ohio-336, ¶ 10. “A de novo review requires the appellate court to conduct an independent
review of the evidence before the trial court without deference to the trial court’s
decision.” Peer v. Sayers, 2011-Ohio-5439, ¶ 27 (11th Dist.).
PAGE 9 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 {¶31} We shall first address a procedural point. Mr. Kline, in his appellate brief,
cites this court’s opinion in Cty. Risk Sharing Auth., Inc. v. State, 2022-Ohio-164, ¶ 12
(11th Dist.), for the following proposition:
A reviewing court does not defer to the trial court’s reasoning, but the lower court’s “analysis often has persuasive effect during appellate review. We strongly encourage the trial court not to abandon its duty, but to continue [to] explain its reasoning when granting summary judgment.” [Scassa v. Dye, 2003-Ohio-3480, ¶ 21 (7th Dist.)]. A barebones judgment entry is “unfair to the parties, who are essentially forced to simply refile their summary judgment motions in the appellate court due to being unsure why the trial court rendered the decision it did.” Mourton v. Finn, . . . 2012-Ohio- 3341, ¶ 9 [9th Dist.].
{¶32} Initially, the Ninth District in Mourton simply concluded that it is the trial
court’s “duty to resolve issues in the first instance.” Id. We do not disagree with this point.
We are a court of error or correction and must have an affirmative disposition of an issue
before embarking on an analysis of an alleged error. The trial court provided this court
with a sufficient basis for its decision, and we may therefore review it for error.
{¶33} With this in mind, we do not agree with the Seventh District’s observation
that a lower court’s analysis in a summary judgment exercise has some “persuasive”
value. A trial court’s disposition or reasoning during an appeal on summary judgment is
not accorded any deference and, as a result, we decline to reinforce the position that such
a judgment has “persuasive effect.” See Scheetz v. Kentwood, Inc., 2003-Ohio-1209, ¶ 8
(11th Dist.) (“An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s judgment
entry granting a motion for summary judgment, which means that no deference is shown
to the trial court’s decision.). Maras v. Girard, 2025-Ohio-608, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.) (An
PAGE 10 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 appellate court affords no deference to a trial court’s findings in conducting a de novo
review.). We accordingly must review such judgments anew.
{¶34} That said, the trial court in this matter disposed of the issues before it and
the record is clear regarding what issues it resolved. The record is not “barebones,” and
the trial court provided sufficient guidance to this court regarding its disposition.
Considering this point, we shall proceed to address the merits of Mr. Kline’s assignment
of error.
{¶35} Under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), employees of political subdivisions are immune
from liability unless the employee’s acts were manifestly outside the scope of the
employment; the employee’s acts or omissions were made with malicious purpose, in bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; or civil liability is expressly imposed upon the
employee by a section of the Revised Code. Pursuant to this section, “government
employees are immune from tort liability for actions that fall within the scope of their
employment and official responsibilities,” however their “immunity is not absolute.”
(Emphasis added.) Hill at ¶ 35, citing Maternal Grandmother, ADMR v. Hamilton Cty.
Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2021-Ohio-4096, ¶ 7. “Government employees acting within
the scope of their employment are not entitled to immunity if ‘the employees’ acts or
omissions in the course and scope of their employment were wanton[,] reckless,’
malicious, or done in bad faith.” Hill at ¶ 35, quoting Maternal Grandmother at ¶ 7, citing
R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b).
{¶36} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “reckless” and “wanton” describe
different and distinct degrees of care that are not interchangeable. Anderson v. Massillon,
2012-Ohio-5711, ¶ 31. “Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of
PAGE 11 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is unreasonable under
the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” (Citations
omitted). Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶37} “Wanton misconduct is the failure to exercise any care toward those to
whom a duty of care is owed in circumstances in which there is great probability that harm
will result.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 33. “[O]ne acting in a wanton manner is aware of
the risk of the conduct but is not trying to avoid it and is indifferent to whether harm
results.” (Citation omitted.) Id.
{¶38} “Malice” is characterized by “hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge,” or “a
conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability
of causing substantial harm.” Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 336(1987). It also
refers to “the willful and intentional design to do injury, or the intention or desire to harm
another, usually seriously, through conduct which is unlawful or unjustified.” (Citation
omitted.) Jackson v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Cty. Commrs., 76 Ohio App.3d 3d 448, 454 (12th
Dist.1991).
{¶39} “Bad faith” connotes a “‘dishonest purpose’” or “‘conscious wrongdoing. . .
.’” Canfora v. Coiro, 2007-Ohio-2314, ¶ 72 (11th Dist.), quoting Cook v. Cincinnati, 103
Ohio App.3d 80, 90 (1st Dist. 1995). It also embraces more than bad judgment and
involves a lack of reasonable justification. See Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio
St.3d 552, 554 (1994)
{¶40} The demonstration of recklessness is subject to a high standard when
attempting to abolish employee immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Rankin v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 2008-Ohio-2567, ¶ 37.
PAGE 12 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 {¶41} Mr. Kline argues that he, as the former mayor of Newton Falls, is entitled to
immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) for his statements, because his statements were not
manifestly outside the scope of his employment and they were not made with malice, bad
faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. He additionally contends that Ms. Priddy’s
defamation and invasion of privacy – false light claims fail as a matter of law because he
did not make the statements with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge of their falsity or with
reckless disregard to their falsity. The first issue is dispositive of this appeal.
{¶42} Regarding his immunity claim, we reiterate that the March 24, 2023 email
published by Mr. Kline to Newton Falls City Council, which moved for Ms. Priddy’s
resignation, stated:
As the mayor of Newton Falls I am on this day, Friday March 24, 2023 asking for the resignation of Pam Priddy as City Manager.
This is based on her removing the SRO from the school, leaving the children unsafe and then attempting to falsify documents and distributing those falsified documents at a public school meeting. (Sic throughout.)
{¶43} The evidence demonstrated that Ms. Priddy communicated with Mr. Kline
regarding the SRO matter on March 16, 2023. Ms. Priddy acknowledged the prior call
and eventual message was related to addressing the SRO issue. Mr. Kline explained that
the superintendent, Mr. Christopher, had sent an email to the school board stating, “they
will have [a] sheriff there tomorrow and are working on a permanent agreement.”
(Emphasis added.) Mr. Kline also advised Ms. Priddy that the discussions or
arrangements “worked out best for all involved.” Mr. Kline also thanked Ms. Priddy for the
information she had provided.
PAGE 13 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 {¶44} Ms. Priddy’s March 16, 2023 email sent to Mr. Chirstopher did indicate she
would be “pulling” the acting SRO. In response, later that day, Mr. Christoper emailed the
Board advising that Ms. Priddy “threatened” to pull the SRO if the Board did not agree to
pay the additional amount. Mr. Christopher’s communication did not necessarily capture
the meaning Ms. Priddy ascribed to her initial email. Nevertheless, his representation to
the Board is not entirely unreasonable and represents, at most, a misunderstanding of
Ms. Priddy’s purported intent.
{¶45} Further, Ms. Priddy’s March 16, 2023 text with Mr. Kline reflects a relative
factual understanding between those individuals: (1) that Ms. Priddy did not know whether
the acting SRO should report the following day, and (2) that Mr. Kline understood, by way
of his wife, that a sheriff’s deputy would be acting as an SRO “tomorrow,” i.e., March 17,
2023, and the Board was working on a permanent agreement with the Sheriff’s Office.
{¶46} Ms. Priddy subsequently sent a text to the acting SRO, relaying to him that
he need not report to the school on March 17, 2023, because, via Mr. Kline’s
representations, a Sheriff’s deputy would be on site as an SRO. The acting SRO did not
appear.
{¶47} Later, Ms. Priddy submitted a collection of documents to the public during
a Board meeting on March 23, 2023. The only feature of the documents at issue that was
redacted was a preliminary statement on the March 16, 2023 text exchange into “why”
Ms. Priddy was contacting Mr. Kline. Mr. Kline seems to assert this redaction was a
“falsification” or “doctoring” of the message exchange.
{¶48} Applying the relevant definitions to the case at bar and in light of the
heightened standard enunciated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, we cannot conclude that
PAGE 14 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 Mr. Kline’s email, while potentially framed in a hasty or incautious fashion, constitutes
behavior that was malicious, in bad faith, wanton, or reckless. In light of the facts, which
involve a highly controversial and politically vexing issue, it is reasonable to conclude that
much, if not all, of the eventual communications that led to Mr. Kline’s email were
premised upon or engendered by some reasonable degree of miscommunication and/or
misunderstanding.
{¶49} Although Mr. Kline’s email implies Ms. Priddy “falsified documents,” it also
indicates she “attempted” to do so. The minor redaction is obviously not a clear
“falsification,” but, read in context, Mr. Kline’s statement is, at most, careless or sent
without reasonable care regarding the nuances of Ms. Priddy’s redaction. There was no
allegation of criminal conduct. Moreover, the email fails to indicate it was sent with a
conscious disregard to a known or obvious risk of harm to Ms. Priddy.
{¶50} Similarly, we recognize that Ms. Priddy did not actually remove, i.e.,
dismiss, the acting SRO. She admitted, however, to advising the SRO not to report to the
school without full confirmation from the Board that a substitute SRO would be on site the
following day. In this respect, Mr. Kline’s email, while somewhat misleading, is again, at
worst, negligent or written inartfully.
{¶51} Finally, we again acknowledge Mr. Kline’s statement that Ms. Priddy’s
actions or omissions functioned to render “children unsafe” is problematic. Nevertheless,
understood in the greater context of the circumstances, we discern his communication to
be merely careless or inattentive to the full circumstances of the matter at issue. This
matter involved a particularly disconcerting and contentious public issue percolating in
the village–an issue that was brought directly to Mr. Kline’s personal attention in his
PAGE 15 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 capacity as mayor. He responded as mayor and his language, while indelicate, cannot be
deemed reckless, malicious, wanton, or in bad faith.
{¶52} R.C. Chapter 2744 does not actually define the type of employee acts that
fall “manifestly outside the scope of employment or official responsibilities” under R.C.
2744.03(A)(6)(a). “In the context of immunity, ‘[a]n employee’s wrongful act, even if it is
unnecessary, unjustified, excessive or improper, does not automatically take the act
manifestly outside the scope of employment.’” Jackson v. McDonald, 144 Ohio App.3d
301, 307 (5th Dist. 2001), quoting Elliott v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 92 Ohio App.3d
772, 775 (10th Dist. 1994). “The act must be so divergent that it severs the employer-
employee relationship.” Elliott at 775. “Conduct is within the scope of employment if it is
initiated, in part, to further or promote the [employer’s] business.” Martin v. Cent. Ohio
Transit Auth., 70 Ohio App.3d 83, 92 (10th Dist. 1990).
{¶53} As discussed above, Mr. Kline’s statements in his email, while possibly
unnecessary, unjustified, or even excessive, were merely carelessly worded. He was
acting in his role as mayor addressing certain nuances of a highly contested village-
oriented matter. His conduct was not so divergent as to undermine his role as mayor of
the village and was ostensibly accomplished to calm or ameliorate the frustrations of the
citizens of the village. Again, we recognize the email was not a model of conciliatory
conflict resolution. Still, we cannot conclude, given the surrounding circumstances, that
its communication was “manifestly outside the scope” of Mr. Kline’s “employment and
official responsibilities” as mayor of the Village.
PAGE 16 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 {¶54} We accordingly hold the trial court erred in denying Mr. Kline immunity
under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). He is entitled to immunity because his actions were not
manifestly outside the scope of his employment and official responsibilities.
{¶55} Mr. Kline’s assignment of error has merit.
{¶56} The judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is reversed,
and judgment is entered in favor of Mr. Kline on the issue of immunity.
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
PAGE 17 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031 JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment of error
has merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and judgment is entered in favor of Mr. Kline
on the issue of immunity.
Costs to be taxed against appellee.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON, concurs
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND, concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PAGE 18 OF 18
Case No. 2025-T-0031