Price v. Myers

CourtDistrict Court, D. South Carolina
DecidedJune 5, 2023
Docket1:21-cv-02729
StatusUnknown

This text of Price v. Myers (Price v. Myers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Price v. Myers, (D.S.C. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Kenneth R. Price, C/A No. 1:21-cv-2729-SAL

Petitioner,

v. OPINION AND ORDER Director Myers,

Respondent.

Pro se petitioner Kenneth R. Price (“Petitioner”), a state pretrial detainee, filed this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This matter is before the court for review of the September 28, 2021 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges (the “Report”), ECF No. 14, recommending that Petitioner’s § 2241 petition be summarily dismissed with prejudice. BACKGROUND As outlined in the Report, Petitioner filed this action as a pretrial detainee. He alleges he is being denied a fast and speedy trial, is unlawfully imprisoned, and is being encouraged to take a plea. [See ECF Nos. 9, 14.] The magistrate judge has recommended that Petitioner’s § 2241 petition be dismissed with prejudice. [ECF No. 14.] Attached to the Report was a notice advising Petitioner that he had the right to file objections to the Report and that he had fourteen days to do so. Id. at 6. Petitioner did not file objections, but on October 28, 2021, he filed a letter indicating he had received the Report. [ECF No. 18.] He further stated he had been placed in lockdown and did not have law books or a way to adequately respond to the Report. Id. On April 20, 2023, the court advised Petitioner that he would be given additional time to file objections to the Report, and, if he wished to do so, he needed to file objections by May 11, 2023. [ECF No. 19.] On April 27, 2023, the court received a letter from Petitioner. [ECF No. 21.] In his letter, Petitioner indicated he could not file objections because he did not have access to a law library, his legal papers, or mailing supplies. Id. at 1. He further complained of physical abuse by officers. Id. He also expressed great dissatisfaction with his state court counsel. Id. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). A district court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the magistrate judge, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A district court, however, is only required to conduct a de novo review of the specific portions of the magistrate judge’s Report to which an objection is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the

absence of specific objections to portions of the Report, this court is not required to provide an explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). “An objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues— factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.’” Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC, 288 F. Supp. 3d 654, 662 n.6 (D.S.C. 2017) (citing One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). “Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” Staley v. Norton, No. 9:07-0288, 2007 WL 821181, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court reviews portions “not objected to—including those portions to which only ‘general and conclusory’ objections have been made—for clear error.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Diamond, 416 F.3d at 315; Camby, 718 F.2d at 200; Orpiano, 687 F.2d at 47). Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the court is charged with liberally construing the

pleadings to allow Petitioner to fully develop potentially meritorious claims. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). DISCUSSION The relevant facts and standards of law on this matter are incorporated from the Report. In summation, Petitioner challenges a pending criminal case state court and asks to be taken to trial. [ECF No. 9.] The magistrate judge found dismissal appropriate based on abstention grounds due

to Petitioner’s pending state proceedings and his ability to pursue his claims in state court. [ECF No. 14 at 3–6.] Petitioner has not filed objections to the Report, nor can any of the statements in his letters dated October 20, 2021 and April 24, 2023 be construed as objections. Indeed, although Petitioner’s letters indicate he received the Report, he does not address the substance of the Report, nor does he identify any errors therein. He declines to respond to the Report. Even to the extent the court could construe his letters as general objections to the Report, that would be insufficient to adequately object. Cf. Elijah v. Dunbar, -- F.4th --, 2023 WL 3028346, at *3 (4th Cir. 2023) (“‘Just as a complaint stating only “I complain” states no claim, an objection stating only “I object” preserves no issue for review.’” (quoting Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988))). Petitioner’s letters focus on his lack of access to law books and other resources. Notably, while pretrial detainees are guaranteed access to the courts, they do not have a constitutional right to a law library. See Jones v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., 586 F. Supp.2d 444, 448 (D.S.C. 2008)

(“[T]he law is quite clear that those being temporarily detained in county facilities awaiting criminal trials do not have a constitutional right to a law library . . . .”). At the same time, Petitioner had the resources to file letters with the court, and he has been provided with multiple copies of the Report itself. Thus, he had the opportunity to raise objections to the Report. Based on the court’s review, the magistrate judge aptly described why dismissal is appropriate under the Younger abstention doctrine, which precludes federal courts from intervening in ongoing state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971)).

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Related

Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Cruz v. Beto
405 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Mathews v. Weber
423 U.S. 261 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Slack v. McDaniel
529 U.S. 473 (Supreme Court, 2000)
Miller-El v. Cockrell
537 U.S. 322 (Supreme Court, 2003)
David E. Camby v. Larry Davis James M. Lester
718 F.2d 198 (Fourth Circuit, 1983)
Charles E. Lockert v. Gordon H. Faulkner
843 F.2d 1015 (Seventh Circuit, 1988)
Rose v. Lee
252 F.3d 676 (Fourth Circuit, 2001)
Jones v. LEXINGTON COUNTY DETENTION CENTER
586 F. Supp. 2d 444 (D. South Carolina, 2008)
United States v. 2121 East 30th Street
73 F.3d 1057 (Tenth Circuit, 1996)
Gilliam v. Foster
75 F.3d 881 (Fourth Circuit, 1996)
Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC
288 F. Supp. 3d 654 (D. South Carolina, 2017)

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Price v. Myers, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/price-v-myers-scd-2023.