NO. 4-05-0532
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
MIKALA PRICE and MIKAL PRICE, ) Appeal from Minors, by DAVID MASSEY, Guardian ) Circuit Court of of the Estates of the Minors, ) Macon County Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) No. 04L29 v. ) HICKORY POINT BANK & TRUST, Trust ) No. 0192; MACON COUNTY TITLE, LLC; ) ANDREW CHILIGIRIS; and REAL ESTATE ) Honorable MANAGERS, LLC, ) Thomas E. Little, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In November 2004, plaintiff David Massey, as guardian
of the estate of plaintiffs, Mikala and Mikal Price (twins, born
in April 2000), filed a second-amended negligence complaint
against defendants, Hickory Point Bank & Trust, Trust No. 0192;
Macon County Title, LLC; Andrew Chiligiris; and Real Estate
Managers, LLC. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that while Mikala
and Mikal were tenants in one of defendants' properties, they
were poisoned by exposure to lead-based paint. (Hickory Point
Bank & Trust, Trust No. 0192, was dismissed as a party early in
the proceedings.) Plaintiffs based their claim, in part, on
defendants' alleged violation of the Decatur Municipal Code and
certain regulations of the federal Environmental Protection
Agency that implement provisions of the federal Residential Lead-
Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. '4851
(2000)).
In December 2004 and February 2005, plaintiffs filed motions for partial summary judgment, through which they sought
findings on purportedly uncontested matters. In April 2005,
defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In June 2005,
the trial court granted summary judgment in defendants' favor,
upon finding that (1) defendants had no knowledge that the
premises contained lead-based paint prior to learning of the
children's injuries, and (2) defendants did not knowingly violate
the regulations of the federal EPA.
Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by granting defendants' motion for summary judgment because
(a) a violation of law constitutes prima facie evidence of
negligence; and (b) the court improperly relied on an unpublished
Illinois Appellate Court decision; and (2) the court erred by
denying plaintiffs' partial-summary-judgment motions. We reverse
the court's grant of defendants' summary-judgment motion and
remand for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
According to plaintiffs= second-amended complaint, in
July 2000, Mikal and Mikala's parents, Jenny and Michael Price,
entered into a lease with Chiligiris for a house at 2075 E.
William Street in Decatur and moved in. In November 2001, the
children's physician detected elevated levels of lead in their
blood. The physician notified the Macon County health department
and on December 6, 2001, the department conducted an investiga-
tion at the William Street residence. In January 2002, the
department issued a notice of its findings to the trust officer
- 2 - at Hickory Point Bank and Trust and sent a copy to Chiligiris.
Findings included that lead hazards were present on certain
windows, baseboards, and doorjambs. The department gave defen-
dants until February 9, 2002, to mitigate the lead hazards at the
residence.
Plaintiffs' second-amended complaint also alleged that
(1) defendants knew or should have known, based on Chiligiris's
years of experience with sale, management, renovation, repair,
and rental of residential real estate, of the hazard to children posed by lead-based paint; (2) defendants knew that children
would be residing at the William Street residence when the Price
family entered the lease; and (3) prior to purchasing the resi-
dence, Chiligiris was notified of the dangers of lead-based paint
and of the recommendation to conduct a risk assessment or inspec-
tion for lead-based paint prior to purchase or rental of the
property. The second-amended complaint further alleged that
defendants were negligent for (1) leasing the William Street
residence to the Price family with lead-based paint present in
the interior and exterior in violation of Decatur's Municipal
Code, which adopted the Building Officials and Code Administra-
tors' (BOCA) National Property Maintenance Code, 1993 edition
(specifically, sections 106.1, 303.4, and 305.4 of the BOCA
Code); (2) failing to notify the Price family of the presence of
lead-based paint at the residence; (3) failing to inspect the
residence for the presence of lead-based paint before renting it
- 3 - to the Price family; and (4) failing to disclose to the Price
family information about protection against lead-based paint, in
violation of federal law--namely, the Residential Lead-Based
Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. '4852(d) (2000))
and the federal Environmental Protection Act (EPA) regulations
implementing the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction
Act (40 C.F.R. '745.100-119 (2000)).
In December 2004, plaintiffs filed their first motion
for partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs sought a finding by the
trial court that defendants failed to warn the Price family about
the risks and dangers of lead-based paint in the William Street
residence. In February 2005, plaintiffs filed another motion for
partial summary judgment. In that motion, plaintiffs' sought a
finding that defendants had a duty to warn the Price family about
lead-based paint hazards when they entered the lease.
Following an April 2005 hearing, the trial court entered a docket
entry order in which it made the following findings:
"1. There is no evidence presently
before the court that the [d]efendants had
actual or constructive knowledge, prior to
the inception of the lease, that the leased
premises contained lead-based paint.
2. The affidavits of Jenny and Michael
Price suggest that they never received a
[l]ead-[p]aint [d]isclosure [f]orm from de-
fendants prior to the inception of the lease.
- 4 - 3. The federal statute and the federal
regulations suggest that a [l]essor shall
disclose to the [l]essee the presence of any
KNOWN lead-based paint and/or lead-based
paint hazards.
4. There remain genuine issues of mate-
rial fact."
The court denied both of plaintiffs= motions for partial summary
judgment.
Later in April 2005, defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, asserting that they were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, in pertinent part, because (1) plaintiffs
neither alleged facts nor developed any evidence that defendants
had actual or constructive notice of lead-based paint at the
William Street residence, and without such notice, defendants
could not be held liable; and (2) plaintiffs neither alleged
facts nor submitted any evidence to show that defendants know-
ingly violated the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction
Act, and absent evidence of a knowing violation, defendants had
no liability; and (3) defendants had no knowledge of the presence
of lead-based paint prior to receiving the mitigation notice
letter from the health department.
In May 2005, plaintiffs filed their third-amended
complaint, which was amended only to correct citations to the
Decatur Municipal Code.
In June 2005, following a hearing on defendants'
- 5 - summary-judgment motion, the trial court entered a written order
granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically,
the court (1) found that under Garcia v. Jiminez, 184 Ill. App.
3d 107, 539 N.E.2d 1356 (1989), a landlord cannot be held liable
for lead-based paint contamination unless he had actual or
constructive knowledge that the premises contained lead-based
paint; and (2) stated, in pertinent part, that "[t]he facts
presently before the court demonstrate that [d]efendants had no
knowledge that the premises contained lead-based paint until
receiving notice from the Macon County Health Department for the
inspection occurring on December 6, 2002." The court further
found that violation of a statute does not constitute per se negligence and the municipal ordinance required that a violation
notice be given to a landlord and a reasonable time be allowed
for mitigation. Finally, the court determined that under federal
law, defendants must "knowingly" violate the Residential Lead-
Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act before liability may attach.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
In Kleiss v. Bozdech, 349 Ill. App. 3d 336, 349, 811 N.E.2d 330, 340 (2004), this court discussed the standard of
review for summary-judgment rulings and wrote as follows:
"'The purpose of a summary[-]judgment
proceeding is not to try an issue of fact,
but to determine whether any genuine issue of
- 6 - material fact exists.= Happel v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 179, 186, 766
N.E.2d 1118, 1123 (2002). Summary judgment
is a "'drastic means of disposing of litiga-
tion'" (Happel, 199 Ill. 2d at 186, 766
N.E.2d at 1123, quoting Espinoza v. Elgin,
Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 2d 107,
113, 649 N.E.2d 1323, 1326 (1995)) and thus
is only appropriate when the pleadings, depo-
sitions, and admissions, together with any
affidavits, show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law
(Happel, 199 Ill. 2d at 186, 766 N.E.2d at
1123; 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998)). We
review de novo a trial court=s grant of sum-
mary judgment, and in so doing, we construe facts strictly against the moving party and
in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.
Happel, 199 Ill. 2d at 185-86, 766 N.E.2d at
1123."
B. Common-Law Negligence Based on a Violation of a Statute
1. Whether Plaintiffs Were Required To Show Defendants' Knowledge
Plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred by
granting defendants' summary-judgment motion because plaintiffs=
- 7 - showing that defendants violated provisions of the Decatur
Municipal Code and the EPA constituted prima facie evidence of
negligence, such that their case should have gone to the jury.
Defendants respond that summary judgment was properly granted
because plaintiffs produced no evidence that defendants (1) knew
of the lead-based paint at the William Street residence or (2)
knowingly violated the EPA.
Initially, we note that plaintiffs state a common-law
negligence claim based on a violation of a statute or ordinance.
The essential elements of common-law negligence are (1) the
existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2)
breach of that duty, and (3) an injury caused by that breach.
Clifford v. Wharton Business Group, L.L.C., 353 Ill. App. 3d 34,
40, 817 N.E.2d 1207, 1212 (2004). However, when a plaintiff=s
negligence claim--as in this case--is based on a violation of a
statute or ordinance, different elements must be shown. A
violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect human
life is prima facie evidence of negligence. Kalata v. Anheuser- Busch Cos., 144 Ill. 2d 425, 434, 581 N.E.2d 656, 661 (1991);
Magna Trust Co. v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 313 Ill. App. 3d
375, 383, 728 N.E.2d 797, 804 (2000). To prevail on a claim of
negligence based on a violation of a statute or an ordinance
designed to protect human life, the plaintiff must show that (1)
the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the statute or
ordinance was designed to protect, (2) the injury is the type of
injury that the ordinance was intended to protect against, and
- 8 - (3) the defendant=s violation of the statute or ordinance was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff=s injury. Kalata, 144 Ill. 2d
at 434-35, 581 N.E.2d at 661. Because evidence of the violation
of a statute is prima facie evidence of negligence, and not
negligence per se, a defendant can prevail despite an ordinance
violation by showing that he acted reasonably under the circum-
stances. Kalata, 144 Ill. 2d at 435, 581 N.E.2d at 661; McCarthy
v. Kunicki, 355 Ill. App. 3d 957, 973, 823 N.E.2d 1088, 1102
(2005). A "plaintiff is not required to show defendants' aware-
ness of the [statutory] violation since the violation itself is
prima facie evidence of negligence." McCarthy, 355 Ill. App. 3d
at 974, 823 N.E.2d at 1102.
Statutes and ordinances designed to protect human life
establish the standard of conduct required of a reasonable person
and thus "fix the measure of legal duty." Noyola v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill. 2d 121, 130, 688
N.E.2d 81, 84-85 (1997). Accordingly, once a violation of
statute is shown, there is no question of duty and the focus turns, as stated above, to whether (1) the plaintiff is a member
of the class of persons protected by the statute, (2) the plain-
tiff=s injury is the type the statute intended to protect
against, and (3) the defendant's violation of the statute proxi-
mately caused the injury. Kalata, 144 Ill. 2d at 434-35, 581 N.E.2d at 661. Thus, in this case--decided at the summary-
judgment phase--all of the discussion in the trial court on
defendants' knowledge of the alleged statutory violations was
- 9 - irrelevant. See McCarthy, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 974, 823 N.E.2d at
1102 ("plaintiff is not required to show defendants' awareness of
the violation since the violation itself is prima facie evidence
of negligence. [The defendants'] knowledge of the violation,
therefore, is irrelevant as to whether defendants were negli-
gent"). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by
granting defendants' summary-judgment motion based on plaintiffs'
failure to produce evidence of defendants' knowledge regarding
their violations of the Decatur Municipal Code and the EPA. In
fact, plaintiffs produced the only evidence of duty that the law
requires--namely, defendants' violation of the municipal ordi-
nance and federal EPA.
In so concluding, we decline to follow the Second
District Appellate Court's decision in Garcia, 184 Ill. App. 3d 107, 539 N.E.2d 1356, relied on by defendants. In that case, the
plaintiffs' lead-based paint exposure complaint alleged, in
pertinent part, (1) negligence and (2) negligence arising from
violation of a city ordinance. A jury found in favor of the
defendant on both negligence counts. Garcia, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 109, 539 N.E.2d at 1357. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that
the defendant should not have been permitted to present evidence
or argument that he did not know or have reason to know that the
subject property contained lead-based paint. Garcia, 184 Ill.
App. 3d at 109, 539 N.E.2d at 1357. Without discussing the law
of negligence based on a violation of statute, the Second Dis-
trict Appellate Court held that the plaintiffs could not recover
- 10 - without showing that the landlord had actual or constructive
knowledge that the peeling paint inside the tenants= residence
contained lead-based paint. In so holding, the Garcia court
stated that to forego a knowledge requirement would impose a form
of "strict liability on landowners whose property contains lead-
based paint." Garcia, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 111-12, 539 N.E.2d at
1359. We disagree. As previously discussed, recognizing that
the violation of a statute constitutes prima facie evidence of
negligence does not amount to imposing strict liability. Rather,
it relieves the plaintiff of having to show a duty and, instead,
requires him to show that (1) the statute was intended to protect
the plaintiff from the type of injury he suffered and (2) the
violation caused that injury.
We further note that Garcia is distinguishable in that
it addressed an evidentiary ruling of the trial court, rather
than a ruling on summary judgment. Regardless of everything else
the Second District said in Garcia, the essence of its holding is
that the jury should have been allowed to hear evidence related
to the defendant's knowledge of a dangerous condition. Our
holding here, that knowledge is not essential for a prima facie
case of negligence based on a violation of statute to survive
summary judgment, does not directly conflict with the
Garcia court's holding. Indeed, in this case, defendants'
knowledge--either of the presence of lead-based paint or their
obligations under the municipal code and EPA--may be relevant to
the fact finder's determination of whether defendants acted
- 11 - reasonably under the circumstances. See Kalata, 144 Ill. 2d at
435, 581 N.E.2d at 661 (a defendant may prevail despite a viola-
tion of statute by showing that he acted reasonably).
Defendants also rely on Abassi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187
Ill. 2d 386, 718 N.E.2d 181 (1999), asserting that it "reaf-
firmed" Garcia. We disagree with defendants' interpretation of
Abassi.
In that case, our supreme court held that the plain-
tiffs did not have a private cause of action under the Lead
Poisoning Prevention Act (410 ILCS 45/1 through 17 (West 1996))
or Chicago's city code. Instead, the court held that plaintiff
had an adequate remedy through a common-law negligence claim.
Abassi, 187 Ill. 2d at 396, 718 N.E.2d at 186. In so holding,
the court noted that in a common-law negligence action, violation
of statute is prima facie evidence of negligence and not negli-
gence per se. Abassi, 187 Ill. 2d at 395, 718 N.E.2d at 186.
However, the court did not analyze the plaintiff's negligence
claim based on a violation of a statute or discuss the elements
of that claim in any detail because that claim remained pending
in the trial court. Moreover, although the Abassi court cited Garcia in its recitation of the plaintiff's negligence complaint
(Abassi, 187 Ill. 2d at 389, 718 N.E.2d at 183), the court did
not rely on Garcia in its analysis or in any way "reaffirm" that
decision.
2. Whether Plaintiffs Showed That Defendants Violated the Decatur Municipal Code and the Federal EPA
In reversing the trial court's order granting summary
- 12 - judgment for defendants, we reject defendants' argument that
plaintiffs failed to show that a violation of the Decatur Munici-
pal Code and the federal EPA occurred because defendants were not
aware of (1) the presence of lead-based paint at the William
Street residence prior to Mikal and Mikala's injuries, or (2)
their obligations under the EPA.
a. The Decatur Municipal Code
Chapter 70 of the Decatur Municipal Code (entitled
"Property Maintenance Code") adopts and incorporates therein the BOCA National Property Maintenance Code, 1993 edition. In their
second-amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendants
violated section 305.4 of the BOCA Code. That section provides
as follows:
"Interior and exterior painted surfaces
of dwellings and child and day care facili-
ties, including fences and outbuildings, which contain in excess of 0.06 percent lead
by weight shall be removed or covered in an
approved manner. Any surface covered shall
first be marked with warnings as to the lead
content of the surface." BOCA National Prop-
erty Maintenance Code '305.4 (1993).
Plaintiffs also cited section 106.1 of the BOCA Code, which
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Unlawful acts: It shall be unlawful for any
person, firm[,] or corporation to *** let to
- 13 - another or occupy or permit another person to
occupy any structure or equipment regulated
by this code, or cause same to be done, con-
trary to or in conflict with or in violation
of any of the provisions of this code ***."
BOCA National Property Maintenance Code
'106.1 (1993).
The trial court determined that defendants' violation
of the Property Maintenance Code did not constitute negligence
because that ordinance required written notice to the landlord
containing (1) a description of the real estate, (2) the reason
for the notice, and (3) a correction order allowing a reasonable
time for corrections to be made. Although the court provided no
citation to the BOCA Code for these requirements, they were cited
in defendants' summary-judgment motion as part of section 106.2
of the BOCA Code. However, chapter 70 of Decatur's Municipal
Code, which incorporates the BOCA Code into the Decatur Property
Maintenance Code, expressly deleted a number of sections of the
BOCA Code, including section 106.2. Decatur Municipal Code ch.
70, par. 6 (2000). Thus, the court's reliance on this section of
the BOCA Code was erroneous, as it is not a part of Decatur=s
Property Maintenance Code.
Pursuant to the language of sections 305.4 and 106.1 of
the BOCA Code and in light of the fact that it is uncontroverted
that the health department found lead hazards at the William
Street residence, we conclude that plaintiffs showed that defen-
- 14 - dants were in violation of the Decatur Municipal Code when Mikal
and Mikala's injuries occurred.
b. The Federal Law
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated provisions
of the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act (42
U.S.C. ''4851 through 4856 (2000)) and the EPA. Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged violations of (1) section 745.113 of the EPA
(40 C.F.R. '745.113 (2000)), which provides that a lessor must
provide a lessee with a lead warning statement providing that
housing built before 1978 may contain lead-based paint; and (2)
section 745.107 of the EPA (40 C.F.R. '745.107 (2000)), which
provides that lessors must provide lessees with a lead hazard
information pamphlet approved by the Environmental Protection
Agency. Defendants acknowledged below that they did not comply
with these EPA provisions.
Nevertheless, defendants contend (and the trial court
determined) that a violation of the EPA did not occur because
defendants did not "knowingly" violate its provisions. For
support, defendants cite the penalties section of the EPA (see 42
U.S.C. '4852d(b)(3) (2000) ("Any person who knowingly violates
the provisions of this section shall be jointly and severally
liable to the purchaser or lessee in an amount equal to 3 times
the amount of damages incurred by such individual"). However,
section 745.118 of the EPA (40 C.F.R. '745.118 (2000)) provides
"Failure or refusal to comply with '745.107
- 15 - (disclosure requirements for sellers and
lessors), '745.110 (opportunity to conduct an
evaluation), '745.113 (certification and
acknowledgment of disclosure), or '745.115
(agent responsibilities) is a violation of 42
U.S.C. [']4852d(b)(5) and of TSCA [(Toxic
Substance Control Act)] section 409 (15
U.S.C. [']2689)."
We thus conclude that plaintiffs have shown that defendants
violated the EPA by failing to comply with sections 745.113 and
745.107.
In light of our conclusions that (1) plaintiffs were
not required to show defendants' knowledge of either the presence
of lead-based paint or the requirements of the EPA in order to
sustain their negligence claim based on a violation of a statute,
and (2) plaintiffs made sufficient showings that defendants
violated the Decatur Municipal Code and the EPA, we further
conclude that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of
negligence. We thus reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants.
B. The Trial Court's Decision Allowing Defendants' Counsel To Cite an Unpublished Illinois Appellate Court Order
Plaintiffs next argue that the trial court erred by
permitting defendants' counsel to cite an unpublished order of
the Illinois Appellate Court. We agree.
At the May 2005 hearing on defendants' summary judgment
- 16 - motion, defendants' counsel tendered to the trial court an
unpublished order of this court. In so doing, counsel stated as
follows:
"[T]here's no question that that order has--
is not binding on this [c]ourt. The [c]ourt
cannot rely upon it in terms of making any
ruling or decision, but I am tendering the
Rule 23 order simply for the [c]ourt to see
that at least as of 2002 that the Garcia
[decision] was still the standard by which
the courts were judging liability on lead-
based contamination cases. It isn't any more
than I would suggest than what a treatise
would be or an article from a publication
because--but I think it is pertinent insofar
as that is concerned."
When plaintiffs' counsel later presented his argument,
he asked that the trial court decline to consider the Rule 23
order cited by defendants' counsel because "it cannot be cited as
precedent." The trial court responded as follows:
"Why should I not consider that when you've
asked me to consider the treatise that you
cited without naming the treatise you put up
here on the overhead, that here's a learned
treatise that I should consider in ruling on
this motion? Why--I would think that your
- 17 - Rule 23 would be equally persuasive at least
in terms of the treatise. Am I mistaken?"
In our view, Supreme Court Rule 23 prohibits the
actions of defendants' counsel at the summary-judgment hearing.
Subsection (e) of Rule 23 provides as follows: "An unpublished
order of the court is not precedential and may not be cited by
any party except to support contentions of double jeopardy, res
judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case." 166 Ill. 2d
R. 23(e). Nothing is ambiguous about the foregoing language, and
the transcript of proceeding shows that defendants' counsel
tendered the unpublished order for an improper purpose.
In so concluding, we reject defendants' contention that
Osman v. Ford Motor Co., 359 Ill. App. 3d 367, 833 N.E.2d 1011 (2005), renders his conduct permissible. In that case, this
court (1) relied on an unpublished opinion of the federal Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and (2) in dicta, stated that under
Supreme Court Rule 23, parties are not barred from "using the
reasoning and logic" contained in a Rule 23 order. Osman, 359
Ill. App. 3d at 374, 833 N.E.2d at 1016-17. However, as we noted
in Osman, the Fourth Circuit rules allow for citation of its unpublished orders under certain conditions. Osman, 359 Ill.
App. 3d at 374, 833 N.E.2d at 1016. Moreover, defendants'
counsel in this case did not argue the reasoning and logic of the
Rule 23 order he tendered to the court; instead, he brought that
case to the court's attention to imply that it had precedential
value--a clear violation of Rule 23(e).
- 18 - Accordingly, we conclude that counsel erred by citing
an unpublished Rule 23 order and the trial court erred by permit-
ting him to do so over plaintiffs' objection. We are confident
that this error will not be repeated either by counsel or the
court, and under the circumstances of this case, we do not find
it necessary to address the issue further.
C. The Trial Court's Denial of Plaintiffs' Motions For Partial Summary Judgment
Last, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by denying their motions for partial summary judgment. We decline
to address this argument.
Ordinarily, a trial court's denial of a summary judg-
ment motion is not appealable. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187
Ill. 2d 341, 357, 718 N.E.2d 191, 200 (1999). We recognize that
in certain circumstances, we may review the denial of a summary-
judgment motion; for instance, when the trial court has ruled on
opposing motions for summary judgment on the same claim.
Arangold, 187 Ill. 2d at 358, 718 N.E.2d at 201.
In our view, reviewing the trial court's rulings on
plaintiffs' partial-summary-judgment motions would serve little
purpose in light of (1) our reversal of the court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants and (2) the extensive
direction our foregoing analysis provides to the parties and the
court. Accordingly, we decline to address plaintiffs' argument
that the trial court erred by denying their partial-summary-
judgment motions.
III. CONCLUSION
- 19 - For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with the
views expressed herein.
Reversed and remanded.
TURNER, P.J., and KNECHT, J., concur.
- 20 -