Price v. Commonwealth

189 S.E.2d 324, 213 Va. 113, 1972 Va. LEXIS 316
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedJune 12, 1972
DocketRecord 7880
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 189 S.E.2d 324 (Price v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Price v. Commonwealth, 189 S.E.2d 324, 213 Va. 113, 1972 Va. LEXIS 316 (Va. 1972).

Opinion

Cochran, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Bobby A. Price, manager of the North Theatre in Danville, was indicted for exhibiting an obscene motion picture, “Anomalies”, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-230 (Cum. Supp. 1971) 1 . He was tried by a jury which found him guilty and fixed his punishment at confinement in jail for 12 months and payment of a fine of $1000. We granted Price a writ of error to the judgment entered on the verdict.

In late December and early January, 1971, the film was shown in Danville. It was advertised as X-rated (restricted to adult audiences), and a security guard was employed by the management to prevent unmarried persons under 21 years of age from entering the theatre.

After Price had been indicted, a consent order was entered enjoining the public exhibition of the film. Thereafter, the Commonwealth arranged for a number of local citizens, including members of *115 the Mayor’s Committee for Decent Literature, to view “Anomalies” at a private showing. Sixteen of these persons testified as witnesses for the Commonwealth at Price’s trial.

If “Anomalies” is obscene it is not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). As more recent decisions of the Supreme Court have reflected divergent opinions which failed to gain majority approval we have felt constrained to follow the definition of obscenity set forth in Roth, 354 U.S. at 489, “whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.” Roth has been reaffirmed in United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971). We have also acquiesced in the following amplification of the Roth definition set forth in a plurality opinion in A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966):

“. . . [T]hree elements must coalesce: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.”

House v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 121, 125, 169 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1969). See Hearn v. Short, 327 F. Supp. 33, 36 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (concurring opinion of Bue, J.).

Price’s assignment of error to the lower court’s ruling that the contemporary standard in issue was that of the local community rather than that of the national or statewide community has been resolved against him by Alexander v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 554, 186 S.E.2d 43 (1972). There, noting that the Supreme Court had not been able to agree on a definition of the community by whose standards obscenity should be measured, we approved the local community standard.

Price has assigned error to the action of the lower court in permitting witnesses for the Commonwealth to express their personal opinions about “Anomalies” in testifying as to local community standards. He contends that in the absence of expert testimony on the subject his motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence was *116 improperly overruled. We do not agree. Although many of the witnesses did state their personal opinions, which were not evidence of community standards, they also testified that they were familiar with the contemporary community standards in the locality and that “Anomalies” was an affront to these standards and had no social value. Price’s reliance on House v. Commonwealth, supra, as requiring expert testimony, is misplaced. Evidence of contemporary community standards is required. Id. at 126, 169 S.E.2d at 576-77. Hence, expert testimony, if available, is admissible, but House does not require that experts be produced by the Commonwealth in order to obtain a conviction under the obscenity statute. Witnesses, whose familiarity with contemporary local community standards has been established, are qualified to testify as to such standards.

The sixteen witnesses testifying for the Commonwealth represented a limited cross-section of the Danville community. They came from different backgrounds and were citizens who had lived in Danville an average of 29 years each. To the extent that none represented morally depraved or disreputable elements of society, they did not comprise a true cross-section. They were representative of educational, religious, business, recreational and civic interests in the community. While not experts in the usual sense they were sufficiently expert to testify to the community standards in Danville. See Gent v. State, 239 Ark. 474, 393 S.W.2d 219 (1965), rev’d per curiam sub nom Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (hereinafter the citation of cases reversed on the inconclusive authority of Redrup will be followed by (Redrup)); State v. Henry, 250 La. 682, 198 So.2d 889, rev’d per curiam 392 U.S. 655 (1967) (Redrup); State v. Childs, 252 Or. 91, 447 P.2d 304 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 931 (1969); Robert Arthur Management Corp. v. State, 220 Tenn. 101, 414 S.W.2d 638, rev’d per curiam, 389 U.S. 578 (1967) (Redrup). Moreover, by stipulation it was agreed that there were five other Commonwealth witnesses summoned, whose occupations were not listed, who, if they had been called, would have given testimony similar to that of the sixteen who testified. So we are satisfied that no reversible error was committed in permitting some of the witnesses for the Commonwealth to give their personal opinions about “Anomalies” as well as their opinions that it violated the community standards with which they were conversant. It follows that the court properly overruled Price’s motion to strike the Commonwealth’s evidence as to standards.' •

*117

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189 S.E.2d 324, 213 Va. 113, 1972 Va. LEXIS 316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/price-v-commonwealth-va-1972.