Preston v. Commissioner

1999 T.C. Memo. 49, 77 T.C.M. 1437, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 56
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedFebruary 23, 1999
DocketNo. 19597-97
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1999 T.C. Memo. 49 (Preston v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Preston v. Commissioner, 1999 T.C. Memo. 49, 77 T.C.M. 1437, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 56 (tax 1999).

Opinion

FOREST R. PRESTON, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Preston v. Commissioner
No. 19597-97
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1999-49; 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 56; 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1437; T.C.M. (RIA) 99049;
February 23, 1999, Filed

*56 Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

*57 Robert R. Lomax, for petitioner.
Eric B. Jorgensen, for respondent.
LARO, JUDGE.

LARO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

[1] LARO, JUDGE: The parties submitted this case to the Court without trial. See Rule 122. Petitioner petitioned the Court to redetermine deficiencies in his 1992, 1993, and 1994 Federal income tax and an accuracy-related penalty for 1994 under section 6662(a). Following concessions, the only issue left to decide is whether petitioner may deduct $ 47,482, $ 40,089, and $ 24,340 of alimony 1 for the respective years. We hold that his alimony deductions for the respective years are $ 1,878, $ 5,014, and zero. Unless otherwise stated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the subject years. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar.

*58 BACKGROUND

[2] All facts were either stipulated or found by the Court from exhibits accompanying the stipulation of facts. The stipulations of fact and accompanying exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner is a cash method taxpayer who resided in Hamilton, Georgia, when he petitioned the Court.

[3] Petitioner claimed alimony deductions of $ 60,102, $ 34,946, and $ 24,202 on his 1992, 1993, and 1994 Federal income tax returns, respectively. Respondent disallowed these deductions, determining that the payments were not alimony. Petitioner concedes that some of the reported amounts did not constitute alimony. Petitioner argues that his alimony deductions for the respective years are $ 47,482, $ 40,089, and $ 24,340.

[4] Petitioner married Dianne Sowell (Ms. Sowell) in 1974, and they had two children (collectively, the children) during their marriage. The older child, Ashley Denise Preston (Ashley), was born October 19, 1976. The younger child, Martin Barron Sowell Preston (Barron), was born October 3, 1984. For most of 1991, petitioner lived with his family in Columbus, Georgia, in a house (the Columbus house) that he owned jointly with Ms. Sowell. Petitioner moved*59 out of the Columbus house in December 1991, and he moved into a cabin that he owned in Harris County, Georgia.

[5] In March 1992, Ms. Sowell petitioned the Superior Court of Muscogee County, Georgia, for a divorce from petitioner. One month later, on April 3, 1992, the superior court issued a temporary order nunc pro tunc to March 19, 1992. The temporary order stated:

                 1.

     Plaintiff [Ms. Sowell] shall have the temporary custody of

   the two (2) minor children of the parties, and the Defendant

   [petitioner] shall have the right to visit said children and

   have said children visit with him at all reasonable times and

   places.

                 2.

     Plaintiff shall have the temporary exclusive use of the

   [Columbus] house and premises and all household furniture and

   furnishings located therein * * * and the Cadillac automobile in

   her possession. The Defendant shall have the temporary exclusive

   use of all marital property now in his possession and the

   property located in Harris County, Georgia known as the house or

   cabin in the backwater.

             *  * *60  *  *  *  *  *

                 4.

     Defendant shall pay for the support of Plaintiff and the

   two (2) minor children of the parties and the following

   household and family expenses until further Order of the Court:

     (a) The mortgage payments, ad valorem taxes and insurance

   on the * * * [Columbus house] * * *;

     (b) All utility expenses at the * * * [Columbus house],

   including electricity, water, garbage and sewer, telephone, gas,

   pest control, cable television and lawn care;

     (c) Wife's automobile expenses, including gasoline and oil,

   repairs, automobile tags, licenses and insurance;

     (d) The medical and dental expenses of Wife and the

   children and prescription drug expenses;

     (e) The children's school tuition, supplies and activities;

     (f) The cost of clothing for Wife and the children * * *.

     In addition to making the payments above enumerated,

   Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff the sum of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS

   ($ 1,000) per month, commencing April 1, 1992, with a payment of

   FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($ 500.00), and the payment of an additional

*61    FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($ 500.00) on the 15th of April, 1992, and

   continuing with like payments during each calendar month

   thereafter until further Order of the Court; with the provision,

   however, that Defendant may at his option pay the monthly sum on

   the 1st day of each calendar month rather than in two (2)

   installments; and Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff immediately

   an amount so that the total sum given to her for support of

   herself and the children during the month of March, 1992 will

   equal the sum of ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($ 1,000).

[6] On June 3, 1993, the superior court held petitioner in contempt of the temporary order because he had failed to pay certain bills covered by the order. The court ordered him to pay these bills and to pay $ 350 of attorney's fees at the rate of $ 50 per month commencing with June 1993.

[7] On September 4, 1993, the superior court entered a final judgment and decree (the final decree) granting Ms.

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Bluebook (online)
1999 T.C. Memo. 49, 77 T.C.M. 1437, 1999 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 56, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/preston-v-commissioner-tax-1999.