Preston Clinch v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

Fifth Circuit

Preston Clinch v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare

328 F.2d 778, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 6151

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedMarch 4, 1964

Docket20992_1

StatusPublished

Cited by19 cases

This text of 328 F.2d 778 (Preston Clinch v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Preston Clinch v. Anthony J. Celebrezze, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, 328 F.2d 778, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 6151 (5th Cir. 1964).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant petitioned the District Court pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), for review of the administrative denial of disability insurance benefits claimed under the provisions of §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act. Title 42 U.S. C.A. §§ 416(i) and 423.

The standard for review by the District Court was to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding that appellant had failed to establish the existence of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which rendered him unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. §§ 405(g) and 416(i), supra. See Celebrezze v. Maxwell, 5 Cir., 1963, 315 F.2d 727, where we said that it is only where there is no substantial evidence from which the Secretary could have made his finding that the District Court, and this court, may modify or reverse the decision reached by the Secretary. Also, we noted in Flemming v. Booker, 5 Cir., 1960, 283 F.2d 321 that we, in reviewing the judgment of the District Court, “pass upon the identical question of law, i. e., whether the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence.” And, relying on Flemming v. Booker, we rejected in Ward v. Celebrezze, 5 Cir., 1962, 311 F.2d 115, the contention of the Secretary that our review was limited to a determination of whether the District Court misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test. See Edgerly v. Ribicoff, 5 Cir., 1962, 311 F.2d 645, to this same effect.

This record discloses the requisite substantial evidence, and it follows that the District did not err in dismissing the petition for review. Cf. Hicks v. Flemming, 5 Cir., 1962, 302 F.2d 470; and Celebrezze v. O’Brient, 5 Cir., 1963, 323 F.2d 989. Neither was there error, absent a good cause showing as was the case, in the denial of the motion to remand the case to the Secretary so that appellant might offer additional evidence.. See § 405(g), supra.

The judgment is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant petitioned the District Court pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), for review of the administrative denial of disability insurance benefits claimed under the provisions of §§ 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act. Title 42 U.S. C.A. §§ 416(i) and 423.

The standard for review by the District Court was to determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the finding that appellant had failed to establish the existence of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which rendered him unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. §§ 405(g) and 416(i), supra. See Celebrezze v. Maxwell, 5 Cir., 1963, 315 F.2d 727, where we said that it is only where there is no substantial evidence from which the Secretary could have made his finding that the District Court, and this court, may modify or reverse the decision reached by the Secretary. Also, we noted in Flemming v. Booker, 5 Cir., 1960, 283 F.2d 321 that we, in reviewing the judgment of the District Court, “pass upon the identical question of law, i. e., whether the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence.” And, relying on Flemming v. Booker, we rejected in Ward v. Celebrezze, 5 Cir., 1962, 311 F.2d 115, the contention of the Secretary that our review was limited to a determination of whether the District Court misapprehended or grossly misapplied the substantial evidence test. See Edgerly v. Ribicoff, 5 Cir., 1962, 311 F.2d 645, to this same effect.

This record discloses the requisite substantial evidence, and it follows that the District did not err in dismissing the petition for review. Cf. Hicks v. Flemming, 5 Cir., 1962, 302 F.2d 470; and Celebrezze v. O’Brient, 5 Cir., 1963, 323 F.2d 989. Neither was there error, absent a good cause showing as was the case, in the denial of the motion to remand the case to the Secretary so that appellant might offer additional evidence.. See § 405(g), supra.

The judgment is affirmed.

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328 F.2d 778, 1964 U.S. App. LEXIS 6151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/preston-clinch-v-anthony-j-celebrezze-secretary-of-health-education-ca5-1964.

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