Prescott v. Contra Costa County

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 EMARIEAY PRESCOTT, Case No. 24-cv-01660-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v. Re: Dkt. No. 32 10 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, et al., 11 Defendants.

12 13 Pending before the Court is the second motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Contra Costa 14 County and Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Office. Dkt. No. 32. The Court finds this matter 15 appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the matter is deemed submitted. See Civil 16 L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS the motion. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 Plaintiff Emarieay Prescott first filed this case against Defendants and various unidentified 19 individual deputies in March 2024.1 See Dkt. No. 1. Defendants moved to dismiss the case, 20 arguing that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and were not adequately 21 pled. Dkt. No. 14. The Court found that Plaintiff’s claims were not time-barred, but agreed that 22 he had not pled enough facts to state a Monell claim against Defendants. Dkt. No. 20. Plaintiff 23 filed an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 30 (“FAC”). 24 According to the FAC, on March 18, 2020, Plaintiff was attacked by other inmates in his 25 cell while awaiting trial in Contra Costa County’s West County Detention Facility. See id. at 26 ¶¶ 6–8. Plaintiff alleges that a deputy observed the incident but failed to intervene. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 16. 27 1 Plaintiff was taken to the emergency room at a local hospital, diagnosed with an orbital fracture of 2 his right eye, and given pain medication. Id. at ¶¶ 10, 17. After the attack Plaintiff was placed in 3 protective custody. See id. at ¶ 9. However, Plaintiff contends that immediately after the incident 4 he had difficulty seeing out of his right eye and he submitted multiple grievance slips to have his 5 eye reexamined. Id. at ¶¶ 11, 12. Plaintiff contends that these grievance slips were ignored for 6 several months, and when he finally received follow-up care he was told his right eye was 7 permanently damaged. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 19. Medical staff said that they could have saved Plaintiff’s 8 eyesight if he had been treated sooner. See id. at ¶¶ 13, 20. Based on these facts Plaintiff asserts 9 causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to protect him from the attack and deliberate 10 indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at ¶¶ 26–38. 11 Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants did not adequately train their employees, and had a 12 custom, policy, or practice of allowing deputies to ignore inmate grievances and not provide 13 medical aid to pretrial detainees. See id. at ¶¶ 39–44. Defendants move to dismiss the FAC. Dkt. 14 No. 32. 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain 17 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A 18 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be 19 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the 20 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 21 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule 22 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible 23 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 24 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 25 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 26 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the 27 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 1 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 2 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 3 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 4 “A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by the 5 applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the 6 complaint.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 7 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[A] 8 complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 9 facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Id. (quoting Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. U.S., 10 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995)). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 Defendants again argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claims are not adequately pled. See Dkt. 13 No. 32 at 4–7. They further urge that the Court should either set a deadline for Plaintiff to serve 14 the unidentified Doe officers or they should be dismissed without prejudice. Id. at 7–8. The Court 15 agrees. 16 A. Monell Claims 17 Pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), “a 18 municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 19 U.S. at 691. Rather, to plausibly state a claim for municipal liability under Monell, a plaintiff 20 must allege unconstitutional conduct attributable to “(1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice 21 or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final 22 policymaker.” Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019). In other 23 words, the plaintiff must “demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was 24 the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Id. (quotation omitted). At the pleading stage, a 25 plaintiff’s Monell claim “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain 26 sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to 27 defend itself effectively.” See AE v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation 1 i. Contra Costa Sherriff’s Office 2 As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not point to any allegations supporting a Monell claim 3 against the Contra Costa County Sherriff’s Office. In his opposition, Plaintiff appears to 4 acknowledge that the FAC only “allege[s] Monell violations against Contra Costa County.” See 5 Dkt. No. 34 at 1 (emphasis added). The Court therefore GRANTS the motion to dismiss as to the 6 Sherriff’s Office. 7 ii. Custom, Policy, and Practice 8 Plaintiff contends that he has adequately alleged that the County had “customs and 9 policies” in place such that its deputies did not protect inmates from violence from other inmates, 10 ignored inmate grievances, and did not provide medical aid or assistance to pretrial detainees. See 11 Dkt. No. 34 at 5–6; see also FAC at ¶¶ 22–24. Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that he does not 12 have information about the nature of any specific policy, custom, or practice. See Dkt. No. 34 at 13 4–6. Rather, he suggests that such detail “will be revealed and sought out during the matter’s 14 discovery phase.” Id. at 4. For now he alleges “upon information and belief” that the County: 15 16 • “[D]id not have protocols and policies in place for dealing with inmate on inmate 17 violence regarding its pre-trial detainees” or for “providing medical aid or 18 assistance to its pre-trial detainees.” See FAC at ¶ 22. 19 • “[H]ad a further custom, policy, and/or practice allowing its deputies not to protect 20 pre-trial detainees from inmate on inmate violence” and “to ignore inmate 21 grievances to not provide medical aid or assistance to its pre-trial detainees.” Id. at 22 ¶ 23. 23 • “[D]id not have rules to prevent or minimize the risk of inmate on inmate violence” 24 and “did not have rules to prevent or minimize the risk of inmates being denied 25 adequate medical aid or assistance.” Id. at ¶ 24. 26 27 Plaintiff offers no facts to support these conclusions aside from the “the rest of the 1 Plaintiff’s own authority makes clear, however, allegations about a single incident are insufficient 2 to support Monell liability based on a longstanding practice or custom. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 3 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or 4 sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency[,] and 5 consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”). As the 6 Ninth Circuit has explained, “[t]he custom must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it 7 constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled [municipal] policy.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 8 691). But the FAC contains no support for the conclusion that what happened to Plaintiff was 9 anything more than an isolated incident. 10 Unlike a claim based on a practice or custom, a single incident may support a Monell claim 11 based on an unconstitutional municipal policy. See Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, No. 16-CV- 12 02250-LHK, 2017 WL 344998, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017) (quoting City of Okla. City v. 13 Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985)). And such a policy may be a policy of inaction. See 14 Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the complaint must provide 15 sufficient factual allegations to plausibly support the inference that the incident “‘was caused by 16 an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal 17 policymaker.’” See Bagley , 2017 WL 344998, at *14 (quoting Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 823–24). “A 18 ‘policy’ is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various 19 alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 20 subject matter in question.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) 21 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). Courts have found that generic allegations about the 22 existence of such policies are insufficient. See Garcia v. Cnty. of Napa, No. 21-CV-03519-HSG, 23 2022 WL 110650, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2022) (collecting cases). 24 Here, Plaintiff alleges that deputies failed to intervene to protect him from inmate violence 25 and failed to provide him sufficient medical care. He further alleges that the County had policies 26 in place allowing such conduct, or that any existing policies were insufficient to prevent it from 27 happening. See FAC at ¶¶ 22–24. But Plaintiff offers no detail about the nature of the alleged 1 Put another way, Plaintiff simply asserts that the County had policies in place that permitted the 2 kind of harm he experienced. But the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that a plaintiff cannot plead 3 a plausible Monell claim based on generic allegations that a defendant “maintained or permitted an 4 official policy, custom, or practice of knowingly permitting the occurrence of the type of wrongs 5 that [the plaintiff] elsewhere alleged.” AE, 666 F.3d at 635, 637. Without more, Plaintiff’s 6 allegations against the County collapse into a respondeat superior theory of liability. 7 Plaintiff relies heavily on the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Jackson v. Barnes, suggesting that 8 little detail is required to allege a policy of inaction. See Dkt. No. 34 at 4–5 (citing Jackson, 749 9 F.3d at 763–65). Plaintiff overreads this case. First, the plaintiff in Jackson was pro se, and the 10 Ninth Circuit thus liberally construed his complaint. See Jackson, 749 F.3d at 763. Second, the 11 plaintiff in Jackson provided factual allegations missing here. In Jackson, the Ventura County 12 Sherriff’s Department had conducted a videotaped interview of the plaintiff while he was in police 13 custody without first giving him his Miranda warnings. Id. at 758–59. During the interview, the 14 plaintiff admitted to being at the scene of the murder under investigation. Id. The plaintiff 15 brought a Monell claim against the Sherriff’s Department, alleging that it had failed to sufficiently 16 supervise the sergeant who had interviewed him. Id. at 759, 762–63. The plaintiff alleged that the 17 sergeant routinely failed to read Miranda warnings and that the Sherriff’s Department knew, or 18 should have known, of this unconstitutional conduct. Id. at 763. He further alleged that the 19 Sherriff’s Department deprived suspects of their Miranda warnings specifically “as a ‘ploy’ to 20 elicit confessions.” Id. at 764. 21 Plaintiff, despite being represented by counsel, offers no such allegations regarding the 22 policies and motivation here. As he notes in his opposition brief, he is “unable to recite any 23 ‘official policy’” and so only pleads “the actions of the deputies . . . .” Dkt. No. 34 at 5. Plaintiff 24 appears to concede that he does not know if there is any relevant policy, but suspects there might 25 be. This is clearly insufficient. And even the broad suggestion that the County deprived pretrial 26 detainees of medical care or assistance, FAC at ¶¶ 23–24, is belied at least in part by Plaintiff’s 27 own experience as described in the complaint. He alleges that following the attack he was taken to 1 policies appear to have fallen short only in his follow-up care. Neither the Court nor Defendants 2 should have to speculate about the nature of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff again has failed to 3 sufficiently allege Monell liability based on a custom, policy, or practice, and the Court GRANTS 4 the motion to dismiss on this basis. 5 iii. Failure to Train 6 Plaintiff also contends that he has sufficiently alleged that the County did not adequately 7 train its deputies regarding how to prevent or minimize the risk of inmate-on-inmate violence and 8 how to prevent or minimize the risk that inmates are denied adequate medical aid or assistance. 9 See Dkt. No. 34 at 6–7; see also FAC at ¶¶ 25, 42–44. A municipality may be held liable under 10 § 1983 for the inadequacy of law-enforcement training, “only where the failure to train amounts to 11 deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” City of 12 Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). To state such a claim, a plaintiff must show 13 (1) “the existing training program” is inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular officers 14 must perform”; (2) the officials have been deliberately indifferent “to the rights of persons with 15 whom the police come into contact”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training “actually caused the 16 deprivation of the alleged constitutional right.” Merritt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 17 (9th Cir. 1989) (quotation omitted). 18 Here, Plaintiff does not point to any specific allegations to support his failure-to-train 19 theory. See Dkt. No. 34 at 6–7. The FAC again just asserts that the County did not adequately 20 train its deputies. See FAC at ¶ 25. It provides no allegations about the training that the deputies 21 actually received, what training they should have received, or how the lack of proper training 22 caused the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court therefore GRANTS 23 the motion as to the failure to train theory as well. 24 * * * 25 Despite Plaintiff’s suggestion, Defendants are not demanding that he “prove his claims” on 26 a motion to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 34 at 3. Rather, under controlling law, he must allege sufficient 27 facts to make his claims plausible and not simply possible. He has not done so, and the Court 1 opportunities to do so, Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim against Defendants. In his 2 opposition, Plaintiff does not offer any additional allegations that he could include if given another 3 opportunity to amend, and instead suggests that he is waiting for discovery to determine the nature 4 of his case. This is improper, and the Court thus concludes that providing Plaintiff yet another 5 opportunity to amend would be futile. See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 6 1007 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Feb. 10, 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been 7 granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims, 8 the district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.”) (quotation omitted). 9 B. Doe Defendants 10 Defendants urge that the unidentified and unserved Doe Defendants should be dismissed as 11 well. See Dkt. No. 32 at 7–8. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), a plaintiff must serve 12 each defendant with a summons and complaint within ninety days of filing the complaint. See 13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). If a plaintiff fails to do so, the Court, on its own after notice to the plaintiff, 14 “must dismiss the action without prejudice,” or order that service be made within a specified time. 15 Id. Nearly a year after the case was filed, however, Plaintiff has yet to identify and serve these 16 parties. Plaintiff appears to acknowledge that he does not know their identities. See Dkt. No. 34 17 at 7. And it is not clear what, if any steps, he has taken to uncover them. In opposition to the 18 motion to dismiss, Plaintiff suggests that Defendants should have to identify them for him. See id. 19 Plaintiff cites no authority for this request. Plaintiff may not, however, keep this case open 20 indefinitely. For the case to proceed, he must identify and serve the Doe Defendants or they will 21 be dismissed without prejudice. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 The Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 32. The Court recognizes that the 24 parties have asked the Court to stay this litigation because Plaintiff’s counsel is receiving medical 25 treatment. See Dkt. No. 37. The parties’ stipulation did not include any reason why the Court 26 should delay ruling on the pending motion to dismiss, and the Court finds that the parties—and 27 this litigation generally—are best served by having the Court’s ruling now. However, the Court 1 || judgment were entered today as to Defendants Contra Costa County and Contra Costa County 2 Sherriff’s Office. 3 Given these unusual circumstances, the Court will GRANT the stipulation to stay the case. 4 || Dkt. No. 37. The Court STAYS the remaining proceedings, including the entry of judgment and 5 || Plaintiffs obligation to serve the remaining Doe Defendants, through March 14, 2025, to 6 accommodate counsel’s convalescence. The parties are directed to file a status report by March 7 11, 2025, discussing (1) why judgment should not be entered as to Defendants Contra Costa 8 || County and Contra Costa County Shernffs Office; (2) whether Plaintiff has served the remaining 9 Doe Defendants, and if they have not yet been served; (3) why they should not be dismissed 10 || without prejudice. The Court cautions that to the extent counsel is still recovering, the Court is 11 unlikely to grant a further stay and co-counsel may need to take over the lead (or Plaintiff may 12 || need to obtain new counsel) if he intends to pursue this case further. The Clerk is directed to 13 administratively close the case. IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 15 || Dated: 12/12/2024 16 Atasparved Lb ih 5 HAYW OD S. GILLIAM, JR. nited States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28