Premier Products Co. v. Cameron

400 P.2d 227, 240 Or. 123, 1965 Ore. LEXIS 472
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 24, 1965
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 400 P.2d 227 (Premier Products Co. v. Cameron) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Premier Products Co. v. Cameron, 400 P.2d 227, 240 Or. 123, 1965 Ore. LEXIS 472 (Or. 1965).

Opinion

DENECKE, J.

The issue is whether the petitioner-employer must pay unemployment taxes for commission salesmen who solicit contracts for the sale of custom storm doors, windows, and patio covers. Appellant Department of Employment Commissioner decided that the tax was payable; the trial court reversed.

The statute requires employers to pay unemployment taxes for all employees unless exempted by statute. ORS 657.087 provides:

“ ‘Employment’ does not include service performed by individals soliciting contracts for home improvements including roofing, siding and alterations of private homes to the extent that the remuneration for such services primarily consists of commissions or a share of the profit realized on each contract.”

On oral argument the attorney for the Commissioner admitted that if it were not for the phrase, “including roofing, * * petitioner’s employees *125 would be soliciting contracts for “home improvements.” The Commissioner’s contention is that “including” is a word of limitation; that the general phrase, “home improvements,” is limited to only-certain kinds of “home improvements,” namely, “roofing, siding and alterations.”

This is the kind of statutory interpretation question in which a court need not pay deference to an administrative interpretation: Rogers Const. Co. v. Hill, 235 Or 352, 357, 384 P2d 219 (1963). No plausible reason has been given for distinguishing between salesmen of such home improvements as roofs and salesmen of such home improvements as windows. The known legislative history contains no indication that such a distinction was intended. “Including” can and has been interpreted as a word of enlargement, or of illustrative application, as well as a word of limitation: Arnold v. Arnold, 193 Or 490, 502, 237 P2d 963, 239 P2d 595 (1952); Federal Land Bank v. Bismark Lumber Co., 314 US 95, 62 S Ct 1, 86 L ed 65 (1941). How it is interpreted depends upon several factors,—context, subject matter, possible legislative intention, etc.

We construe the statute as not being limited to sellers of roofing, siding and alterations, but rather, to include sellers of custom storm doors, windows, and patio covers.

Affirmed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
400 P.2d 227, 240 Or. 123, 1965 Ore. LEXIS 472, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/premier-products-co-v-cameron-or-1965.