Prayze FM v. United States

83 F. Supp. 2d 293, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20959, 1999 WL 1441995
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedNovember 8, 1999
Docket3:98CV375(WWE), 3:98CV529(WWE)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 83 F. Supp. 2d 293 (Prayze FM v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Prayze FM v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 293, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20959, 1999 WL 1441995 (D. Conn. 1999).

Opinion

RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

EGINTON, Senior District Judge.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65, defendant Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), seeks an order preliminarily enjoining plaintiffs Prayze FM, Incom LLC, Mark Blake and all persons acting in concert with them from making radio transmissions within the United States until they first obtain a license from the FCC or other appropriate authorization in accordance with 47 U.S.C. sec. 301 et seq. For the reasons below, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.

FACTS

In December 1996, the Field Office of the Compliance and Information Bureau of the FCC in Boston, Massachusetts, began an investigation into the existence of' a possible unlicensed FM radio station transmitting from the Bloomfield, Connecticut area. Alerted from newspaper clippings, telephone calls and written correspondence, the FCC discovered a transmission on the frequency 105.3 MHZ identifying itself as Prayze FM and WPRZ. As of December 1996, the FCC had not authorized any radio station to operate in the Bloomfield, Connecticut area with the call sign WPRZ on 103.5MHZ.

On March 4, 1997, an FCC engineer located the source of the radio source transmission to be in the vicinity of 701 Cottage Grove Road, Bloomfield, Connecticut. On March 19, 1997, the FCC was informed that Prayze FM’s transmission was causing interference with-one licensed station’s signal and having a negative economic impact on another licensed station. On various occasions the FCC engineer measured the strength of the Prayze FM signal and determined that it exceeded the requirements for low power stations provided in the FCC regulations and could be heard approximately ten miles from the broadcasting location. On July 17, 1997, an FCC engineer found the signal strength to be 150 millivolts/meter 150 feet from the base of the antennae, which is 600 times the maximum signal strength authorized for low powered radio operations. On February 12, 1998, the field strength measured to- be 80 millivolts/meter 200 feet from the base of the antennae, which is 320 times the maximum signal strength authorized for low powered radio operations.

Despite repeated instruction to first apply and obtain a license before broadcasting, Prayze FM has not made application with the FCC to this date.

STANDARD

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show (1) irreparable harm, and (2) either (a) likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant’s favor. See, e.g. Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Manufacturing Corp., 25 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir.1994); Bourne Co. v. Tower Records, Inc., 976 F.2d 99, 101 (2d Cir.1992); Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir.1985); Padula v. U.S. I.N.S., 537 F.Supp 563 (D.Conn.1982); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F.Supp. 1235 (D.Conn.1978).

DISCUSSION

IRREPARABLE HARM

Where the government seeks injunctive relief for a statutory violation, *295 there is a presumption of irreparable harm:

irreparable harm is presumed where the government seeks to enforce a statutory violation by way of preliminary injunction expressly authorized in favor of the government by that statute.

United States v. Schmitt, 784 F.Supp. 1035, 1052 (E.D.N.Y.) (citing Securities and Exchange Commission v. Management Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir.1975)). U.S. v. State of Connecticut, 566 F.Supp. 571 (D.Conn.), aff'd., 742 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir.1983). “By making a showing that the plaintiff is engaged in illegal acts, the Commission is seeking to protect the public interest,” and the “standards of the public interest not the requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief,” Securities & Exchange Commission, 515 F.2d at 809 (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. at 321, 321, 64 S.Ct. 587 (1944)). “A finding that future violations are likely to occur implies that a significant injury to the public has been shown.” United States v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25, 28 (2d Cir.1972).

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the government is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm because Prayze FM is contesting the constitutionality of the various FCC regulations which prevent the licensing of low powered radio stations. This Court agrees with the general proposition that the government should not be entitled to the presumption of irreparable harm where the constitutionality of a statute is at issue. United States v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 398 (9th Cir.1992). The “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitute irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). However, this issue is not before the Court. As discussed below, Prayze FM does not have standing as required by Article III of the Constitution to challenge the regulations because the regulations were never applied to Prayze; Prayze FM never applied for a license with the FCC.

ARTICLE III STANDING

In order to invoke federal jurisdiction, a litigant must establish that: (1) the litigant has suffered an actual and concrete injury consisting of “an invasion of a legally protected interest”; (2) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct of which the litigant complains; and (3) there must be a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

Prayze FM has neither applied for a license nor a waiver to operate its low powered station. Accordingly, the statute challenged has never been applied to Prayze FM. Therefore, because there is no causal connection between the injury and the conduct of which the litigant complains, the plaintiffs do not have standing to raise a constitutional claim at this point of the proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Dunifer, 997 F.Supp. 1235 (N.D.Cal.1998). 1

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83 F. Supp. 2d 293, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20959, 1999 WL 1441995, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/prayze-fm-v-united-states-ctd-1999.