Pratum Farm, LLC v. United States Department of Agriculture

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PRATUM FARM, LLC, No. 24-6160 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 6:23-cv-01525-AA v. MEMORANDUM* UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 11, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.***

Pratum Farm, LLC (“Pratum”) appeals the district court’s order granting

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. summary judgment in favor of the United States Department of Agriculture

(“USDA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

To satisfy the requirements of Article III standing, “a plaintiff must have (1)

suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of

the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial

decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). The injury must be

“‘concrete,’ meaning that it must be real and not abstract,” FDA v. All. for

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024), and “particularized,” in that it

“affect[s] ‘the plaintiff in a personal and individual way,’” id. (quoting Lujan v.

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, n.1 (1992)). At the summary judgment stage,

the plaintiff must “set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts” to

establish standing, “which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be

taken to be true.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. Johnson v.

Barr, 79 F.4th 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2023).

1. Pratum fails to set forth specific facts to show injury-in-fact based on

a theory of reputational damage to the USDA “organic” seal. Pratum does not

have an ownership interest in the USDA seal, nor a greater right to use the seal

than any other agricultural producer who complies with the certification

requirements of the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (“the Act”), 7 U.S.C.

2 24-6160 §§ 6501-6524. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.303(a)(4) (specifying that qualifying

agricultural products “may display” the seal). Thus, any purported reputational

damage to the seal does not affect Pratum in a “personal and individual way.” All.

for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. 560 n.1).

Moreover, Pratum failed to introduce any evidence that the challenged rule, see

National Organic Program (NOP); Strengthening Organic Enforcement, 88 Fed.

Reg. 3548-01 (Jan. 19, 2023) (codified at 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.2–205.681) (hereinafter,

the “Rule”), in fact damaged the seal’s goodwill. Pratum’s assertion that the Rule

misleads consumers by permitting agricultural producers to violate the

requirements of the Act is insufficient. See All for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at

381 (“[A plaintiff] does not have standing to challenge a government regulation

simply because the plaintiff believes that the government is acting illegally.”).

2. Pratum also fails to set forth specific facts to show that the Rule

causes it competitive injury. Where, as here, the plaintiff “challenges the

government’s ‘unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else,’” rather

than the government’s regulation of the plaintiff, Article III standing is

“‘substantially more difficult to establish.’” Id. at 382 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at

562). To show competitive injury, the plaintiff must show that the challenged

regulation causes or is likely to cause the plaintiff “actual or imminent” economic

injury, rather than a mere windfall for a competitor. Id. at 381; see Already, LLC v.

3 24-6160 Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 99 (2013) (rejecting “a boundless theory” of competitor

standing where a plaintiff “is injured for Article III purposes whenever a

competitor benefits from something allegedly unlawful”).

Pratum fails to set forth specific facts showing that the Rule causes it actual

or imminent economic injury. Pratum argues that the Rule reduces producer

groups’ production costs by enabling them to obtain organic certificates without a

certified agent annually inspecting each individual member. But the Rule also

imposes other requirements on producer groups, including establishing an internal

control system to monitor and inspect individual members for compliance with the

Act and USDA’s implementing regulations. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.201(c),

205.400(g)(4), 205.403(a)(2). Pratum, therefore, fails to show that the Rule

provides producer groups a competitive advantage that necessarily causes Pratum

economic injury. To the extent Pratum argues that the Rule in fact enabled certain

Turkish producer groups to sell organic hazelnut kernels at lower prices than

Pratum, Pratum “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities” insufficient to

show its competitors’ conduct was fairly traceable to the Rule. Clapper v. Amnesty

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013); see All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at

383 (“[P]laintiffs attempting to show causation generally cannot ‘rely on

speculation about the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the

courts’” (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 415 n.5)).

4 24-6160 AFFIRMED.

5 24-6160