OPINION BY
Judge McCULLOUGH.
Presently before this Court is the application of PPL Electric Utilities Corporation (PPL) for summary relief seeking a judgment in its favor with respect to counts I, II, III, and V of its amended petition for review, specifically, a declaration that several provisions of Administrative' Ordinance No. 16-2013 (the Ordinance) enacted by the City of Lancaster (City) are invalid and preempted by the Public Utility Code (Code), 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-3316, and an order enjoining enforcement of these provisions.
I. Facts and Procedural History
The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. PPL is a public utility, regulated by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC). PPL provides electric service to the public pursuant to a PUC-approved tariff. Under its tariff, PPL’s service territory covers 29 counties and 653 municipalities, including the City. On May 28, 2013, the City enacted Administrative Ordinance No. 2-2013 for the purpose of implementing a comprehensive program for management of the City’s rights-of-way, including management of public utilities and public utility facilities within these rights-of-way. The City also adopted, on this same day, a resolution which set forth a fee schedule related to activities and uses in the public rights-of-way.1 On September 17, 2013, PPL filed a petition for review in -the nature of a complaint in this Court’s original-jurisdiction seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. PPL joined the PUC as an additional defendant.
II. December 17, 2013 Ordinance
On December 17, 2013, the City enacted the Ordinance'at issue, which repealed the previously enacted Administrative Ordinance No. 2-20132 and implemented another program for management of the City’s rights-of-way, again including management of public utilities and public utility facilities within these rights-of-way. The City relied on the powers granted to it under the Third Class City Code (TCCC)3 [841]*841and the Home Rule Charter and Optional Plans Law4 in enacting the Ordinance.5
The Ordinance described the City’s rights-of-way as a “valuable resource and asset, not only for City purposes, but also for the benefit of third-party users, who rely upon the Rights-of-Way of the City for the installation and maintenance of various facilities owned and operated- by such third-parties to their economic benefit. ..(Ordinance at 2.) The Ordinance stated, that the management and maintenance of the public rights-of-way represented a “significant continuing operational and capítol cost” for the City, which, by extension, is passed on to City taxpayers, residents, and business owners. Id. The Ordinance also stated that it was necessary to recoup these maintenance and management costs from “the actual users of such facilities” in the.City’s rights-of-way. (Ordinance at 3.)
Section 263B of the Ordinance addresses PUC-regulated utilities and purports to grant various powers to the City. For example, section 263B-3 authorizes the City to conduct inspections to ensure that utility facilities within the rights-of-way do not constitute a public safety hazard and remain in compliance with PUC standards. Section 263B-4(6) authorizes the City to direct a utility to “temporarily or permanently remove, relocate, change, or alter the position of any Facilities within the Righb-of-Way” under certain circumstances, including “the construction, repair, maintenance, or installation of any City or other public improvement,” “the operations of the City,” the “vacation of a Street or the release of a utility easement,” or during emergency situations. (Ordinance at 7.) Additionally, section 263B-5 permits the City to impose an annual maintenance fee “in connection with the ongoing use and occupancy of City Rights-of-Way” and section 263D-1 allows thé City to impose a penalty for a violation of any provision of the Ordinance that is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUC.6 (Ordinance at 8,16.)
[842]*842III. Amended Petition for Review
PPL thereafter filed an amended petition for review seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and joining the PUC as an additional defendant. PPL noted that it is a regulated utility subject to the provisions of the Code and, in accordance with certificates of public convenience issued by the PUC, was authorized to offer, render, furnish, or supply utility service to nearly 1.4 million customers throughout its certificated service territory, which encompasses approximately 10,000 square miles, all or portions of 29 counties, and more than 680 cities, boroughs, and townships. PPL also noted that it rendered service to the public in accordance with a PUC-approved tariff, which includes a list of services, rules for service, and rates for service.7 PPL stated that it owns, operates, and maintains approximately 43,000 miles of distribution lines, 5,000 miles of transmission lines, and 375 substations within its certificated territory.
' PPL argued, generally, that the Ordinance violated the policy of the Commonwealth for a uniform, state-wide regulation of public utilities and public utility facili[843]*843ties; was preempted by the Commission’s exclusive authority over the location, construction and maintenance of all public utility facilities; exceeded the City’s authority under the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC);8 violated PPL’s statutory right under section 1511(e) of the Business Corporation Law of 1988,15 Pa.C.S. § 1511(e), to use public rights-of-way without charge;9 and imposed a fee schedule and penalties that amount to an unlawful tax.
More specifically, PPL’s amended petition for review included five counts. In Count I, PPL alleged that the City’s assessment of an annual maintenance fee under section 263B-5 and the fee resolution interfered with the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction and violated PPL’s rights under the MPC. Count II alleged that the inspection requirements of section 263B-3 were preempted by the Code and violated PPL’s rights under the MPC. Count III alleged that the Code preempted section 263D-1. Count IV alleged that the maintenance fee was an illegal tax. Count V averred that the Ordinance’s relocation and removal provisions interfered with the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction and violated PPL’s rights under the MPC.10
The City filed preliminary objections alleging that this Court lacked jurisdiction because the PUC was not an indispensable party to this action. The City further alleged a demurrer as to all counts stating that it acted entirely within its police powers in adopting the Ordinance, PPL failed to plead how the specific Ordinance provisions interfere with the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction or are preempted by the Code, and the .MPC is- irrelevant to the present action. PPL filed a response denying these ■ allegations. By order dated April 28, 2014, this Court overruled the City’s preliminary objections and directed the City to file an answer to PPL’s amended petition for review.
The City later filed an answer denying the material allegations of PPL’s amended petition for review and reiterating in new matter its previous assertions that it acted entirely within its police powers in adopting the Ordinance and that PPL failed to demonstrate how the specific Ordinance provisions interfere with the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction or are preempted by the Code. The City also asserted that the PUC has no jurisdiction to regulate rights-of-way fees, including maintenance fees, and that such fees are a method of cost recovery, not taxes. Both PPL and the PUC filed answers to this matter, denying these assertions.
IV. Application for Summary Relief
PPL thereafter filed its application for summary relief which is presently before this Court.11 PPL seeks a judgment in its [844]*844favor with respect to counts I, II, III, and V of its amended petition for review, a declaration that sections 263B, 263B-4(6), 263Bt5, and 263D-1 of the City’s Ordinance are invalid and preempted by the Code, and an order enjoining the City from enforcing these provisions.12 We agree with PPL that the Code preempts sections 263B, 263B-4(6), and 263D-1 of the City’s Ordinance. However, we do not agree with PPL that the Code preempts the imposition of an annual maintenance fee pursuant to section 263B-5 of' the City’s Ordinance.
V. Discussion
A. Preemption
“Municipalities are creatures of the state and have no inherent powers of their own. Rather, they possess only such powers of government as are expressly granted to them and as are necessary to carry the same into effect.” Huntley & Huntley, Inc. v. Borough Council of Oakmont, 600 Pa. 207, 964 A.2d 855, 862 (2009). Additionally, under the law of preemption, “even in areas over which municipalities have been granted power to act, the state may bar local governing bodies from legislating in a particular field.” Hoffman Mining Company v. Zoning Hearing Board of Adams Township, 612 Pa. 598, 32 A.3d 587, 593 (2011).
In Hoffman Mining Company, our Supreme Court noted that there are three generally recognized types of preemption:
(1) express or explicit preemption, where the statute includes a preemption clause, the language of which specifically bars local authorities from acting on a particular subject matter; (2) conflict preemption, where the local enactment • irreconcilably conflicts with or stands as an obstacle to the execution of the full purposes of the statute; and (3) field preemption, where analysis of the entire statute reveals the General Assembly’s implicit intent to occupy the field completely and to permit no local enactments.
Id. at 593-99, 32 A.3d 587 (citations, omitted).
. B. Exclusive Authority of the PUC
The courts of this Commonwealth have long recognized the intent of our General Assembly that public utilities be regulated on a uniform basis by a statewide regulator and not be subject to the varied regulation of the many cities, townships, and boroughs throughout the Commonwealth. Over 100 years ago, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed several ordinances passed by the city of York “for the purpose of regulating the measuring of water supplied to consumers,” requiring York Water Company to install meters, at its own expense, when requested by a consumer, and prescribing penalties for failure to comply with the provisions of said ordinances. York Water Company v. York, 250 Pa. 115, 95 A. 396, 396 (1915). York Water Company filed a bill in equity seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing these ordinances. The Court of Common Pleas of York County issued a decree granting York Water Company a perpetual injunction restraining the city from enforcement.
[845]*845Referring to the predecessors of the current Code and PUC, the Supreme Court held as follows:
There can be no reasonable doubt that the legislative intention was to make the Public Service Act the supreme law of the State in the regulation and supervision of public service corporations, and this being so, it follows as a necessary-sequence that all laws inconsistent with the powers thus conferred must be held to be repealed or supplied thereby ... The Public Service Company Law was intended to , establish a complete and uniform system throughout the State for the enforcement of such powers as were conferred upon the Public Service Commission by that statute....
We do not mean to be understood as saying that cities of the third class, or of any other class for that matter, may not under their police powers prescribe reasonable regulations as a protection to the health, lives, property and safety of their inhabitants, even as applied to public service corporations. But such regulations are incidents of the police power and must be so restricted. Under the guise of a police regulation cities cannot undertake to determine the reasonableness of rates charged by public service corporations, nor can they prescribe regulations relating to the facilities, service and business of such corporations. These are the functions of the Public Service Commission and must be so regarded. The legislature has so declared and what the law making body does within the limit of its powers becomes a rule of action binding upon all branches of government, state or municipal, and upon the people as well.
Id. at 396-97.
Nearly four decades later, our Supreme Court reaffirmed this policy in Duquesne Light Company v. Upper St. Clair Township, 377 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954). In that case, Duquesne'Light Company, an electric utility company, sought approval from the PUC to build a transmission line through a residential area of Upper St. Clair Township. The construction of this new transmission line required Duquesne Light Company to obtain, by purchase or condemnation, various rights-of-way and easements. The PUC issued the necessary certificates of public convenience to Duquesne Light Company, which proceeded with the purchases and condemnation of lands and later eomménced construction of the new line. The township sought to block the construction of the utility line towers on the grounds that their, presence would violate the township’s zoning ordinance. The township issued a notice of work stoppage to Duquesne Light Company, advising that a building permit must be secured and threatening the imposition of daily fines and the arrest of contractors if construction continued without a permit.
Duquesne Light Company filed an action in equity with the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County seeking to enjoin the township from enforcing its zoning ordinance. The common pleas court- issued a decree, which granted the requested injunctive relief. The Supreme ‘Court affirmed, citing the PUC’s authority under section 901 of the thén-existing Public Utility Code13 to “supervise and regulate all public utilities doing business within'the Commonwealth,” and holding that “the policy of the Commonwealth in entrusting to the Commission the regulation and supervision of public utilities has' excluded townships from the same field.” Duquesne Light Company, 105 A.2d at 292. The court explained that:
[846]*846The Public Utility Code demonstrates without question that the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has therein expressed its policy to commit the regulation of utilities to the Public Utility Commission and to impose a duty upon utilities to render efficient service. It is clear that the proposed transmission line is necessary for the rendition of efficient service to the public and that that necessity transcends the legitimate objectives of any one of the political subdivisions of the Commonwealth. We believe that this is the reason why the General Assembly entrusted the regulation of public utilities to a commission of state-wide jurisdiction. Local authorities not only are ill-equipped to comprehend the needs of the public beyond their jurisdiction, but, and equally important, those authorities, if they had the power to regulate, necessarily would exercise that power with an eye toward the local situation and not with the best interests of the public at large as the point of reference.
Id. at 293.
Twelve years later, in County of Chester v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 420 Pa. 422, 218 A.2d 331 (1966), the Supreme Court affirmed a common pleas court decision declaring as unconstitutional a Chester County ordinance prohibiting persons or corporations from constructing pipelines without submitting plans related to the routes and use of such lines to the Chester County Planning Commission and once again reaffirming the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUC with respect to regulation of public utilities. The court held that:
The necessity for conformity in the regulation and control of public utilities is as apparent as the electric lines which one views traversing the Commonwealth. If each county were to pronounce its own regulation and control over electric wires, pipelines and oil lines, the conveyors of power and fuel could become so twisted and knotted as to affect adversely the welfare of the entire state. It is for that reason that the Legislature has vested in the Public Utility Commission exclusive authority over the complex and technical service and engineering questions arising in the location, construction and maintenance of all public utilities facilities....
Id. at 333.
More recently, this Court reaffirmed this reasoning in PECO Energy Company v. Township of Upper Dublin, 922 A.2d 996 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007), and Pennsylvania Power Company v. Township of Pine, 926 A.2d 1241 (Pa.Cmwlth.2007), both of which invalidated a township’s attempt to regulate a public utility. In Toumship of Upper Dublin, the township enacted an ordinance to regulate the manner in which a public utility trims shade trees within the township’s rights-of-way. The Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County granted the motion of PECO Energy Company for judgment in mandamus, holding that the township “possesses no authority to regulate PECO’s vegetation management practices, which fall within the Public Utility Code’s definition of ‘utility service’ and are solely regulated by the [PUC].” Id. at 999.
This Court affirmed, noting that PECO’s tariff specifically authorizes it “to trim, remove, or separate trees, vegetation or any structures therein, which, in the opinion of [PECO], interfere with its aerial conductors” and that “[p]ublic utility tariffs have the force and effect of law, and are binding on the customer as well as the utility.” Id. at 1004 (citations omitted). We also noted that, consistent with a public utility’s duties under section 1501 of the [847]*847Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 1501,14 and the Code’s definition of service in section 102, 66 Pa. C.S. § 102,15 “[u]tility service is not confined to the distribution of electrical, energy, but includes ‘any and all acts’ related to that function,” such as vegetation management activities. Id. at 1005 (citing West Penn Power Company v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 134 Pa. Cmwlth. 53, 578 A.2d 75, 77 (1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 660, 593 A.2d 429 (1991)).
Most importantly, we concluded that “the legislature intended the Public Utility Code to preempt the field of public utility regulation.” Township of Upper Dublin, 922 A.2d at 1005 (emphasis added). Further, citing Duquesne Light Company, County of Chester, and West Penn Power Company, as well as the PUC’s electric safety and reliability regulations and its then-proposed inspection and maintenance regulations, which directly conflicted with the township’s shade tree ordinance, we held that the township was preempted by the Code and PUC regulations “from applying its shade tree ordinance pruning standards to PECO’s vegetation management practices.” Id.
in Township .of Pine, the township der nie,d the application of Pennsylvania Power Company for a permit to install poles and utility lines along a public right-of-way in the township. The township demanded that such service be underground, consistent with an agreement entered into by the township and a private developer with respect'to a residential subdivision.. Pennsylvania Power Company appealed the denial of a permit to the common pleas court, which affirmed the township’s denial based upon section 57.84 of the PUC regulations, 52 Pa.Code § 57.84, which requires that new distribution lines located' within 100 feet of a development be placed underground, “if practicable.” The common pleas court also relied on Duquesne Light Company as support for its decision that the township may define by ordinance a reasonable underground wiring district. On further appeal, this Court vacated the decision of the common pleas court and directed that the matter be transferred to the PUC. . ■ •
We began our analysis by noting that the common pleas court misinterpreted the holding in Duquesne Light Company, as [848]*848that ease “neither expanded the authority of local government bodies over public utilities, nor diminished the authority of the PUC. It simply reconciled two conflicting statutes and reaffirmed the long line of decisions in this Commonwealth establishing that a municipality may not, through ordinance or otherwise, compel the underground installation ' of electric utilities.” Township of Pine, 926 A.2d at 1249 (emphasis in original). Additionally, we noted that the township had never passed' an ordinance or regulation pursuant to its home rule powers that would require a utility to place its lines underground, but instead relied upon its authority to issue permits under section 18 of the Act of May 11, 1911, P.L. 244, as amended, 53 P.S. § 1991 (section 1991).16
However, we stated that the permit powers in section 1991 were not unlimited, and that section 1991 had been repealed insofar as it was inconsistent with section 1511(a)(2) of the Business ■ Corporation Law of 1988 (BCL), which grants a public utility “the right to take, occupy and condemn property5’ for the “transportation of artificial or natural gas, electricity, petroleum or petroleum products or water or any combination of such substances for the public.” 15 Pa.C.S. § 1511(a)(2). In addition, we cited section 1511(e) of the BCL, which specifically addresses a public utility’s right to occupy streets and other public' rights-of-way for the “placemént, maintenance and removal of aerial, surface and subsurface public utility facilities thereon or therein.” 15 Pa.C.S. § 1511(e).17
Construing section 1991, section 1511 of the BCL, and the Code together, we held that the “the scope and breadth of [the township’s] permit authority ha[d] been limited by Section 1511 of the BCL to matters of local concern,” ie., the time and manner of opening a street, and “[b]ecause the underground installation of a distribution, line within the Township’s right-of-way is not, by statutory -definition, a matter of local concern, the Township has no authority to require Penn Power to proceed in that fashion.” Township of Pine, 926 A.2d at 1251. Further, we emphasized [849]*849“the ‘initial and exclusive authority’ of the PUC to first determine public utility regulatory matters....” Id. at-1252. Because a question remained in that case regarding whether, consistent with PUC regulations, the placement of underground utility lines was practicable, we vacated: the common pleas court’s decision and transferred the' matter to the PUC. ;
C. City of Lancaster Ordinance
In the present case, the City similarly relies on section 1991 and section 1511(e) of the BCL as support for- its authority to regulate utilities within, its rights-of-way. However, we reject these arguments based upon our decision in Township of Pine. The City also relies on section 701 of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 701, and its police powers under the TCCC. However, such reliance is misplaced. Section 701 of the Code merely authorizes the City to file a written complaint with the Commission whenever a public utility acts or fails to act in violation of “any law which the [PUC] has jurisdiction to administer” or “any regulation or order of- the [PUC].”18 This section - does not convey any authority to municipal organizations, let alone empower the City to enact ordinances regulating public utilities.
The City cites its general police powers under former section 2403(60) of the TCCC, which empowered it to.“make and; .adopt all such ordinances, by-laws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with of restrained by the Constitution and íaws of this Commonwealth, as may be expedient or necessary for the proper management, care and control of the city and its finances, and the maintenance of the peace, good government, safety and welfare of the city — ” 53 P.S. § 37403(60) (emphasis added).19 The City also cites its general power under section 2915(3) of the TCCC to keep its rights-of-way “in order and repair and in safe passable condition.” 53 P.S. § 37915(3). Again, however, neither of .these provisions authorizes the City to enact ordinances regulating public utilities. Moreover, similar to Township of Upper Dublin, where the First Class Township Code (FCTC),20 the authority upon which the township relied in enacting its shade tree ordinance, Contained a general repeal provision stating that - nothing in that act shall “repeal or modify any of the- provisions of the [Code],”21 the TCCC'includes a general repeal provision at section .4701 stating that “[n]othing-contained in this act shall be construed to repeal any local or special laws; or to repeal the provisions of 66 [850]*850Pa.C.S. Pt. I, known as the Public Utility Code....” 53 P.S. § 39701.
Furthermore, the relevant provisions of the Ordinance implicate subjects, including the inspection and location of utility facilities and the imposition of fees and penalties, that are committed to the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction by the Code. We will discuss each of these provisions separately below.
Section 263B-3 of the Ordinance
Section 263B-3 of the Ordinance purports to authorize the City to inspect public utility facilities to ensure that such facilities do not constitute a public safety hazard and remain in compliance with PUC standards. As PPL states, this provision essentially makes the City a regulator itself.
However, the General Assembly has declared, as the policy of this Commonwealth, that because “continuing and ensuring the reliability of electric service depends on adequate generation and on conscientious inspection and maintenance of transmission and distribution systems, the independent system operator or its functional equivalent should set, and the commission shall set through regulations, inspection, maintenance, repair and replacement standards and enforce those standards.” Section 2802(20) of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 2802(20). In this regard, the Code specifically empowers the PUC to: appoint inspectors to ensure “the proper conduct of the work of the [PUC],” and “investigate and examine the condition and management of any public utility,” section 331 of the Code, 66 Pa. C.S. § 331; and “enter upon the premises, buildings, machinery, system, plant, and equipment, and make any inspection, valuation, physical examination, inquiry, or investigation of any and all plant and equipment, facilities, property ... of any public utility,” section 506 of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 506. In addition, the PUC has enacted regulations setting forth specific inspection and maintenance standards relating to utility poles, overhead lines, transformers, switching and protective devices, regulators, capacitors, and substations. See 52 Pa.Code § 57.198.22
Section 263B-4(6) of the Ordinance
Section 263B-4(6) of the Ordinance purports to grant the City the power to order a public utility to remove, relocate, change, or alter the position of any facilities within the right-of-way whenever the City determines that it is “reasonably necessary” to do so “or such shorter period in the case of an Emergency.” However, as our Supreme Court stated in County of Chester, “the Legislature has vested in the [PUC] exclusive authority over the complex and technical service and engineering questions arising in the location, construction and maintenance of all public utilities facilities.... ” 218 A.2d at 333 (emphasis added). In this regard, section 1505(a) of the Code directs the PUC as follows:
Whenever the commission, after reasonable notice and hearing, upon its own motion or upon complaint, finds that the service or facilities of any public utility are unreasonable, unsafe, inadequate, insufficient, or unreasonably discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of this part, the commission shall determine and prescribe, by regulation or order, [851]*851the reasonable, safe, adequate, sufficient, service or facilities to be observed, furnished, enforced, or employed, including all such repairs, changes, alterations, extensions, substitutions, or improvements in facilities as shall be reasonably necessary and proper for the safety, accommodation, and convenience of the public.
66 Pa.C.S. § 1505(a). Further, the PUC has promulgated extensive regulations relating to the location of line extensions, transmission lines, and underground electric service. See 52 Pa.Code §§ 57.19, 57.71-57.77, 57.81-57.88, 69.3101, 69.3107.
The City contends that section 263B-4(6) does not conflict with the Code. The City acknowledges the existence of the above-mentioned regulations, which the City asserts specifically limit application of this section of .the Ordinance. The City cites that portion of section 263B-4(6) which states that “Utilities must relocate and remove Facilities consistent with the regulations and standards of the [PUC].” However, such limitation does not overcome the fact that section 263B-4(6), like section 263B-3 above, essentially makes the City a regulator itself with the authority to direct the relocation or removal of public utility facilities. Again, our General Assembly and the courts of this Commonwealth have recognized that such authority rests solely with the PUC.
Section 263B-5 of the Ordinance
Section 263B-5 seeks to impose an annual maintenance fee on any public utility with facilities in the City’s rights-of-way. PPL argues that such a fee is redundant to the annual assessment fee that it pays to the PUC for regulatory expenses under section 510 of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 510. Section 510 of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 510, imposes an annual assessment, on public utilities for its regulatory expenses. The PUC calculates this assessment in accordance with a formula set forth in section 510(b), which includes consideration of the amount of PUC expenditures “directly attributable to the regulation of each group of utilities furnishing the same kind of service” and the “gross intrastate operating revenues” and “sum of the debits” of a particular utility group as compared to all utility groups. 66 Pa.C.S. § 510(b)(l)(4).
However, as the City correctly notes, the proposed annual maintenance fee represents the costs it expends to maintain the rights-of-way occupied by public utilities and no section of the Code provides for an annual assessment of these costs. Our Supreme Court has held that maintenance of rights-of-way is within the ambit of the traditional exercise of municipal police powers and the assessment of a reasonable fee for the recovery of costs incurred by the City expended in maintaining such rights-of-way does not constitute local regulation of public utilities. See Adams v. New Kensington, 357 Pa. 557, 55 A.2d 392, 394-95 (1947); Kittanning Borough v. American Natural Gas Company, 239 Pa. 210, 86 A. 717, 717-18 (1913).
Moreover, we note that the City is a home rule municipality. As such, it has the legal ability to assess fees for recovery of costs under its home rule powers, which are not constrained by Dillon’s Rule, and generally enable it to undertake government action unless preempted by a law of statewide applicability. Since the Code does not preempt the imposition of an annual fee relative to the maintenance of the City’s rights-of-way, it may do so provided the fee is reasonable in relation to the costs incurred by the City for such purpose and not a tax.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by PPL’s contention that the City’s imposition [852]*852of an annual maintenance fee will be ultimately passed back on to consumers through the PUC’s ratemaking process. This contention is speculative and presumes the PUC will merely rubberstamp a PPL rate increase and pass it along to consumers, which in turn insinuates that the PUC will not exercise proper oversight should PPL seek a rate increase. We are likewise not persuaded by PPL’s fears that the impact on consumer rates could be magnified exponentially if each of the 652 municipalities in.PPL’s service territory imposed their own annual maintenance fees. This argument is not only specula.-tive but specious as the same could be said of any kind of local government assessment for taxes or fees. Such an argument is also best directed to the legislative branch of government which can revise the Code to preempt the imposition of local maintenance fees for public rights-of-way.
In light of the above, the issue as to the imposition of an annual right-of-way fee is not whether it is preempted by the Code, but whether the fee is reasonable and not a tax. This issue cannot be determined at this summary stage of. the proceedings and may require further factual development; hence, we must deny PPL’s application for summary relief as to Count I of its amended petition for' review.
Section 263D-1 of the Ordinance
Section 263D-1 addresses both PUC-regulated utilities (263D-l(a)) and non-PUC-regulated entities (263D-l(b)). Regarding the former, this section seeks' to permit the City to bring a complaint against a public utility “[i]n the event a public utility is found by the City to have violated a PUC regulation, standard, or order....” This section also permits the City to “notify the Utility of thé existence of any suspected violation of PUC standards, regulations or order [sic] in order to obtain compliance by the Utility.” Additionally, this section states that if a public utility is found to have violated any provision of the Ordinance that is not within the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction, then the public utility “shall be subject, upon conviction thereof, to a fine not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300), for each and every offense, together with attorneys’ fees and costs, and in default of the payment thereof, imprisonment for not.more than ninety (90)' days.” Further, this section deems each day a violation continues to occur as a separate and distinct violation.
We agree with PPL that section 263D-1(a) attempts to impose an overlapping enforcement regime for public utilities that is preempted by the Code. As noted above, section 1505 of the Code specifically authorizes the PUC, by its own motion or upon the filing of a complaint by a third party, to: convene a hearing; make findings regarding the reasonableness, safety, adequacy, and sufficiency of a public utility’s service and/or facilities; and to prescribe, by regulation1 or order, any necessary repairs, changes, alterations, extensions, substitutions, or ' improvements in this service or facilities. Additionally, section 3301(a) of the Code, 66 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a), provides for the imposition of civil penalties against a public utility for any violation of the Code, PUC regulation, or PUC final determination or order. Section 3301(b) addresses continuing offenses and states that “[e]ach and every day’s continuance in the violation of any regulation or final direction, requirement, determination, or order of the commission ,.. shall be a separate and distinct offense.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 3301(b).
Moreover, section 3314(a) of the Code sets forth a three-year statute of limitations for the recovery of any penalties or forfeitures incurred under the Code, commencing from the “date at which the liabil[853]*853ity therefor arose.... ” 66 Pa.C.S. § 3814(a). Furthermore, the PUC has promulgated its own investigation and enforcement regulation, 52 Pa.Code § 57.197, as well as a regulation setting forth the factors and standards that the PUC will consider in imposing penalties or approving settlements for a violation, 52 Pa.Code § 69.1201. .
The City contends that the Ordinance does not create an overlapping enforcement regime, but instead recognizes the jurisdiction of the PUC. In support of this contention, the City cites that portion of section 263D-l(a) limiting imposition of fines to violations of Ordinance provisions “not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PUC” and recognizing that “[njothing in this Section shall be construed to permit the City to commence or attempt to commence prosecution of any PUC Regulated Utility for a violation of any regulation, standard or order of the PUC.” The City notes that, in such situations, its only recourse is to file a complaint with the PUC under section 701 of the Code.
However, the City ignores that' portion of section 263D-l(a) that permits the City to independently contact a public utility and advise the public utility of the City’s perceived violations of the Code or the PUC’s regulations or orders. Similar to the aforementioned sections of the Code, section 263D-l(a) essentially makes the City a regulator itself. Indeed, in its answer and new matter to PPL’s amended petition for review, the City conceded that the Ordinance was an attempt to exercise “concurrent” authority with the PUC over management of its rights-of-way. (City’s Answer and New Matter, May 27, 2014, ¶111.)
Conclusion
Summary relief is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the right to relief is clear as a matter of law. Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b); Hospital & Healthsystem Association of Pennsylvania. A century of case law has firmly established that the General Assembly’s intent in enacting the. Code and its predecessor statute was to provide for the uniform, statewide regulation of public utilities and public utility facilities. Indeed, this Court has expressly held that “the legislature intended the Public Utility Code to preempt the field of public, utility regulation.” Township of Upper Dublin, 922 A.2d at 1005. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that sections 263B-3, 263B-4(6), and 263D-1 of the City’s Ordinance are preempted by the Code, and, hence, are invalid. However, we conclude that section 263B-5 of the City’s Ordinance, by which the City imposes an annual right-of-way maintenance fee based only on its costs to 'maintain the same, is not a public utility regulation and, hence, is neither preempted by the Code nor invalid.
Because no genuine issues of material fact remain to be decided as to counts II, III, and IV of PPL’s amended petition for review and PPL has established a clear right to relief as a matter, of law, we grant PPL’s application for summary relief and enter judgment in its favor with respect to these counts. The City is specifically enjoined from enforcing sections 263B-3, 263B-4(6), and 263D-1 of its Ordinance.23 However, because we disagree with PPL that section 263B-5 of the City’s Ordinance is preempted by the Code, we deny PPL’s application for summary relief as to Count I of its amended petition for review.24 As noted above, the issues regard[854]*854ing the reasonableness of the annual maintenance fee imposed under section 263B-5 of the City’s Ordinance, and whether said fee is a tax, may require further factual development before this Court.
Judge McGINLEY dissents.
Judge LEADBETTER joins in part but dissents to maintenance fee (Section 263B-5) only.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 2015, the application for summary relief filed by PPL Electric Utilities Corporation (PPL) is granted as to counts II, III, and V of its amended petition for review. We hereby declare sections 263B-3, 263B-4(6), and 263D-1 of the December 17, 2013 Ordinance enacted by the City of Lancaster (City) to be preempted by the Public -Utility Code, and enjoin the City from enforcing these sections. PPL’s application for summary relief as to Count I is denied. Section 263B-5 of the City’s Ordinance is not preempted by the Code.