Powell v. Merino

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 2, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-2795
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TERRI POWELL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-02795 (UNA) ) JHONNY MERINO, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”),

ECF No. 1, and Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The

Court grants the IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses the Complaint

without prejudice.

Plaintiff, who provides only a P.O. Box, states that she is resident of the District of

Columbia, 1 sues the American Legion (located in Indianapolis, Indiana), American Legion Post

108 (located in Cheverly, Maryland), and Post 108’s Commander and two of its bartenders. See

Compl. at 1–4. Plaintiff purports to raise claims for assault, defamation, libel, and slander. See

id. at 3. She vaguely alleges only that “Defendants used false statements to others in order to

destroy the Plaintiff’s reputation, and cancel her American Legion Membership.” Id. at 3. She

contends that she has endured pain and suffering and demands $100,000. See id. at 4.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires

1 The Local Rules of this Court requires a plaintiff to, inter alia, provide a full residence address in her first filing, and use of a P.O. Box is allowed only upon leave of Court, see D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1), which Plaintiff has not sought in this case. Notwithstanding this failure, the Court will sua sponte grant Plaintiff leave to use the P.O. Box in this circumstance because she indicates that her physical location is protected pursuant to a protective order. See Compl. at 1. complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction

[and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d

661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that defendants receive fair notice of

the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive answer and an adequate defense and

determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498

(D.D.C. 1977).

Here, the Complaint fails to provide Defendants or this Court with notice of Plaintiff’s

intended claims. It is unclear how, when, why, or where the Defendants allegedly defamed

Plaintiff, nor are her boilerplate allegations particularized for any given Defendant. And she

provides no factual support whatsoever for her intended assault claim. As here, “threadbare

recitals” that “supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to state a claim. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although a pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)

(cleaned up), it still “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere

possibility of [defendant’s] misconduct,’” Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor,

567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79; see Aktieselskabet AF

21. Nov.2001 v. Fame Jeans, Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 16 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“We have never accepted

‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations’ because a complaint needs some

information about the circumstances giving rise to the claims.”) (quoting Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns

Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. An Order consistent with this

Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.

TREVOR N. McFADDEN Date: December 1, 2025 United States District Judge