Powell v. Mason

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Powell v. Mason

267 A.D.2d 1025, 700 N.Y.S.2d 324, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13782

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 30, 1999

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 267 A.D.2d 1025 (Powell v. Mason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Powell v. Mason, 267 A.D.2d 1025, 700 N.Y.S.2d 324, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13782 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

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Opinion

—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants met their initial burden, and “plaintiff[s] failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant [s], as plaintiff [s’] landlord [s], had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead paint condition for a sufficient period of time to have remedied it” (Arnold v Advantage Fed. Credit Union [appeal No. 2], 261 AD2d 939; see, Boler v Malik, 267 AD2d 998 [decided herewith]). Defendants’ knowledge of the existence of peeling paint does not constitute actual or constructive knowledge of a hazardous lead paint condition (see, Lanthier v Feroleto, 237 AD2d 877). Defendants transferred the property to the mortgagee before receiving notice of the presence of lead based paint at the premises, and thus we reject plaintiffs’ contention that defendants are liable for their failure to correct the condition pursuant to Public Health Law § 1373. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Buckley, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present— Green, J. P., Lawton, Pigott, Jr., Scudder and Callahan, JJ.

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—Order unanimously affirmed without costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants met their initial burden, and “plaintiff[s] failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant [s], as plaintiff [s’] landlord [s], had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead paint condition for a sufficient period of time to have remedied it” (Arnold v Advantage Fed. Credit Union [appeal No. 2], 261 AD2d 939; see, Boler v Malik, 267 AD2d 998 [decided herewith]). Defendants’ knowledge of the existence of peeling paint does not constitute actual or constructive knowledge of a hazardous lead paint condition (see, Lanthier v Feroleto, 237 AD2d 877). Defendants transferred the property to the mortgagee before receiving notice of the presence of lead based paint at the premises, and thus we reject plaintiffs’ contention that defendants are liable for their failure to correct the condition pursuant to Public Health Law § 1373. (Appeal from Order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Buckley, J. — Summary Judgment.) Present— Green, J. P., Lawton, Pigott, Jr., Scudder and Callahan, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

267 A.D.2d 1025, 700 N.Y.S.2d 324, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13782, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/powell-v-mason-nyappdiv-1999.

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