Postell v. Wells

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 25, 2020
Docket7:20-cv-03991
StatusUnknown

This text of Postell v. Wells (Postell v. Wells) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Postell v. Wells, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JONATHAN POSTELL, SR., Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-3991 (LLS) KELLY WELLS; PENNIE MERCADO; ORDER TO AMEND JENNY SILVERMAN; FALLSBURG LIBRARY, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701- 796; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; and the New York City and State Human Rights Laws. He alleges that his employer discriminated against him on the basis of his race, color, sex, national origin, disability, and age. By order dated June 10, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts his claims using the Court’s Employment Discrimination Complaint form. He checks boxes indicating that he is asserting claims that his employer, the Fallsburg Library, discriminated against him on the basis of his (1) race, color, sex, and national origin, in violation of Title VII; (2) race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; (3) age, in violation of the ADEA; and (4) disability, which he lists as a “leaking disk,” in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. He also checks boxes to indicate that he is bringing claims under the New York City and State Human Rights Laws, and checks the “other” box, after which he writes, “seniority, godfather [sic] claus[e], equal pay.” (ECF No. 2, at 4.) The following allegations are taken from the complaint, which is not a model of clarity and which appears to be incomplete: Plaintiff has worked as a cataloger for the Fallsburg Library

for nine years. He has asked for a raise each year, but “all [he] get[s] is excuse after excuse,” such as budget constraints, for why he cannot receive a raise. (Id. at 5.) The library has now “found someone who[se] mom is on the friends committee” to work in his position two days a week, while Plaintiff is “cataloging two days a week and working [the] circulation desk one day a week.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he is “being deprived of [his] grandfather clause rights, [his] seniority rights, equal pay and equal work opportunity because of [his] age and [his] race.” (Id.) In a sentence that cuts off midway through, Plaintiff references an “ergonomic chair that [he] received from the v.e.s.i.d. program.” (Id.) In the section of the complaint form that asks for him to state the relief that he is seeking, Plaintiff checks off boxes requesting the Court issue an order directing his employer to promote him and to reasonably accommodate his disability. He also checks a box for miscellaneous relief, and writes that he was promised a raise for taking the cataloging position, but has been “consistently given reasons they couldn’t afford it but continued hiring others and promoting

others while skipping over [him] and paying them higher wages than [him] although” he has ten years’ more experience. He also states that when he was hired in 2005, he had a “thirteen day holiday pay plan” but that he was later put on “a 40hrs per year sick day plan.” (Id. at 6.) This section of the complaint also appears to be incomplete. DISCUSSION A. Pleading standards The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well- pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). Section 1981 prohibits discrimination “on account of [a person’s] race, ancestry, or ethnic characteristics.” Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1987). To state a claim of employment discrimination under Title VII or § 1981, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the [defendants] took adverse employment action against him, and (2) [a protected characteristic] was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v.

Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Khanna v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., 785 F. App’x 15, 15-16 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (applying Vega pleading standard to § 1981 employment-discrimination claims); Johnson v. Wendys Corp., No. 1:19-CV-8157, 2019 WL 6311790, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2019) (same). “The ADA prohibits discrimination against a ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability’ in the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Kinneary v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Kinneary v. City of New York
601 F.3d 151 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
455 U.S. 385 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
524 U.S. 742 (Supreme Court, 1998)
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
536 U.S. 101 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Beth Lyons v. The Legal Aid Society
68 F.3d 1512 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Laurance A. Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers
192 F.3d 322 (Second Circuit, 1999)
Chin v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
685 F.3d 135 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
McMillan v. City of New York
711 F.3d 120 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Postell v. Wells, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/postell-v-wells-nysd-2020.