Posey v. Perez

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedSeptember 30, 2024
Docket2:24-cv-01675
StatusUnknown

This text of Posey v. Perez (Posey v. Perez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Posey v. Perez, (D. Nev. 2024).

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Anthony Posey, Case No. 2:24-cv-01675-CDS-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Report and Recommendation v. 8 Officer C. Perez, et al., 9 Defendants. 10 11 12 Southern Desert Correctional Center inmate, Plaintiff Anthony Posey, submitted an 13 application to proceed in forma pauperis and a complaint. (ECF Nos. 4, 5). The Court screens 14 Plaintiff’s complaint and recommends dismissing it without leave to amend because Plaintiff’s 15 claims are better brought through a habeas corpus, and not a civil rights, action. Because the 16 Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend, it also recommends 17 denying Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) as moot. 18 I. In forma pauperis application. 19 Plaintiff has filed the forms required to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4). 20 Plaintiff’s forms are complete and Plaintiff has shown an inability to prepay fees and costs or give 21 security for them. However, as outlined more fully below, upon screening Plaintiff’s complaint, 22 the Court finds that dismissal without leave to amend is appropriate. So, the Court will 23 recommend denying Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4) as moot. 24 II. Legal standard for screening. 25 Upon granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts additionally screen the 26 complaint under § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is 27 legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 1 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 2 the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the 3 complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 4 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 5 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a 6 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 7 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 8 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of 9 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. 10 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 11 allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 12 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. 13 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations 14 contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 15 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory 16 allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the 17 line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 18 Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 19 drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal 20 construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). 21 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by 22 the Constitution and statute. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Under 28 U.S.C. 23 § 1331, federal courts have original jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the 24 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Cases “arise under” federal law either when 25 federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 26 necessarily turns on the construction of federal law. Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 27 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the 1 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 2 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal 3 district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in 4 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of 5 different states.” Generally speaking, diversity jurisdiction exists only where there is “complete 6 diversity” among the parties; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each 7 of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 8 III. Screening Plaintiff’s complaint. 9 Plaintiff sues his attorney in his state-court criminal case, Todd Leventhal; the Las Vegas 10 Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) Chief, John Doe; Instagram.com; the State of 11 Nevada; LVMPD Officer C. Perez; LVMPD Detective C. Savino; LVMPD Detective M. Moore; 12 and LVMPD Detective B. Lablane for damages. Plaintiff brings various claims related to his 13 state-court conviction and the traffic stop, arrest, investigation, and criminal court proceeding 14 leading up to it. However, Plaintiff’s claims are better brought through a habeas corpus, and not a 15 civil rights, action, because they challenge Plaintiff’s state-court conviction. 16 42 U.S.C. § 1983—the civil rights statute under which Plaintiff has brought his claims— 17 aims “to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their 18 federally guaranteed rights.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 19 McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000)). The statute “provides a federal cause of 20 action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of his federal 21 rights[,]” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999), and is “merely . . . the procedural device 22 for enforcing substantive provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes.” Crumpton v. Gates, 23 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Claims under § 1983 require the plaintiff to allege (1) the 24 violation of a federally-protected right by (2) a person or official who acts under the color of state 25 law. Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1067.

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