Porter v. McCurdy

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: February 19, 2026
• Docket: 25-7020
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-7020 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 02/19/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT February 19, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MARYLIN MONAE PORTER, a/k/a Lamone M. Johnson,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 25-7020 (D.C. No. 6:23-CV-00058-RAW-GLJ) JOEL MCCURDY; KIM HALL; (E.D. Okla.) CHRISTIE QUICK; EARLENE SYLVESTER; TERRI APALA; JIM FARRIS; FNU DIXON; FNU TINSLEY; ROSS FISHER; UTILIZATION REVIEW COMMITTEE,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, Circuit Judge, LUCERO, Senior Circuit Judge, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judge. _________________________________

Marylin Monae Porter is a transgender Oklahoma inmate who brought this

pro se action for alleged violations of her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 1

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Ms. Porter was formerly known as Lamone M. Johnson. Appellate Case: 25-7020 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 02/19/2026 Page: 2

In a previous appeal, we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on

her Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims against a prison physician and

nurse for discontinuing her hormone replacement therapy (HRT) in May 2018. See

Johnson v. Sanders, 121 F.4th 80, 87-88, 96 (10th Cir. 2024). The physician’s

decision to stop HRT was predicated on a correctional psychologist’s conclusion that

Ms. Porter does not have gender dysphoria. Id. at 84-85.

In this case, Ms. Porter brought six new claims, four alleging deliberate

indifference to her serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and

two alleging Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process violations.

She named as defendants the following officials from the Oklahoma Department of

Corrections (ODOC): Chief Medical Officer Joel McCurdy, the Collective John

Does of the Utilization Review Committee (URC), Correctional Health Services

Administrator Kim Hall, Deputy Warden Christie Quick, Canteen Supervisor Earlene

Sylvester, Warden Jim Farris, Chief of Security Tinsely, Chief Medical Officer Ross

Fisher, Unit Manager Terri Apala, and Disciplinary Hearing Officer Lt. Dixon.

The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim, ruling as

follows:

First, Ms. Porter’s claim against McCurdy for affirming the discontinuation of

HRT in May 2018 was untimely under Oklahoma’s two-year statute of limitations

because she did not file this action until February 2023. See Braxton v. Zavaras,

614 F.3d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010); Beck v. City of Muskogee Police Dep’t,

195 F.3d 553, 557 (10th Cir. 1999).

2 Appellate Case: 25-7020 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 02/19/2026 Page: 3

Second, Ms. Porter’s claim that she was denied fertility treatment after she was

“again diagnosed with gender dysphoria” on May 27, 2020, R., vol. 2 at 41, failed to

allege the personal participation of any defendant. See Bledsoe v. Carreno, 53 F.4th

589, 607 (10th Cir. 2022) (“In the context of a § 1983 action against multiple

individual government actors, it is particularly important that the complaint make

clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual

with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.” (ellipsis and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Third, Ms. Porter’s claim for her preferred gender affirming care—injections

and surgery—failed to allege “the complete denial, or the functional equivalent of a

complete denial of medical care,” because there are no allegations she was denied

HRT after she was re-diagnosed with gender dysphoria on May 27, 2020. See

Johnson, 121 F.4th at 92 (explaining that hormone therapy and surgery are among the

four types of treatment for gender dysphoria); Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrs.,

165 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] prisoner who merely disagrees with a . . .

prescribed course of treatment does not state a constitutional violation.”).

Fourth, Ms. Porter’s claim that Hall delayed her treatment for Amblyopia (an

eye condition) failed to allege Hall knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to her

health when Hall scheduled her to see an optometrist, who in turn referred her to an

ophthalmologist. See Sealock v. Colo., 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating

the requirements for claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs); see

also Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, 58 F.4th 1127, 1137 (10th Cir. 2023)

3 Appellate Case: 25-7020 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 02/19/2026 Page: 4

(official “who prevents an inmate from receiving treatment or denies access to

someone capable of evaluating the inmate’s need for treatment” may be liable).

Fifth, Ms. Porter’s equal protection claim collectively against “all” defendants

failed to specify who did what to discriminate against her. See Robbins v. Okla.,

519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that in § 1983 cases involving

multiple government actors, collective allegations fail to satisfy the fair notice

pleading standards of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8).

Sixth, Ms. Porter’s due process claim against Apala and Dixon for denying her

an unbiased disciplinary hearing failed to allege the disciplinary action imposed

(visitation, canteen, and phone restrictions) would “inevitably affect the duration of

[her] sentence,” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995), or impair a protected

liberty interest, see Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1218 (10th Cir. 2018).

We have reviewed de novo the district court’s detailed and comprehensive

decision. See Purgatory Rec. I, LLC v. United States, 157 F.4th 1173, 1182

(10th Cir. 2025). 2 Having also reviewed the record on appeal, the parties’ briefs, 3

and the relevant legal authorities, we affirm the district court’s judgment for

2 The district court dismissed all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) except those against Fisher and the Collective John Does of the URC, which it dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1), see R., vol. 3 at 189 n.2. Our standard of review is the same. See Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806 (§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Gross v. Koury, 78 F. App’x 690, 693 n.3 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (§ 1997e(c)(1)). 3 We afford Ms. Porter’s pro se filings a liberal construction but do not act as her advocate. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009). 4 Appellate Case: 25-7020 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 02/19/2026 Page: 5

substantially the same reasons stated in the district court’s order dated March 13,

2025. Ms. Porter’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs and

fees (Dkt. No. 14) is granted.

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Senior Circuit Judge