Porter v. MacY's Job Employment Center

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedApril 1, 2025
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-0262
StatusPublished

This text of Porter v. MacY's Job Employment Center (Porter v. MacY's Job Employment Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Porter v. MacY's Job Employment Center, (D.D.C. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EBONY PORTER,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-262 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

MACY’S JOB EMPLOYMENT CENTER,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Ebony Porter, proceeding pro se, sued Macy’s Retail Holdings, LLC, alleging that it

“violated the tenant code of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of

Public and Indian housing choice voucher law[.]” Compl. at 11, ECF No. 1-1 (page numbers

designated by CM/ECF). The Defendant moved to dismiss Ms. Porter’s Complaint under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 5-1. The Court agrees and dismisses the

Complaint without prejudice.

In November 2024, Ms. Porter, a resident of Washington D.C., filed a Complaint in the

Superior Court of the District of Columbia against Macy’s Retail Holdings, LLC (improperly

named as Macy’s Job Employment Center). Compl. at 11. On January 29, 2025, Macy’s removed

the case to this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Notice of Removal at 2–3, ECF No. 1. On

February 5, 2025, Macy’s moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Ms. Porter’s Complaint “lacks

[the] facts necessary to meet the pleading standard of [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8(a).” Def.’s Mot. at 1.1 The following day, this Court directed Ms. Porter to respond to the motion by

March 10, 2025, and warned that if she failed to respond, the Court might “(1) treat the Motion as

conceded[]; (2) rule on the Motion based on the Defendant’s arguments alone and without

considering [her] arguments; or (3) dismiss [her] claims for failure to prosecute[.]” Fox/Neal Order

at 1, ECF No. 6; see also Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d 507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988). That deadline has

come and gone, and Ms. Porter has not responded to the Motion to Dismiss.

Even pro se litigants must comply with the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jarrell

v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Relevant here, Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to

contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a);

see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 670 (D.C. Cir.

2004). This requirement ensures that a defendant has fair notice of the claims alleged in order to

file a responsive answer and prepare an adequate defense. See Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497,

498 (D.D.C. 1977). Courts have “unhesitatingly dismissed actions where the complaint” fails to

comply with Rule 8(a), including complaints that are “confusing, ambiguous, redundant, vague

and, in some respects, unintelligible.” Id. at 499 (collecting cases).

1 The Defendant’s Motion states that it is seeking dismissal “pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See Def.’s Mot. at 1, ECF No. 5. But its Memorandum of Points and Authorities relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Def.’s Mot. at 1–5, ECF No. 5-1. Although there is much overlap between Rule 8(a)(2) and Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper under Rule 8(a)(2) when the complaint is “so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible” that a defendant cannot discern the plaintiff’s claims. Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 670 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Court considers the motion under Rule 8(a).

2 Ms. Porter’s Complaint does not comply with Rule 8(a)(2). She vaguely contends that

“Macy’s Job Employment Center . . . violated the tenant code of the U.S. Department of Housing

Urban Development [HUD] Office of Public and Indian housing choice voucher law” by

“denying” her proper payment for “job training.” See Compl. at 11. But she does not explain how

HUD’s “tenant code” is relevant to her “job training.” Id. Ms. Porter also checks boxes on the

Complaint cover sheet for a litany of claims including: breach of contract, discrimination, lost

wages, whistleblower retaliation, wrongful termination, and violation of the Freedom of

Information Act. Id. at 15–16. But these claims do not appear in the Complaint, and Ms. Porter

alleges no facts to support them.

Ms. Porter also fails to establish how the Court can grant her requested relief. She asks the

Court “to remove whatever stigma” that “den[ies] her . . . work as an undergraduate student at

Macy’s” and to order the Defendant “not to discriminate [against her] because of her race, sex,

religion, or identity.” Id. at 11. But Ms. Porter does not even allege any employment relationship

with Macy’s, and she does not explain what “stigma” she wants the Court “to remove.” Without

more, this is not “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). And to the extent Ms. Porter is asserting a

discrimination claim in her prayer for relief, it fails without any factual allegations whatsoever.

Her Complaint does not explain how the Defendant discriminated against her or provide any other

particulars—i.e., the details of any discrimination on the basis of race or religion—that would

allow Macy’s to formulate a response. See Poblete v. Indymac Bank, 657 F. Supp. 2d 86, 96

(D.D.C. 2009) (“The court or opposing party must be able to understand whether a valid claim is

alleged and if so[,] what it is.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

3 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5,

and dismisses the Complaint without prejudice.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: April 1, 2025

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ciralsky v. Central Intelligence Agency
355 F.3d 661 (D.C. Circuit, 2004)
Thomas C. Fox v. Marion D. Strickland
837 F.2d 507 (D.C. Circuit, 1988)
Jarrell v. Tisch
656 F. Supp. 237 (District of Columbia, 1987)
Poblete v. Indymac Bank
657 F. Supp. 2d 86 (District of Columbia, 2009)
Brown v. Califano
75 F.R.D. 497 (District of Columbia, 1977)

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