Port Authority of Guam v. Guam Industrial Services, Inc. dba Guam Shipyard

2026 Guam 2

• Court: Supreme Court of Guam
• Decided: March 20, 2026
• Docket: CVA25-006
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM

PORT AUTHORITY OF GUAM, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GUAM INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, INC. dba GUAM SHIPYARD, Defendant-Appellant.

Supreme Court Case No. CVA25-006 Superior Court Case No. CV0095-25

OPINION

Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam Argued and submitted on August 29, 2025 Hagåtña, Guam

Appearing for Defendant-Appellant: Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee: George Neil P. Valdes, Esq. James L. Canto II, Esq. Law Office of Louie J. Yanza, P.C. Port Authority of Guam 862 S. Marine Corps Dr., Ste. 203 Aturidat I Puetton Guåhan Tamuning, GU 96913 1026 Cabras Hwy., Ste. 201 Piti, GU 96915 Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 2 of 41

BEFORE: ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.1

TORRES, C.J.:

[1] This appeal arises from an unlawful detainer action between Plaintiff-Appellee Port

Authority of Guam (“PAG” or the “Port”) and Defendant-Appellant Guam Industrial Services,

Inc., dba Guam Shipyard (“GSY”). The dispute centers on possession of two locations at the Port:

Hotel Wharf and the old Dong Yang site (“Dong Yang”). Following a hearing and summary

unlawful detainer proceeding, the Superior Court entered judgment awarding possession of both

locations to PAG. GSY now challenges (1) the denial of its motion to dismiss, (2) the court’s

handling of its alleged rent overpayments, (3) the application of unlawful detainer statutes to a

license, and (4) the denial of an opportunity to file an answer after its motion to dismiss was denied.

[2] The court did not err in denying GSY’s motion to dismiss or entering judgment for PAG

on its unlawful detainer claim. Although the Superior Court erred by proceeding directly to trial

without allowing GSY to answer PAG’s complaint, GSY has not demonstrated prejudice as

required under Guam’s civil procedure statutory framework. See 7 GCA § 15802 (2005).

[3] We affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

1. PAG leases Hotel Wharf to GSY

[4] On May 5, 2017, GSY and PAG entered into a written Open Space Lease Agreement (the

“Lease”) for GSY to occupy PAG property initially covering approximately 20,000 square feet at

Hotel Wharf for a 120-day term at a monthly rate of $10,710. The Lease stated that “[t]he Lessor

1 The signatures in this opinion reflect the titles of the Justices at the time this matter was argued and submitted. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 3 of 41

[PAG] or Lessee [GSY] shall have the right to terminate this Lease whether or not Lessee is in

default upon thirty (30) days written notice in accordance with 21 G.C.A. §§ 5101 and 21105,”

and that “[GSY] shall vacate the Property [Hotel Wharf] upon termination of the Lease.” Record

on Appeal (“RA”), tab 1 (V. Compl., Feb. 12, 2025), Ex. A at 8 (Open Space Lease, May 5, 2017).

[5] The parties executed a written amendment to the Lease (the “Amendment”), changing the

term to a month-to-month tenancy beginning on September 2, 2017, and ending no later than

December 31, 2017. The Amendment “provided that Lessor [PAG] may terminate this lease upon

giving thirty (30) days written notice in accordance with 21 G.C.A. §§ 5101 and 21105.” RA, tab

1 (V. Compl.), Ex. B at 1 (Amendment to Lease Agreement, Sep. 2017).

[6] Upon the expiration of the amended Lease term, GSY remained on Hotel Wharf for seven

years without a new executed lease agreement or amendment. During that time, GSY paid invoices

for an increased monthly rental amount of $11,760 without written protest.

[7] GSY is engaged in a U.S. Navy project to construct two aircraft carrier camels for a floating

camel fender system,2 and due to the camels’ sheer size and weight, GSY asserts that the work can

be performed only on PAG’s premises—specifically at Hotel Wharf. Appellant’s Br. at 3 (June

23, 2025).

2. PAG gives GSY permission to use Dong Yang

[8] From February 28, 2022, until December 20, 2024, GSY also occupied Dong Yang with

PAG’s permission “to use as a lay-down area for a crane demolition project contract with the Port.”

RA, tab 1 at 3 (V. Compl.); Appellee’s Br. at 7 (July 22, 2025); Transcript (“Tr.”) at 70–72

(Unlawful Detainer Hr’g, Feb. 19, 2025). By letter dated February 28, 2024, PAG approved an

2 According to GSY, a camel fender system functions as a bumper system to protect large ships—such as

aircraft carriers—from impact and damage when contacting a dock, wharf, or pier. Appellant’s Br. at 3 n.1 (June 23, 2025). GSY asserts that these systems are “critical” for safely berthing large naval vessels, particularly in ports not originally designed for ships of that size. Id. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 4 of 41

extension of the crane demolition project and memorialized the license agreement, setting the term

of GSY’s occupancy of Dong Yang to expire on May 31, 2024 (“License Agreement”). See RA,

Admitted Exs. (Unlawful Detainer Hr’g, Feb. 19, 2024), Def. Ex. 3 at 1–2 (PAG Letter, Feb. 28,

2024). The letter also permitted PAG to terminate the License Agreement at PAG’s discretion,

“with or without cause, upon thirty days (30) notice.” Id. at 1–2. According to PAG, the crane

demolition project “is not complete, but the period of performance has since expired.” Tr. at 73.

3. PAG serves GSY with notices to quit

[9] On December 20, 2024, PAG served GSY with a 47-day notice to quit (“Notice to Quit”),

terminating GSY’s month-to-month tenancy effective February 5, 2025, and directing GSY to

vacate Hotel Wharf and all other occupied areas of PAG property, including Dong Yang.

[10] When GSY did not vacate, on February 6, 2025, PAG served a notice to quit and vacate

(“Notice to Vacate”) demanding immediate surrender of possession under 21 GCA § 21103(a).

4. PAG’s intent to lease Hotel Wharf to Black Construction

[11] On January 23, 2025, PAG’s Board of Directors resolved to imminently lease Hotel Wharf

to Black Construction Corporation (“Black Construction”) in connection with a $330.6 million

U.S. Navy contract to repair the three most critically failed parts of the Glass Breakwater (“Glass

Breakwater Repair Project”),3 which sustained significant damage from Typhoon Mawar and is

critical to maintaining Port access.

3 PAG provides context for the Glass Breakwater Repair Project:

Glass Breakwater is an off-shore concrete and stone barrier structure that bounds the northern side of Apra Harbor and serves as vital protection against tides, currents, and storm surges into Apra Harbor; however, the breakwater suffered major damage from Typhoon Mawar, subjecting it to imminent breaching as assessed by the Army Corps of Engineers, and the failure of Glass Breakwater would catastrophically affect the ability of ships to enter and exit both the Jose D. Leon Guerrero Commercial Port and the Naval Base Guam. Opp’n Mot. Stay at 13 (Apr. 23, 2025). Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 5 of 41

[12] Although the record reflects that no lease existed between PAG and Black Construction

when this court took the matter under advisement, PAG’s Board of Directors declared that the

“entirety of Hotel Wharf” is needed for the Glass Breakwater Repair Project. See RA, tab 1 (V.

Compl.), Ex. E at 1 (Resolution, Jan. 23, 2025); Opp’n Mot. Stay at 14 (Apr. 23, 2025). This is

reinforced by an email from Black Construction’s President to PAG stating that Black

Construction “will need to [sic] the entire wharf area for our work on the GBW [Glass

Breakwater].” RA, tab 18 (Decl. Valdes, Mar. 20, 2025), Ex. B at 4 (Email from Kaae to Canto,

Feb. 21, 2025) (emphasis added).

B. Procedural Background

1. PAG’s complaint and GSY’s motion to dismiss

[13] When GSY continued to occupy PAG property after the Notice to Vacate, PAG filed a

verified complaint for unlawful detainer on February 12, 2025, seeking immediate possession of

Hotel Wharf and Dong Yang under 21 GCA § 21103(a) and, in the alternative, damages for unpaid

rent.4

[14] GSY moved to dismiss under Guam Rule of Civil Procedure (“GRCP”) 12(b)(6), arguing

that: (1) alleged overpayment of $1,050 per month extended its tenancy; (2) the complaint did not

strictly comply with 21 GCA § 21103(b) because it sought unpaid rent without specifying the

amount due; and (3) summary unlawful detainer procedure was improper given factual disputes.

4 PAG’s alternative prayer for relief states:

Further in the alternative, in addition to the above, for judgment against Defendant in the total amount of monies due and owing Plaintiff under the 2017 Lease Agreement, the 2017 Lease Extension, and any holdover tenancy therefrom between the parties, to include any interest due at law or in equity, or any prorations thereof, in such amounts which may be proven at trial, up to the date of rendition of judgment herein. RA, tab 1 at 9 (V. Compl., Feb. 12, 2025) (emphasis added). Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 6 of 41

2. Hearing, trial, and “abandonment” of monetary claim

[15] At a combined proceeding, the Superior Court first held a hearing on GSY’s motion to

dismiss, denied the motion from the bench, and then proceeded directly to the unlawful detainer

trial on the merits, during which it admitted multiple exhibits and heard testimony from two

witnesses—PAG Acting General Manager Dominic Muna and GSY Compliance Manager Selina

Ashland.

[16] Throughout the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the ensuing trial on the merits, PAG

repeatedly stated that it was withdrawing and abandoning its alternative claim for monetary

damages, proceeding solely on its claim for possession. See Tr. at 11, 21–24, 39, 95, 99 (“[T]he

Port is abandoning, withdrawing, and retracting any alternative plea, or otherwise, for back rent as

part of its complaint.”); RA, tab 16 at 2 (Dec. & Order, Mar. 11, 2025).

[17] The trial court entered judgment for PAG on its unlawful detainer claim and issued its

written decision and order memorializing its denial of the motion to dismiss and its findings

supporting the judgment.

[18] In its decision and order, the Superior Court concluded that PAG’s complaint adequately

stated an unlawful detainer claim under 21 GCA § 21103(a) by alleging that GSY remained in

possession of PAG property without consent after the expiration of its month-to-month tenancy.

The court rejected GSY’s argument that the complaint was defective under section 21103(b),

noting that PAG proceeded solely under section 21103(a) after withdrawing its alternative

damages request, leaving only a possession claim that was suitable for summary unlawful detainer

proceedings before a magistrate judge. The court also found that GSY received adequate notice

to quit and vacate the premises under section 21103(a) but nevertheless remained in possession

after termination of its tenancy, thereby committing unlawful detainer. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 7 of 41

[19] The Superior Court also rejected GSY’s argument that alleged prior rent overpayments

renewed its month-to-month tenancy under 18 GCA § 51105, thereby precluding unlawful

detainer. The court explained that even if excess rent triggered a renewal, section 51105 would

extend tenancy for only one additional month after its termination on February 5, 2025—at most

through March 5, 2025. The court ultimately ordered GSY to vacate Hotel Wharf by March 23,

2025, and Dong Yang by April 1, 2025.

[20] The court set March 23, 2025, as the deadline to vacate Hotel Wharf based on

representations by PAG’s counsel that Black Construction required access by that date for the

Glass Breakwater Repair Project. The court set April 1, 2025, as the deadline to vacate Dong

Yang, which was not required for the Glass Breakwater Repair Project, to provide GSY additional

time to use this site “as a staging area to move property in order to allow for potentially building

the camels.” See Tr. at 108. The court awarded possession to PAG but denied all monetary relief,

attorney’s fees, and costs “based on [PAG’s] removal of those claims” and the terms of the Lease.

See RA, tab 16 at 4–5 (Dec. & Order).

3. Appeal

[21] GSY filed its timely Notice of Appeal challenging the denial of its motion to dismiss, the

use of summary unlawful detainer procedure, the trial court’s handling of alleged rent

overpayments, the sufficiency of notice, and the alleged termination of its Dong Yang license.

[22] After the Superior Court denied its ex parte motion to stay proceedings, GSY filed an

emergency motion in this court to stay the proceedings pending appeal. We denied the motion.

II. JURISDICTION

[23] This court has jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments and orders of the Superior

Court of Guam. 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-1(a)(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 119-74 (2026)); 7 GCA

§§ 3107, 3108(a) (2005). Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 8 of 41

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[24] This appeal presents questions of law subject to de novo review, including: (1) the denial

of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, First Hawaiian Bank v. Manley, 2007 Guam 2 ¶ 6;

(2) whether notice in an unlawful detainer action was defective so as to render the complaint

insufficient to state a claim, Archbishop of Guam v. G.F.G. Corp., 1997 Guam 12 ¶ 9; and

(3) statutory interpretation, Guerrero v. Santo Thomas, 2010 Guam 11 ¶ 8. Under 7 GCA §

15802,5 reversal is warranted only where the record shows that an error was prejudicial to the

defendant’s substantial rights.

[25] If a party fails to raise an issue before the trial court, this court has the discretion to review

the issue for plain error.6 See E.C. Dev., Ltd. v. Gen. Conf. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventist, 2005

Guam 9 ¶ 55 (recognizing authority to review “plain error[s] affecting substantial rights although

they were not brought to the attention of the court” in civil cases (quoting 6 GCA § 103(d))); cf.

5 Title 7 GCA § 15802 states:

The court must, in every stage of an action, disregard any error, improper ruling, instruction, or defect, in the pleadings or proceedings which, in the opinion of said court, does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. No judgment, decision or decree shall be reversed or affected by reason of any error, ruling, instruction, or defect, unless it shall appear from the record that such error, ruling, instruction, or defect was prejudicial, and also that by reason of such error, ruling, instruction, or defect, the said party complaining or appealing sustained and suffered substantial injury, and that a different result would have been probable if such error, ruling, instruction, or defect had not occurred or existed. There shall be no presumption that error is prejudicial, or that injury was done if error is shown. 7 GCA § 15802 (2005) (emphases added). 6 Guam’s rules of civil procedure are modeled on their federal counterparts. See Sharrock v. McCoy, 2016 Guam 7 ¶ 109. Likewise, “Guam’s plain error statute is derived from the former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure.” People v. Quitugua, 2009 Guam 10 ¶ 10. Accordingly, interpretations of the analogous federal rules may be considered persuasive. See id. As Wright and Miller observe, although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lack “a formal provision allowing the appellate courts to notice plain error” analogous to that in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the “principle nonetheless appears well established.” 9B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2472 (3d ed.) (citations omitted). Federal appellate courts have recognized that, “despite the absence of an objection, they may consider an error so fundamental that it may have resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. & n.19 (collecting cases). The discretion to review for plain error, however, “will be invoked only in fairly extraordinary circumstances.” Id. The treatise also notes that some appellate courts “will consider issues of pure law despite a failure to object below.” Id. (citation omitted). Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 9 of 41

Ramiro v. White, 2016 Guam 6 ¶ 17 (reviewing admission of evidence in civil case for plain error

where no objection was made); Lujan v. Quinata, 2016 Guam 39 ¶ 21 (same). Reversal is

warranted under plain error review only when “(1) there was an error; (2) the error is clear or

obvious under current law; (3) the error affected substantial rights; and (4) reversal is necessary to

prevent a miscarriage of justice or to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.” Lujan, 2016

Guam 39 ¶ 22 (quoting People v. Quitugua, 2009 Guam 10 ¶ 11). “This court views a plain error

analysis with deference to the trial court.” Ramiro, 2016 Guam 6 ¶ 35 (citing E.C. Dev., 2005

Guam 9 ¶ 55). “Only where there is such plain error apparent on the face of the record that failure

to review would result in a manifest miscarriage of justice should the appellate court analyze the

evidence.” Id. (quoting E.C. Dev., 2005 Guam 9 ¶ 55). “Moreover, [the appellant] bears the

burden of showing that the error that occurred was prejudicial.” E.C. Dev., 2005 Guam 9 ¶ 55

(citing People v. Ueki, 1999 Guam 4 ¶ 23); see also 7 GCA § 15802.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Denying GSY’s Motion to Dismiss

[26] On appeal, GSY argues that the Superior Court erred in its bench ruling and decision and

order denying its motion to dismiss. Appellant’s Br. at 7–15. GSY maintains that the complaint

was “defective” because it sought unpaid rent without stating the specific amount due, which GSY

asserts is strictly required under Guam’s unlawful detainer statutes and warranted dismissal under

GRCP 12(b)(6). See id. at 7–10 (citing 21 GCA § 21103(a)–(b) (2005)). GSY further argues that

the court compounded this error by permitting PAG to withdraw its damages claim during trial

rather than dismissing the action entirely for failure to satisfy statutory pleading requirements. See

id. at 13–15.

[27] We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss under GRCP 12(b)(6). See

First Hawaiian Bank, 2007 Guam 2 ¶ 6; see also Archbishop, 1997 Guam 12 ¶ 9 (stating that Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 10 of 41

determining whether a party has failed to state a claim is a question of law subject to de novo

review). In reviewing such a motion, a court considers only the complaint, its exhibits, documents

incorporated by reference, and materials relied upon therein. Newby v. Gov’t of Guam, 2010 Guam

4 ¶ 14. The court “must accept all the well-pleaded facts as true, ‘construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, and resolve all doubts in the non-moving party’s favor.’”

Cruz v. Cruz, 2023 Guam 20 ¶ 10 (quoting Guam Police Dep’t v. Guam Civ. Serv. Comm’n

(Charfauros), 2020 Guam 12 ¶ 8). “Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only ‘if it

appears beyond doubt that the [non-moving party] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim

which would entitle him to relief.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Taitano v. Calvo Fin.

Corp., 2009 Guam 9 ¶ 6).

[28] Whether notice in an unlawful detainer action was defective so as to render the complaint

insufficient to state a claim is also a question of law reviewed de novo. See Archbishop, 1997

Guam 12 ¶ 9. Because unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding, its statutory notice provisions

must be strictly complied with. See id. ¶ 10. Under Guam’s strict compliance standard, “[a] plain

reading construction is appropriate where the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates

exactly what is necessary for compliance without ambiguous terms.” See Castino v. G.C. Corp.,

2010 Guam 3 ¶ 29.

[29] The Superior Court denied GSY’s motion to dismiss, holding that PAG’s complaint

adequately stated an unlawful detainer claim under 21 GCA § 21103(a) by alleging that GSY

remained in possession of PAG property without PAG’s permission after expiration of its month-

to-month tenancy. The court rejected GSY’s contention that PAG’s alternative request for unpaid

rent rendered the entire complaint defective for failing to state the amount of rent owed in the

notices to quit, as required by 21 GCA § 21103(b). As the court observed, PAG’s Notice to Vacate

and complaint cite 21 GCA § 21103(a), not subsection (b), and did not require an allegation of Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 11 of 41

rent default. Finally, the court determined that PAG’s withdrawal of its alternative request for

monetary damages left only the claim for possession, allowing the case to properly proceed as a

summary unlawful detainer action under section 21103(a) before a magistrate judge.

[30] The trial court did not err in denying GSY’s motion to dismiss.

1. Statutory framework and strict compliance requirements for unlawful detainer actions in Guam

[31] Guam’s unlawful detainer statutes set forth multiple circumstances in which a tenant may

be found guilty of unlawful detainer. Under 21 GCA § 21103(a), an “unlawful detainer” occurs

when “[a] tenant of real property . . . continues in possession . . . of the property . . . after the

expiration of the term for which it is let to him, without the permission of his landlord . . . including

a case where . . . the time fixed for such occupancy by the agreement between the parties has

expired.” 21 GCA § 21103(a). Under section 21103(b), an “unlawful detainer” also occurs when:

a tenant of real property . . . continues in possession . . . without the permission of his landlord . . . after default in the payment of rent, pursuant to the lease or agreement under which the property is held, and five (5) days’ notice in writing, requiring its payment, stating the amount which is due, or possession of the property, shall have been served upon him . . . .

21 GCA § 21103(b). Furthermore, 21 GCA § 21108 provides: “In case the unlawful detainer

charged is after default in the payment of rent, the complaint must state the amount of such rent.”

21 GCA § 21108 (2005).

[32] When a landlord seeks to evict a tenant through an unlawful detainer action, courts treat it

as a summary proceeding. See Archbishop, 1997 Guam 12 ¶ 10 (“Proceedings in an unlawful

detainer action are intended to be summary in nature and are required by law to be expedited.”

(citing 21 GCA § 21120 (2005))); 7 GCA Ch. 32 art. 4 (incorporating unlawful detainer statutes

into summary proceedings chapter); 21 GCA § 5104 (2005); see also 21 GCA §§ 21103–21104.

“[T]he purpose of an unlawful detainer action is to recover possession.” Archbishop, 1997 Guam Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 12 of 41

12 ¶ 10. Furthermore, “because an unlawful detainer action is a summary remedy, the unlawful

detainer statute must be complied with strictly.” Id. (citing Cal-Am. Income Prop. Fund IV v. Ho,

207 Cal. Rptr. 532, 533 (Ct. App. 1984)).

2. PAG’s complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under 21 GCA § 21103(a)

[33] The trial court was correct in noting that PAG’s “Verified Complaint adequately claimed

that Defendant was in possession of the property without consent from the property owner in

violation of 21 GCA § 21103(a).” RA, tab 16 at 2 (Dec. & Order). The complaint alleged that on

December 20, 2024, PAG served GSY with the Notice to Quit, which provided 47 days’ notice

and “unequivocally terminated, effective as of February 5, 2025, the month-to-month tenancy of

Guam Shipyard of Hotel Wharf and all other Port properties occupied by GSY.” See RA, tab 1 at

3–4, 6 (V. Compl.); id., Ex. C at 1 (Notice to Quit, Dec. 20, 2024). The Notice to Quit, attached

as an exhibit, also directed GSY to vacate Hotel Wharf and all other PAG properties. PAG’s

complaint further asserted that when GSY continued in possession, PAG served the Notice to

Vacate on February 6, 2025, demanding immediate surrender of possession under section

21103(a). The complaint further alleged that GSY continued to occupy PAG’s property at the

time of filing.

[34] Taken together, PAG’s complaint alleged that GSY continued in possession of PAG’s

property after the expiration of the term for which it was let, without PAG’s permission. The

complaint also alleged that PAG provided GSY with more than 30 days’ written notice to GSY to

terminate its month-to-month tenancy of all PAG property. The complaint also alleged that PAG

provided GSY with notice of its intent to initiate an unlawful detainer action if GSY remained in

possession of the property without permission at least five days before filing the action.

Accordingly, PAG adequately stated an unlawful detainer claim upon which relief (i.e., recovery Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 13 of 41

of possession) could be sought under section 21103(a). The trial court therefore did not err in

denying GSY’s motion to dismiss PAG’s unlawful detainer claim under section 21103(a).

3. PAG’s complaint did not state a proper claim under section 21103(b), but PAG’s inclusion of an improper request for unpaid rent did not invalidate the entire complaint

[35] While PAG’s complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under 21 GCA

§ 21103(a), GSY argues the complaint nonetheless warranted dismissal for failure to strictly

comply with section 21103(b). See Appellant’s Br. at 7–10. We reject this argument.

[36] GSY maintains that “[a]lthough PAG’s complaint cites 21 GCA § 21103(a), which

concerns a holdover tenant, because rent is also sought, § 21103(b), which concerns a tenant’s

failure to pay rent, is also triggered.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2 (Aug. 8, 2025). GSY cites

Archbishop of Guam v. G.F.G. Corp., 1997 Guam 12, to argue that “[t]o be valid, the default notice

[under 21103(b)] must be served at least five days prior to the filing of the action, must state the

amount of rent which is due, and must be served within one year of the date that the rent became

due.” Appellant’s Br. at 20 (quoting Archbishop, 1997 Guam 12 ¶ 11). Archbishop, however, is

distinguishable. There, this court reversed an unlawful detainer judgment because the landlord’s

default notice under 21 GCA § 21103(b) demanded sixteen months of rent, exceeding the

twelve-month maximum permitted by statute. See Archbishop, 1997 Guam 12 ¶¶ 13–15, 17. This

court emphasized that strict compliance with section 21103(b) is required in unlawful detainer

actions based on nonpayment of rent and that an overstated or excessive rent demand renders a

default notice defective, thereby invalidating the landlord’s claim for possession. Id. ¶¶ 10–15.

[37] GSY misapplies Archbishop. Archbishop involved an unlawful detainer action where the

landlord’s claim for possession was based on nonpayment of rent under section 21103(b), not a

holdover or lease-expiration claim under section 21103(a). See id. ¶¶ 1–17. Archbishop does not

hold that all unlawful detainer actions must include a statement of rent due. See id. Rather, its Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 14 of 41

rule requiring a default notice to specify the amount of unpaid rent applies only to rent-based

unlawful detainer under section 21103(b). See id. ¶ 11. It does not extend to actions brought

solely under section 21103(a), where the landlord seeks possession following lease expiration or

holdover—not payment of rent. See id.

[38] None of PAG’s Notice to Quit, Notice to Vacate, or its complaint mention 21 GCA

§ 21103(b). See RA, tab 1 at 1–10 (V. Compl.); id., Ex. C at 1 (Notice to Quit); id., Ex. D at 1

(Notice to Quit & Vacate, Feb. 6, 2025). Instead, the Notice to Vacate and complaint reference

only section 21103(a). See RA, tab 1 at 4, 6–7 (V. Compl.); id., Ex. D at 1 (Notice to Quit &

Vacate). PAG’s request in its complaint for “monies due and owing [PAG] under the 2017 Lease

Agreement, the 2017 Lease Extension, and any holdover tenancy” was pleaded in the alternative,

RA, tab 1 at 9 (V. Compl.), and PAG expressly and repeatedly stated that it was withdrawing and

abandoning that claim during the motion to dismiss hearing (and at trial), see Tr. at 11, 21–24, 39,

95, 99 (“[T]he Port is abandoning, withdrawing, and retracting any alternative plea, or otherwise,

for back rent as part of its complaint.”); RA, tab 16 at 2 (Dec. & Order); Opp’n Mot. Stay at 5–6.

[39] PAG contends that “even if the unperfected § 21103(b) claim in the Complaint were

objectionable,” PAG (1) pleaded its request for back rent only in the alternative, (2) never pursued

that alternative back-rent claim at trial, (3) expressly and repeatedly withdrew and abandoned it

during the hearing and at trial, and (4) elected to seek only surrender of the premises. See

Appellee’s Br. 24–25, 29–31. PAG argues that including an alternative prayer for back rent did

not render the entire complaint defective because GRCP 8(e)(2) permits alternative, even

inconsistent, pleadings. See id. at 24–27. Under GRCP 8(e)(2), “[w]hen two or more statements

are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading

is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative statements.” Guam

R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2). PAG convincingly maintains that “[w]hile the Port could not collect back rent Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 15 of 41

as part of its action for lack of a § 21103(b) notice, it could certainly still prevail on its § 21103(a)

claim due to serving a perfected notice for surrender of premises per § 21103(a).” Appellee’s Br.

at 22 (citing RA, tab 16 at 2 (Dec. & Order); Tr. at 29).

[40] Persuasive California case law supports the view that including a request for relief that is

unauthorized under 21 GCA § 21103(b) does not invalidate an otherwise proper claim under

section 21103(a) in an unlawful detainer complaint. California decisions are generally persuasive

in our courts where Guam has adopted a California statute or substantially similar language, absent

a compelling reason to depart from California’s interpretation. See Castino, 2010 Guam 3 ¶ 22.

The source of 21 GCA § 21103 is California Civil Procedure Code section 1161. See 21 GCA

§ 21103, SOURCE. Accordingly, California authority interpreting section 1161 is persuasive to

the extent that section 21103 and section 1161 remain substantively parallel. See Archbishop, 1997

Guam 12 ¶ 10; see also Zurich Ins. (Guam), Inc. v. Santos, 2007 Guam 23 ¶ 7.

[41] PAG cites Saberi v. Bakhtiari, 215 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Ct. App. 1985), to argue that an

improper request for unpaid rent does not automatically render an entire unlawful detainer

complaint defective where the complaint also properly seeks recovery upon holdover under 21

GCA § 21103(a). See Appellee’s Br. at 20–21. In Saberi, the California Court of Appeal

considered an unlawful detainer complaint that asserted both (1) a proper request for possession

based on a 30-day notice of termination of tenancy and (2) an improper request for pre-termination

rent, despite the absence of a separate three-day pay-or-quit notice, as required by California law.

See 215 Cal. Rptr. at 361–65. The court held that inclusion of the improper rent request did not

invalidate the entire complaint or render the summons subject to a motion to quash; instead, it

found that the appropriate avenue for objecting to the improper request was moving to strike or

raising the issue as a defense in the answer to the complaint. See id. at 362–65. Applied here, this

supports PAG’s position that even if a request in the alternative for rent fails to strictly comply Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 16 of 41

with 21 GCA § 21103(b)’s notice requirements, it does not invalidate an otherwise proper claim

to recover possession upon lease expiration or holdover under section 21103(a).

[42] GSY contends that Saberi is distinguishable because it involved an appeal from a default

judgment, not a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and thus has “no application” to its motion.

Reply Br. at 3. Because the Saberi court considered—and ultimately rejected—the defendant’s

parallel argument that an unlawful detainer complaint improperly seeking unpaid rent was entirely

“invalid and of no effect whatsoever,” its reasoning remains persuasive. See 215 Cal. Rptr. at 364.

[43] In determining whether the inclusion of an improper request for rent invalidated the entire

complaint, the Saberi court considered whether any of the relief requested was available in an

unlawful detainer proceeding. See id. at 364–65. It contrasted Greene v. Municipal Court, 124

Cal. Rptr. 139 (Ct. App. 1975), which involved a complaint where “none of the relief requested in

the complaint was available in an unlawful detainer proceeding,” with the case before it, where a

“portion of the complaint which sought possession of the premises based upon the service of a 30-

day notice to quit stated a proper claim for recovery.” Saberi, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 364–65. The

Saberi court “d[id] not deem that the inclusion of the improper request for pre-termination rent

rendered the entire complaint invalid or made the summons subject to a successful motion to quash

service.” See id.

[44] Similarly, we determine that, because PAG’s complaint properly sought recovery of

possession under 21 GCA § 21103(a), the inclusion of an improper request for unpaid rent did not

invalidate the entire complaint or require dismissal. This interpretation adheres to our precedent

and the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Cruz, 2023 Guam 20 ¶ 10 (“Dismissal for failure

to state a claim is appropriate only ‘if it appears beyond doubt that the [non-moving party] can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” (alteration in

original) (emphases added) (quoting Taitano, 2009 Guam 9 ¶ 6)); Guam R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) (“When Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 17 of 41

two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would

be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the

alternative statements.”).

[45] The Saberi court explained that “the appropriate attack on an improper request for relief”

is to raise an objection “by a motion to strike the allegations pertaining thereto or as a defense in

the answer to the complaint.” See 215 Cal. Rptr. at 365. Applied here, this indicates that GSY’s

decision to seek dismissal of the entire complaint based on the inclusion of an allegedly improper

rent request was not the appropriate procedural avenue for raising its objection—and that the

inclusion alone would not justify dismissal of the entire unlawful detainer action. Taken together,

Saberi’s reasoning also suggests that when an unlawful detainer complaint includes a proper claim

for recovery of possession, the presence of an unauthorized request does not require the case to be

removed from an unlawful detainer summary proceeding into an ordinary civil action, contrary to

GSY’s position.

[46] Ultimately, the trial court did not err in denying GSY’s motion to dismiss because PAG’s

complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under section 21103(a), and the

inclusion of an improper request for unpaid rent did not invalidate the entire complaint or force

the case outside of an unlawful detainer summary proceeding.

4. Any technical error in allowing PAG to abandon and withdraw its alternative rent request does not warrant reversal

[47] GSY asserts that the trial court should have dismissed PAG’s complaint rather than

permitting PAG to withdraw its alternative claim for unpaid rent. Appellant’s Br. at 13; Reply Br.

at 4–5. GSY argues that PAG was “abusing the summary nature of unlawful detainer proceedings

by forcing GSY to defend the action on such short notice and by amending its complaint on the

fly.” Appellant’s Br. at 13 (citing Tr. at 26–27). GSY further contends that by allowing PAG to Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 18 of 41

withdraw its claim for unpaid rent, the trial court’s “considerable leeway provided to PAG

contradicts the requirement of strict compliance with the unlawful detainer statutes.” Id. at 20.

GSY maintains that the strict compliance required for unlawful detainer actions prohibits “simply

abandoning improper and defective claims” in a summary proceeding, and that dismissal was

required. See id. at 13–14.

[48] PAG counters that courts routinely allow parties to abandon alternative claims or elect

remedies at or after trial without prejudicing the defendant, and that trial courts should resolve

meritorious claims while disregarding abandoned ones. See Appellee’s Br. at 32–34. PAG also

maintains that its explicit abandonment of the alternative claim constituted a clear election of

remedies, fulfilling the doctrine’s purpose of preventing double recovery while leaving its

section 21103(a) claim for possession intact. See id. at 32–34. PAG references Teutscher v.

Woodson, 835 F.3d 936, 955 (9th Cir. 2016), and Latman v. Burdette, 366 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir.

2004), to explain that a party is bound by an election of remedies if: (1) two or more remedies

existed, (2) they were “repugnant and inconsistent with each other,” and (3) the party affirmatively

chose one of them. See Appellee’s Br. at 32–33. PAG maintains that it affirmatively chose to

pursue only possession, and this voluntary election bars no relief and cures any alleged defect in

the complaint. See id. at 32–34.

[49] But Guam law does not prohibit simultaneous recovery of possession and unpaid rent in a

single unlawful detainer action, and PAG has not shown that the two remedies here are mutually

exclusive or otherwise legally incompatible. See id. at 1–56; see also Lamb v. Hoffman, 2008

Guam 2 ¶ 35 (“It is not sufficient for a party ‘simply to announce a position . . . and then leave it

up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for

him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.”).

Ultimately, the election of remedies doctrine does not apply here. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 19 of 41

[50] GSY argues that the trial court’s informal handling of PAG’s attempt to abandon and

withdraw its unpaid rent request failed to strictly comply with the unlawful detainer statutes. See

Appellant’s Br. at 13–14, 20. Although summary proceedings require strict adherence to

unambiguous statutory requirements, an appellant must still demonstrate that any deviation

resulted in prejudice to warrant reversal under 7 GCA § 15802. Section 15802 directs courts to

disregard any pleading or procedural error that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

See 7 GCA § 15802. A judgment or ruling may be reversed only if the record shows the error or

defect was prejudicial, caused substantial injury, and affected the outcome; no presumption of

prejudice arises from the mere existence of error. See id. The appellant bears “the burden to not

only affirmatively show error but that the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal.”

Fenwick v. Watabe Guam, Inc., 2009 Guam 1 ¶ 34 (citing S.D. Hous. Comm’n v. Indus. Indem.

Co., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 404 (Ct. App. 1998)).

[51] Some courts recognize that a “party praying for relief may withdraw the request at any time

prior to judgment.” Sweet v. Sweet, 462 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Conn. 1983); see also McKee v.

Hayward, 710 So. 2d 362, 369 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (“A party has the right to waive or withdraw a

claim.”), writ denied, 726 So. 2d 407 (La. 1998); Riverside Cnty. Transp. Comm’n v. S. Cal. Gas

Co., 268 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196, 209 (Ct. App. 2020), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sep. 16, 2020)

(“A plaintiff who sets forth alternative remedies in separate counts in his complaint may abandon

or dismiss one count without prejudice to his right to proceed on the other.” (quoting Steele v.

Litton Indus., Inc., 68 Cal. Rptr. 680, 690 (Ct. App. 1968))). At the same time, several jurisdictions

have emphasized that “the proper means for a party to abandon some, but not all, of its claims

prior to trial is a motion to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [(“FRCP”)] 15(a).”

Dynamic CRM Recruiting Sols., L.L.C. v. UMA Educ., Inc., 31 F.4th 914, 924 (5th Cir. 2022); see

also Shwachman v. Town of Hopedale, 540 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139–40 (D. Mass. 2021) (“‘A plaintiff Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 20 of 41

wishing to eliminate particular claims or issues from the action should amend the complaint under

Rule 15(a) . . . .” (citation omitted)); Am. Booksellers Ass’n, Inc. v. Webb, 590 F. Supp. 677, 684

(N.D. Ga. 1984).

[52] GRCP 15, modeled after FRCP 15, provides that a party may amend its pleading “once as

a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.” Guam R. Civ. P 15(a) &

SOURCE. “Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written

consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Id.

Amendments to complaints must comply with formal filing and service requirements. See 2 Maine

Prac., Maine Civil Practice § 15:2 (3d ed. 2025) (analyzing Me. R. Civ. P. 15(a), which is identical

to GRCP 15(a)). GRCP 15 also grants the opposing party time to respond to an amended pleading.

See Guam R. Civ. P. 15(a).

[53] Here, PAG retained the right under GRCP 15(a) to amend its complaint once as a matter

of course before the filing of a responsive pleading. GSY had filed only a motion to dismiss,

which does not constitute a responsive pleading. See Core Tech Int’l Corp. v. Hanil Eng’g &

Constr. Co., 2010 Guam 13 ¶ 53 n.6. Nevertheless, PAG never filed an amended complaint nor

formally moved to amend its complaint, and it did not make an oral request to amend or invoke

GRCP 15. Instead, it repeatedly stated that it had “abandoned” and “withdrawn” its alternative

request during the motion to dismiss hearing and at trial. See Tr. at 11, 21–24, 39, 95, 99. Such

oral statements do not satisfy the formal filing and service requirements of GRCP 5 or Chapter 21

of Title 21 of the GCA.

[54] Although GRCP 15 also permits amendment by leave of court or by written consent of the

adverse party, GSY did not provide written consent to the “amendment,” and the trial court never

explicitly provided leave to amend the complaint. See Tr. at 2–109; RA, tab 16 at 1–5 (Dec. &

Order). The trial court did not condone or even comment on the abandonment and withdrawal Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 21 of 41

during the pretrial hearing or ensuing trial. See Tr. at 2–109. Instead, the court only referenced

the withdrawal as a settled fact7 in its written decision and order. See RA, tab 16 at 2 (Dec. &

Order).

[55] Even if the trial court erred in allowing PAG to informally withdraw and abandon its

alternative request, the record does not demonstrate that any such error was sufficiently prejudicial

to warrant reversal. GSY broadly claims the trial court’s “ad hoc” handling of the motion to

dismiss “resulted in prejudice to GSY in its ability to defend against the action.” See Appellant’s

Br. at 14. GSY further asserted that PAG’s ability “to pick and choose which parts of the complaint

it wished to assert and to abandon those which were defective to avoid dismissal” left it “unable

to adequately defend against what was purported to be just an unlawful detainer” action. Id. at 15.

To support its claim of prejudice, GSY also quotes Lynch & Freytag v. Cooper, 267 Cal. Rptr. 189

(Ct. App. 1990), suggesting that it unfairly had to defend against an “ordinary civil action” while

still being subject to the constraints of a summary unlawful detainer proceeding:

It would obviously be unfair to require the defendant-tenant to defend against ordinary civil actions under the constraints of the summary procedure in unlawful detainer actions. Indeed, the constitutionality of these summary procedures is based on their limitation to the single issue of right to possession and incidental damages. Where, as here, those constraints are removed and the action proceeds as an ordinary civil action for rent there is no prejudice to the defendant.

Appellant’s Br. at 15 (quoting Lynch, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 192–93). GSY appears to argue that it was

7 In reference to PAG’s withdrawal of its alternative request for rent, the trial court stated in its written

decision and order: Additionally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs claim for monetary damages in the Verified Complaint requires dismissal because the request for monetary damages forces the issues of this case outside of an unlawful detainer action. In response, Plaintiff withdrew its claim for monetary damages. The Court will not make a decision on whether a request for monetary damages could potentially take the matter outside the ability of a Magistrate Judge to return the possession of a property to a plaintiff. The Court does find, in this case, the Plaintiff limited its claim to regain possession of the property and that issue was appropriately before the Court. Plaintiff did appropriately plead a set of facts that would entitle it to relief. RA, tab 16 at 2 (Dec. & Order, Mar. 11, 2025) (emphasis added). The court also “decline[d] to award any costs, attorneys fees or any monetary damages based on Plaintiff’s removal of those claims.” Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 22 of 41

prejudiced because the alleged defects in PAG’s complaint effectively transformed this case into

an ordinary civil action while leaving GSY limited to summary procedures. See id.

[56] However, Lynch is distinguishable. There, the plaintiff—not the defendant—sought to

convert the unlawful detainer action into an ordinary civil action before trial to recover rent,

damages, and attorney fees because possession had already been delivered and was no longer in

dispute. See Lynch, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 191–92. Summary procedures apply in unlawful detainer

actions because “[t]he purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is to provide the landlord with a

summary, expeditious way of getting back his property when a tenant fails to pay the rent or

refuses to vacate the premises at the end of his tenancy.” See id. at 192. Thus, it would have been

unfair in Lynch to subject the defendant to the constraints of summary procedure once possession

was no longer at issue. See Cal. Civ. Prac. Real Property Litigation § 18:1 (Nov. 2025 Update)

(“Because the purpose of an unlawful detainer action is to recover possession, there will be no

unlawful detainer if the tenant surrenders the premises before the proceeding is commenced, even

if surrender is not within the three-day notice period.” (citing Witkin, 4 Summary of California L.,

Real Property § 686 (9th ed.); Briggs v. Elec. Memories & Magnetics Corp., 126 Cal. Rptr. 34 (Ct.

App. 1975)). By contrast, here, GSY remained in possession of PAG’s property, and PAG’s action

properly proceeded under the summary unlawful detainer framework to recover possession.

[57] GSY’s conclusory assertions that it was prejudiced and the trial court’s actions were

“improper and unfair,” Appellant’s Br. at 15, fall short of satisfying its burden under section 15802

to affirmatively demonstrate that any error was prejudicial and caused substantial injury; GSY does

not explain how it was prejudiced or how its ability to defend against the action was impaired. See

Lamb, 2008 Guam 2 ¶ 35; People v. Rasauo, 2011 Guam 1 ¶ 36 (“The parties may not merely cite

a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law

cited.”). Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 23 of 41

[58] GSY fails to show that the trial court’s alleged error affected the outcome of the case. Even

if the court had not permitted PAG to informally abandon and withdraw its alternative rent request,

the result would be the same. As discussed, an unlawful detainer complaint seeking both

authorized and unauthorized relief is not invalidated by the inclusion of an unauthorized request.

Thus, the trial court’s decision to allow PAG to informally withdraw its alternative request did not

affect the validity of the court’s analysis under 21 GCA § 21103(a). In fact, the trial court’s

decision to allow PAG to withdraw its rent request ultimately benefited GSY, as the court cited

this “removal” as a basis for denying PAG any costs, attorney fees, or monetary damages. See

RA, tab 16 at 4 (Dec. & Order) (“The Court declines to award any costs, attorneys fees or any

monetary damages based on Plaintiff’s removal of those claims.” (emphasis added)).

[59] Ultimately, the trial court’s decision to permit PAG to informally abandon and withdraw

its alternative request was not prejudicial, did not cause substantial injury, and did not affect the

outcome of the case. Because GSY fails to meet its burden under section 15802 to show prejudicial

error, any alleged mistake in allowing the informal withdrawal does not warrant reversal. We

affirm the trial court’s denial of GSY’s motion to dismiss.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Err by Entering Judgment for PAG on Its Claim for Unlawful Detainer

[60] After denying GSY’s motion to dismiss, and based on testimony and exhibits admitted at

trial, the Superior Court found that GSY received adequate notice to quit and vacate PAG’s

premises under 21 GCA § 21103(a) but remained in possession after termination of its month-to-

month lease, constituting unlawful detainer. RA, tab 16 at 3–5 (Dec. & Order). The court also

rejected GSY’s argument that alleged prior rent overpayments renewed its month-to-month

tenancy under 18 GCA § 51105, thereby preventing unlawful detainer. See id. at 1–3. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 24 of 41

[61] GSY contends that the trial court erred in its bench ruling and in entering judgment for

PAG on its unlawful detainer claim. Appellant’s Br. at 15–23. But a judgment warrants reversal

due to an error only if the record shows that the error was prejudicial. See 7 GCA § 15802. This

standard requires the appellant to affirmatively demonstrate that the error caused substantial injury

and that a different result would have been probable absent the error. See id.; Fenwick, 2009 Guam

1 ¶ 34. GSY has not met this burden.

1. The Superior Court did not err in concluding that GSY’s alleged rent overpayments did not preclude unlawful detainer

[62] GSY argues that the trial court “erroneously ruled that PAG successfully proved that GSY

was no longer authorized to possess the property after notice was provided” because GSY’s alleged

“overpayment of rent extended the lease” under 18 GCA § 51105. Appellant’s Br. at 10–13, 20–

23. GSY asserts that although the original Lease stated the rent was $10,710 per month, GSY paid

monthly rent of $11,760 from December 2017 until January 2025, resulting in an excess of $1,050

per month for seven years. See id. at 10; Reply Br. at 7; Tr. at 20, 25–27; RA, tab 4 at 1–2 (Ashland

Decl., Feb. 18, 2025). GSY argues that “[b]ecause GSY was overpaying rent, pursuant to 18 GCA

§ 51105, the lease was automatically extended beyond February 5, 2025.” Appellant’s Br. at 10.

According to GSY, these alleged overpayments should have been treated as additional rent

sufficient to extend its leasehold interest, or at a minimum created a factual dispute unsuitable for

summary unlawful detainer proceedings. See id. at 10–13, 20–23.

a. The plain language of 18 GCA § 51105 forecloses GSY’s argument

[63] We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Guerrero, 2010 Guam 11 ¶ 8. “When

interpreting statutes, ‘the plain language of a statute must be the starting point.’” In re Request of

I Mina’ Trentai Dos Na Liheslaturan Guåhan, 2014 Guam 15 ¶ 48 (citing Amerault v. Intelcom

Support Servs., Inc., 2004 Guam 23 ¶ 14); People v. Joshua, 2015 Guam 32 ¶ 31 (“If a statute is Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 25 of 41

unambiguous, then the judicial inquiry into the meaning of the statute is complete.” (quoting

People v. Lau, 2007 Guam 4 ¶ 14)). Title 18 GCA § 51105 provides:

If a lessee of real property remains in possession thereof after the expiration of the hiring, and the lessor accepts rent from him, the parties are presumed to have renewed the hiring on the same terms and for the same time, not exceeding one month when the rent is payable monthly, not in any case one year.

18 GCA § 51105 (2005) (emphasis added).

[64] The statutory text clarifies that the presumption of renewal is triggered only when a

landlord accepts rent after the expiration of the hiring. See id. The statute does not provide that

pre-expiration “overpayments”—even if proven—operate as advance payments for future months

or extend a tenancy beyond its stated expiration. See id. And even when a renewal is triggered,

the statute expressly caps the renewed term at one month where rent is payable monthly. See id.

[65] PAG persuasively explains that 18 GCA § 51105 did not extend the Lease because section

51105 “only applies to a situation where a landlord accepts rental payments after the expiration of

the tenancy, not before,” and it is undisputed that PAG accepted no rent from GSY after January

2025. See Appellee’s Br. at 37; accord Tr. at 5–6 (confirming last rent payment that GSY made

and PAG accepted was in January). PAG thus correctly concludes “the statute does not compel a

holdover tenancy beyond the date that it expired on February 5, 2025 because the Port no longer

accepted rent payments from GSY, nor did GSY pay rent after that date.” Appellee’s Br. at 37–

38 (citing People ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Lucero, 170 Cal. Rptr. 554, 556 (Ct. App. 1980)).

[66] PAG further maintains that: (1) GSY never made, and PAG never accepted, advance

payments securing occupancy beyond February 5, 2025; (2) the Lease did not permit such

payments and was never amended to allow them; (3) GSY offered no proof of advance payments

at trial; and, (4) in any event, GSY paid the increased rent each month for seven years without Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 26 of 41

protest, thereby impliedly modifying the lease or waiving any right to later claim an extended

property interest. See id. at 35.

[67] We agree with PAG and conclude that GSY was not entitled to any extension, even a one-

month extension, under the plain language of section 51105.

b. The trial court did not err in rejecting GSY’s overpayment theory

[68] The trial court properly rejected GSY’s argument that alleged prior rent overpayments

triggered a renewal of its month-to-month tenancy under 18 GCA § 51105 and precluded unlawful

detainer. See RA, tab 16 at 3 (Dec. & Order). The court explained that, even if excess rent

qualified as prepayment under section 51105, such payment would, at most, extend the tenancy by

only one additional month beyond the February 5, 2025, termination date—i.e., until March 5,

2025. Id. at 3–4.

[69] Nevertheless, the court afforded GSY more time to vacate than section 51105 permits. The

court ordered GSY to vacate Hotel Wharf by March 23, 2025, and Dong Yang by April 1, 2025.

RA, tab 9 at 1–3 (Judgment, Feb. 25, 2025); RA, tab 16 at 3 (Dec. & Order). The March 23

deadline reflected PAG’s representations at trial that this is the date by which GSY should vacate

Hotel Wharf so Black Construction could begin working on the Glass Breakwater Repair Project.

See Tr. at 25, 30, 105–09. The April 1 deadline was selected to give GSY additional time to use

Dong Yang—which is not needed for the Glass Breakwater Repair Project—for staging and

moving property, considering GSY’s camel fender system project with the Navy. See id. at 108.

The trial court also selected these dates after GSY’s counsel repeatedly requested that—if PAG

prevailed on its possession claim—the court give GSY “as much time as possible” to vacate,

suggesting that additional time might enable GSY to work out a solution with the Navy. See id. at

102–03. The trial court leniently afforded GSY more time to vacate than section 51105 permits,

even though the statute did not entitle GSY to even a one-month extension. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 27 of 41

c. California authority cited by GSY does not support its overpayment theory

[70] GSY argues that it overpaid rent and that there was “insufficient evidence presented to

support the court’s finding that the rent was properly increased from $10,710 per month to $11,760

per month.” See Appellant’s Br. at 20–22; Reply Br. at 5–8. Even if (1) the rent increase was

improper and (2) GSY was entitled to an extension of the expired Lease, the plain language of

section 51105 caps such an extension at one month where rent is payable monthly. Rent was

payable monthly; thus, the Lease could have been extended no more than one month. The trial

court correctly recognized this limit and afforded GSY more than the statutory maximum.

[71] To sidestep the statutory cap on lease extensions under section 51105, GSY cites California

case law to claim that rent overpayment may extend a lease term beyond one month. See

Appellant’s Br. at 11–12; Reply Br. at 9–10. GSY maintains that because “18 GCA § 51105 was

adopted, nearly verbatim, from California Civil Code § 1945 . . . California cases interpreting

§ 1945 [are] persuasive authority unless there is a compelling reason to deviate from that

jurisdiction’s interpretation.” Appellant’s Br. at 11–12 (citing E.C. Dev., 2005 Guam 9 ¶ 15).

GSY cites Corson v. Berson, 25 P. 7 (Cal. 1890) (in bank), to support the notion that tenant rent

overpayments can effectively extend a lease by crediting the overpaid amounts toward future

occupancy. See Appellant’s Br. at 12; Reply Br. at 9–10 (“Corson is directly applicable here to

demonstrate that the overpayment of rent under a lease entitles the tenant to a credit towards future

months.”). GSY summarizes Corson as a case where the California Supreme Court, relying on

California Civil Procedure Code section 1945, credited overpaid rent toward three and a half

months of occupancy without rent payment, implying a functional extension of the tenancy. See

Appellant’s Br. at 12; Reply Br. at 9–10.

[72] Corson involved crediting overpaid rent as an offset for months without rent payment due

to landlord deceit, but it did not create a right to extend a tenancy or compel continued occupancy. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 28 of 41

See Corson, 25 P. at 7–9. There, tenants leased a store for $300 per month under an agreement

that their rent would match a lower amount if the adjoining store rented for less. Id. at 7–8. The

landlord secretly rented the adjoining store for $200 per month while the tenants continued to pay

$300 until they discovered the deception. Id. The court credited the $100-per-month

overpayments toward three and a half months during which the tenants remained without paying

rent, awarding the net overpayment as damages, but it did not order a formal extension of the

tenancy or create a right to continued occupancy. See id. at 7–9. Thus, Corson is distinguishable.

There is no compelling reason to contravene the plain language of section 51105 by extending the

Lease further.

[73] Ultimately, the plain language of section 51105 indicates that the maximum extension of

the Lease was one month. GSY’s claims of rent overpayment and entitlement to an extension are

relevant, if at all, only to the question of whether any alleged overpayment triggered a single one-

month extension. Broader disputes over the validity of the rent increase are extraneous to the

ultimate issue of possession and are outside the proper scope of summary unlawful detainer

proceedings. For this appeal, this is particularly true given that the trial court already granted GSY

more than the statutory maximum extension under section 51105.

[74] As the Saberi court emphasized, given the summary nature of unlawful detainer

proceedings, “extraneous matter is excluded from an unlawful detainer proceeding by ‘confining

the unlawful detainer action to issues directly relevant to the ultimate question of possession.’”

Saberi, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 363 (quoting Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1180 (Cal. 1974)

(in bank)). Because PAG’s unlawful detainer action is primarily based on a lease-expiration or

holdover claim under 21 GCA § 21103(a), the validity of the rent increase is immaterial to the

ultimate question of possession and may be properly excluded as extraneous. The trial court

therefore did not err in excluding it and limiting the summary proceedings to issues directly Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 29 of 41

relevant to the ultimate question of possession. Any further challenge to the rent increase or related

damages is collateral and must be pursued, if at all, in a separate, ordinary civil action.

2. We interpret 21 GCA § 21103 as authorizing PAG to pursue unlawful detainer to recover possession of Dong Yang, and find no error in the trial court’s entry of judgment in PAG’s favor

[75] GSY argues that the Superior Court improperly applied unlawful detainer procedures to

evict GSY from Dong Yang because its right to occupy that site was under a license agreement

tied to a crane demolition project, rather than a leasehold interest. See Appellant’s Br. at 22–23;

Reply Br. at 11–13. It claims that using summary proceedings to terminate a license, especially

where the license had not expired by its project-based terms, was erroneous. See Appellant’s Br.

at 22–23; Reply Br. at 11–13.

[76] A license is personal privilege granted by the landowner (licensor) to another (licensee) to

enter or perform acts on the licensor’s land, generally revocable at any time without cause or

consideration. See Gutierrez v. Guam Power Auth., 2013 Guam 1 ¶ 15; Richardson v. Franc, 182

Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 858 (Ct. App. 2015); De Haro v. United States, 72 U.S. 599, 627 (1866); Jon

W. Bruce, James W. Ely, Jr., & Edward T. Brading, The Law of Easements and Licenses in Land

§ 11:6 (Mar. 2026 Update); 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses § 110 (Feb. 2026 Update).

“A license may be revoked by express notice or by conduct on the part of the licensor that is

inconsistent with the continuation of the privilege.” Bruce, Ely & Brading, Easements and

Licenses in Land § 11:6; see also 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses §§ 110–11.

[77] GSY had a license to occupy Dong Yang to complete its crane demolition project with

PAG. See RA, tab 1 at 3 (V. Compl.); Appellee’s Br. at 7; Tr. at 21, 70–72. Under the License

Agreement, GSY’s occupancy of Dong Yang was set to expire on May 31, 2024. See RA,

Admitted Exs. (Unlawful Detainer Hr’g), Def. Ex. 3 at 1–2 (PAG Letter). By its terms, the License

Agreement also gave PAG the right to terminate the agreement at PAG’s discretion, “with or Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 30 of 41

without cause, upon thirty days (30) notice.” Id. at 1–2. At trial, PAG Acting General Manager

Muna testified that the crane demolition project “is not complete, but the period of performance

has since expired.” Tr. at 57, 73.

[78] On December 20, 2024, PAG served GSY with the Notice to Quit, which provided 47 days’

notice and directed GSY to vacate Hotel Wharf and all other occupied areas of PAG property,

including Dong Yang, by February 5, 2025. See RA, tab 1 at 3–4 (V. Compl.); id., Ex. C at 1

(Notice to Quit); Tr. at 58, 70 (confirming Notice to Quit includes Dong Yang). When GSY did

not vacate, PAG served the Notice to Vacate demanding immediate surrender of possession of all

PAG property under 21 GCA § 21103(a). See RA, tab 1 at 4 (V. Compl.); id., Ex. D at 1 (Notice

to Quit & Vacate); Appellee’s Br. at 6–7. Contrary to GSY’s arguments, its license to occupy

Dong Yang was terminated by PAG’s Notice to Quit, not by the trial court’s actions.

[79] GSY maintains that “Guam’s Unlawful Detainer law does not apply to licenses.” Reply

Br. at 11–12. GSY suggests that a “license does not fall under unlawful detainer” because it is not

expressly mentioned in 21 GCA § 21103(a)–(d). See id. at 13. GSY asserts that the license in this

case is instead “governed by contract law and not unlawful detainer”; therefore, it argues, the entire

case “should have proceeded as an ordinary civil matter.” Id. (citing Castaic Studios, LLC v.

Wonderland Studios, LLC, 315 Cal. Rptr. 3d 163, 166–67 (Ct. App. 2023)). We reject these

arguments. Still, GSY’s position raises a broader question of statutory interpretation—whether

Guam’s unlawful detainer statutes encompass licensees who remain in possession after their

licenses have been lawfully terminated.

[80] Guam’s strict-compliance standard applies when statutory requirements are clear and

unambiguous. See Castino, 2010 Guam 3 ¶ 29 (“A plain reading construction is appropriate where

the statute lays out specific requirements and indicates exactly what is necessary for compliance

without ambiguous terms.”). However, when a statute is ambiguous, this court may apply a “fair Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 31 of 41

and reasonable” construction consistent with the statute’s underlying public policy and legislative

intent. See id. ¶¶ 26, 30, 37–40, 58. A statute is ambiguous if its terms are “susceptible to two or

more reasonable interpretations.” See People v. Walliby, 2024 Guam 13 ¶ 10 (quoting San Agustin

v. Superior Court (Nadeau), 2024 Guam 2 ¶ 16). To resolve ambiguity, the court may consider

the statute’s object and policy, see id. ¶¶ 10, 18; People v. Aldan, 2022 Guam 4 ¶ 47, and may also

look to persuasive authority from other jurisdictions interpreting similar provisions, see People v.

Quenga, 1997 Guam 6 ¶ 8 (“Guidance can be found, however, by examining judicial

interpretations of similar statutes in other jurisdictions.” (quoting People v. Kingsbury, 649 F.2d

740, 742 (9th Cir. 1981))); Richardson v. Richardson, 2010 Guam 14 ¶ 12 n.7; People v. Camacho,

2015 Guam 37 ¶ 25.

[81] Section 21103 is ambiguous as to whether licensees are included. On the one hand, the

statute defines unlawful detainer using the term “tenant”: “A tenant of real property, for a term

less than life, is guilty of unlawful detainer . . . .” 21 GCA § 21103 (emphasis added). But

subsection (a) expressly contemplates relationships that rarely involve a tenancy: “including a case

where the person to be removed became the occupant of the premises as a servant or employee,

and the relation of master and servant or employer and employee has been lawfully terminated, or

the time fixed for such occupancy by the agreement between the parties has expired.” Id. §

21103(a) (emphases added).

[82] GSY’s position seems to suggest that the statute applies only to the relationships expressly

identified in section 21103. See Appellant’s Br. at 13. While this interpretation is reasonable, the

statute’s use of the term “including” can also be reasonably read to suggest that section 21103(a)

is not exhaustive but illustrative of the types of relationships encompassed within its scope.

Although unlawful detainer is generally framed in the context of a tenancy, section 21103(a)’s

inclusion of master-servant and employer-employee relationships supports a broader reading that Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 32 of 41

encompasses other occupants who wrongfully remain in possession—even if they are not

technically “tenants.” Because section 21103(a) is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation, we apply a “fair and reasonable” construction aligned with the statute’s underlying

public policy and legislative purpose. See Castino, 2010 Guam 3 ¶¶ 26, 30, 37–40, 58.

[83] Considering that the purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is to give landowners a

summary and expeditious means to recover possession of their real property, see Archbishop, 1997

Guam 12 ¶ 10; 21 GCA § 21120 (establishing preference for expeditious resolution of summary

unlawful detainer actions); Lynch, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 192, we conclude that the statute’s object and

policy are best served by construing section 21103(a) to reach licensees who remain in possession

after the lawful termination of their license.

[84] Persuasive authority from other jurisdictions supports this interpretation.8 The Supreme

Court of Iowa, for example, has held that summary proceedings are available to recover possession

from licensees “wrongfully detaining possession,” even though the applicable statute does not

precisely contemplate licensees. See Bernet v. Rogers, 519 N.W.2d 808, 810–12 (Iowa 1994)

(analyzing Iowa Code Ann. § 648.1 (1993)); accord Arns v. Arns, 671 N.W.2d 531, 531 (Iowa Ct.

App. 2003) (unpublished table decision). While Iowa courts have required strict compliance with

8 Title 21 GCA § 21103 is modeled on the 1931 version of California Civil Procedure Code section 1161.

See 21 GCA § 21103, SOURCE; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1161 Amended Stats. 1931 ch. 738 § 1; Stats. 1933 ch. 513 § 1; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1161 (Deering 1981) (historical note at 136–37). After Guam adopted section 1161, the California legislature amended the statute in 1933 to expressly include licensees (and agents) in the definition of unlawful detainer under subsection (1): A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of unlawful detainer: 1. When he continues in possession . . . of the property . . . after the expiration of the term for which it is let to him, without the permission of his landlord . . . including the case where the person to be removed became the occupant of the premises as a servant, employee, agent, or licensee and the relation of master and servant or employer and employee or principal and agent or licensor and licensee has been lawfully terminated or the time fixed for such occupancy by the agreement between the parties has expired . . . . Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1161(1), Stats. 1933 ch. 513 § 1 (emphases added). Guam has not enacted a similar amendment. Nevertheless, we conclude that the object and policy of Guam’s unlawful detainer statutes are best served by interpreting the ambiguous section 21103(a) to reach licensees whose right to possession has lawfully terminated. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 33 of 41

their forcible entry and detainer9 statutes’ notice provisions, see, e.g., Town of Lakota v. Gray, 35

N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 1949); Fritch & Himes v. Reynolds, 176 N.W. 297, 298–99 (Iowa 1920),

they have also held that these statutes may be liberally construed to reach licensees because the

statutes’ objective is to provide a summary means for landowners to recover possession of real

property from persons unlawfully in possession thereof, see Bernet, 519 N.W.2d at 810–12

(quoting Rudolph v. Davis, 30 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Iowa 1948)); accord Arns, 671 N.W.2d at 531;

Petty v. Faith Bible Christian Outreach Ctr., Inc., 584 N.W.2d 303, 307 (Iowa 1998); Steele v.

Northup, 168 N.W.2d 785, 787 (Iowa 1969).

[85] The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i has similarly held that summary unlawful detainer

proceedings are available to remove a licensee whose right to possession has terminated, even

though the applicable statute only expressly refers to “lessees” and “tenants.” See Kiehm v. Adams,

126 P.3d 339, 347–48 (Haw. 2005) (analyzing Haw. Rev. Stat. § 666-1 (1993)), reconsideration

denied by, 128 P.3d 891 (Haw. 2006).

[86] We adopt a similar approach. Strict compliance with the unlawful detainer statutes’ clear

notice requirements remains mandatory, as we stated nearly three decades ago in Archbishop.

However, we construe 21 GCA § 21103 to reach licensees who remain in possession after the

lawful termination of their license. Applied here, PAG’s 47-day written Notice to Quit lawfully

terminated GSY’s license to occupy Dong Yang. Title 21 GCA § 21103 authorized PAG to pursue

9 The Iowa courts interpret Iowa Code section 648, which is codified as “forcible entry and detainer” but

functionally encompasses unlawful detainer as well; Iowa does not separately codify “unlawful detainer.” See Iowa Code Ann. § 648 (West); see also Bernet v. Rogers, 519 N.W.2d 808, 810–12 (Iowa 1994). While Guam law distinguishes between “forcible entry,” “forcible detainer,” and “unlawful detainer” as separate causes of action, see 21 GCA §§ 21101–21103, Iowa courts have applied their forcible entry and detainer statutory scheme to address similar scenarios. They have interpreted section 648.1 to allow summary proceedings against licensees wrongfully detaining possession—even though licensees are not expressly listed in the statute—while simultaneously requiring strict compliance with statutory notice provisions. See, e.g., Bernet, 519 N.W.2d at 810–12; Town of Lakota v. Gray, 35 N.W.2d 841, 844 (Iowa 1949); Fritch & Himes v. Reynolds, 176 N.W. 297, 298–99 (Iowa 1920). This dual approach—strict adherence to unambiguous procedural requirements combined with a liberal construction of the statute’s scope to effectuate its remedial purpose—informs our interpretation of Guam’s unlawful detainer statutes. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 34 of 41

unlawful detainer to recover possession of that property, and the trial court did not err in entering

judgment in PAG’s favor.

C. It Was Harmless Error to Deny GSY the Opportunity to File an Answer After Denying Its Motion to Dismiss

[87] GSY argues that the Superior Court erred by denying it the opportunity to file an answer

after denying its motion to dismiss and by proceeding directly to trial on the unlawful detainer

complaint. See Appellant’s Br. at 16–19; Reply Br. at 10–11. GSY characterizes this as an abuse

of discretion.10 See Appellant’s Br. at 16–19. But GSY did not object to proceeding directly from

the denial to trial on the merits at any point before the Superior Court. See Tr. at 28–109.

[88] Generally, when a party fails to raise an issue before the trial court, we may exercise our

discretion to review for plain error. See E.C. Dev., 2005 Guam 9 ¶ 55; Ramiro, 2016 Guam 6 ¶ 17;

Lujan, 2016 Guam 39 ¶ 21. Although we agree that the trial court erred by proceeding directly to

trial without first affording GSY an opportunity to answer, reversal is warranted only if GSY

affirmatively demonstrates that the error caused substantial injury and that a different result would

have been probable absent such error. See 7 GCA § 15802; Fenwick, 2009 Guam 1 ¶ 34; E.C.

Dev., 2005 Guam 9 ¶ 55. GSY has not met this burden.

10 GSY does not persuasively explain why abuse of discretion review should apply. As we have recently stated, “[t]he abuse-of discretion rubric ‘is not monolithic.’” Waathdad v. Cyfred, Ltd., 2024 Guam 6 ¶ 11 (per curiam). GSY asserts that the trial court’s “decision to address the merits of the unlawful detainer without permitting GSY to file an answer was improper and not in accordance with the unlawful detainer or general pleading requirements and constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. GSY then cites this court’s precedent to explain that “[a]buse of discretion is defined as a trial court decision ‘exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.’” Id. (quoting De Vera v. Chen, 2006 Guam 1 ¶ 10). But GSY does not identify how the trial court’s failure to provide an opportunity to answer after denying the motion to dismiss was “not justified by the evidence” or was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found.” GSY likewise quotes Shin v. Fujita Kanko Guam, Inc., 2009 Guam 21 ¶ 21, for the proposition that “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs where the court does not apply the proper legal standard or its findings of fact are clearly erroneous.” Id. Yet GSY does not explain which legal standard the trial court supposedly misapplied or which factual findings were clearly erroneous in proceeding directly to trial. Under either plain error or abuse of discretion review, reversal in a civil case requires the appellant to affirmatively show that the alleged error caused substantial injury and that a different outcome was probable absent the error. See 7 GCA § 15802; Fenwick, 2009 Guam 1 ¶ 34. GSY has not made that showing. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 35 of 41

[89] This court has recognized that a failure to object to a procedural error does not necessarily

bar appellate review in a civil matter; instead, the absence of an objection relates to whether the

party suffered prejudice. See HRC Guam Co. v. Bayview II L.L.C., 2017 Guam 25 ¶ 94 (“failure

to object [is] an issue of prejudice, not an issue of waiver” in the context of attorney misconduct);

Adams v. Duenas, 1998 Guam 15 ¶¶ 17–18. Under plain error review, failing to object in a civil

case may weigh against a finding of prejudice. See HRC Guam, 2017 Guam 25 ¶ 94; Adams, 1998

Guam 15 ¶ 17.

1. The Superior Court erred by denying GSY the opportunity to file an answer after denying its motion to dismiss

[90] Title 21 GCA § 21117 states that unlawful detainer proceedings follow the general rules of

civil practice in Division 2 of Title 7 GCA, unless specifically supplanted by provisions of the

unlawful detainer statutes. 21 GCA § 21117 (2005). Similarly, GRCP 1 states that the Guam

Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the procedure in all suits of a civil nature, including civil

actions . . . [and] special proceedings.” Guam R. Civ. P. 1 (emphasis added). Unlawful detainer

actions are generally governed by the GRCP, to the extent they do not conflict with the specific

procedures set forth in Guam’s unlawful detainer statutes.

[91] In general, a defendant’s right to answer a complaint in a civil action arises from GRCP

7(a) and 12(a). See Guam R. Civ. P. 7(a), 12(a). GRCP 7(a) identifies the answer as one of the

primary pleadings in a civil action, providing that “[t]here shall be a complaint and an answer,”

which reflects that a defendant’s right to file an answer is a fundamental component of the civil

litigation process. See Guam R. Civ. P. 7(a). This right also appears to extend to unlawful detainer

actions. For example, unlawful detainer statute 21 GCA § 21112 states that “[o]n or before the

day fixed for his appearance, the defendant may appear and answer or demur.” 21 GCA § 21112 Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 36 of 41

(2005). Likewise, 21 GCA § 2110911 requires that the summons in an unlawful detainer action

direct “the defendant to appear and answer within five (5) days after the service of the summons

upon him,” and that “[i]n all other respects, the summons . . . must be issued, served, and returned

in the same manner as summons in a civil action.” 21 GCA § 21109 (2005) (emphasis added).

[92] GSY asserts that under Guam’s unlawful detainer statutes and general pleading rules, a

defendant has the right to file an answer after the denial of a motion to dismiss, and that the trial

court’s failure to allow such an answer contravened the strict‐compliance standards governing

summary proceedings. See Appellant’s Br. at 16–19; Reply Br. at 10–11 (citing 21 GCA § 21109).

To support its asserted right to answer, GSY notes that the summons served by PAG expressly

required a written answer within five days, and that unlawful detainer statute 21 GCA § 21109

likewise mandates the filing of an answer. Reply Br. at 10. GSY further maintains that its decision

to move to dismiss instead of an immediate answer was permissible under the Guam Rules of Civil

Procedure, even in unlawful or forcible detainer cases. Id. at 10–11. GSY also argues that, once

its motion to dismiss was denied, the Superior Court was required under GRCP 12(a)(1) to permit

it to file an answer before proceeding to trial. Id. at 11.

[93] PAG counters that GSY had no right to file an answer after failing to do so within the

period set by the court’s summons. See Appellee’s Br. at 46–50. The summons directed GSY to

file an answer to PAG’s complaint within five days after service of the summons, excluding the

day of service, and ordered GSY to appear on February 19, 2025, to answer the complaint. RA,

11 Title 21 GCA § 21109 states:

The summons must require the defendant to appear and answer within five (5) days after the service of the summons upon him, and must notify him that if he fails to so appear and answer, the plaintiff will apply to the court for the relief demanded in the complaint. In all other respects, the summons, or any alias summons in such proceedings, must be issued, served, and returned in the same manner as summons in a civil action. 21 GCA § 21109 (2005) (emphases added). Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 37 of 41

tab 2 at 1–2 (Summons, Feb. 12, 2025).12 Rather than file an answer, GSY moved to dismiss on

February 18, 2025.

[94] Under GRCP 12(a), service of a motion to dismiss suspends the deadline to answer until

the court rules on the motion. Guam R. Civ. P. 12(a)–(b). Thus, GSY remained entitled to file an

answer after the motion’s denial. The precise time to answer in this posture, however, is an issue

of first impression in this court.

[95] In an ordinary civil action, GRCP 12(a) gives a defendant twenty days to answer a

complaint, or ten days after denial of a motion to dismiss—a reset rather than resumption of the

original deadline. Id. In the unlawful detainer context, however, 21 GCA § 21109 supplies a

shorter, five-day answer period designed to preserve the summary nature of the proceeding. See

21 GCA § 21109. Guam’s unlawful detainer statutory scheme does not specify how a pending

motion to dismiss affects that five-day deadline.

[96] This gap in the statutory scheme presents a procedural question: whether, in unlawful

detainer proceedings, the five-day answer period under section 21109 continues to govern after

denial of a motion to dismiss, or whether GRCP 12(a)(1)’s ten-day period applies. Consistent with

21 GCA § 21109’s initial five-day answer requirement and the summary nature of unlawful

detainer proceedings, we hold that a defendant has five days to answer the complaint following

the denial of a motion to dismiss. We further hold that the denial of a motion to dismiss in an

unlawful detainer action resets—rather than merely resumes—the defendant’s answer period. This

interpretation aligns with GRCP 12(a)’s reset structure while preserving the expedited timeline

required by section 21109.

12 The parties do not challenge the trial court’s treatment of February 19, 2025, as the operative deadline to

answer the complaint. We therefore do not address whether that date was properly calculated under 21 GCA § 21109, including whether the statute’s five-day period excludes weekends. Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 38 of 41

[97] The trial court therefore erred by proceeding directly to trial without affording GSY the

opportunity to answer the complaint.

2. GSY failed to show that the Superior Court’s error caused substantial injury or made a different outcome probable

[98] Although the trial court erred in denying GSY an opportunity to answer after its motion to

dismiss was denied, reversal is unwarranted because GSY has not shown that the error caused

substantial injury or that a different result would have been probable absent the error. See 7 GCA

§ 15802; Fenwick, 2009 Guam 1 ¶ 34; E.C. Dev., 2005 Guam 9 ¶ 55.

[99] GSY maintains that the court’s immediate transition from denying the motion to dismiss

to conducting the bench trial on the unlawful detainer claim deprived it of a meaningful

opportunity to prepare a defense, including filing an answer, engaging in discovery, and receiving

notice of PAG’s trial evidence. See Appellant’s Br. at 17. GSY characterizes this sequence as a

“rushed” and “ad hoc” process that was fundamentally unfair in a highly summary proceeding,

where strict compliance is required because such actions deny litigants certain procedural rights

available in ordinary civil cases. See id. at 18–19.

[100] Citing Archbishop, 1997 Guam 12 ¶ 10, and 21 GCA § 21120, PAG counters that, because

unlawful detainer actions are summary proceedings intended to expedite recovery of possession,

the court was not required to allow discovery, a witness list, a briefing schedule, or a late-filed

answer. See Appellee’s Br. at 48–49. PAG convincingly asserts that, although GSY “implies” it

would have raised additional defenses if allowed to answer, it has never identified any defense it

could not plead. See Appellee’s Br. at 47 (“[N]ow that months have passed, GSY still has never

asserted what defense it was deprived from pleading by not being allowed to file an answer.”).

PAG also persuasively observes that GSY raised no new defense or issue in its motions to stay Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 39 of 41

proceedings before either the Superior Court or this court, both of which required showing a

likelihood of success on the merits. Id.

[101] PAG maintains that GSY suffered no prejudice from being denied the opportunity to file

an answer after the trial court denied its motion to dismiss in a statutorily limited summary

proceeding. Id. at 46–50. It persuasively contends that GSY was not hindered in presenting its

case, noting that GSY moved to dismiss, re-argued those same issues at trial, presented a witness,

cross-examined PAG’s sole witness, introduced various exhibits, and was represented by two

attorneys who each examined witnesses and argued separately. Id. at 48. PAG asserts that “[a]n

answer, in form alone, especially when sufficient defenses are raised at trial, and the issues in a

written motion to dismiss are also raised and adjudicated, would appear ministerial if not

superfluous.” Id.

[102] While a defendant retains the right to answer after denial of a motion to dismiss in an

unlawful detainer action, we assess the Superior Court’s error against the statutory preference for

expeditious resolution of summary unlawful detainer actions. See 21 GCA § 21120 (“[A]ll such

actions [for recovering possession of property under Guam’s unlawful detainer statutes] shall be

quickly heard and determined.” (emphasis added)); see also Archbishop, 1997 Guam 12 ¶ 10

(“Proceedings in an unlawful detainer action are intended to be summary in nature and are required

by law to be expedited.” (emphasis added) (citing 21 GCA § 21120)); Lynch, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 192

(“The purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is to provide the landlord with a summary,

expeditious way of getting back his property when a tenant fails to pay the rent or refuses to vacate

the premises at the end of his tenancy.” (emphasis omitted; emphasis added)).

[103] Because GSY failed to object to the Superior Court’s procedural error in this civil action,

its claim of prejudice is significantly weakened. See HRC Guam, 2017 Guam 25 ¶ 94; Adams,

1998 Guam 15 ¶ 17. The record reflects that GSY made no objection in the Superior Court to the Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 40 of 41

court’s decision to proceed immediately from denying its motion to dismiss to a trial on the merits.

See Tr. at 28–109. It remained silent when the court announced the back-to-back proceedings,

when the motion to dismiss was denied, and throughout the ensuing trial. See id. GSY raises this

procedural challenge for the first time on appeal.

[104] Before the hearing on GSY’s motion to dismiss, the Superior Court stated, “My game plan

is to address the motion today, as well as the underlining [sic] unlawful detainer,” to which GSY’s

co-counsel responded, “Okay.” Id. at 3. The court reiterated its intent to rule on the motion, take

a short recess, and then proceed with the unlawful detainer trial, offering to allow additional time

that day or to reconvene if necessary. See id. at 28–29. GSY did not object to the court’s decision

to proceed directly from the denial of its motion to dismiss to trial on the unlawful detainer claim—

either at that time or at any point during the proceedings. See id. at 28–109. Instead, GSY

requested only that the denial of its motion to dismiss be memorialized in writing. See id. at 103.

After a 30-minute recess following the denial of the motion, the court reconvened, stating, “Seeing

that I’ve denied the motion to dismiss . . . we’ll begin with Plaintiff,” without objection from GSY.

See id. at 30–31. At the close of testimony, when the court asked whether to take arguments

immediately or reconvene after lunch, GSY’s co-counsel replied, “I’m prepared to argue.” Id. at

93–94. GSY’s failure to object to the court’s error weighs strongly against a finding of prejudice.

[105] Ultimately, GSY has failed to meet its burden under 7 GCA § 15802 because it has not

identified any substantial injury or shown that the outcome would have been different without the

trial court’s error. Its failure to object in the Superior Court reinforces the lack of prejudice.

Reversal is unwarranted.

V. CONCLUSION

[106] The Superior Court did not err in denying GSY’s motion to dismiss because PAG’s

complaint adequately stated an unlawful detainer claim under 21 GCA § 21103(a) upon which Port Auth. of Guam v. Guam Indus. Servs., Inc., 2026 Guam 2, Opinion Page 41 of 41

relief could be granted. The inclusion—and subsequent withdrawal—of an improper request in

the alternative for unpaid rent did not render the entire complaint defective. We AFFIRM the

denial of the motion to dismiss.

[107] Likewise, the Superior Court did not err in entering judgment for PAG on its unlawful

detainer claim and ordering GSY to vacate Hotel Wharf and Dong Yang. GSY’s reliance on 18

GCA § 51105 to argue that alleged rent overpayments extended its Lease is misplaced, as the

statute caps any renewal at one month—a period the trial court already exceeded to give GSY

additional time to vacate.

[108] Regarding Dong Yang, unlawful detainer proceedings were also properly available despite

GSY being a “licensee” rather than a “tenant.” We construe 21 GCA § 21103 to reach licensees

who remain in possession after the lawful termination of their license. But we reiterate that strict

compliance with the unlawful detainer statutes’ clear notice requirements remains mandatory.

[109] Finally, although the trial court erred by proceeding directly to trial without affording GSY

an opportunity to answer PAG’s complaint following the denial of its motion to dismiss, GSY has

not shown prejudice under 7 GCA § 15802. This is underscored by GSY’s failure to object in the

Superior Court and its failure to affirmatively demonstrate that the error caused substantial injury

or affected the outcome. We AFFIRM the judgment awarding PAG possession of Hotel Wharf

and Dong Yang.

/s/ /s/ F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO KATHERINE A. MARAMAN Associate Justice Associate Justice

/s/ ROBERT J. TORRES Chief Justice