Poole v. Brown

706 F. Supp. 74, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1762, 1989 WL 13705
CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 14, 1989
DocketCiv. A. 87-2482 SSH
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 706 F. Supp. 74 (Poole v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Poole v. Brown, 706 F. Supp. 74, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1762, 1989 WL 13705 (D.D.C. 1989).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STANLEY S. HARRIS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, that motion is granted.

Background

This case stems from an attack on a child by a female Rhodesian Ridgeback. The *75 alleged attack took place at the home of defendant while he was stationed in Kinshasa, Zaire. 1 Plaintiffs are citizens of the United Kingdom who are temporarily residing in Kinshasa, Zaire. Daniel Poole, age six at the time this suit was filed, was the child injured in the attack; Christopher Poole is his father.

According to the complaint, the dog — Jin-ga — was owned by defendant, was a trained attack dog, and was caring for a recent litter of puppies. The complaint alleges that defendant knew that the dog was likely to attack a stranger, but that he took no precautions for the presence of plaintiffs (invited by defendant to his residence). 2 When defendant opened the door to admit plaintiffs, the dog attacked Daniel, inflicting serious injuries to his nose and lips. Because the dog had not been inoculated against rabies, the child had to undergo painful anti-rabies shots. The complaint further alleges that Daniel is permanently disfigured, has suffered pain and trauma, and will be forced to undergo further surgery. Defendant has moved to dismiss this case on the grounds of forum non conveniens.

Discussion

The seminal case on forum non conveniens is Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947). 3 Gulf Oil sets forth a number of factors to be applied by courts in declining jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds:

An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining willing, witnesses; ... and all other practical problems that make trial of a ease easy, expeditious and inexpensive_ But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine.... Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.

Id. at 508-09, 67 S.Ct. at 843. In sum, the court’s obligation is to weigh the three interests at stake: plaintiff’s, defendant’s, and the forum’s. See Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 783 (D.C.Cir.1980).

Alternative Forum Availability

The Court’s initial responsibility 4 is to ensure that there is an alternative forum available and that the remedies provided are not so unsatisfactory as to render that forum inadequate. 5 See 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper at § 3828. Defendant asserts that Zaire, whose code and court system *76 are modeled on those of Belgium, is an adequate alternative forum. Moreover, defendant cites article 261 of its code as proof that this cause of action also exists in the other forum:

Le propriétaire d’un animal, ou celiu [sic ] qui s’en sert, pendant qu’il est á son usage, est responsable du dommage que l’animal a causé soit que 1’animal fut sous sa garde, soit qu’il fut egaré ou échappé. 6

Plaintiff does not squarely dispute the applicability of article 261 to his claim, nor does he challenge the adequacy of the forum. Instead, plaintiff argues that because Jinga was kept within the United States Embassy compound in Kinshasa, the alleged tort took place on American soil. In plaintiff’s view, “to hold that the courts of Zaire should determine what laws apply to events occurring within the Embassy, would subvert the very sovereignty of the United States of America.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss at 2. This argument is without merit — American embassies are not considered to be American soil. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867, 85 S.Ct. 137, 13 L.Ed. 2d 70 (1964). See McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 588 (9th Cir.1983) (“A United States embassy ... remains the territory of the receiving state and does not constitute territory of the United States.”); see also Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 77 (1965).

The other point raised by plaintiffs touching on Zaire’s availability as a forum also sidesteps the relevant issue. Plaintiffs originally filed suit in Kinshasa. 7 Defendant states that he was compelled by the United States to assert diplomatic immunity during his period of service in Zaire. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 4; Gittleman Affidavit at ¶ 10. Plaintiffs accuse defendant of returning to the United States to “avoid the jurisdiction of the courts of Zaire,” Plaintiffs’ Opposition at 2, but this assertion is not supported by the record. Plaintiffs also allege that the District of Columbia is the only jurisdiction in which defendant could be found and served. Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Reply at 2. Plaintiffs, while arguing that the District of Columbia is the only available forum, have not responded to defendant’s assertion that the Zairian action is on inactive status and can go forward at any time. While it is true, especially in terms of a public policy argument, that defendants should not be allowed to manipulate the doctrine of forum non conveniens in order to forum shop, the Court concludes that this has not happened here.

Private Interest Factors

In response to defendant’s vigorous argument that Zaire is a more convenient forum for both parties, plaintiffs reply that both Zaire and the District of Columbia are equally inconvenient. “It is submitted that ‘convenience’ being in equipoise, the ‘strong presumption’ in favor of Plaintiffs’ choice of forum must prevail.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition at 4 (cites omitted). This is a presumption, not a fixed rule.

When the home forum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choice is convenient. When the plaintiff is foreign, however, this assumption is much less reasonable.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
706 F. Supp. 74, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1762, 1989 WL 13705, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/poole-v-brown-dcd-1989.