Wilkie, J.
The principal issue to be determined on this appeal is whether old-age benefits, paid pursuant to the Federal Social Security Act, -42 USCA, secs. 301 to 1370, and retirement benefits paid pursuant to the Wisconsin retirement fund, sec. 66.90, Stats., are includable items of income in a determination pf a person’s ability to pay for the support of a dependent relative within the meaning of sec. 52.01 (4).
In his findings supporting the determination of liability, the trial court specifically focused upon the monthly income Mrs. Hedrick received in accrued retirement benefits from the Social Security Act and from the Wisconsin retirement fund, sec. 66.90, Stats.,3 a system of “social security” for [386]*386state employees. In view of the fact that Mrs. Hedrick’s basic needs could be satisfied from her husband’s income, the court concluded that a portion of her retirement income could be allocated to the support of her dependent mother.
Mrs. Hedrick’s counsel argued on appeal that under the terms of 42 USCA, sec. 407,4 social-security benefit payments could not be reached by any legal process. Because sec. 66.918 (1) (a), Stats.,5 contains a clause similar to the provisions of 42 USCA, sec. 407, counsel argues that Wisconsin retirement-fund benefits are not includable items in a determination of ability to pay under the standards set forth in sec. 52.01 (4). We disagree.
[387]*387Federal cases construing 42 USCA, sec. 407, hold that the provisions seek to prevent transfer of benefits prior to receipt. . . [T]he section [407] is intended to preclude a person entitled to benefits under sections 401 to 409 from transferring his right before, but not after, the Administrator has recognized it.” 6 The provisions of sec. 407 apply to the assignment of future receipts, not to received benefits.
Other state jurisdictions have applied the federal construction of sec. 407 in cases involving allocation of received benefits to the payment of a dependent’s welfare costs. In Texas Baptist Children’s Home v. Corbitt7 the court held that a guardian could be compelled to apply social-security death benefits received by minor children to their maintenance costs in a welfare home. The reason for this construction is apparent. A person whose sole source of received income is accrued social-security benefits cannot be permitted to frustrate all creditors. The comfortable enjoyment of retirement does not entail exemption from reasonable debts contracted during the period of retirement.
The same rationale must apply in the construction of sec. 66.918, Stats. Wisconsin retirement-fund benefits may not be validly assigned prior to accrual. However, when retirement-fund benefits have been recognized, they are subject to legal process in relation to transactions occurring after such recognition, upon determination of a valid claim against the state employee.
However, even though we rule that these payments made under the Federal Social Security Act and from the Wisconsin retirement fund may be reached by general creditors after their receipt, we nevertheless conclude that “due regard” for the “future maintenance” of persons whose source [388]*388of income derives from social-security benefits, and state employees’ retirement funds, and “reasonable allowance for the protection of the property and investments from which they derive their living and their care and protection in old age,” requires that these earned retirement benefits be excluded as factors in the determination of ability to pay within the meaning of the relative responsibility statute.
The fundamental purpose of old-age and survivors benefits under the Social Security Act, and the Wisconsin retirement fund, is to insure that persons removed from the active labor market because of advanced age will enjoy comfortable retirement years predicated upon a modest, but adequate, income earned during their active employment years. The social-security system and the Wisconsin retirement fund are predicated upon the insurance principle. Income is diverted from spending to investment for “care and protection in old age.” As perceived by the United States supreme court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo:
“But the ill [unemployment] is all one, or at least not greatly different whether men are thrown out of work because there is no longer work to do or because the disabilities of age make them incapable of doing it. Rescue becomes necessary irrespective of the cause. The hope behind this statute [Social Security Act] is to save men and women from the rigors of the poor house as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when journey’s end is near.” 8
This rationale is applicable to the Wisconsin retirement-fund program, sec. 66.90, Stats.
Sec. 52.01 (4), Stats., specifically directs the trier of fact to make reasonable allowance for the protection of investment designed to provide income in old age, when determining a responsible relative’s ability to provide sup[389]*389port for a dependent. Sec. 52.01 (4) is one of the few relative responsibility statutes which provides a specific legislative elaboration of the standard of ability to pay. Most relative responsibility statutes simply set forth the generic standard of “ability to pay.” 9 Because sec. 52.01 (4) expressly directs the trier of fact to make allowance for investments designed to provide income in old age, it would be unreasonable to construe the relative responsibility statute in a manner which would defeat the objectives of government old-age insurance systems.
The average social-security payment is $70 per month.10 Of the people who receive social-security benefits, 25 percent of them have no other savings at all and half have additional assets of less than $1,000.11 To allocate funded retirement benefits to the support of dependent relatives would defeat the purpose of these insurance programs— to provide a comfortable standard of living for retired people. An additional obligation of support would reduce most people living on funded retirement benefits to a subsistence standard of living. In giving meaning to the standards of ability to pay, set forth in sec. 52.01 (4), Stats., a judicial task under the provisions of sec. 52.01, we must take care not to defeat the objectives of other social-welfare programs. In light of these “legislative” facts, and the express statutory language relating to an allowance for investment for old age, we conclude that federal social-security benefits, and Wisconsin retirement-fund benefits, are not includable items in a determination of a relative’s ability to pay under sec. 52.01 (4).
Counsel for the Department of Public Welfare argues that in assessing Mrs. Hedrick’s ability to pay the court may consider her husband’s income and economic position.
[390]*390If the wife has an income that can be considered, then the trial court, under sec. 52.01, Stats., is free to consider her husband’s economic position both in terms of his worth and his income.
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Wilkie, J.
The principal issue to be determined on this appeal is whether old-age benefits, paid pursuant to the Federal Social Security Act, -42 USCA, secs. 301 to 1370, and retirement benefits paid pursuant to the Wisconsin retirement fund, sec. 66.90, Stats., are includable items of income in a determination pf a person’s ability to pay for the support of a dependent relative within the meaning of sec. 52.01 (4).
In his findings supporting the determination of liability, the trial court specifically focused upon the monthly income Mrs. Hedrick received in accrued retirement benefits from the Social Security Act and from the Wisconsin retirement fund, sec. 66.90, Stats.,3 a system of “social security” for [386]*386state employees. In view of the fact that Mrs. Hedrick’s basic needs could be satisfied from her husband’s income, the court concluded that a portion of her retirement income could be allocated to the support of her dependent mother.
Mrs. Hedrick’s counsel argued on appeal that under the terms of 42 USCA, sec. 407,4 social-security benefit payments could not be reached by any legal process. Because sec. 66.918 (1) (a), Stats.,5 contains a clause similar to the provisions of 42 USCA, sec. 407, counsel argues that Wisconsin retirement-fund benefits are not includable items in a determination of ability to pay under the standards set forth in sec. 52.01 (4). We disagree.
[387]*387Federal cases construing 42 USCA, sec. 407, hold that the provisions seek to prevent transfer of benefits prior to receipt. . . [T]he section [407] is intended to preclude a person entitled to benefits under sections 401 to 409 from transferring his right before, but not after, the Administrator has recognized it.” 6 The provisions of sec. 407 apply to the assignment of future receipts, not to received benefits.
Other state jurisdictions have applied the federal construction of sec. 407 in cases involving allocation of received benefits to the payment of a dependent’s welfare costs. In Texas Baptist Children’s Home v. Corbitt7 the court held that a guardian could be compelled to apply social-security death benefits received by minor children to their maintenance costs in a welfare home. The reason for this construction is apparent. A person whose sole source of received income is accrued social-security benefits cannot be permitted to frustrate all creditors. The comfortable enjoyment of retirement does not entail exemption from reasonable debts contracted during the period of retirement.
The same rationale must apply in the construction of sec. 66.918, Stats. Wisconsin retirement-fund benefits may not be validly assigned prior to accrual. However, when retirement-fund benefits have been recognized, they are subject to legal process in relation to transactions occurring after such recognition, upon determination of a valid claim against the state employee.
However, even though we rule that these payments made under the Federal Social Security Act and from the Wisconsin retirement fund may be reached by general creditors after their receipt, we nevertheless conclude that “due regard” for the “future maintenance” of persons whose source [388]*388of income derives from social-security benefits, and state employees’ retirement funds, and “reasonable allowance for the protection of the property and investments from which they derive their living and their care and protection in old age,” requires that these earned retirement benefits be excluded as factors in the determination of ability to pay within the meaning of the relative responsibility statute.
The fundamental purpose of old-age and survivors benefits under the Social Security Act, and the Wisconsin retirement fund, is to insure that persons removed from the active labor market because of advanced age will enjoy comfortable retirement years predicated upon a modest, but adequate, income earned during their active employment years. The social-security system and the Wisconsin retirement fund are predicated upon the insurance principle. Income is diverted from spending to investment for “care and protection in old age.” As perceived by the United States supreme court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo:
“But the ill [unemployment] is all one, or at least not greatly different whether men are thrown out of work because there is no longer work to do or because the disabilities of age make them incapable of doing it. Rescue becomes necessary irrespective of the cause. The hope behind this statute [Social Security Act] is to save men and women from the rigors of the poor house as well as from the haunting fear that such a lot awaits them when journey’s end is near.” 8
This rationale is applicable to the Wisconsin retirement-fund program, sec. 66.90, Stats.
Sec. 52.01 (4), Stats., specifically directs the trier of fact to make reasonable allowance for the protection of investment designed to provide income in old age, when determining a responsible relative’s ability to provide sup[389]*389port for a dependent. Sec. 52.01 (4) is one of the few relative responsibility statutes which provides a specific legislative elaboration of the standard of ability to pay. Most relative responsibility statutes simply set forth the generic standard of “ability to pay.” 9 Because sec. 52.01 (4) expressly directs the trier of fact to make allowance for investments designed to provide income in old age, it would be unreasonable to construe the relative responsibility statute in a manner which would defeat the objectives of government old-age insurance systems.
The average social-security payment is $70 per month.10 Of the people who receive social-security benefits, 25 percent of them have no other savings at all and half have additional assets of less than $1,000.11 To allocate funded retirement benefits to the support of dependent relatives would defeat the purpose of these insurance programs— to provide a comfortable standard of living for retired people. An additional obligation of support would reduce most people living on funded retirement benefits to a subsistence standard of living. In giving meaning to the standards of ability to pay, set forth in sec. 52.01 (4), Stats., a judicial task under the provisions of sec. 52.01, we must take care not to defeat the objectives of other social-welfare programs. In light of these “legislative” facts, and the express statutory language relating to an allowance for investment for old age, we conclude that federal social-security benefits, and Wisconsin retirement-fund benefits, are not includable items in a determination of a relative’s ability to pay under sec. 52.01 (4).
Counsel for the Department of Public Welfare argues that in assessing Mrs. Hedrick’s ability to pay the court may consider her husband’s income and economic position.
[390]*390If the wife has an income that can be considered, then the trial court, under sec. 52.01, Stats., is free to consider her husband’s economic position both in terms of his worth and his income. This is because the court should consider these factors in determining the extent to which the husband has sufficient income or other economic position in order for him to assume responsibility for his wife’s basic needs, thus freeing her income for possible consideration as an ability to pay on her part for a portion or all of the support furnished to a dependent relative under the statute.
But since, in the case at bar, Mrs. Hedrick had no income that could be legally considered in charging her with a duty to support her mother, there was no basis for the trial court to consider her husband’s economic position or income.
By the Court. — Order reversed.