OPINION
POGUE, Chief Judge:
This action is about the correct tariff classification of two items of glass merchandise that Plaintiff, The Pomeroy Collection, Ltd. (“Pomeroy” or “Plaintiff’), imported from Mexico. The United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) classified both items of merchandise, under Heading 7013 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), as “[g]lassware of a kind used for ... indoor decoration or similar purposes,” with a 5, 10, or 12%
ad valorem
duty. Plaintiff claims that the merchandise is properly classified, under Heading 9405, as parts of lamps, which Plaintiff also imports. Parts of lamps, classified under Heading 9405, are duty free when imported from Mexico.
Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment.
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)(2006).
As explained below, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and because Plaintiffs lamps could not function in their intended manner without the glass merchandise at issue, that merchandise is appropriately classified as parts of Plaintiffs lamps. Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiffs motion.
BACKGROUND
At issue are 25 entries of Pomeroy’s glass merchandise, identified as sku 804427, and two entries of another Pomeroy glass product, identified as sku 807329.
Sku 804427, an example of which is the glass component of Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, is a tall, somewhat cylindrical, vase-shaped glass structure, open at the top and enclosed at its bottom. Sku 807329, an example of which is Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, is a
similar glass structure that is slightly shorter than sku 804427.
Customs classified each of these entries under HTSUS Subheading 7013.99.50.
Pomeroy protested Customs’ classifications, but its protests were denied.
After paying all required duties, charges and exactions on the entries,
Pomeroy brought this action, challenging the denial of its protests.
As noted above, Plaintiff claims that both sku 804427 and sku 807329 are properly classified as parts of lamps, under HTSUS 9405.91.60.
Plaintiff accordingly requests that the court direct Customs to re-liquidate the contested entries, and refund the excess duties collected, with lawful interest. Am. Compl. 6.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Customs classification decisions are reviewed
de novo. See
28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1);
BASF Corp. v. United States,
30 CIT 227, 236, 427 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1208 (2006),
aff'd,
497 F.3d 1309 (Fed.Cir.2007). Following the familiar two-step analysis,
see Pillowtex Corp. v. United States,
171 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir.1999) (citing
Bausch & Bomb, Inc. v. United States,
148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir.1998)), the court first ascertains the correct meaning of the relevant tariff provisions and then determines the proper classification for the merchandise at issue.
Id.
The first step presents a question of law,
Franklin v. United States,
289 F.3d 753, 757 (Fed.Cir.2002), while the second concerns issues of fact.
Pillowtex Corp.,
171 F.3d at 1373.
The court’s analysis of tariff classification provisions in the HTSUS is governed by the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRI”), which are applied in numerical order.
Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. United States,
607 F.3d 771, 773 (Fed.Cir.2010). In accordance with GRI 1,
[The] court first construes the language of the heading, and any section or chapter notes in question, to determine whether the product at issue is classifiable under the heading. Only after determining that a product is classifiable under the heading should the court look
to the subheadings to find the correct classification for the merchandise.
Orlando Food Corp. v. United States,
140 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing GRI 1).
Summary judgment is then appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the nature of the merchandise in question,
i.e.,
where determination of the proper classification is a matter solely of correctly construing the meaning and scope of particular tariff provisions.
Intercontinental Marble Corp. v. United States,
381 F.3d 1169, 1173 (Fed. Cir.2004).
DISCUSSION
If, as Plaintiff contends, sku 804427 and sku 807329 are classifiable as parts of articles properly classified under Heading 9405, then this merchandise was incorrectly classified under Chapter 70 of the HTSUS, which includes Heading 7013. This is true because Note 1(e) to Chapter 70 specifically exempts from all headings in that Chapter any articles classifiable as parts of articles classified under Heading 9405.
For both sku 804427 and sku 807329, therefore, the question before the court is whether each is classifiable as a part of an article which is properly classified under Heading 9405 of the HTSUS.
I. Legal Framework for Proper Classification as ‘Part’ of Another Article
The appellate court has adopted two tests for determining whether merchandise may be classified as a part of an article. The first is when the article of which the merchandise in question is claimed to be a part “could not function as such article” without the claimed :.part.
United States v. Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc., 21
C.C.P.A. 322, 324, 1933 WL 1887 (1933) (emphasis and citations omitted)
;
see also Bauerhin Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. United States,
110 F.3d 774, 778 (Fed.Cir.1997) (relying on this “oft-quoted passage” of Willoughby).
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OPINION
POGUE, Chief Judge:
This action is about the correct tariff classification of two items of glass merchandise that Plaintiff, The Pomeroy Collection, Ltd. (“Pomeroy” or “Plaintiff’), imported from Mexico. The United States Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) classified both items of merchandise, under Heading 7013 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), as “[g]lassware of a kind used for ... indoor decoration or similar purposes,” with a 5, 10, or 12%
ad valorem
duty. Plaintiff claims that the merchandise is properly classified, under Heading 9405, as parts of lamps, which Plaintiff also imports. Parts of lamps, classified under Heading 9405, are duty free when imported from Mexico.
Before the court are cross-motions for summary judgment.
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)(2006).
As explained below, because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and because Plaintiffs lamps could not function in their intended manner without the glass merchandise at issue, that merchandise is appropriately classified as parts of Plaintiffs lamps. Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiffs motion.
BACKGROUND
At issue are 25 entries of Pomeroy’s glass merchandise, identified as sku 804427, and two entries of another Pomeroy glass product, identified as sku 807329.
Sku 804427, an example of which is the glass component of Plaintiffs Exhibit 2, is a tall, somewhat cylindrical, vase-shaped glass structure, open at the top and enclosed at its bottom. Sku 807329, an example of which is Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, is a
similar glass structure that is slightly shorter than sku 804427.
Customs classified each of these entries under HTSUS Subheading 7013.99.50.
Pomeroy protested Customs’ classifications, but its protests were denied.
After paying all required duties, charges and exactions on the entries,
Pomeroy brought this action, challenging the denial of its protests.
As noted above, Plaintiff claims that both sku 804427 and sku 807329 are properly classified as parts of lamps, under HTSUS 9405.91.60.
Plaintiff accordingly requests that the court direct Customs to re-liquidate the contested entries, and refund the excess duties collected, with lawful interest. Am. Compl. 6.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Customs classification decisions are reviewed
de novo. See
28 U.S.C. § 2640(a)(1);
BASF Corp. v. United States,
30 CIT 227, 236, 427 F.Supp.2d 1200, 1208 (2006),
aff'd,
497 F.3d 1309 (Fed.Cir.2007). Following the familiar two-step analysis,
see Pillowtex Corp. v. United States,
171 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir.1999) (citing
Bausch & Bomb, Inc. v. United States,
148 F.3d 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir.1998)), the court first ascertains the correct meaning of the relevant tariff provisions and then determines the proper classification for the merchandise at issue.
Id.
The first step presents a question of law,
Franklin v. United States,
289 F.3d 753, 757 (Fed.Cir.2002), while the second concerns issues of fact.
Pillowtex Corp.,
171 F.3d at 1373.
The court’s analysis of tariff classification provisions in the HTSUS is governed by the General Rules of Interpretation (“GRI”), which are applied in numerical order.
Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc. v. United States,
607 F.3d 771, 773 (Fed.Cir.2010). In accordance with GRI 1,
[The] court first construes the language of the heading, and any section or chapter notes in question, to determine whether the product at issue is classifiable under the heading. Only after determining that a product is classifiable under the heading should the court look
to the subheadings to find the correct classification for the merchandise.
Orlando Food Corp. v. United States,
140 F.3d 1437, 1440 (Fed.Cir.1998) (citing GRI 1).
Summary judgment is then appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the nature of the merchandise in question,
i.e.,
where determination of the proper classification is a matter solely of correctly construing the meaning and scope of particular tariff provisions.
Intercontinental Marble Corp. v. United States,
381 F.3d 1169, 1173 (Fed. Cir.2004).
DISCUSSION
If, as Plaintiff contends, sku 804427 and sku 807329 are classifiable as parts of articles properly classified under Heading 9405, then this merchandise was incorrectly classified under Chapter 70 of the HTSUS, which includes Heading 7013. This is true because Note 1(e) to Chapter 70 specifically exempts from all headings in that Chapter any articles classifiable as parts of articles classified under Heading 9405.
For both sku 804427 and sku 807329, therefore, the question before the court is whether each is classifiable as a part of an article which is properly classified under Heading 9405 of the HTSUS.
I. Legal Framework for Proper Classification as ‘Part’ of Another Article
The appellate court has adopted two tests for determining whether merchandise may be classified as a part of an article. The first is when the article of which the merchandise in question is claimed to be a part “could not function as such article” without the claimed :.part.
United States v. Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc., 21
C.C.P.A. 322, 324, 1933 WL 1887 (1933) (emphasis and citations omitted)
;
see also Bauerhin Techs. Ltd. P’ship v. United States,
110 F.3d 774, 778 (Fed.Cir.1997) (relying on this “oft-quoted passage” of Willoughby). Thus, for example, a lens that allows a camera to take colored photos is properly a part of such cameras — without such lens, “cameras could not perform one of their proper functions — the taking of colored pictures,”
Willoughby, 21
C.C.P.A. at 326-27.
The second test by which a piece of merchandise may qualify as a part of another article is if, when imported, the claimed part is “dedicated solely for use” in such article and, “when applied to that use,” the claimed part meets the
Willoughby
test.
United States v. Pompeo,
43 C.C.P.A. 9, 14, 1955 WL 6859 (1955).
The example here is a supercharger that may be installed in a car engine — although both the ear engine and the supercharger are complete in themselves, the supercharger is dedicated solely for supercharging the car engine, and, when applied to that use — i.e., when the article being considered is not just a car engine, but a
supercharged
car engine — the supercharged car engine cannot function without the super
charger, and so the
Willoughby
test is met.
See id.
at 13-14.
With this legal framework in mind, the court will consider each of the items at issue here.
11. Sku 80U27
Plaintiff argues that sku 804427 should be classified as part of an article which is properly classified under Heading 9405 because sku 804427 was specifically designed to serve as the container for Pomeroy’s Gondola Botanical Hurricane, Pl.’s Ex. 2, and the latter could not function as intended without sku 804427. Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 8-10 (relying on,
inter alia,
PL’s Ex. 1 (Pomeroy Aff.) and PL’s Ex. 2 (the Gondola Botanical Hurricane product)).
The specific question before the court is whether the
Willoughby
or
Pompeo
tests are satisfied with regard to the relationship between sku 804427 and the Gondola Botanical Hurricane. This is because Customs does not contest that Pomeroy’s Gondola Botanical Hurricane, when assembled, is properly classified as under Heading 9405.
See
Answer to Am. Compl. ¶ 14;
see also Pomeroy Collection, Ltd. v. United States,
32 CIT-, 559 F.Supp.2d 1374, 1386-87 (2008)
(“Pomeroy
I”) (holding certain Pomeroy merchandise, functionally identical to the Gondola Botanical Hurricane,
to be properly classified under Heading 9405); PL’s Ex. 8 (HQ 964842 (June 25, 2002)) (classifying Pomeroy’s “ ‘Gondola’ Hurricane Candleholder” under Heading 9405).
Plaintiff is correct that sku 804427 should be classified as part of Pomeroy’s Gondola Botanical Hurricane, because the relationship between the sku 804427 glass and the Gondola Botanical Hurricane satisfies the
Willoughby
test. The Gondola Botanical Hurricane clearly could not function without the sku 804427 glass, which constitutes its external structure.
See
PL’s Ex. 2.
Without the glass part, the
metal candleholder, meant to hang over the enclosed potpourri, as depicted on the retail packaging, would have nothing to hang from. Accordingly, because sku 804427 is appropriately part of an article that is properly classified under Heading 9405,
see Pomeroy I,
559 F.Supp.2d at 1386-87, and is therefore itself classifiable under such heading,
see
HTSUS, 9405.91, this merchandise was improperly classified under Heading 7013.
See
HTSUS Chapter 70, Note 1(e).
III. SKU 807829
Next, Plaintiff avers that sku 807329, exemplified by Plaintiffs Exhibit 3, was specifically designed to serve exclusively as the candle holder in a number of Pomeroy products. Pl.’s Stmt, of Material Facts as to Which There Are No Genuine Issues to be Tried ¶¶ 10-11 (citing Pl.’s Ex. 1 (Pomeroy Aff.) ¶¶ 8-9
). Plaintiff contends that these articles could not function in their intended manner without the sku 807329 glass.
Id.
at ¶ 15 (citing Pl.’s Ex. 1 (Pomeroy Aff.) ¶ 16
).
The relationship between the sku 807329 glass and the products exemplified by Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 — and depicted in Plaintiffs Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 — satisfies the
Pompeo
test, such that sku 807329 is properly a ‘part’ of such articles. Sku 807329 is “dedicated solely for use” as the wind-breaking and protective structure of these products,
and, “when applied to
that use,” the
Willoughby
test is satisfied, as these products cannot function as protected flames without sku 807329.
See Pompeo,
43 C.C.P.A. at 14. Accordingly, because sku 807329 is appropriately part of an article that is properly classified under Heading 9405,
see Pomeroy I,
559 F.Supp.2d at 1386-87,
and is therefore itself classifiable under such heading,
see HTSUS,
9405.91, this merchandise was also improperly classified under Heading 7013.
See
HTSUS Chapter 70, Note 1(e).
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The parties are directed to prepare and submit to the court, by July 27, 2011, a judgment, in accordance with this opinion, to be entered by the court.
It is SO ORDERED.
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