Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund v. Bank of America, NA

907 F. Supp. 2d 536, 2012 WL 6062544, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173871
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 7, 2012
DocketNo. 12 Civ. 2865(KBF)
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 907 F. Supp. 2d 536 (Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund v. Bank of America, NA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund v. Bank of America, NA, 907 F. Supp. 2d 536, 2012 WL 6062544, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173871 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

KATHERINE B. FORREST, District Judge:

Plaintiff Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of the City of Chicago (“plaintiff’ or “PABF”) brings this putative class action against defendants Bank of America, N.A. (“BofA”) and U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank” and, with BofA, “defendants”) in their capacity as trustees for forty-one trusts of residential mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”). Plaintiff alleges that defendants breached their contractual duties under the trusts’ respective Pooling and Servicing Agreements (“PSAs”), as well as the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violated the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (“TIA”), 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq.

The gravamen of the corrected class action complaint (the “Complaint”) is that defendants failed to take certain actions required by the PSAs, which caused a decline in the value of plaintiffs MBS1 and thus damaged plaintiff.

Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint. The motion was fully submitted as of July 20, 2012. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on August 6, 2012.

For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND2

A. The Parties

Plaintiff PABF, a state governmental pension fund organized under Illinois law, provides retirement benefits to its members and their beneficiaries and, in that capacity, “relies heavily upon the performance of its investments.” (Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 24.) PABF purchased certificates in five of the 41 trusts at issue in this action (the five purchased trusts, the “Trusts”) (id. ¶ 1, Ex. B), but no longer holds an interest in any of the Trusts (Oral Arg. Tr. (“Tr.”) 69:22-70:1, Aug. 6, 2012, ECF No. 40).

Defendant BofA is a U.S. national banking association with its principal place of business in Charlotte; North Carolina. (Compl. ¶ 15.) In early October 2007, BofA acquired LaSalle Bank National Association (“LaSalle”) — the Trusts’ original [541]*541Trustee. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 15.) Through that acquisition, BofA succeeded LaSalle as Trustee. (Id. ¶ 15.)

Defendant U.S. Bank is a U.S. national banking association with a principal place of business in Minnesota. (Compl. ¶ 16.) In or about July 2008, U.S. Bank succeeded BofA as Trustee for certain of the Trusts. (Id.)3

B. MBS Securitization

Although “[t]he features of residential mortgage-securitization trusts are well known in the recent annals of litigation,” BlackRock Fin. Mgmt. Inc. v. Segregated Account of Ambac Assur. Corp., 673 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir.2012), reviewing the process here is helpful to resolution of the instant motion.

MBS are securities entitling the holder to income payments from pools of residential mortgage loans held by a trust. Those mortgage loans are “securitized” when they are converted into “bond-like instruments, the MBS, that trade over the counter in capital markets.” (Compl. ¶ 17.) There are four major players involved in an MBS securitization: the mortgage originator/underwriter, the seller, the depositor, and the securitization underwriter. (See id. ¶¶ 19-22.)

For the MBS securitizations here, Washington Mutual Bank (“WaMu”) and its affiliates played all four roles. WaMu originated the mortgage loans through its own mortgage lending arm, or through certain “correspondent” mortgage lenders. (Compl. ¶ 19.)4 The seller (a WaMu affiliate) acquired the mortgages from WaMu, grouped them into “loan pools,” and then sold/transferred them to the depositor-here, WaMu Asset Acceptance Corp. (“WAAC”). (Id. ¶ 20.) To effect the transfer, the seller and depositor entered into an agreement, the Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement (“MLPA”). (Id.) The MLPA contains the seller’s representations and warranties about the quality of the mortgages in the loan pool as well as an agreement from the seller to cure, substitute, or repurchase any mortgages that do/did not comply with the representations and warranties. (Id.)

Alter the seller-to-depositor transfer, the depositor then transferred the mortgage loan pool into the trust, created specifically for the securitization. (Compl. ¶ 21.) The trust then issued certificates to the underwriter — here, WaMu Capital Corp. (“WCC”) — who then marketed and sold the certificates to investors, including plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 22.) In purchasing certificates, investors essentially acquired the right to receive cash flows generated from the principal and interest payments of the mortgagors. (Id. ¶ 23.) Once the loans were deposited into the trust, they were overseen by a servicer (here, WaMu (see PSA at 112)), who “service[d] and administered] the Mortgage Loans” by,' inter alia, collecting the principal and interest payments and distributing those remittances to certificate-holders pursuant to a payment schedule, colloquially referred to as a “waterfall.” (PSA at 92,112.)

Each MBS securitization trust comprises various “tranches” — slices or levels — of MBS. Each tranche bears its own distinct characteristics — ie., priority of payment, credit rating, level of credit risk, type of credit enhancement, etc. (Id. ¶ 23.) Certificate-holders in the various tranches are paid according to the waterfall. Certifi[542]*542cate-holders who hold “senior” tranches— ie., tranches with higher credit ratings and higher payment priority-receive their allotted percentage of the incoming cash flows first (they are the “top” of the waterfall); tranches lower in payment entitlement are paid out in a predetermined order, descending from “mezzanine,” or mid-level, tranches to the “equity,” or lower level, tranches. The certificate-holders of more subordinated tranches may or may not receive the hoped-for/expected amount of the cash flows, as they are lower in the waterfall’s payment schedule.

The value of the certificates, then, depends upon, inter alia, the mortgagors’ ability to repay the loan principal and interest. (See Compl. ¶ 25.) In other words, mortgagors’ defaults on their loans affect payments to certificate-holders (depending on the tranche in which they are invested) — e.g., lower tranches may receive only a percentage (or none) of the expected principal and interest payments if the trusts’ underlying mortgages experience a significant rate of default. (Id.) Such reduced payments likely equate with a reduction in the value of the MBS. (See id.)

C. The PSAs5

Plaintiff alleges that the Trustee had specific duties in connection with the Trusts, emanating from the PSAs. (See Compl. ¶ 27.) The PSA is a lengthy document, imposing myriad duties upon the Trustee (and others). Only the Trustee’s duties pertinent to the instant motion are discussed below.

Section 2.05 of the PSA provides the Trustee authorization “to appoint on behalf of the Trust any bank or trust company ...

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
907 F. Supp. 2d 536, 2012 WL 6062544, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173871, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/policemens-annuity-benefit-fund-v-bank-of-america-na-nysd-2012.