UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Christopher Polansky
v. Civil No. 13-cv-458-JL Opinion No. 2016 DNH 012 Ann Marie McCoole
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This civil rights action turns squarely on the requirement
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a), that an inmate exhaust the Department of
Corrections’s formal grievance process prior to seeking recovery
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court. By his Amended
Complaint, the plaintiff, Christopher Polansky, seeks to recover
for damages he allegedly suffered as a result of inadequate
medical care during a one-month stay in the Residential Treatment
Unit (RTU) at the New Hampshire State Prison for Men in Concord.
He asserts an Eighth Amendment civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and state-law claims for negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress. This court has subject-matter
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1367
(supplemental jurisdiction).
The sole defendant in this case, Ann Marie McCoole, a
registered nurse and Nursing Coordinator employed by the New
Hampshire Department of Corrections, moves for summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, on Polansky’s Eighth Amendment claim that
she provided inadequate medical care during his stay at the RTU.
After hearing oral argument, and for the reasons set forth below,
the court concludes that Polansky failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him before filing this
action, as the PLRA requires. The court therefore grants summary
judgment in favor of the defendant and dismisses Polansky’s
Eighth Amendment claim. Having done so, the court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
negligence claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
I. Applicable legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). To defeat such a motion, the party
opposing summary judgment “must set forth specific facts showing
that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to each issue
upon which she would bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial.”
Torres-Negron v. Merck & Co., 488 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2007)
(quotations omitted). An issue is “genuine” if it may reasonably
be resolved in either party’s favor at trial, and “material” if
2 it has the capacity to sway the outcome under applicable law.
Vineberg v. Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 56 (1st Cir. 2008)
(quotations omitted). In performing these calculations, the
“court must scrutinize the record in the light most flattering to
the party opposing the motion, indulging all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.” Mulvihill v. Top-Flite Golf
Co., 335 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 2003). Where, as here, the party
seeking summary judgment also bears the burden of proof at
trial,1 the court will not grant summary judgment unless, based
on the record taken in this light, no reasonable jury could find
for the nonmoving party. See E.E.O.C. v. Union Independiente de
la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de P.R., 279 F.3d
49, 55 (1st Cir. 2002); Winnacunnet Coop. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 84 F.3d 32, 35 (1st Cir.
1996).
II. Background
The following background summary, drawn from the complaint
and the documents submitted in support of defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and plaintiff’s opposition thereto, takes the
1 As further discussed infra, the defendant has asserted the affirmative defense of failure-to-exhaust under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). She carries the burden of proving this defense at trial. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 (2007).
3 approach described above and draws all reasonable inferences in
Polansky’s favor.
While incarcerated in the New Hampshire State Prison for Men
in Concord, Polansky requested a transfer to the that facility’s
RTU so that he could attend counseling and group therapy
sessions. During his month-long stay in the RTU, between August
21, 2012, and September 20, 2012, Polansky was housed in the
RTU’s Secure Psychiatric Unit (SPU) infirmary. The defendant was
a Psychiatric Unit Nurse Coordinator there at that time.
As a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, Polansky relied on
equipment to move himself between his wheelchair and other
surfaces, such as his bed. During the majority of his stay in
the RTU, the facility provided a trapeze unit over Polansky’s
bed, which allowed him to change positions using his arms alone,
and a slide board, along which he could slide from one surface to
another. As a result of spending a significant amount of time in
a wheelchair, Polansky suffered from decubitus, pressure sores,
and ulcers. Upon arriving at the RTU, he told the prison staff
that using a slide board would exacerbate those conditions and
injure him further. He requested a Hoyer lift instead.2 A Hoyer
2 A Hoyer lift, or sling lift, is a floor crane used to transfer a patient between two surfaces (e.g., a bed and a wheelchair) using a sling. See Santos v. Sunrise Med., Inc., 351 F.3d 587, 589 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2003).
4 lift arrived in the state warehouse during the week of September
11, 2012, and was set up for Polansky’s use on September 19,
2012. While waiting for the Hoyer lift, Polansky used the slide
board to move between his wheelchair and other surfaces. The
resulting friction led to open sores, about which Polansky
complained to the prison staff. Separately, Polansky also
complained of constipation that resulted in bowel blockage.
Polansky submitted two Inmate Request Slips relating to his
request for a Hoyer lift and his bowel blockage during his stay
at the RTU.3 Specifically, on September 13, 2012, Polansky
submitted an Inmate Request Slip addressed to a staff doctor,
complaining that his “buttocks [were] pretty much shredded from
using a slide board” asked for an examination and informing the
staff that he had not “had a [bowel movement] now since 09-03-
12.” Plaintiff’s Ex. A-2. He was told to speak to a nurse to
schedule an examination with a provider. Id. On September 18,
2012, Polansky submitted another Inmate Request Slip, this time
directed specifically to McCoole, asking for the Hoyer lift and
for additional remedies for his bowel blockage. Plaintiff’s Ex.
A-3. The RTU staff made the Hoyer lift available to Polansky the
3 Polansky also filed at least five other Inmate Request Slips during his stay at the RTU, but does not contend that they concern these issues, nor do they appear to do so. See Defendant’s Ex. B-1 at 1-3, 5, 7.
5 next day. Polansky Aff’t ¶ 10. He left the RTU one day later,
on September 20, 2012.
After leaving the RTU, Polansky continued to file additional
Inmate Request Slips complaining of pain and sores he claims were
caused by using the slide board during his RTU stay. Plaintiff’s
Exs. A-4 (September 23, 2012), A-5 (September 24, 2012), A-6a
(October 8, 2012), and A-6b (October 8, 2012). He also
complained about the quality of the prison’s water. Plaintiff’s
Exs. A-8 (January 31, 2013) and A-9 (February 5, 2013). After a
slew of Inmate Request Slips cataloging various complaints,
Polansky filed two second-level grievances in early 2013. The
first addressed his concerns about the quality of the water,
Plaintiff’s Ex. A-11, and the second a previously undocumented
concern about the conduct of the mail room staff, Plaintiff’s Ex.
A-12.
Polansky commenced this action on October 16, 2013. After a
year and several amendments to his complaint, Polansky obtained
counsel4 and, on November 10, 2014, filed the operative Amended
4 Neither the Constitution nor any statute entitled Polansky to counsel in this action. In light of the proceedings in this action and Polansky’s prior sojourns in this District, the court determined that the interests of justice would be served by his having counsel. After contacting several legal aid agencies who were, unfortunately, unwilling or unable to take on Polansky’s case, the court appointed Matthew Cairns, Esq. from its roster of volunteer pro bono counsel, the Pro Bono Volunteer Attorney
6 Complaint5 asserting a single claim under the Eighth Amendment
and two state law negligence claims against McCoole in her
official and personal capacities. McCoole moved for summary
judgment on her affirmative defense that Polansky failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing a suit in
this court contesting prison conditions as required by the PLRA.
III. Analysis
The defendant’s motion for summary judgment turns on whether
Polansky exhausted his available administrative remedies. The
exhaustion provision of the PLRA prohibits a prisoner from
bringing any action “with respect to prison conditions under [42
U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, . . . until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Such a requirement “allows prison officials
an opportunity to resolve disputes concerning the exercise of
their responsibilities before being haled into court” which “has
the potential to reduce the number of inmate suits, and also to
improve the quality of suits that are filed by producing a useful
administrative record.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 204.
Panel. The court appreciates Attorney Cairns’ advocacy on Polansky’s behalf in this action. 5 Document no. 66.
7 The PRLA “requires proper exhaustion,” which means that an
inmate taking advantage of the grievance process must comply with
all of the prison’s “deadlines and other critical procedural
rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006); see also Acosta
v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 445 F.3d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216. To prevail on summary
judgment, then, the defendant must show that no reasonable jury
could find that Polansky exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him before commencing this action. And she has done
so here.
1. The DOC grievance process
The New Hampshire Department of Corrections has promulgated
administrative remedies in the form of an official, three-step
grievance process. That procedure is set forth in the DOC Policy
and Procedure Directive (PPD) 1.16, which the defendant has
attached to her motion as Exhibit G. As this court has
previously described the process:
PPD 1.16 requires an inmate make an initial attempt -- albeit an informal one -- to resolve any issue with the staff member involved. If that fails, a three-level grievance procedure is set in motion with the filing of
8 a written complaint -- known as an inmate request slip (IRS) -- with the lowest level staff member authorized to deal with the issue in question. The IRS must be filed within 30 days of the underlying incident or it will be rejected as untimely. Once filed, prison officials are required to conduct an appropriate investigation of the issues raised and provide a written response to the inmate within 15 days.
At the second level, an inmate dissatisfied with the prison’s response may pursue further administrative remedies by submitting a “grievance form” to the Warden. The inmate is afforded 30 days from the receipt of the response to appeal to the Warden, who then has 30 days to conduct any necessary investigation and make a decision.
The third and final level of the grievance procedure enables the inmate to appeal the Warden’s decision to the Commissioner of Corrections. Any appeal to the Commissioner must be filed within 30 days of the Warden’s response and the Commissioner in turn has 30 days to decide. The Commissioner’s decision is final. See PPD 1.16, at 3–4; Inmate Manual, § D. Until the Commissioner has responded to the grievance, the inmate has not fully exhausted all of his or her administrative remedies.
Perfetto v. New Hampshire State Prison, 2008 DNH 77, 7-8.
The defendant here argues that Polansky’s suit must be
dismissed because Polansky has not properly exhausted his
available administrative remedies with respect to his claims that
McCoole failed to provide him with adequate medical care by
“forcing him to use a physically injurious slideboard and an
unsanitary toilet/shower seat, and to endure prolonged
constipation and bowel obstruction . . . .” Amended Compl. ¶ 31.
9 The court agrees. As explained more fully below, see infra Part
II.3, the evidence -- even taken most generously in Polansky’s
favor -- demonstrates that Polansky never availed himself of the
third tier of the DOC’s grievance policy with respect to injuries
arising from use of the slide board or his bowel issues. Nor
does the evidence admit the inference that he engaged the
administrative grievance process at all with respect to his
complaint about an unsanitary toilet and shower seat. His
failure to fully and properly exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him is fatal to his request for judicial relief.
2. Polansky’s access to the grievance process
The first question the court must address is whether the
grievance process described above was available to Polansky. He
contends that it was not. The PLRA makes clear that an inmate
need only exhaust those remedies “as are available.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). As this court has previously observed, giving the
language of the PLRA its plain and ordinary meaning,
“‘[a]vailable’ means accessible or capable of being possessed or
used.” Knowles v. New Hampshire Dep't of Corr. Comm'r, 538 F.
Supp. 2d 453, 460 (D.N.H. 2008). The evidence before the court
clearly shows that Polansky frequently complained through the
grievance process. For example, the court has reviewed some
10 eighteen Inmate Request Slips submitted by Polansky between
August 20, 2012, and April 10, 2013,6 and two phase two grievance
forms, submitted February 26, 2013, and March 8, 2013.
Polansky’s frequent use of the grievance system undercuts his
various arguments that he lacked effective access to that system.
First, Polansky argues that he was unable to access the
grievance system because he “failed to consistently receive
responses to his Inmate Request Slips.” Plaintiff’s Mem. at 8.
However, the evidence here demonstrates that Polansky received a
response to all but one of the Inmate Request Slips submitted as
evidence in support of or opposition to defendant’s motion.7 See
Plaintiff’s Exs. A-1 through A-10; Defendant’s Ex. B-1. Polansky
received responses to both of the Inmate Request Slips filed
during his RTU stay that addressed the issues raised in this
lawsuit, see Defendant’s Exs. A-2 and A-3, as well as those filed
afterward, see, e.g., Defendant’s Exs. A-4 and A-5. The
frequency of Polansky’s requests and the high rate of response
indicates not, as Polansky contends, that he lacked access to the
6 Polansky filed fourteen of these during the two-month period between August 20, 2012 and October 24, 2012. 7 The solitary Inmate Request Slip to which Polansky alleges he never received a response -- and the court draws that inference in his favor -- was his February 5, 2013 IRS submitted to Warden Gerry on the subject of the prison’s water quality. See Plaintiff’s Ex. A-9.
11 system, but that his access was adequate and that he was a
frequent participant.
At oral argument, Polansky cast a new light on this
position. He had inadequate access to the administrative
grievance process, he contended, because the process would take
too much time to address the complaints at issue here -- that is,
that the system fails in emergency medical situations. However,
the administrative process provides a safety valve for emergency
situations. The first step of the process is “waivable where an
inmate can demonstrate that using the process ‘is likely to
result in an identifiable risk of harm to their physical safety
or psychological well-being.’” Knowles, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 460
(quoting PPD 1.16(IV)(A)(4)). A direct approach to the warden,
bypassing the Inmate Request Slip level, would require Polansky
to have sought a waiver. PPD 1.16(IV)(A)(4). There is no
evidence that he did so here.
Polansky’s second argument, that the Inmate Requests Slips
were inconsistently available to him, see Plaintiff’s Mem. at 8,
is equally unavailing for much the same reason. The defect in
Polansky’s complaint here, as described in greater detail below,
is not his failure to submit an Inmate Request Slip cataloging
his complaints of insufficient medical care; it is his failure to
12 continue along the next two steps of the grievance process before
filing this action.8 See, infra, Part III.3. Any alleged lack
of Inmate Request Slips fails to explain that discrepancy. And,
as discussed supra, the evidence shows that Polansky had access
to Inmate Request Slips and employed them to complain about the
conditions that he has raised in this lawsuit.9 His August 10,
2012, complaint about the staff’s lack of response to prior
Inmate Request Slips, which he filed before his move to the RTU
on August 20, 2012, see Plaintiff’s Mem. at 7; Plaintiff’s Ex. A-
1, sheds no light on the question of whether Polansky was able to
exhaust his administrative remedies in seeking redress for the
alleged defects in his care during his RTU stay.
Finally, invoking the imbalance of power between inmates and
prison staff, Polansky contends that the grievance system was
unavailable to him because McCoole and Warden Gerry actively
discouraged him from using the system. See Plaintiff’s Mem. at
8. Specifically, Polansky alleges that McCoole informed him that
8 Indeed, Polansky’s only arguable second-level grievance related to the issues raised in this case was actually submitted on an Inmate Request Slip addressed to Warden Gerry rather than the proper level two grievance form. See Polansky Aff’t ¶ 15; Plaintiff’s Ex. A-8. 9 Notably, when Polansky used an Inmate Request Slip to complain of a dearth of Inmate Request Slips, the staff responded by agreeing to increase the number of slips ordered for the unit. Plaintiff’s Ex. A-13.
13 he would be “taken care of as far as the bowel blockage and the
Hoyer Lift, so long as [he] ‘didn’t rock the boat’ or ‘be
unreasonable’.” Polansky Aff’t ¶ 6. He took this to mean his
concerns would be addressed if he avoided complaining about them.
Id. Similarly, he took the Warden’s response to his March 8,
2013 grievance about contaminated water and mailroom malfeasance,
see Plaintiff’s Ex. A-12, in which the Warden directed him to
file an Inmate Request Slip rather than raising the issue for the
first time in a grievance, as a deterrent to using the grievance
system at all. Because of this discouragement, Polansky argues,
the grievance system was effectively not available to him.
Polansky’s participation in the system again cuts against
him. As explained supra, whether the system was “available” to
him turns on whether he was able to access or use it. Knowles,
538 F. Supp. 2d at 460. And, as this court explained in Knowles,
in light of Polansky’s consistent employment of the system,
“[t]here is no question that the three-level grievance procedure
set forth in the Inmate Manual and promulgated by the DOC at PPD
1.16 was literally ‘available’ to the plaintiff.” Id. Even
taking Polansky at his word that he was unable to obtain the full
sum of Inmate Requests Slips to which he was entitled and that
McCoole encouraged him not to “rock the boat,” his continued
filing of Inmate Request Slips -- including complaints on the
14 subject of this action -- demonstrates that the “the grievance
process was nonetheless always ‘available’ to him in the sense
that the means to take advantage of it were available to him
frequently enough to comfortably meet all of its procedural
requirements and deadlines.” Perfetto, 2008 DNH 77, 18. Nothing
in the record suggests that Polansky was dissuaded from filing
grievances “to a degree that effectively made administrative
remedies unavailable to him.” Id. at 17-18.
For these several reasons, even viewed in the light most
favorable to Polansky, the record leaves no question that the
three-level administrative grievance process was available to him
and that he took regular advantage of it.
3. Polansky’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies
Having established that the DOC had an administrative
grievance process in place that was available to Polansky, the
court now turns to the question of whether Polansky exhausted his
available remedies. It concludes that he did not.
As described above, the three-step grievance process allows
for an aggrieved inmate to attempt to resolve a complaint by
filing an Inmate Request Slip. If the administration’s response
to that request is unsatisfactory, an inmate may file a level two
15 grievance, bringing the issue to the Warden’s attention. If the
Warden’s resolution of the issue fails to satisfy the inmate, he
may appeal that decision to the Commissioner of Corrections.
This process is “highly formalized and standardized, with
specific time frames and mandatory standardized forms. . . .
[U]se of these forms and observance of these deadlines is
required for ‘proper exhaustion.’” Knowles, 538 F. Supp. 2d at
460 (citing Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93)).
Even under the most generous reading of Polansky’s various
submissions, the record contains no indication that he ever
appealed those issues to the Commissioner of Corrections. At
best, Polansky may have filed a level 2 grievance on the issues
raised in this lawsuit. He addressed an Inmate Request Slip to
Warden Gerry on January 31, 2013, in which he complained that
wounds sustained while using the slide board may have become
infected due to the prison’s water, which to Polansky appeared
dirty and contaminated. Polansky Aff’t ¶ 15; Plaintiff’s Ex. A-
9. He alleges that this Inmate Request Slip was intended to
serve as a level 2 grievance to the Warden. Polansky Aff’t ¶ 15.
The court is skeptical that an Inmate Request Slip submitted in
this context should be construed as a second-level grievance due
to Polansky’s misapprehension when Polansky in fact filed second-
16 level grievances on other matters, which strongly suggests he had
knowledge of the process and was able to abide by it. See
Plaintiff’s Exs. A-11 and A-12. Even if the court considered
this Inmate Request Slip as such a grievance, however, the court
discerns no evidence to suggest that he raised any appeal to the
Commissioner of Corrections -- let alone one related to the
issues involved in this litigation. Absent any such evidence,
the court concludes that no reasonable question of material fact
remains as to whether Polansky exhausted his available
administrative remedies. The defendant is, therefore, entitled
to judgment as a matter of law that Polansky failed to satisfy
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement before commencing this suit.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
IV. State-law claims
The court having disposed of Polansky’s federal claim on
summary judgment, only his state-law negligence claims against
McCoole remain. Where “the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” it “may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over remaining state law
claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Under these circumstances, where
the federal claim is dismissed before trial, the balance of
factors that the court considers when deciding whether to retain
17 supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims -- such as
judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity -- will
generally point toward relinquishing the claims to the state
court. Id. at 350 n.7. Accordingly, the court “declin[es] to
exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims,” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350
(1988), and dismisses them.
V. Conclusion
The undisputed facts in this case establish that the DOC’s
grievance policy was available to Polansky and that he failed to
properly exhaust those administrative remedies. Although he
unquestionably complained about the issues currently before the
court, his complaints did not constitute “proper exhaustion”
under the PLRA. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary
judgement10 on her failure-to-exhaust affirmative defense is
GRANTED. The plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is dismissed
without prejudice for his failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. His state-law claims are also dismissed. The clerk
shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case.
10 Document no. 77.
18 SO ORDERED.
____________________________ Joseph N. Laplante United States District Judge
Dated: January 20, 2016
cc: R. Matthew Cairns, Esq. Lynnmarie C. Cusack, Esq.