2022 IL App (1st) 220712-U
FIFTH DIVISION June 1, 2022
No. 1-22-0712
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
ROLAND POLANCO, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellant, ) Cook County ) v. ) ) COOK COUNTY OFFICERS ) No. 22 COEL 7 ELECTORAL BOARD, and its members, KAREN ) YARBROUGH, Cook County Clerk; KIMBERLY ) FOXX, Cook County State’s Attorney; and IRIS ) MARTINEZ, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook ) County; and LARRY DOMINICK, ) Honorable ) Maureen O. Hannon, Respondents-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cunningham and Connors concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the circuit court’s order affirming the decision of the Cook County Officers Electoral Board, which had dismissed objections to the nomination papers of a candidate for the office of Township Committeeperson, Democratic Party, of Cicero Township for the 2022 General Primary Election. The objections were insufficiently specific to provide the candidate sufficient notice of the nature of the objections as required by the Election Code. The objector procedurally defaulted his other claims by failing to raise them in a timely manner. No. 1-22-0712
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The petitioner-appellant, Roland Polanco, appeals from an order of the circuit court
which affirmed a decision of the respondent-appellee Cook County Officers Electoral Board
(Board). The Board had overruled Polanco’s objections to the nomination papers of respondent-
appellee Larry Dominick, a candidate in the upcoming June 28, 2022 General Primary Election.
In light of this determination, the circuit court also declined to reach Polanco’s other claims
regarding the composition of the electoral board. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶4 FACTS
¶5 Dominick filed nomination papers with the Cook County Clerk, seeking to be placed on
the ballot for election to the office of Township Committeeperson, Democratic Party, Cicero
Township. His nominating papers included petition sheets containing approximately 279
signatures of individuals purporting to be registered voters residing in the township, affiliated
with the Democratic Party.
¶6 Polanco filed objections to those nomination papers. The only substantive allegation in
the objections reads:
“Candidate has submitted a number of signatures less than the statutory minimum
number of signatures as required by the Election Code per 10 ILCS 5/7-10(i). Therefore,
Candidate has failed to comply with a mandatory provision of the Illinois Election Code
(Jackson-Hicks v. East St. Louis Board of Election Commissioners, 2015 IL 118929).
Thus, by the law of the State of Illinois, the name of Candidate is not eligible to appear
on the ballot for the Office at the Election.”
¶7 The Board assigned the case to a hearing officer. Dominick moved to dismiss the
objections on the basis that, by merely stating he filed fewer signatures than required, they were 2 No. 1-22-0712
insufficiently specific to provide him notice of what he would have to defend against. He further
noted that the objections failed to indicate either how many signatures he had filed or what the
statutorily required number of the signatures was. Since, in Dominick’s view, the law required
him to submit between 175 to 280 valid signatures, and the petitions had 279 signatures on their
face, he contended that the objections failed to fulfill the requirement of section 10-8 of the
Election Code (Code) that the objector’s petition state “fully the nature of the objections.” Pub.
Act 102-15, § 5 (eff. June 17, 2021) (amending 10 ILCS 5/10-8).
¶8 In response to Dominick’s motion to dismiss, Polanco revealed his actual theory of the
case for the first time. Polanco asserted that the number of required signatures was 540, not
between 175 and 280. He based this computation on the following analysis. Section 7-10(i) of
the Code provided that the minimum number of petition signatures for candidates for township
committeeperson was “no less than the number of signatures equal to 5% of the primary electors
of his or her party of the township.” Pub. Act 102-692, § 5 (eff. Jan. 7, 2022) (amending 10 ILCS
5/7-10). Section 7-10(k), in turn, specified that the number of “primary electors” in a township
“shall be determined by taking the total vote cast for the candidate for that political party who
received the highest number of votes in the political subdivision at the last regular election at
which an officer was regularly scheduled to be elected from that subdivision.” Id.
¶9 In Polanco’s view, the “last regular election at which an officer was regularly scheduled
to be elected from” Cicero Township was the November 2020 General Election, even though
there was no Cicero Township office on the ballot at that election. That election was the
quadrennial presidential election. Polanco argued that since all Cicero voters participated in that
election, it was proper to use that election as the base year for computing the signature
requirement. Polanco showed that the highest Democratic vote-getter in Cicero Township in the
3 No. 1-22-0712
November 2020 General Election was Justice P. Scott Neville, a candidate for the Illinois
Supreme Court who was running, not merely in Cicero Township, but in the First Judicial
District, which happens to encompass Cicero Township. Justice Neville received 16,127 votes in
Cicero Township, which, multiplied by 5% then further multiplied by two-thirds 1, resulted in a
540 minimum signature requirement.
¶ 10 The hearing officer granted Dominick’s motion to dismiss, finding that Polanco’s petition
did not “state fully” the objections as required by section 10-8 of the Code. In particular, the
hearing officer’s written report and recommendation stated that Polanco’s analysis regarding the
higher signature requirement was raised for the first time in the briefing on the motion to dismiss
and, among other things, violated the Board’s rule prohibiting amendments to filed objections.
The hearing officer also stated that Polanco’s objections had pleaded no “basis” for his assertion
that the candidate failed to submit the required number of signatures. Accordingly, the hearing
officer recommended that the objections be dismissed.
¶ 11 The Board received the hearing officer’s report and recommendation, and heard further
arguments from the parties. During the hearing, the parties stipulated that the Cook County
Clerk’s published computations showed the minimum signature requirement was 280. The
record shows that the County Clerk did not base its computation on Justice Neville’s vote totals
at the November 2020 General Election, an election at which no Cicero Township officers were
elected. Instead, the County Clerk used 2018 General Primary Election, the last preceding
election at which Cicero Township voted as a distinct unit for any Democratic candidate to serve
in a township office.
1 Under Public Act 102-15, the normal signature requirements for Township Committeeperson in the Code were reduced by one-third for the 2022 election only. See Pub. Act 102-15, § 5 (eff. June 17, 2021) (amending 10 ILCS 5/2A-1.1(b)). 4 No. 1-22-0712
¶ 12 Board members discussed whether the Board should resolve the case based on the lack of
specificity or the candidate’s compliance with the published signature requirement. The State’s
Attorney’s designee on the Board, assistant State’s Attorney Jessica Scheller, moved:
“to affirm the conclusion of the hearing officer but on an alternate basis having resolved
the substantive merits of the objection as filed in that Mr. Polanco alleged that candidate
Dominick did not meet the signature requirement, but all parties stipulate those
requirements were between 175 and 280, and the candidate filed 279 signatures. We
would not move to the second part of the Objector’s—the Petitioner’s objection—excuse
me—because it was not properly raised in the papers, and therefore the objection would
be overruled and Candidate Dominick’s name would appear on the ballot.”
The Board adopted Scheller’s motion by unanimous vote. Apparently, the Board had a pre-
drafted written order before it which did not precisely track Scheller’s motion. Accordingly, the
Board agreed to amend the order to state “as amended on the record.” The Board’s legal counsel
clarified: “so that would be part of the order.” As a result, the Board’s typed written order states
that it adopted the recommendation of its hearing officer in that Polanco’s petition “failed to
specify the nature of the objections,” but it also contains a handwritten amendment reading “as
amended on the record.”
¶ 13 At no time during the Board’s proceedings did Polanco file or orally present any
argument whatsoever relating to the Board composition, or the alleged bias of any Board
member or their staff.
¶ 14 Polanco then filed a lawsuit in the circuit court. The lawsuit contained two counts. Count
I was a standard petition for judicial review of an electoral board decision. See 10 ILCS 5/10-
10.1 (West 2020). It alleged that, by dismissing the case for lack of specificity, the Board never
5 No. 1-22-0712
actually computed the correct applicable signature requirement using Polanco’s methodology,
that is, that the signature requirement was 5% of the vote received by Justice Neville in the
November 2020 General Election. In Count I, Polanco requested reversal of the Board’s decision
and removal of Dominick from the ballot. In Count II, entitled “Electoral Board Bias Created
Due Process Violation,” Polanco alleged that County Clerk Yarbrough was biased. In support,
Polanco reasoned that because Yarbrough was a candidate in the June 2022 General Primary
Election for Township Committeeperson of Proviso Township, she could benefit from a
favorable decision in the Dominick case because her petitions relied on the lower number
published by her office, and those petitions did not contain enough signatures under Polanco’s
methodology.
¶ 15 He also alleged that Yarbrough’s conflict extended to the Board’s attorney, who was an
employee of the Cook County Clerk’s office. Finally, he stated that the Board’s “refusal” to
“appoint a public member” to replace Yarbrough and to obtain alternate legal counsel violated
Polanco’s right to due process of law. Polanco requested the relief that the Board’s decision be
“vacated and reversed” [sic], and that the objections be remanded to an electoral board consisting
of different members and advised by a different attorney.
¶ 16 Yarbrough filed an answer to the petition for judicial review consisting of the
administrative record of the Board as required by section 10-10.1 of the Code (10 ILCS 5/10-
10.1 (West 2020). This record shows that Yarbrough and Dominick accurately asserted that
Polanco failed to raise any objection regarding the Board composition.
¶ 17 Yarbrough also moved to strike the portion of the complaint regarding the Board
composition. In her motion, Yarbrough stated that she took no position on the merits of the
objections vis-à-vis Dominick and Polanco, but that the allegations regarding her and her legal
6 No. 1-22-0712
counsel should be stricken because they were false. Yarbrough claimed that at no time during the
proceedings did the Board “refuse” to do anything regarding its membership, because Polanco
never raised the issue of a potential due process violation to the Board, and first raised it in
Count II of the petition for judicial review of the Board’s decision. Further, Yarbrough stated
that she and her legal counsel had recused themselves from participation on various cases
involving the position of Proviso Township Democratic Committeeperson upon advice of
outside counsel. She supported these assertions with a copy of the transcript of a hearing on
those objections, showing that a representative of the Cook County Treasurer sat in Yarbrough’s
place. See 10 ILCS 5/10-9 (West 2020) (providing that the county treasurer replaces the county
clerk on a county officers electoral board when the clerk is a candidate in the subject race).
¶ 18 Dominick also moved to strike the due process allegations in the petition for judicial
review, agreeing with Yarbrough that “at no time” did Polanco raise the issue of Yarbrough’s
participation before the Board either orally or in writing. Accordingly, Dominick requested that
Count II be stricken on the basis of forfeiture, and further argued the doctrine of laches barred
the claim.
¶ 19 Polanco filed a memorandum in support of his petition, arguing that he sufficiently
pleaded his objections as required by section 10-8 of the Code, and that his signature
computation methodology was correct. He also argued that he had not waived his due process
contentions because a waiver requires a “knowing, voluntary, and intentional” act by the waiving
party. He claimed—without any further explanation—that the due process violations were “not
apparent” to him during the course of the Board proceedings. He also argued that his due process
argument was “not waivable,” and that since the State’s Attorney represented the Cook County
7 No. 1-22-0712
Clerk in various pending lawsuits relating to the clerk’s official functions, the clerk’s
disqualification should also extend to the State’s Attorney.
¶ 20 After briefing and argument, the circuit court entered an order disposing of both counts of
Polanco’s lawsuit. The court found that: (1) “all parties agree” that Polanco never asked any
Board member or attorney to be recused in the proceedings below; (2) the Board’s rules did not
allow amendments to objections; (3) the objections did not set forth any allegation or
computation regarding the number of signatures filed or required; (4) the objections “provided
no way for the Board to determine the basis for the objection and no way for the Candidate to
effectively respond”; (5) “the fact that a candidate is not required to answer the objection
supports the notion that all parties expect the pleading to clearly inform the candidate of the
nature of the objection for due process but also to alleviate confusion and move the
proceedings”; (6) the bare allegation that Dominick failed to file enough valid signatures was
insufficient to apprise any Board member of the need to recuse; (7) the allegations raised in
certain paragraphs of Count I relating to the Proviso Township objections, and Count II in its
entirety, were not raised before the Board; (8) the Board’s and Dominick’s motions to strike
were moot; and (9) the Board’s decision was affirmed. The court also found there was no just
reason to delay enforcement or appeal of its order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), a finding which was technically unnecessary because the circuit
court’s order impliedly disposed of both counts of the lawsuit.
¶ 21 This appeal followed. This court granted Polanco’s motion for an accelerated docket
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(b) (eff. July 1, 2018)).
8 No. 1-22-0712
¶ 22 ANALYSIS
¶ 23 On appeal, Polanco asserts the following contentions of error: (1) the Board should not
have dismissed his objections because he pleaded them with sufficient specificity as required by
section 10-8 of the Code; (2) under Ramirez v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, 2020
IL App (1st) 200240, the base year for computing the signature requirement was 2020, not 2018;
and (3) the Board’s composition denied him his right to due process of law.
¶ 24 We address the last contention first. Polanco argues that the circuit court erred by not
granting relief with respect to his argument that the Board was improperly constituted and was
biased against him. “[I]t is indeed a well-settled principle of law that concepts of due process
apply to administrative hearings, and the parties are guaranteed the right to a fair and impartial
tribunal.” Girot v. Keith, 212 Ill. 2d 372, 380 (2004) (reversing decision of electoral board which
refused to grant a motion to disqualify a member who was a material witness), citing Anderson v.
McHenry Township, 289 Ill. App. 3d 830, 832; Sindermann v. Civil Service Commission, 275 Ill.
App. 3d 917, 923 (1995); Collura v. Board of Police Commissioners, 113 Ill. 2d 361, 369
(1986).
¶ 25 Due process is of paramount importance in our judicial system, particularly when dealing
with public elections and the right to vote. However, parties can forfeit even constitutional
claims by failing to raise them promptly. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department. of
Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 396-97 (2002). We find that Polanco has forfeited this
contention by failing to raise it in a timely manner. In so holding, we are bound by our supreme
court, which has explained in the context of a ballot access case:
“It is quite established that if an argument, issue, or defense is not presented in an
administrative hearing, it is procedurally defaulted and may not be raised for the first
9 No. 1-22-0712
time before the circuit court on administrative review. The rule of procedural default in
judicial proceedings applies to administrative determinations, so as to preclude judicial
review of issues that were not raised in the administrative proceedings. The rule is based
on the demands of orderly procedure and the justice of holding a party to the results of
his or her conduct where to do otherwise would surprise the opponent and deprive the
opponent of an opportunity to contest an issue in the tribunal that is supposed to decide
it. Additionally, raising an issue for the first time in the circuit court on administrative
review is insufficient. The rule of procedural default specifically requires first raising an
issue before the administrative tribunal rendering a decision from which an appeal is
taken to the courts. Given that in administrative review cases the circuit courts act as the
first-tier courts of review, the reason and logic behind that requirement are clear.”
Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 212-
13 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
¶ 26 We find further support for forfeiture in the extensive procedure which the Cook County
Circuit Court has established to promptly resolve electoral board membership dispute. Cook
County Circuit Court General Order 21 specifically addresses the right of an election litigant to
seek relief regarding an elector’s board membership, and provides an avenue to resolve those
claims on an expedited basis before the Board even convenes. Cook County Cir. Ct. G.O. 21 (eff.
Feb. 1, 2005); Zurek v. Franklin Park Officers Electoral Board, 2014 IL App (1st) 142618,
¶¶ 77-81. (noting that the general order can be interpreted as providing an avenue to remove
electoral board members for reasons not specified in the Code, and that the circuit court adopted
it pursuant to section 10-9 of the Code). Polanco did not avail himself of this avenue of relief
10 No. 1-22-0712
before filing his objections, before the Board met, or at any time during the course of the Board’s
hearings.
¶ 27 The rule enunciated in Cinkus applies equally to issues involving constitutional due
process rights (Smith v. Department of Professional Regulation, 202 Ill. App. 3d 279, 287
(1990)), even though an administrative agency does not have the authority to declare a statute
unconstitutional or question its validity. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 214. Administrative review, or its
functional equivalent, judicial review of an electoral board’s decision, is confined to the evidence
offered before the Board. Id. By asserting a due process challenged on the record before the
administrative agency, a party avoids piecemeal litigation and fully allows opposing parties to
refute the constitutional challenge. Id. Since Polanco did not timely raise any argument regarding
the Board’s composition, the potential bias of certain Board members, or Board staff members,
he procedurally defaulted those contentions and they are forfeited. Id. at 212–13; see also Girot,
212 Ill. 2d at 377-78 (recognizing ability of electoral board to consider disqualification of one of
its members even though not disqualified under the statutory criterion of being a candidate for
the same office as provided by section 10-9 of the Code).
¶ 28 That brings us to the merits of the Board’s decision. On appeal from an order of the
circuit court affirming a decision of the Board, we review the Board’s decision, not the decision
of the circuit court. Burns v. Municipal Officers Electoral Board of Village of Elk Grove Village,
2020 IL 125714, ¶ 10. Our standards of review of the Board’s decision mirror those applicable to
review of an administrative agency decision. Cinkus, 228 Ill. 2d at 209-10 (2008). The Board
essentially dismissed the objections for failing to state a valid claim under section 10-8 of the
Code. To determine the applicable standard for our review, we analogize to the standards
applicable to dismissal of complaints under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735
11 No. 1-22-0712
ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)). It is well established that whether a complaint states a valid claim
presents a question of law. Douglas Theater Corp. v. Chicago Title & Tr. Co., 288 Ill. App. 3d
880, 883 (1997). Where, as here, the issue presented is one of law, our review is de novo. Id.
¶ 29 An electoral board is a creature of statute and its authority is derived from its enabling
legislation. Delay v. Board of Election Commissioners of City of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 3d 206,
209 (2000) (citing Kozel v. State Board of Elections, 126 Ill. 2d 58, 68 (1988)). Section 10-8 of
the Code states in pertinent part: “The objector’s petition shall give the objector’s name and
residence address, and shall state fully the nature of the objections to the certificate of
nomination or nomination papers or petitions in question, and shall state the interest of the
objector and shall state what relief is requested of the electoral board.” Pub. Act 102-15, § 5 (eff.
June 17, 2021) (amending 10 ILCS 5/10-8). The Code does not allow parties to file amendments
to their objections and does not authorize an electoral board to raise sua sponte objections to
nominating petitions. Delay, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 210 (citing Reyes v. Bloomingdale Township
Electoral Board, 265 Ill. App. 3d 69, 72 (1994)). Additionally, the Code does not specifically
address the degree of precision required to satisfy section 10-8. Siegel v. Lake County Officers
Electoral Board, 385 Ill. App. 3d 452, 457 (2008).
¶ 30 Polanco’s entire case revolves around an esoteric issue: whether the correct base year for
determining the signature requirement for candidates for township committeeperson is: (1) the
immediately preceding General Election, because all of the voters of the township would have
necessarily voted for some party candidate in that election; (2) the election for Township
Committeeperson held at the General Primary Election four years earlier, because the township
did not vote as a unit for any officer to serve that unit since then; or (3) the election for township
officers held at the Consolidated Election one year earlier, because candidates of that party ran
12 No. 1-22-0712
for township offices (such as township supervisor) in that year. The first method, Polanco argues,
is required by the holding in Ramirez, in which this court found that the correct base year for
computing the signature requirements for Chicago ward committeepersons was the previous
year’s general election even though no officers were elected at that election strictly to serve the
ward. Ramirez, 2020 IL App (1st) 200240, ¶¶ 24-33.
¶ 31 Since Polanco’s theory of the case was entirely based on such a nuanced analysis of the
election cycle and township voting history, we cannot say that Polanco’s bare-bone objection,
compressed into a single opaque sentence, provided anyone, whether the candidate, the Board, or
the public, with even the slightest scintilla of fair notice of the “nature” of his objections, much
less one which “fully” described them. See Pub. Act 102-15, § 5 (eff. June 17, 2021) (amending
10 ILCS 5/10-8) (requiring that the objector’s petition “shall state fully the nature of the
objections”). This is particularly true because the Cook County Clerk had published her own
non-binding computations, using the second and third above-described methodologies, upon
which many candidates undoubtedly relied. Polanco’s objections were the legal equivalent of
filing a tort lawsuit saying merely that “the defendant committed a tortious act upon me and thus
owes me damages,” without describing the nature, time, or place of the tortious act.
¶ 32 Again, we analogize to case law regarding pleading standards in common law
complaints. “Illinois is a fact-pleading jurisdiction.” Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521, ¶ 32.
Accordingly, while the plaintiff is not required to set forth evidence in the complaint, he “must
allege facts sufficient to bring a claim within a legally recognized cause of action, not simply
conclusions.” (Internal citations omitted.) Marshall v. Burger King Corporation, 222 Ill. 2d 422,
429-30 (2006). Here, Polanco pleaded the bare conclusion that Dominick failed to submit
enough valid signatures required under the Code. However, Polanco failed to explain why the
13 No. 1-22-0712
signatures fell under the required number, something which at least required factual allegations
regarding the allegedly correct computational base year, identification of which Democratic
candidate received the most votes in the township at that supposedly applicable base year
election, and a numerical comparison of the resulting minimum signature requirement to the
apparent number of signatures in the candidate’s nomination papers.
¶ 33 “We are mindful of the need to tread cautiously when construing statutory language
which restricts the people’s right to endorse and nominate the candidate of their choice.” Lucas
v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 176 (1997) (citing Tully v. Edgar, 171 Ill. 2d 297, 307 (1996)). In light
of the extremely expedited nature of ballot access challenges, the need to put the candidate on
fair notice at an early date is especially important, so that he can prepare a defense. We therefore
affirm the Board’s order dismissing the objections.
¶ 34 We express no opinion on whether the Cook County Clerk’s published signature
computation methodology for township committeeperson comports with the recent authority of
Ramirez. In light of the confusion regarding the correct requirement as shown both in the record
before us and also in cases such as Corbin v. Schroeder, 2021 IL 127052 (involving the
computation of signature requirements for village officers), we recommend that the General
Assembly clarify the signature requirements for this office.
¶ 35 CONCLUSION
¶ 36 The Board correctly dismissed Polanco’s objections. We affirm the judgment of the
circuit court, which affirmed the Board’s decision and dismissed count II of the complaint. The
mandate shall issue instanter.
¶ 37 Affirmed.