UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DANIEL L. POHLE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25-cv-808 (CRC) JOHN G. ROBERTS, in his official capacity as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, et al.,
Defendants.
v. Civil Action No. 25-cv-809 (CRC) JOHN G. ROBERTS, in his official capacity as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Daniel L. Pohle, proceeding pro se, filed complaints in these two cases
challenging Rule 28.8 of the Supreme Court Bar (“the Rule”), which prevents pro se litigants
from appearing for oral argument before the Supreme Court. The first action, 25-cv-808, is
against the Honorable John G. Roberts, in his official capacity as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and the Supreme Court of the United States Bar. Pohle titled that
complaint, “First Amendment Civil Action,” seemingly alleging that Supreme Court Rule 28.8
violates the First Amendment. The complaint seeks more than $1 billion in damages. The second action, 25-cv-809, is also brought against the Chief Justice Roberts, in his official
capacity, as well as the Honorable Ketanji Brown Jackson, in her official capacity as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Donald J. Trump, in his official
capacity as the President of the United States of America, (collectively, the “Federal
Defendants”), and the State of Indiana. Pohle’s complaint in 25-cv-809, labeled “PETITION for
Leave to Challenge the Constitutionality of the United States Rule 28.8 and the Legal Status of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” has no clearly identifiable claims.
Because neither complaint satisfies Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(1), or
12(b)(6), the Court will dismiss both cases without prejudice.
I. Background
Pohle filed the complaints in these two civil actions on the same day.
In 25-cv-808, he alleges a “Financial Collusion Scheme” between Chief Justice Roberts
and the Supreme Court Bar that “created a culture of aversion against Pro Se non lawyer
Petitioners in the SCOTUS.” Compl., 25-cv-808, at 1. Pohle claims that the “Chief Justice and
his wife had received about ten million dollars from SCOTUS Bar members for help with job
placement the Chief Justice created SCOTUS Rule 28.8 which silenced the Pro Se non-lawyer
petitioners thus creating more ‘Cash Flow’ for the SCOTUS Bar[.]” Id. He exclaims that this
scheme effectively said “to hell with the First Amendment.” Id. at 2. He appears to suggest that
a previous case of his, Pohle v. Pence, in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court, “reached conference” and “with Chief Justice Roberts recused” froze in its tracks. Id. In
the section of the complaint titled, “Redress,” he seeks more than $1 billion so that the
“judgement [is] a wake up call to all who dare to challenge the Constitutional Rights and
Intelligence of Non-Lawyers” as he believes that the “United States Supreme Court must be
2 made available to non-lawyers.” Id. at 3. Attached to the complaint as Exhibit A are a variety
of documents, including the text of the First Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, the docket for Pohle
v. Pence, and the petition for certiorari he filed.
In 25-cv-809, attached to the complaint—which contains no identifiable claims—as
“Exhibit A” is a packet of disjointed documents, including a letter from Pohle to several federal
agencies in which he claims to be “a spatial savant with an uncanny ability to recognize the
obvious” and requests a clearance upgrade for an FBI Special Agent to whom Pohle has “pushed
hundreds of pages of evidence”; documents from several “original action[s]” that Pohle
previously filed in the Supreme Court raising a litany of incomprehensible issues ranging from
Supreme Court Rule 28.8 to “Blood Diamonds,” whistleblowers, and international treaties; a
“challenge to President Trump and Governor [Indiana] Mike Braun to: Grow a set of cojones”;
and various mail tracking numbers and receipts for unknown items. See 25-cv-809, Ex. 1 at 3, 7,
9–13, 15, 17–20. In May 2025, Plaintiff requested an injunction ordering President Trump and
Indiana Governor Mike Braun to “Cease and Desist knowing and willfully violating the United
Nation Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods” and to grant him “one
billion and one US dollars in the form of a tax exempt restoration grant.” See Mot. for Inj., 25-
cv-809, at 1, 3.
Following a notice of related cases from the government, see ECF 8, 25-cv-808, these
cases were consolidated, and the later filed case was transferred by consent to the undersigned.
In both cases, the federal government moved to dismiss, and in 25-cv-809, the State of Indiana
separately moved to dismiss. Pohle opposes.
II. Legal Standards
A pro se “litigant’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Redwood v. 3 Council of the District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). But this standard does
not allow a pro se litigant “to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the [c]ourt to
decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not want to assert.” Id. A pro se plaintiff “must
present a claim on which the court can grant relief.” Chandler v. Roche, 215 F.Supp.2d 166, 168
(D.D.C. 2002). Accordingly, a plaintiff must assert a claim with “the requisite specificity, so as
to give defendants notice, plead the involvement of each defendant,” and clarify the claim and
the grounds on which it rests. Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239; see Bell Atl. Corp., v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
III. Analysis
Rule 12(b)(1) imposes on the court an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting
within the scope of its authority.” Bond v. DOJ, 828 F. Supp. 2d 60, 69 (D.D.C. 2011). If a
plaintiff fails to establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any claims in the
complaint, the court must dismiss the action. See Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 850 F. Supp. 2d 300, 303 (D.D.C. 2012). A patently
insubstantial complaint that fails to present a federal question suitable for decision may be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (citing Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). “[F]ederal courts are without
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DANIEL L. POHLE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25-cv-808 (CRC) JOHN G. ROBERTS, in his official capacity as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, et al.,
Defendants.
v. Civil Action No. 25-cv-809 (CRC) JOHN G. ROBERTS, in his official capacity as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Daniel L. Pohle, proceeding pro se, filed complaints in these two cases
challenging Rule 28.8 of the Supreme Court Bar (“the Rule”), which prevents pro se litigants
from appearing for oral argument before the Supreme Court. The first action, 25-cv-808, is
against the Honorable John G. Roberts, in his official capacity as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States, and the Supreme Court of the United States Bar. Pohle titled that
complaint, “First Amendment Civil Action,” seemingly alleging that Supreme Court Rule 28.8
violates the First Amendment. The complaint seeks more than $1 billion in damages. The second action, 25-cv-809, is also brought against the Chief Justice Roberts, in his official
capacity, as well as the Honorable Ketanji Brown Jackson, in her official capacity as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Donald J. Trump, in his official
capacity as the President of the United States of America, (collectively, the “Federal
Defendants”), and the State of Indiana. Pohle’s complaint in 25-cv-809, labeled “PETITION for
Leave to Challenge the Constitutionality of the United States Rule 28.8 and the Legal Status of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,” has no clearly identifiable claims.
Because neither complaint satisfies Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 12(b)(1), or
12(b)(6), the Court will dismiss both cases without prejudice.
I. Background
Pohle filed the complaints in these two civil actions on the same day.
In 25-cv-808, he alleges a “Financial Collusion Scheme” between Chief Justice Roberts
and the Supreme Court Bar that “created a culture of aversion against Pro Se non lawyer
Petitioners in the SCOTUS.” Compl., 25-cv-808, at 1. Pohle claims that the “Chief Justice and
his wife had received about ten million dollars from SCOTUS Bar members for help with job
placement the Chief Justice created SCOTUS Rule 28.8 which silenced the Pro Se non-lawyer
petitioners thus creating more ‘Cash Flow’ for the SCOTUS Bar[.]” Id. He exclaims that this
scheme effectively said “to hell with the First Amendment.” Id. at 2. He appears to suggest that
a previous case of his, Pohle v. Pence, in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court, “reached conference” and “with Chief Justice Roberts recused” froze in its tracks. Id. In
the section of the complaint titled, “Redress,” he seeks more than $1 billion so that the
“judgement [is] a wake up call to all who dare to challenge the Constitutional Rights and
Intelligence of Non-Lawyers” as he believes that the “United States Supreme Court must be
2 made available to non-lawyers.” Id. at 3. Attached to the complaint as Exhibit A are a variety
of documents, including the text of the First Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, the docket for Pohle
v. Pence, and the petition for certiorari he filed.
In 25-cv-809, attached to the complaint—which contains no identifiable claims—as
“Exhibit A” is a packet of disjointed documents, including a letter from Pohle to several federal
agencies in which he claims to be “a spatial savant with an uncanny ability to recognize the
obvious” and requests a clearance upgrade for an FBI Special Agent to whom Pohle has “pushed
hundreds of pages of evidence”; documents from several “original action[s]” that Pohle
previously filed in the Supreme Court raising a litany of incomprehensible issues ranging from
Supreme Court Rule 28.8 to “Blood Diamonds,” whistleblowers, and international treaties; a
“challenge to President Trump and Governor [Indiana] Mike Braun to: Grow a set of cojones”;
and various mail tracking numbers and receipts for unknown items. See 25-cv-809, Ex. 1 at 3, 7,
9–13, 15, 17–20. In May 2025, Plaintiff requested an injunction ordering President Trump and
Indiana Governor Mike Braun to “Cease and Desist knowing and willfully violating the United
Nation Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods” and to grant him “one
billion and one US dollars in the form of a tax exempt restoration grant.” See Mot. for Inj., 25-
cv-809, at 1, 3.
Following a notice of related cases from the government, see ECF 8, 25-cv-808, these
cases were consolidated, and the later filed case was transferred by consent to the undersigned.
In both cases, the federal government moved to dismiss, and in 25-cv-809, the State of Indiana
separately moved to dismiss. Pohle opposes.
II. Legal Standards
A pro se “litigant’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Redwood v. 3 Council of the District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). But this standard does
not allow a pro se litigant “to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the [c]ourt to
decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not want to assert.” Id. A pro se plaintiff “must
present a claim on which the court can grant relief.” Chandler v. Roche, 215 F.Supp.2d 166, 168
(D.D.C. 2002). Accordingly, a plaintiff must assert a claim with “the requisite specificity, so as
to give defendants notice, plead the involvement of each defendant,” and clarify the claim and
the grounds on which it rests. Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239; see Bell Atl. Corp., v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
III. Analysis
Rule 12(b)(1) imposes on the court an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting
within the scope of its authority.” Bond v. DOJ, 828 F. Supp. 2d 60, 69 (D.D.C. 2011). If a
plaintiff fails to establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over any claims in the
complaint, the court must dismiss the action. See Shuler v. United States, 531 F.3d 930, 932
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 850 F. Supp. 2d 300, 303 (D.D.C. 2012). A patently
insubstantial complaint that fails to present a federal question suitable for decision may be
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1009 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (citing Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). “[F]ederal courts are without
power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are so attenuated and
unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial, obviously frivolous,
plainly unsubstantial, or no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37
(1974) (internal citations omitted).
4 In 25-cv-809, Pohle fails to present a suitable federal question. Pohle seeks the
“resolution of EXHIBIT A[,] a U.S. Supreme Court ‘ORIGINAL ACTION,’” but the documents
contained in Exhibit A inconsistently cite a spattering of statutes, procedural rules, constitutional
provisions, and treaties, including Supreme Court Rule 28.8, the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and the First Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. See generally Ex. 1. Plaintiff’s claims are incomprehensible. It is unclear
under which sources of law Plaintiff seeks to proceed or against which Defendants any such
claims would lie. See, e.g., Akhan v. United States, No. 22-cv-3812 (TSC), 2023 WL 3750490,
at *3 (D.D.C. June 1, 2023) (“Plaintiff's complaint ‘present[s] no federal question suitable for
decision,’ as she broadly cites the Dawes Act of and 371 recorded treaties the United States
executed as support for her requested relief” (citation omitted)).
Further, in both actions, Pohle lacks standing to bring any claims he theoretically might
have related to Rule 28.8. A plaintiff must plead facts that demonstrate he has standing.
Accordingly, the complaint must show he has a “concrete, particularized and actual or
imminent” injury that is “fairly traceable to the challenged action” and is likely to be
“redressable by a favorable ruling.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). First,
Pohle lacks an injury that satisfies Article III. As the federal government notes, Rule 28.8
prevents a pro se party from arguing at the Supreme Court, and here, Pohle’s petition was denied
at the certiorari stage. See Mot. to Dismiss, 25-cv-808, at 7. Pohle therefore was not denied a
chance to argue his case because of the Rule. And even if he did have an injury, this Court
cannot redress his injury because it cannot order the Supreme Court (or those who administer its
bar) to take any given action. See, e.g., In re Marin, 956 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“We
5 are aware of no authority for the proposition that a lower court may compel the Clerk of the
Supreme Court to take any action”); Miller v. Harris, 599 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam) (unpublished disposition) (“The district court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction
to review decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”); In Re Lewis, No. 99-5015, 1999 WL
150347, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 1999) (per curiam) (“It is axiomatic that this court may not
review orders of the Supreme Court or direct the Court to take any action.”).
Finally, sovereign immunity bars Pohle’s claims in both actions. Insofar as Pohle in 25-
cv-808 seeks damages from the federal government, sovereign immunity forbids him from doing
so as the United States has not waived sovereign immunity. See United States v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (The federal government “may not be sued without its consent and . . . the
existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction”). And the Eleventh Amendment bars his
claim against Indiana, as Indiana has not consented to this suit. See Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72–
73 (2000)).
Because the court cannot glean a federal question suitable for decision in 25-cv-809,
because Pohle lacks standing to bring any claims he could have in either case, and because
sovereign immunity bars both suits, the complaints violate Rule 12(b)(1). See e.g., Wells v.
Trump, No. 25-cv-1589 (APM), 2025 WL 1488023, at *1 (D.D.C. May 23, 2025) (“It is entirely
unclear on what grounds this court may assert jurisdiction, nor is it clear what claim Plaintiff
brings against President Trump. In such circumstances, courts have not hesitated to dismiss the
complaint.”).
6 Pohle’s complaints also do not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a), as they
lack a short and plain statement that indicates he warrants relief, and dismissal is therefore
warranted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as well.
Rule 8(a), meanwhile, lays out the minimum standard for the sufficiency of complaints.
Rule 8(a) dictates that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). A plaintiff must assert
enough facts to give a defendant “fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the
[defendant] the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and
determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497,
498 (D.D.C. 1977). A district court “dismiss[es] a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) . . . where it
is patently obvious that the plaintiff cannot possibly prevail based on the facts alleged in the
complaint.” Jafari v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 277, 279 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Rollins v.
Wackenhut Servs. Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
Both of Pohle’s complaints are “rambling, disjointed, incoherent, [and] full of irrelevant
of confusing material” and therefore “patently fail” to satisfy Rule 8(a)’s standard. Jiggetts v.
District of Columbia, 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff'd sub nom., Cooper v. District of
Columbia, No. 17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017) (internal quotations
omitted). The complaints lack any coherent factual allegations and request a laundry list of relief
including more than $1 billion, see Compl. 25-cv-808, at 3, and “[1] The Removal of Supreme
Court Rule 28.8. [2] The Resignation of Chief Justice John G Roberts [sic] with apology. [3] The
Resignation of associate Justice Jackson with apology. [4] The Prosecution of Redmond Barnes.”
See 25-cv-809, Ex. 1 at 12. Plaintiff further claims national security expertise as a “spatial
savant” working with the FBI, alleges a conspiracy by the Supreme Court involving a clerk who
7 “thinks he is President Barak [sic] Obama’s public defender,” threatens a lawsuit that will result
in “the fall of a constitutional republic called The United States of America,” and states that he
provided mining equipment “to criminals seeking Blood Diamonds in failing nations.” See
Compl., 28-cv-809, Ex. 1 at 3, 11–14, 37. The asserted claims are “neither plainly nor concisely
stated” and cannot give the Defendants “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. And his various replies to the motions to
dismiss only accentuate this point. In both, he seems to include allegations concerning Pohle v.
Pence, the case he sought certiorari for, rather than anything concerning Rule 28.8. See ECF No.
22 at 1; ECF No. 27 at 1-2. In the second, his requested relief is an order to Solicitor General
Sauer to bring Pohle v. Pence before the Supreme Court. ECF No. 27 at 2. The Court is unable
to discern what these complaints claim, and thus, they do not satisfy Rule 8(a).
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, this court will grant the Motions to Dismiss without
prejudice. A separate Order shall accompany this memorandum opinion
CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER United States District Judge
Date: August 28, 2025