Podgorny v. Ally Finance

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedSeptember 23, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00288
StatusUnknown

This text of Podgorny v. Ally Finance (Podgorny v. Ally Finance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Podgorny v. Ally Finance, (D. Ariz. 2021).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Judy Podgorny, et al., No. CV-21-00288-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 Ally Finance,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Pending before the Court are two Motions. The first is pro se Plaintiffs’ Motion to 16 File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 13), which Defendant does not contest. (Doc. 14 at 1 17 n.1).1 Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ Motion (Doc. 13), and it will now consider 18 the filing to be Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 19 The second matter is Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration or, in the 20 Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14). Plaintiffs subsequently filed a document 21 captioned, in part, “Move for Summary of Judgment not to Compel Arbitration,” (Doc. 22 17), which the Court will construe as a Response. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 23 (2007) (noting that courts must liberally construe pro se filings). Defendant filed a Reply 24 (Doc. 18). 25 I. Background 26 The FAC’s four claims against Defendant Ally Finance allege violations of the Fair 27 Debt Collection Practices Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Racketeer Influenced and

28 1 Defendant notes that Plaintiffs’ Motion to File an Amended Complaint is really a First Amended Complaint that Plaintiffs may file as of right. See Fed. R. Civ. P 15(a)(1). 1 Corrupt Organizations Act, and bring a claim of gross negligence. (Doc. 13 at 12–17). 2 The FAC is largely verbose and difficult to understand, but the Court gathers Plaintiffs’ 3 dispute with Defendant is somehow related to a car loan. (Doc. 13 at 15) (“The Defendant 4 is demanding monthly payments and collecting fund through E-Payment for representing 5 they gave a loan(funds) to the Plaintiff which they never establish that they had lent any of 6 their asset to fund the vehicle.”). 7 II. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration or Dismiss 8 Defendant claims the loan is subject to an arbitration agreement and seek to compel 9 arbitration or, in the alternative, to dismiss this matter for failing to state a claim under 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 14). Attached to Defendant’s Motion is 11 a copy of a “Retail Installment Sale Contract” which names Judith Podgorny as the buyer 12 of a 2020 Chevrolet. (Doc. 14-1 at 2). This Contract contains an “Arbitration Provision” 13 that governs any “claim or dispute” which relates to the “credit application, purchase or 14 condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship . . . .” (Id. 15 at 4). The Court will first address the Motion to Compel Arbitration and then the Motion 16 to Dismiss. 17 a. Motion to Compel Arbitration 18 The Federal Arbitration Act validates and governs arbitration agreements. 9 U.S.C. 19 § 2. When a party seeks to compel arbitration, the court must first determine if a valid 20 arbitration agreement exists and, if so, whether the agreement covers the dispute at issue. 21 Lee v. Intelius Inc., 737 F.3d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 2013). If a valid agreement exists that 22 governs the dispute, the court must stay the proceedings until the contemplated arbitration 23 is complete. 9 U.S.C. § 3. 24 The Court is unable to determine whether the FAC’s claims are encompassed by the 25 arbitration agreement, because, as Defendant says, the FAC is “incomprehensible.” (Doc. 26 14). Although it seems likely, given some of the FAC’s language and Defendant’s 27 characterization of the FAC, that the arbitration agreement does cover the dispute, the 28 Court cannot say so definitively until it has a clearer understanding of Plaintiffs’ claims. 1 Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant’s request to compel arbitration without prejudice, 2 with leave to refile if and when Plaintiff files a complaint with sufficient factual allegations 3 to determine whether arbitration is necessary. 4 b. Motion to Dismiss 5 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim. 6 Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011). Complaints must make a short and 7 plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief for its claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 8(a)(2). This standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more 9 than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 10 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 11 There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 12 While courts do not generally require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff 13 must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” See 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 15 face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 16 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 17 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In addition, “[d]etermining whether a 18 complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires 19 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 20 Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim can be based on either the “lack 21 of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable 22 legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In 23 reviewing a motion to dismiss, “all factual allegations set forth in the complaint ‘are taken 24 as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.’” Lee v. City of L.A., 250 25 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 26 (9th Cir. 1996)). But courts are not required “to accept as true a legal conclusion couched 27 as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 28 265, 286 (1986)). 1 The Court finds that the FAC fails to make a short and plain statement of its claims 2 showing that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While the FAC 3 vaguely reference a vehicle loan, it says nothing more that allows the Court to infer that 4 Defendant is liable for illegal conduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. There is no mention of 5 when the car was purchased, under what conditions, and why the conditions of that 6 particular loan give rise to the specifically alleged claims, if they are indeed related at all. 7 In addition, there is no clear statement of what injury Plaintiffs incurred and how the 8 remedy they seek will redress it.

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Related

Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Cook v. Brewer
637 F.3d 1002 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Donovan Lee v. Intelius Inc
737 F.3d 1254 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Frederick Jackson v. Michael Barnes
749 F.3d 755 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Podgorny v. Ally Finance, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/podgorny-v-ally-finance-azd-2021.