NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3740-21
PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARREN PIEPER AND TRACY PEIPER, h/w, each of their heirs, devisees, and personal representatives and his, her, their or any of their successors in right, title and interest,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
Defendant. _______________________________
Submitted November 5, 2025 – Decided November 24, 2025
Before Judges Susswein and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. F-009048-19. Darren Pieper, self-represented appellant.
KML Law Group, PC, attorneys for respondents (J. Eric Kishbaugh, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This appeal arises from a residential mortgage foreclosure action.
Defendant Darren Pieper challenges two orders of the Chancery Division: (1) a
December 10, 2021 order denying his emergency motion to stay the sheriff's
sale, and (2) a March 1, 2022 order denying his motion to stay further sheriff 's
action and rescind the sale. We affirm both orders.
I.
In March 2017, defendant and his now ex-wife, Tracy Pieper, executed a
mortgage for $247,392 in favor of plaintiff, PNC Bank, covering their home in
Flemington ("property"). Defendant made his last monthly payment in
November 2018. In February 2019, plaintiff sent defendant notice of default
and intention to foreclose.
In May 2019, plaintiff commenced a mortgage foreclosure action. Service
of the complaint was sent to the property and received by defendant's foster son,
an adult co-inhabitant of the property.
Defendant claims to have sent plaintiff a change of address notice "in or
about October 2019," but the record does not contain such notice. However,
A-3740-21 2 plaintiff did begin sending certain correspondence, including mortgage
statements, to the property as well as defendant's new address, the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center ("ADTC") in Avenel.1
Defendant never answered the complaint. In November 2019, the
Chancery Division entered a final judgement by default for $251,081.46 with
interest and costs. Plaintiff served notice of sheriff's sale at the property, and
the sale was scheduled for January 22, 2020.
Defendant used his two statutory adjournments 2 and the sale was
rescheduled for March 2020. However, pursuant to Governor Murphy's
executive order instituting a moratorium on evictions and sheriff's sales during
the Covid-19 pandemic, the sale was stayed. See Exec. Order No. 106 (March
19, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 553(a) (April 6, 2020). After the moratorium was lifted,
the sale was scheduled for November 17, 2021. Notice of sale was sent to the
property and ADTC; however, plaintiff addressed correspondence sent to ADTC
1 Plaintiff was sentenced to the ADTC following a September 26, 2019 guilty plea. See generally State of New Jersey v. Darren R. Pieper, No. A-3113-21 (App. Div. March 4, 2024). 2 N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 permits two adjournments of a sheriff's sale, each for a maximum of thirty days, for both the lender and the homeowner. Homeowners can request adjournments without showing cause, but must submit a written request and pay a statutory fee. A-3740-21 3 to Tracy Pieper, not Darren Pieper. Thereafter, the sale date was adjourned to
December 15, 2021.
On December 1, 2021, defendant filed a self-represented emergent motion
to stay the sale, arguing lack of notice and an ongoing landlord-tenant dispute.
See generally Darren Pieper v. Zachary Colfer, No. A-2978-21 (App. Div. Feb.
14, 2024). The court denied the motion on December 10, 2021, finding
defendant failed to satisfy the requirements of Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126
(1982).
Plaintiff used one of its adjournments and the sale was moved to January
12, 2022. Notice was sent to defendant at the property and ADTC. On that date,
the property was sold at sheriff's sale to third party purchasers for $304,000.
Defendant then filed a February 3, 2022 emergent motion for replevin
which the court denied four days later. The sheriff's office deeded the property
to the purchasers, and the deed was duly recorded on February 13. Two weeks
later, plaintiff filed a motion to stay further action by the Sheriff and rescind the
sheriff sale, which was denied on March 1.
In May 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal, which we dismissed for
failure to prosecute. See PNC Bank, N.A. v. Darren Pieper, et. al., No. A-3740-
21 (App. Div. Aug. 16, 2022), certif. denied, 258 N.J. 37 (2024). In November
A-3740-21 4 2024, we vacated the dismissal and reinstated defendant's appeal. See PNC
Bank, N.A. v. Darren Pieper, et. al., No. M-0216-24 (App. Div. Nov. 9, 2024).
II.
Preliminarily, we note that defendant only appeals from the December 10,
2021 order denying his emergent motion to stay the sale and a March 1, 2022
order denying his motion to stay further action by the Sheriff and to rescind the
sheriff sale. "[I]t is only the judgments or orders or parts thereof designated in
the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal process and review."
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 6.1 on R. 2:5-1 (2025); see
also Campagna ex rel. Greco v. American Cyanamid Co., 337 N.J. Super. 530,
550 (App. Div. 2001) (refusing to consider an order not listed in the notice of
appeal).
Moreover, in his brief, defendant raises several arguments for our
consideration that have not been raised below. "Generally, an appellate court
will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised below."
State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012) (citing Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. E.
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 120 (1972)). Indeed, our jurisdiction is "[bound] by
the proofs and objections critically explored on the record before the trial court
by the parties themselves." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009). We decline
A-3740-21 5 to address those issues as there is no record on which to base our review.
Consequently, the only decisions subject to challenge are those the court made
when it denied defendant's motion to stay the sheriff's sale and when it declined
to stay further action by the Sheriff and rescind the sheriff's sale. We address
each argument in turn.
A.
We first consider defendant's arguments related to the denial of his motion
to stay the sheriff's sale. He contends he had no notice of the sale and was in
the process of evicting a hold-over tenant which, if successful, would have
permitted him to rent the property, create income, and pay off his debt. We are
not persuaded.
We review an order denying a request to stay a sheriff's sale for abuse of
discretion. Matter of City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super. 366, 387 (App. Div. 2021)
(citing Stoney v. Maple Shade Tp., 426 N.J. Super. 297, 307 (App. Div. 2012));
Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Morris Cnty. Mun. Utils. Auth., 433 N.J. Super.
445, 451 (App. Div. 2013). Ultimately, on appeal, we "consider[] the soundness
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3740-21
PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARREN PIEPER AND TRACY PEIPER, h/w, each of their heirs, devisees, and personal representatives and his, her, their or any of their successors in right, title and interest,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
Defendant. _______________________________
Submitted November 5, 2025 – Decided November 24, 2025
Before Judges Susswein and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Hunterdon County, Docket No. F-009048-19. Darren Pieper, self-represented appellant.
KML Law Group, PC, attorneys for respondents (J. Eric Kishbaugh, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This appeal arises from a residential mortgage foreclosure action.
Defendant Darren Pieper challenges two orders of the Chancery Division: (1) a
December 10, 2021 order denying his emergency motion to stay the sheriff's
sale, and (2) a March 1, 2022 order denying his motion to stay further sheriff 's
action and rescind the sale. We affirm both orders.
I.
In March 2017, defendant and his now ex-wife, Tracy Pieper, executed a
mortgage for $247,392 in favor of plaintiff, PNC Bank, covering their home in
Flemington ("property"). Defendant made his last monthly payment in
November 2018. In February 2019, plaintiff sent defendant notice of default
and intention to foreclose.
In May 2019, plaintiff commenced a mortgage foreclosure action. Service
of the complaint was sent to the property and received by defendant's foster son,
an adult co-inhabitant of the property.
Defendant claims to have sent plaintiff a change of address notice "in or
about October 2019," but the record does not contain such notice. However,
A-3740-21 2 plaintiff did begin sending certain correspondence, including mortgage
statements, to the property as well as defendant's new address, the Adult
Diagnostic and Treatment Center ("ADTC") in Avenel.1
Defendant never answered the complaint. In November 2019, the
Chancery Division entered a final judgement by default for $251,081.46 with
interest and costs. Plaintiff served notice of sheriff's sale at the property, and
the sale was scheduled for January 22, 2020.
Defendant used his two statutory adjournments 2 and the sale was
rescheduled for March 2020. However, pursuant to Governor Murphy's
executive order instituting a moratorium on evictions and sheriff's sales during
the Covid-19 pandemic, the sale was stayed. See Exec. Order No. 106 (March
19, 2020), 52 N.J.R. 553(a) (April 6, 2020). After the moratorium was lifted,
the sale was scheduled for November 17, 2021. Notice of sale was sent to the
property and ADTC; however, plaintiff addressed correspondence sent to ADTC
1 Plaintiff was sentenced to the ADTC following a September 26, 2019 guilty plea. See generally State of New Jersey v. Darren R. Pieper, No. A-3113-21 (App. Div. March 4, 2024). 2 N.J.S.A. 2A:17-36 permits two adjournments of a sheriff's sale, each for a maximum of thirty days, for both the lender and the homeowner. Homeowners can request adjournments without showing cause, but must submit a written request and pay a statutory fee. A-3740-21 3 to Tracy Pieper, not Darren Pieper. Thereafter, the sale date was adjourned to
December 15, 2021.
On December 1, 2021, defendant filed a self-represented emergent motion
to stay the sale, arguing lack of notice and an ongoing landlord-tenant dispute.
See generally Darren Pieper v. Zachary Colfer, No. A-2978-21 (App. Div. Feb.
14, 2024). The court denied the motion on December 10, 2021, finding
defendant failed to satisfy the requirements of Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126
(1982).
Plaintiff used one of its adjournments and the sale was moved to January
12, 2022. Notice was sent to defendant at the property and ADTC. On that date,
the property was sold at sheriff's sale to third party purchasers for $304,000.
Defendant then filed a February 3, 2022 emergent motion for replevin
which the court denied four days later. The sheriff's office deeded the property
to the purchasers, and the deed was duly recorded on February 13. Two weeks
later, plaintiff filed a motion to stay further action by the Sheriff and rescind the
sheriff sale, which was denied on March 1.
In May 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal, which we dismissed for
failure to prosecute. See PNC Bank, N.A. v. Darren Pieper, et. al., No. A-3740-
21 (App. Div. Aug. 16, 2022), certif. denied, 258 N.J. 37 (2024). In November
A-3740-21 4 2024, we vacated the dismissal and reinstated defendant's appeal. See PNC
Bank, N.A. v. Darren Pieper, et. al., No. M-0216-24 (App. Div. Nov. 9, 2024).
II.
Preliminarily, we note that defendant only appeals from the December 10,
2021 order denying his emergent motion to stay the sale and a March 1, 2022
order denying his motion to stay further action by the Sheriff and to rescind the
sheriff sale. "[I]t is only the judgments or orders or parts thereof designated in
the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal process and review."
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 6.1 on R. 2:5-1 (2025); see
also Campagna ex rel. Greco v. American Cyanamid Co., 337 N.J. Super. 530,
550 (App. Div. 2001) (refusing to consider an order not listed in the notice of
appeal).
Moreover, in his brief, defendant raises several arguments for our
consideration that have not been raised below. "Generally, an appellate court
will not consider issues, even constitutional ones, which were not raised below."
State v. Galicia, 210 N.J. 364, 383 (2012) (citing Deerfield Estates, Inc. v. E.
Brunswick, 60 N.J. 115, 120 (1972)). Indeed, our jurisdiction is "[bound] by
the proofs and objections critically explored on the record before the trial court
by the parties themselves." State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 19 (2009). We decline
A-3740-21 5 to address those issues as there is no record on which to base our review.
Consequently, the only decisions subject to challenge are those the court made
when it denied defendant's motion to stay the sheriff's sale and when it declined
to stay further action by the Sheriff and rescind the sheriff's sale. We address
each argument in turn.
A.
We first consider defendant's arguments related to the denial of his motion
to stay the sheriff's sale. He contends he had no notice of the sale and was in
the process of evicting a hold-over tenant which, if successful, would have
permitted him to rent the property, create income, and pay off his debt. We are
not persuaded.
We review an order denying a request to stay a sheriff's sale for abuse of
discretion. Matter of City of Newark, 469 N.J. Super. 366, 387 (App. Div. 2021)
(citing Stoney v. Maple Shade Tp., 426 N.J. Super. 297, 307 (App. Div. 2012));
Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc. v. Morris Cnty. Mun. Utils. Auth., 433 N.J. Super.
445, 451 (App. Div. 2013). Ultimately, on appeal, we "consider[] the soundness
of the trial court's ruling and the effect of a stay on the parties and the public."
Garden State Equality v. Dow, 216 N.J. 314, 320 (2013).
A-3740-21 6 An applicant seeking stay relief must demonstrate the following: denial
of the stay would result in irreparable harm; likelihood of prevailing on the
merits based on settled law; and a balancing of the equities favors stay relief.
See Ibid.; see also Crowe, 90 N.J. at 132-34. "[T]hese factors must be 'clearly
and convincingly' demonstrated." Waste Mgmt. of N.J., Inc., 433 N.J. Super. at
452 (citing McKenzie v. Corzine, 396 N.J. Super. 405, 414 (App. Div. 2007)).
On this record, defendant presented no competent evidence, let alone the
required clear and convincing evidence, to support his requested stay relief.
There was no irreparable harm as defendant would not be evicted on the date of
the sheriff's sale, and defendant was confined to ADTC, not residing at the
property. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 4:65-6, defendant still had the right to
object and redeem the property within ten days of the sale—denying defendant's
motion did not foreclose his right of redemption.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, Pieper was entitled to mail service
under Rule 4:65-2. Generally, non-compliance with the rule warrants setting
aside a sheriff's sale; however, such relief requires that "the party entitled thereto
has no knowledge of the pendency of the sale, seeks relief promptly upon
learning thereof, and no intervening equities in favor of innocent third parties
have been created in the interim." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
A-3740-21 7 Rules, cmt. following R. 4:65-2, at 1633 (2026); See also Assoulin v. Sugarman,
159 N.J. Super. 393, 398 (App. Div. 1978). Defendant failed to meet his burden
of establishing probability of success on the merits because he had actual notice
of the sale.
Defendant's knowledge of the foreclosure and the sale is shown by: (1)
proper service being made at the property; (2) defendant requesting and
obtaining his two statutory adjournments; (3) defendant's motions made before
the trial court seeking to stay the sale; (4) a second notice of sale being sent to
the property and ADTC, though improperly addressed; and (5) notice of
subsequent adjournments and notices of the sale being sent to ADTC and the
property. As plaintiff highlights, defendant is appealing the denial of an
emergent motion he filed to postpone the sale; thus, he had knowledge of the
sale prior to it being completed. Because defendant had actual knowledge of
the sale, he would not have prevailed on the merits.
Finally, the balance of hardships weighs against defendant. The mortgage
was over three years in default, plaintiff had been supporting the property, and
defendant had made no attempts to sell the property to satisfy his debt.
Moreover, defendant's assertion that he could have refinanced or modified the
A-3740-21 8 mortgage is mere speculation. Considering the property was sold to innocent
third party purchasers, the equities favor plaintiff.
B.
We next address defendant's arguments related to his February 28, 2022
motion to stay further action by the Sheriff and to rescind the sheriff 's sale.
Defendant contends the court erred by dismissing his motion on procedural and
substantive grounds. We disagree.
First, based on settled principles of law, we are satisfied defendant's
challenge to stay further action by the Sheriff was moot. "An issue is moot when
the decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on
the existing controversy." Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs., 382 N.J. Super.
254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
This is rooted in our court's longstanding position against rendering "advisory
opinions or function in the abstract." Jackson v. Dep't of Corrs., 335 N.J. Super.
227, 230-31 (App. Div. 2000). "It is firmly established that controversies which
have become moot or academic prior to judicial resolution ordinarily will be
dismissed." Cinque v. N.J. Dep't of Corrs., 261 N.J. Super. 242, 243 (App. Div.
1993). When defendant filed his motion, the deed had already been transferred
A-3740-21 9 and recorded—the sheriff's office was no longer involved. As such, the court
was correct in determining the issue was moot.
Next, defendant filed an improperly captioned motion to rescind the
sheriff's sale. The court dismissed this motion on procedural grounds for not
serving the plaintiff or the third parties who had purchased the property.
Defendant does not challenge that his service was improper but asserts that it
was satisfactory because he was not served on various occasions. That argument
is without merit.
Although defendant does not mention Rule 4:50-1, it is clear he intended
to argue to set aside the sale pursuant to that Rule. Where a party seeks to vacate
a final judgment or order, they must meet the standard of Rule 4:50-1:
On motion, with briefs, and upon such terms as are just, the [judge] may relieve a party or the party's legal representative from a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which would probably alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under R[ule] 4:49; (c) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or order should have prospective application; or (f) any other reason
A-3740-21 10 justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or order.
[Rule 4:50-1.]
Since he asserted a lack of notice, he insinuates that he was surprised.
A trial judge's determination on a motion to vacate a final judgment
"warrants substantial deference, and should not be reversed unless it results in a
clear abuse of discretion." US Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467
(2012). An abuse of discretion is a decision "made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis." Ibid. (quoting Iliadis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 191 N.J.
88, 123 (2007)).
Because we have already determined that defendant had actual notice of
every step in the foreclosure proceedings, we are satisfied with the court's
determination that there were no grounds to grant his application to rescind the
sheriff's sale. Additionally, defendant's assertion that he may have been able to
evict the tenant and have renters in the property to pay off his debt to plaintiff
was pure speculation and not the kind of evidence which would justify setting
aside the foreclosure.
A-3740-21 11 To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments we
conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-3740-21 12