Plintron Technologies USA LLC v. Phillips

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 16, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00093
StatusUnknown

This text of Plintron Technologies USA LLC v. Phillips (Plintron Technologies USA LLC v. Phillips) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Plintron Technologies USA LLC v. Phillips, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 PLINTRON TECHNOLOGIES USA LLC, CASE NO. 24-93 11 Plaintiff, ORDER OF CONTINUANCE 12 v. 13 JOSEPH PHILLIPS, RICHARD PELLY, THOMAS MATHEW, GREG MCKERVEY, 14 and DESIREE MICHELLE GRAY, 15 Defendants. 16

17 JOSEPH PHILLIPS, 18 Counterclaim Plaintiff, 19 v. 20 PLINTRON TECHNOLOGIES USA LLC,

21 Counterclaim Defendant. 22

23 24 1 This Matter comes before the Court on the Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Plintron 2 Technologies USA LLC’s Motion for Extension of Time to Extend Expert Report Deadline, 3 (Dkt. No. 64) and Defendants/Counterclaimant Joseph Phillips, Richard Pelly, Thomas Mathew, 4 Greg McKervey, Desiree Michelle Gray’s Motion to Continue Trial Date and Extend Pretrial

5 Deadlines, (Dkt. No. 65.) Having considered the Motions, the Responses (Dkt. Nos. 69, 71), 6 Defendant’s Reply (Dkt. No. 73), and all other supporting materials, the Court GRANTS both 7 Motions IN PART. 8 BACKGROUND 9 Plintron seeks a two-month extension of the deadline for expert witnesses to submit 10 reports. (Dkt. No. 64.) Under the existing case schedule, the expert report deadline is set for 11 December 16, 2024, but has since passed while Plaintiff’s motion was under consideration. (See 12 Order Setting Trial Date & Related Dates (Dkt. No. 62).) Plaintiff asserts that because “[f]act 13 discovery is set to close two months after the expert witness reports are due,” the two-month 14 extension is needed to “allow any expert witnesses to analyze and incorporate a more complete

15 evidentiary record into their reports.” (Dkt. No. 64 at 2.) 16 Concurrently, Defendants seek a five-to-six month continuance of both the July 14, 2025, 17 trial date, along with the related pretrial deadlines. (Dkt. No. 65.) Defendants identify two 18 primary reasons for the requested extension. First, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s 19 unwillingness or inability “to define its trade secrets with reasonable particularity,” requires an 20 extension of the trial date and related deadlines. (Id. at 11–14.) Specifically, Defendants argue 21 that Plaintiff’s failure to “identify with reasonable particularity the matter which it claims 22 constitutes a trade secret,” prohibits Defendants from “determine[ing] the relevancy of Plaintiff’s 23 requested discovery,” and thus “produc[ing] responsive documents in a timely fashion. (Id. at

24 1 11–12.) Defendants argue that despite their diligence in propounding discovery, even if Plaintiffs 2 were to provide fully responsive responses regarding trade secrets they would be “severely 3 handicapped if forced to comply with the current Scheduling Order,” because they would have 4 little time to “adequately explain Plaintiff’s trade secrets and convoluted theory of damages to a

5 jury.” (Id. at 12–13.) The Court notes that while this extension request was under review, 6 Defendants moved to compel Plaintiff’s fulsome responses to their discovery requests related to 7 the trade secrets at issue. (See Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery (Dkt. No. 90).) Second, 8 Defendants raise the complexity of the case and the volume of discovery needed as good cause to 9 continue the trial date. Defendants claim this case will require “substantial third-party discovery 10 and subpoenas issued by both sides,” which, along with “Plaintiff’s request for double the 11 normal number of depositions,” warrants extension. (Dkt. No. 65 at 10.) Relatedly, Defendants 12 “anticipate that they will also have to pursue discovery by international subpoenas,” which may 13 “require foreign service.” (Id. at 7–8.) 14 ANALYSIS

15 Rule 16 provides that a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with 16 the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); Local Rule 16(b)(6). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ 17 standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. 18 Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). “The district court may modify 19 the pretrial schedule ‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the 20 extension.’” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment)). “Mere 21 failure to complete discovery within the time allowed does not constitute good cause for an 22 extension or continuance.” Local Rule 16(b)(6). “If [the] party [seeking the extension] was not 23 diligent, the inquiry should end.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

24 1 The Court here finds good cause to continue the trial date and interim case deadlines. 2 While the Court typically does not recognize failure to complete discovery within the time 3 allowed as good cause to alter the case schedule, it finds that extension of the trial and case 4 deadlines is warranted here due to the complexity of the case and growing volume of necessary

5 discovery. In their briefs, both Parties admit that discovery in this case presents a significant 6 challenge that justifies the extension of at least some of the deadlines. (See Dkt. 71 at 4 7 (“Plaintiff acknowledges that significant discovery remains for both parties, particularly third- 8 party discovery”).) Further, the Court notes that recent activity in this case suggest that the 9 matter may be more complex than the Parties initially believed. (See, e.g., Def.’s Motion for 10 Leave to Amend Answer and Counterclaims (Dkt. No. 81).) The Court is also unconvinced that 11 Plaintiffs will suffer any prejudice from the requested extension. Plaintiff’s ability to “establish 12 finality to the action and the uncertainty” with its customers will not be significantly impaired by 13 an extension allowing for fulsome investigation and advocacy of the issues. (Dkt. No. 71 at 5.) 14 Nor does the Court agree that a December 2025 trial date would be somehow “impractical” due

15 to Plaintiff’s counsel’s anticipated “requisite post-trial motions” in a trial set to end the month 16 before. (Id.) 17 As an aside, the Court turns to the Parties’ discussion regarding the number of 18 depositions permitted by each party. Specifically, the Parties refer to an agreement between 19 themselves that each side be permitted 20 depositions as opposed to the 10 depositions permitted 20 under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i). (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 65 at 4.) Parties cannot agree amongst 21 themselves to circumvent the requirements laid out by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 22 Should either party seek to conduct more than ten depositions, they must first seek leave of court, 23 and must make a particularized showing of need for each deposition beyond the initial ten. See

24 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2)(A); see also Thykkuttathil v. Keese, 294 F.R.D. 601, 602 (W.D. Wash. 2 2013). 3 The Court finds good cause to continue the trial date and interim case deadlines, as 4 requested by Defendants. This continuance necessarily includes continuing the expert witness

5 deadline, as requested by Plaintiff.

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Thykkuttathil v. Keese
294 F.R.D. 601 (W.D. Washington, 2013)

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Plintron Technologies USA LLC v. Phillips, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/plintron-technologies-usa-llc-v-phillips-wawd-2025.