Plaza-Uzeta v. Taylor

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 6, 2026
• Docket: 24-6902
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 6 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RUBEN PLAZA-UZETA, AKA Ruben No. 24-6902 Franco-Plaza, D.C. No. 1:23-cv-01773-HBK Petitioner - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

TAYLOR, FCI Mendota Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Helena M. Barch-Kuchta, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 30, 2026**

Before: N.R. SMITH, BUMATAY, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Ruben Plaza-Uzeta appeals pro se from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241

habeas corpus petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). We

review the denial of the habeas petition de novo. Schleining v. Thomas, 642 F.3d

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.

In 2007, Plaza-Uzeta was sentenced to a life sentence, commencing on

March 6, 2007. We affirmed the sentence. During his time in prison, in 2010,

2015, and 2021, Plaza-Uzeta was found guilty of possession of a dangerous

weapon.1 A disciplinary hearing officer (“DHO”) sanctioned Plaza-Uzeta for the

2010 and 2021 violations, which reduced his potential good conduct time credits

(“GCT”) by 81 days.

In 2022, Plaza-Uzeta was resentenced from life imprisonment to 360 months

with credit for time served. Thereafter, the Bureau of Prison (BOP) conducted an

audit of Plaza-Uzeta’s sentence. Because the district court amended its original

judgment, the BOP commenced Plaza-Uzeta’s amended sentence on March 6,

2007, the commencement date of the original sentencing. That BOP decision is

consistent with the BOP’s internal Sentence Computation Manual, Program

Statement 5880.28. See Sentence Computation Manual, 48 (July 20, 1999)

http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5880_028.pdf (“If an SRA term is vacated

solely for the purposes of a resentencing, then the date the sentence begins will be

the same as the original computation.”). The BOP also provided Plaza-Uzeta

credit for all the time previously spent in custody and GCT for each year he served

from 2007 through 2022, minus the 81 days for the 2010 and 2021 sanctions.

1 Plaza-Uzeta does not dispute that he was found guilty of these charges.

2 24-6902 1. To receive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a petitioner in federal

custody must show that his sentence is being executed in an illegal, but not

necessarily unconstitutional, manner. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d

861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaza-Uzeta argues that the BOP improperly calculated

his GCT, because the DHO lacked authority to impose a sanction of loss of GCT

when he was serving a life sentence. Plaza-Uzeta argues that because prisoners

sentenced to life are statutorily ineligible to earn GCT, they cannot be sanctioned

with a loss of GCT. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). Plaza-Uzeta’s arguments lack

merit.

First, Plaza-Uzeta cannot prevail on a habeas claim challenging the DHO’s

authority to issue sanctions pursuant to BOP’s program statement.2 A “habeas

claim cannot be sustained based solely upon the BOP’s purported violation of its

own program statement because noncompliance with a BOP program statement is

not a violation of federal law.” Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.

2011).

Second, the BOP appropriately recalculated Plaza-Uzeta’s release date after

his sentence was reduced as if the new sentence had commenced on the same date

as the original sentence. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585, the Attorney General, through

2 Plaza-Uzeta does not argue the BOP Program Statement 5270.09, Inmate Discipline Program, codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 541.1–541.8, was in violation of any federal law.

3 24-6902 the BOP, is responsible for computing federal sentences. United States v. Wilson,

503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992). In making this calculation, the Agency determines

when the prisoner’s sentence commences and whether any credits should be

applied to that sentence. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3585(a) and 3624(b).

After determining that Plaza-Uzeta’s amended sentence began to run on the

date of original sentencing, the BOP applied 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), which

outlines a prisoner’s ability to earn credit toward the service of his sentence for

satisfactory behavior. Applying § 3624(b)(1), the BOP awarded Plaza-Uzeta GCT

credits for each year he spent in prison since 2007, totaling 837 days. The BOP

then disallowed 81 days of GCT because of the disciplinary sanctions imposed.

That is a straightforward, fair, and logical application of § 3624(b)(1), squaring

with the Program Statement. A finding that the BOP could credit GCT earned

during a former life sentence but not reduce Plaza-Uzeta’s GCT based on his

failure to comply with BOP disciplinary regulations (simply because he was then

serving a life sentence) would fail to reflect “the most natural reading of the

statutory language and the most consistent with its purpose.” Barber v. Thomas,

560 U.S. 474, 492 (2010). Plaza-Uzeta has not identified, and we are not aware of

any precedent, statutes, or regulations that would suggest that the BOP acted

improperly here.

2. To the extent that Plaza-Uzeta argues that the BOP’s calculation of his

4 24-6902 release date violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, we will not hear

an issue raised for the first time on appeal, although we have the power to do so.

Bolker v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985).

Given that (a) Plaza-Uzeta’s due process claim refashions the same arguments

made in his claim that DHO lacked the authority to disallow GCT, and (b) our

determination that the BOP properly calculated Plaza-Uzeta’s sentence, we do not

perceive an exceptional situation warranting review. See id.; United States v.

Greger, 716 F.2d 1275, 1277 (9th Cir. 1983).

AFFIRMED.

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