Placida Velasco, an individual and on behalf of all others similarly situated v. Hyatt Corporation, a Delaware stock corporation doing business as Hyatt Regency Mission Bay; Katherine Jaime, an individual; and Does 1 through 100, inclusive

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PLACIDA VELASCO, an individual and Case No.: 25-cv-2782-TWR (MSB) on behalf of all others similarly situated, 12 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO REMAND ACTION TO v. STATE COURT 14

HYATT CORPORATION, a Delaware 15 (ECF No. 8) stock corporation doing business as Hyatt 16 Regency Mission Bay; KATHERINE JAIME, an individual; and DOES 1 17 through 100, inclusive, 18 Defendant. 19 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Placida Velasco’s Motion to Remand (“Mot.,” 20 ECF No. 8), as well as Defendant Hyatt Corporation’s Opposition (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 10), 21 and Plaintiff’s Reply (“Reply,” ECF No. 12) in Support of the Motion. The Court heard 22 oral argument on the Motion on March 12, 2026. (See ECF No. 14.) After considering the 23 Parties’ arguments, the Notice of Removal, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS 24 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 1 BACKGROUND 2 I. Factual Background 3 Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendants for violations of the 4 California Labor Code on August 18, 2025, in San Diego County Superior Court. (See 5 generally ECF No. 1-2 Exh. A (“Compl.”).) Plaintiff alleges the following violations: 6 (1) failure to pay overtime wages (id. ¶ 14), (2) failure to pay minimum wages (id. ¶ 15), 7 (3) failure to provide uninterrupted meal periods (id. ¶ 16), (4) failure to authorize and 8 permit rest breaks (id. ¶ 17), (5) failure to pay the full amount of wages upon termination 9 or resignation (id. ¶ 18), (6) failure to provide itemized wage statements (id. ¶ 19), 10 (7) failure to pay wages in a timely fashion (id. ¶ 20), and (8) failure to indemnify class 11 members for the costs in laundering mandatory work uniforms and using cell phones for 12 work purposes (id. ¶ 21). Plaintiff also alleges “Defendants have had a consistent policy 13 of failing to provide” class members with compensation at their final rate of pay for unused 14 vested paid vacation days and failing to provide class members with the rights provided to 15 them under the Healthy Workplace Healthy Families Act of 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) Further, 16 when alleging typicality, Plaintiff states Defendants had a “common course of conduct in 17 violation of laws and regulations.” (Id. ¶ 32.) 18 On October 17, 2025, Defendant Hyatt Corporation (“Defendant”) removed this 19 action to this Court. (See id.) Defendant’s Notice of Removal states, “[d]uring the relevant 20 time period identified in the Complaint, Hyatt employed approximately 565 non-exempt 21 hourly employees at the Hyatt Regency Mission Bay who worked a total of approximately 22 45,625 workweeks.” (ECF No. 1 (“NOR”) at 11 (citing ECF No. 1-4 (“Strittmatter Decl.”) 23 ¶ 5).) Further, Defendant states “[t]he average hourly rate of pay for these individuals is 24 approximately $22.04 per hour during the proposed class period.” (Id.) On December 23, 25 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand this action to state court. (See ECF No. 26 8.) In Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, which challenges Defendant’s amount 27 in controversy (“AIC”) calculations, Defendant submitted a Declaration of Julian 28 Pankhurst, a “Manager – Workforce Management Solutions for Enterprise Applications.” 1 (ECF No. 10-1 (“Pankhurst Decl.”) ¶ 2.) He states that the “565 current and former non- 2 exempt employees . . . worked 7.3 hours per day and 4.25 days per week” in the relevant 3 period. (Id. ¶ 6.) Further, the 245 former non-exempt employees that were terminated 4 during the relevant period “worked an average shift of 6.63 hours per day.” (Id. ¶ 7.) 5 II. Whether Plaintiff Makes a Facial or Factual Attack 6 A plaintiff can contest the amount in controversy by making either a “facial” or 7 “factual” attack on the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations. See Harris v. KM Indus., 8 Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Salter v. Quality Carriers, 974 F.3d 959, 9 964 (9th Cir. 2020)). A facial attack asserts that the defendant’s assumptions are 10 insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. See id. “A factual attack, however, 11 need only challenge the truth of the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations by making a 12 reasoned argument as to why any assumptions on which they are based are not supported 13 by evidence.” Id. at 700. When a plaintiff makes a facial attack, a defendant does not need 14 to support its jurisdictional allegations with competent proof, under the same evidentiary 15 standard that governs in the summary judgment context. See id. (citing Salter, 974 F.3d at 16 964). In contrast, when a plaintiff makes a factual attack, the defendant must support their 17 jurisdictional allegations with competent proof “under the same evidentiary standard that 18 governs in the summary judgment context.” Salter, 974 F.3d at 964 (citation omitted). 19 Here, Plaintiff’s Motion indicates she is making a facial attack and Plaintiff’s 20 counsel confirmed at the hearing that he believes the Motion to Remand brings a facial 21 attack. (See Mot. at 11; ECF No. 14.) In reality, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand brings a 22 factual attack on Defendant’s Notice of Removal. A facial attack challenges “the form, 23 not the substance” of the defendant’s removal allegations. See Harris, 980 F.3d at 700. 24 Here, Plaintiff does not contest the “form” of Defendant’s Notice of Removal; rather, she 25 attacks Defendant’s violation rate assumptions and argues they are not based on the 26 language in the Complaint, which is the factual evidence in the record. That is a factual 27 attack. See Williams v. VibrantCare Rehab., Inc., No. 22-16424, 2022 WL 17592428, at 28 *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 13, 2022) (finding the plaintiff “clearly made a factual attack” when she 1 attacked the “factual evidence in the record addressing the number and types of 2 violations”). As one example, Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s meal and rest break 3 assumptions because they assume “the average California class member worked five 4 qualifying shifts per week— something not alleged in the complaint.” (Mot. at 9.) This 5 illustrates that Plaintiff is making a factual attack. See Harris, 980 F.3d at 699 (finding 6 that the plaintiff mounted a factual attack when they contested the defendant’s failure to 7 demonstrate that all members of the class worked shifts long enough to qualify for meal 8 and rest periods). Thus, Defendant must support its jurisdictional allegations with 9 competent proof “under the same evidentiary standard that governs in the summary 10 judgment context.” Salter, 974 F.3d at 964 (citation omitted). 11 LEGAL STANDARD 12 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 13 1711–1715, “gives federal courts jurisdiction over certain class actions, defined in 14 § 1332(d)(1), if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, 15 and the amount-in-controversy exceeds $5 million.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. 16 v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 84–85 (2014). CAFA not only confers original jurisdiction on 17 federal courts but also authorizes the removal of certain class actions to federal courts. See 18 28 U.S.C. § 1453. Generally, courts “strictly construe [] removal statute[s] against removal 19 jurisdiction,” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992); however, “no 20 antiremoval presumption attends cases invoking CAFA,” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 89. 21 Unlike other removal statutes, “Congress intended CAFA to be interpreted expansively.” 22 Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). 23 “To remove a case from a state court to a federal court, a defendant must file in the 24 federal forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds 25 for removal.’” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at 83 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)). Under 26 CAFA, “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the 27 amount-in-controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Id. at 89. A plaintiff may 28 then challenge a defendant’s notice of removal through a motion to remand. See Moore- 1 Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1447(c)). 3 If a plaintiff’s motion to remand challenges the amount-in-controversy estimate in 4 the defendant’s notice of removal, “then the party seeking removal—and invoking the 5 jurisdiction of the federal courts—bears the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance 6 of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.” Perez v. Rose Hills 7 Co., 131 F.4th 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199). “The district 8 court’s task is simply to determine if the defendant’s ‘reasoning and underlying 9 assumptions are reasonable.’” Id. (citing Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 28 10 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022)). Because the court evaluates a challenged amount-in- 11 controversy estimate under the preponderance of the evidence standard, the defendant need 12 only establish “that the potential damage could exceed the jurisdictional amount.” Rea v. 13 Michaels Stores Inc., 742 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (quoting Lewis 14 v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 397 (9th Cir. 2010)). Still, “if the evidence 15 submitted by both sides is balanced, in equipoise, the scales tip against federal-court 16 jurisdiction.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199. In sum, the defendant has the burden of 17 establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount-in-controversy could 18 exceed five million dollars; if the defendant fails to do so, the federal court lacks subject 19 matter jurisdiction, and the case must be remanded. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 20 Importantly, the defendant’s evidentiary burden “does not always require the 21 defendant to produce evidence supporting every element of its amount-in-controversy 22 estimate.” Thornhill v. McLane Foodservice, Inc., No. 25-CV-07475-EKL, 2026 WL 23 125197, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026). In determining reasonableness in a wage-and- 24 hour case, it “may make sense to expect a defendant to introduce evidence” of “the number 25 of employees in the class.” Perez, 131 F.4th at 808. However, “it makes little sense to 26 require a CAFA defendant to introduce evidence of the violation rate” they believe is zero; 27 accordingly, “a defendant can readily ascertain the violation rate by looking at the 28 plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. Therefore, a defendant only needs to submit evidence 1 supporting an alleged violation rate if the alleged violation rate “cannot be justified by the 2 allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 809. Further, a defendant’s “assumption is not 3 unreasonable simply because another equally valid assumption may exist.” Id. But 4 assumptions must have “some reasonable ground underlying them” and cannot be based 5 on “mere speculation and conjecture.” Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1199; see also Jauregui, 28 6 F.4th at 992. 7 ANALYSIS 8 I. Plaintiff’s Arguments 9 Plaintiff argues “not only are Defendant’s assumptions unreasonable under the 10 governing case law, but the Southern District has already determined that these exact same 11 assumptions are unreasonable when asserted by this Defendant [i]n Benitez v. Hyatt Corp., 12 722 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (S.D. Cal. 2024).” (Mot. at 8 (emphasis in original).) In Benitez, the 13 court found Defendant’s assumptions were unreasonable when “Defendant assumed that 14 (1) the average California class member worked five qualifying shifts per week and (2) 15 missed two meal periods and two rest periods each week” when the plaintiff has alleged 16 Defendant “from time to time failed to provide meal and rest periods.” (Id. (internal 17 quotations omitted and citing Benitez, 722 F. Supp. 3d 1094 at 1100–01).) Plaintiff argues 18 Defendant’s assumptions in Benitez were “almost identical to those asserted by Defendant 19 here . . . except that here Defendant assumes a 100% violation rate and then applies its so- 20 called conservative estimates.” (Id.) 21 II. Defendant’s Arguments 22 Defendant argues that its violation-rate assumptions—two meal- and two rest-period 23 premiums and one-half hour of unpaid work per week, coupled with derivative 24 wage-statement and waiting-time penalties—“are modest, tethered to Plaintiff’s 25 allegations of a common course of unlawful conduct affecting the entire class, and 26 supported by ‘real evidence’ of class size, workweeks, and pay rates of the type discussed 27 in recent case law.” (Opp’n at 1.) Defendant also submitted a declaration providing shift 28 length data in response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. (See Pankhurst Decl. ¶¶ 6–7.) 1 III. The Reasonableness of Defendant’s Assumptions 2 A. 100% Violation Rate for Employees 3 Defendant assumes a 100% violation rate for the number of employees who suffered 4 violations when calculating the amount in controversy. (See NOR at 9.) Plaintiff argues 5 Defendant’s 100% violation rate assumption is unreasonable because “the complaint’s 6 language expressly restricts the violation rates, stating that Defendant ‘at times’ failed to 7 provide meal and rest periods to ‘Plaintiff and Class Members, or some of them’ and does 8 so for each stated cause of action.” (Mot. at 13 (emphasis in original) (quoting Compl. 9 ¶¶ 16–19).) 10 Plaintiff’s vague allegations preclude her current argument. See Rodriguez v. Gen. 11 Dynamics Info. Tech., Inc., No. 25-CV-00626-BAS-DEB, 2025 WL 3078706, at *6 (S.D. 12 Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (“[I]t is Plaintiff who chose to plead his allegations with a net instead 13 of a spear. By doing so, Plaintiff left the Complaint subject to the reasonable inference that 14 all class members could recover for the alleged violations.”). Problematically, Plaintiff 15 does not allege only some of the class members suffered the violations; instead, she alleges 16 all of them “or some of them” suffered the violations. (Compl. ¶¶ 16–19 (emphasis 17 added).) These allegations, “when viewed in context with the class allegations, support the 18 inference that all class members could potentially recover for these violations.” Rodriguez, 19 2025 WL 3078706 at *6; see also Perez v. Rose Hills Co., No. 2:24-CV-04827-JLS-PVC, 20 2025 WL 2631603, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2025) (“Rather than narrowing the range of 21 reasonable interpretations, ‘or’ preserves the possibility that the violations were suffered 22 by all class members.”). Accordingly, at large, Defendant’s assumption of 100% of 23 employees being impacted is reasonable. 24 B. Meal and Rest Breaks 25 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that “at times” Plaintiff and Class Members were not 26 provided complete meal periods for every five hours of work and “at times” were not 27 authorized or permitted to take complete rest periods for every four hours of work. (Compl. 28 ¶¶ 53, 61.) Defendant’s Notice of Removal states that Plaintiff “alleged a practice of meal 1 period violations” making it “reasonable to assume that there at least two meal period 2 violations each week for every employee.” (NOR ¶ 39 (emphasis in original).) Similarly, 3 Defendant states “Plaintiff has alleged a common practice of rest period violations . . . 4 making it “reasonable to assume that there at least two rest period violations each week for 5 every employee.” (Id. ¶ 45 (emphasis in original).) 6 1. Evidence of Qualifying Shifts 7 Plaintiff argues Defendant’s assumption of two missed meal and rest periods a week 8 “implies that the average California class member worked five qualifying shifts per week— 9 something not alleged in the complaint.” (Mot. at 9.) Because “shift length is essential to 10 evaluating whether estimates for meal and rest break amounts in controversy are 11 reasonable, it makes sense to expect the defendant to introduce evidence of that number.” 12 Lopez v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2025) 13 (citing Perez, 131 F.4th at 807) (cleaned up). In Opposition, Defendant submitted evidence 14 that the “565 current and former non-exempt employees . . . worked 7.3 hours per day and 15 4.25 days per week” in the relevant period.1 (Pankhurst Decl. ¶ 6.) 16 2. Two Meal Periods and Two Rest Breaks Per Week 17 Defendant relies on the Complaint’s “common course of conduct” allegation to 18 justify its assumption of two meal period violations and two rest break violations per week. 19 (See Opp’n at 9–11.) Plaintiff argues Defendant’s twice-a-week assumptions are “directly 20 contrary to Perez, where ‘at times’ language supported only one missed meal break and 21 one missed rest break per week as reasonable.” (Mot. at 13; see also id. at 11 (stating 22 “[m]ore restrictive phrasing, such as ‘at times,’ supports only minimal assumptions—e.g., 23 one missed rest period and one missed meal period per week.”). Plaintiff’s reading of 24 Perez is incorrect. The Ninth Circuit in Perez did not find the allegation that violations 25 26 1 Because Defendant has submitted shift length data, the analysis in Benitez is no longer applicable. 27 See Benitez v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (granting the plaintiff’s motion to remand when the defendant “offered no evidence regarding the average shift length worked by 28 1 occurred “at times” only supported assumptions of one missed meal break and one missed 2 rest break per week. The Ninth Circuit explained that a complaint’s language may provide 3 multiple equally valid assumptions and one “assumption is not unreasonable simply 4 because another equally valid assumption may exist.” Perez, 131 F.4th at 809. 5 Accordingly, the inclusion of “at times” language does not result in a strict upper limit of 6 once-a-week violation assumptions. 7 But that does not mean that all levels of violation assumptions will reasonably reflect 8 “at times” language in conjunction with common class allegations. The phrase “at times” 9 means “at intervals” or “occasionally.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 10 https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/at%20times (last visited Feb. 24, 2026); see 11 also Thornhill v. McLane Foodservice, Inc., No. 25-CV-07475-EKL, 2026 WL 125197, at 12 *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026) (“Alleging that a violation occurred ‘at times’ . . . suggests 13 that the conduct occurred with some regularity and frequency, but not always or even more- 14 often-than-not.”). Therefore, courts have found that a violation rate of 20% is reasonable 15 when the complaint uses “at times” language. See, e.g., Perez, 2025 WL 2631603 at *5 16 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2025) (finding that assumptions of one meal period violation and one 17 rest break violation per class member per week were reasonable). But Defendant alleges 18 two missed meal periods and two missed rest periods a week for a group of 565 employees 19 who worked 4.25 days a week with an average shift length of 7.3 hours a day. This 20 represents an assumed 47% violation rate. The Court harbors doubt that a 47% violation 21 rate reasonably reflects the phrase “at times.” 22 However, the Court does not need to decide whether the twice-a-week assumption 23 is unreasonable because Defendant also provides a more reasonable assumption of once-a- 24 -week violations. (See Opp’n at 22.) Violations occurring once-a-week—a 23.5% 25 violation rate here—reasonably reflects conduct occurring occasionally or with some 26 regularity and frequency, but not always or even more-often-than-not. See Reed v. 27 Benjamin Moore & Co., No. 1:25-CV-00214-SAB, 2025 WL 1419751, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 28 May 16, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-CV-00214-KES-SAB, 1 2025 WL 1601097 (E.D. Cal. June 6, 2025) (choosing to find a 20% violation rate 2 appropriate instead of the defendant’s suggested 50% violation rate when the complaint 3 contained “policy and practice” allegations and limiting language); Jauregui, 28 F.4th at 4 996 (“[T]he district court should consider the claim under the better assumption[.]”). 5 Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the proper assumption is 0.85 violations per week, since 6 the average employee worked 4.25 days per week. (See Reply at 5.) The Court finds that 7 both a 23.5% violation rate and a 20% violation rate are reasonable based on the language 8 in the Complaint; therefore, because Defendant only needs to show that potential recovery 9 could exceed $5 million, the Court accepts Defendant’s reasonable assumption and adds 10 $2,011,150 to the amount in controversy. 11 C. Minimum Wage 12 The Complaint alleges that “at times” Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Class 13 Members minimum wage by requiring them to work off the clock including to “don and 14 doff uniforms and/or safety equipment.” (Compl. ¶ 46.) Defendant’s Notice of Removal 15 assumed “6 minutes of unpaid time per day (or 30 minutes of unpaid time per week) for 16 alleged off-the-clock activities.” (NOR ¶ 50.) Now, in Opposition, Defendant assumes 17 “7.06 minutes per day for alleged unpaid [w]ages, including donning and doffing uniforms, 18 and other off-the-clock work, for each of the 4.25 days that class members work on average 19 per workweek.” (Opp’n at 12.) Plaintiff challenges this violation rate based on the 20 Complaint’s “restrictive” language. (Mot. at 9.) Further, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s 21 Opposition increased its calculation based on its new shift length data when it should have 22 been decreased because the average employee only worked 4.25 days per week. (See Reply 23 at 6.) 24 The Complaint’s “at times” limiting language does not make the 30 minutes of 25 unpaid time per week assumption unreasonable. Courts routinely assess minimum wage 26 allegations on a weekly basis, not a shift basis. See, e.g., Cocroft v. EquipmentShare.com 27 Inc., No. 24-CV-00645-BAS-AHG, 2024 WL 3877274, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2024). 28 Further, courts have found other similar assumptions of 30 minutes or one hour a week to 1 be reasonable. See Soto v. Graybar Elec. Co., Inc., No. 1:24-CV-00520-JLT-SKO, 2025 2 WL 3648360, at *4, *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025) (finding an assumption of one hour of 3 minimum wage per every five shifts was reasonable when the complaint used “at times” 4 language); see also Cabrera v. S. Valley Almond Co., LLC, No. 121CV00748AWIJLT, 5 2021 WL 5937585, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2021) (finding that an assumption of one hour 6 of unpaid minimum wages per week was “consistent with allegations that violations 7 occurred ‘at times’ and ‘on occasion,’” when they were paired with policies and practices 8 allegations). Accordingly, Defendant’s assumption of 30 minutes a week of unpaid 9 minimum wage is reasonable. While the Court also finds Plaintiff’s assumption of 25.5 10 minutes per week is reasonable based on the language in the Complaint, because Defendant 11 only needs to show that potential recovery could exceed $5 million, the Court accepts 12 Defendant’s reasonable assumption and adds $502,787.50 to the amount in controversy. 13 D. Wage Statements Penalties 14 Defendant applies a 100% violation rate to Plaintiff’s wage statement claim. (See 15 NOR ¶ 52.) Plaintiff challenges this violation rate based on the Complaint’s use of “at 16 times” and argues it should be reduced to at least a 50% violation rate. (See Mot. at 9; 17 Reply at 6–7.) Defendant rebuts that the Complaint states that Defendants had “policies 18 and practices” resulting in the failure to provide accurate wage statements which justify a 19 100% violation rate. (Opp’n at 17 (citing Compl. ¶ 76).) Courts have found that when 20 meal and rest break violation rates are reasonable, a 100% wage statement calculation is 21 also reasonable. See Lopez v. Bellingham Marine Indus., Inc., No. 25-CV-00518-DAD- 22 JDP, 2025 WL 2710458, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (finding it was reasonable to 23 assume a 100% violation rate for the plaintiff’s wage statement claims when there were 24 reasonable violation rates for the plaintiff’s meal and rest break claims); Sanchez v. Abbott 25 Lab’ys, No. 2:20-CV-01436-TLN-AC, 2021 WL 2679057, at *6 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2021) 26 (“[W]hen meal period and rest period violation rates are found reasonable, courts have held 27 a 100% wage statement inaccuracy assumption may also be reasonable.”); see also Kraebel 28 v. Siemens Indus., Inc., No. CV 25-885-GW-MARX, 2025 WL 1421383, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 1 Apr. 8, 2025) (“[C]ourts have held that ‘at times’ allegations can be sufficient to suggest 2 one violation on each wage statement when multiple types of different violations are 3 alleged.”). Accordingly, Defendant’s assumption of a 100% violation rate for inaccurate 4 wage statements is reasonable and adds $644,000 to the amount in controversy. 5 E. Unreimbursed Business Expenses 6 Defendant applies a 100% violation rate to Plaintiff’s unreimbursed business claim 7 and assumes $5 a week. (See NOR ¶ 59.) Defendant bases this assumption on the 8 Plaintiff’s “claims that she and other putative class members were required to launder their 9 mandatory work uniforms at their own expense in addition to other undisclosed alleged 10 expenses.” (Opp’n at 20 (citing Compl. ¶ 91).) Further, Defendant relies on case law 11 where other courts have found assumptions of similar or higher amounts reasonable. (See 12 id.) 13 Plaintiff challenges this violation rate based on the Complaint’s use of “at times” 14 language. (Mot. at 9.) Further, in her Reply, Plaintiff alleges the amount in controversy 15 for this claim should be $88,310, based on $5 per month for laundry expenses. (See Reply 16 at 8.) Plaintiff bases this assumption on case law, not her experiences as an employee for 17 Defendant. (See id.) Plaintiff also attempts to distinguish Defendant’s case law by arguing 18 “the case law cited by Defendant concerns reimbursement for cell phone expenses, not 19 uniform laundry costs.” (Reply 7–8.) This argument is odd considering Plaintiff’s 20 Complaint alleges that Defendant failed to indemnify class members for “the costs incurred 21 in laundering mandatory work uniforms and using cellular phones for work-related 22 purposes.” (Compl. ¶ 21 (emphasis added).) 23 Defendant’s assumption of $5 a week or $20 dollars a month is reasonable based on 24 the Complaint which alleges both unreimbursed expenses for laundry and cellphones. See 25 Vallejo v. Sterigenics U.S., LLC, No. 3:20-CV-01788-AJB-AHG, 2021 WL 2685348, at 26 *6 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2021) (finding a $25 a month estimate was reasonable when the 27 complaint alleged unreimbursed business expenses not limited to cell phone expenses). 28 While the Court also finds Plaintiff’s assumption of half the class members incurring 1 laundry expenses of $5 per month is reasonable based on the language in the Complaint, 2 because Defendant only needs to show that potential recovery could exceed $5 million, the 3 Court accepts Defendant’s reasonable assumption and adds $176,620 to the amount in 4 controversy. 5 F. Waiting Time Penalties 6 Plaintiff’s waiting time penalties claim is derivative of her meal and rest period 7 claims, and she asserts the same arguments about Defendant’s assumptions being 8 unreasonable. (See Mot. at 10.) Defendant’s Opposition and supplemental evidence 9 calculate waiting time penalties for 245 former employees earning $21.61 per hour on 10 average for an average of 6.63 hours per day. (See Opp’n at 19.) Importantly, “[t]o be 11 entitled to recover waiting time penalties, each putative class member need suffer only one 12 of the other injuries alleged in the complaint.” Valero v. MKS Instruments, No. 8:24-CV- 13 01948-JWH-ADS, 2025 WL 72171, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2025) (emphasis in original). 14 Because the Court finds Defendant has made other reasonable assumptions, the Court also 15 finds Defendant’s waiting time assumption is reasonable and adds $1,053,066.10 to the 16 amount in controversy. 17 G. Attorneys’ Fees 18 Defendant applies 25% in attorneys’ fees to the amount in controversy, which 19 Plaintiff does not contest. (See Opp’n at 21; Reply at 8.) The Court’s analysis of attorney’s 20 fees, however, is constrained by the Ninth Circuit’s instruction that “the amount of 21 attorneys’ fees at stake must take into account [] statutory and contractual restrictions.” 22 Fritsch v. Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 796 (9th Cir. 2018). 23 And in California, “the attorneys’ fees shifting provisions in California Labor Code 24 §§ 218.5 and 1194 do not apply to legal work relating to meal and rest period claims[.]” 25 Id. (quoting Kirby v. Immoos Fire Prot., Inc., 53 Cal. 4th 1244, 1255 (2012)). Therefore, 26 the 25% in attorneys’ fees should not be applied to Plaintiff’s meal and rest break claims. 27 Accordingly, applying 25% to all claims other than Plaintiff’s meal and rest break claims, 28 the Court adds attorneys’ fees of $594,118.40 to the amount in controversy. l H. ~~ Conclusion 2 Adding together Defendant’s reasonable assumptions, the amount in controversy is 3 ||$4,981,742.01. Because the amount in controversy does not exceed $5 million, Defendant 4 || has failed to establish the Court has jurisdiction over this case under CAFA. Accordingly, 5 Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. 6 ||IV. Plaintiff's Request for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 7 Plaintiff requests $7,500 in attorneys’ fees and costs in bringing the instant motion. 8 ||(See Mot. 18-19.) “Absent unusual circumstances, attorney’s fees should not be awarded 9 ||under § 1447(c) when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal.” 10 || Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 132 (2005). As this Order illustrates, the 11 |/amount in controversy calculation is very close to exceeding $5 million. The Court does 12 || not find Defendant lacked an objectively reasonable basis for removal. As such, the Court 13 || DENIES Plaintiff's request for attorneys’ fees in bringing the instant motion. 14 CONCLUSION 15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, 16 |} REMANDS this action to the Superior Court for the State of California, County of San 17 || Diego, and DENIES Plaintiff's request for attorneys’ fees and costs in bringing the motion. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || Dated: March 31, 2026 —_—— 00 [dm (Q bre Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28

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