Place v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co.

350 P.2d 788, 186 Kan. 523, 1960 Kan. LEXIS 305
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedApril 9, 1960
Docket41,837
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 350 P.2d 788 (Place v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Place v. Falcon Seaboard Drilling Co., 350 P.2d 788, 186 Kan. 523, 1960 Kan. LEXIS 305 (kan 1960).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Fatzer, J.:

In this workmen’s compensation case the respondent and its insurance carrier have appealed from the findings and judgment of the district court that the claimant sustained personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the respondent, suffering 80 percent permanent partial disability.

The principal question presented is whether the award and judgment of the district court are based upon substantial evidence. In other words, whether the evidence showed any casual relation between the injury and the employment. Two other contentions are made: first, whether an objection by the appellants to certain medical testimony of the claimant should have been sustained, and second, whether the code of civil procedure should be applied in workmen’s compensation proceedings so as to limit proof of claimant’s disability to injury stated on the claim for compensation.

It is unnecessary to cite the many authorities of this court to the effect that whether disabling injuries caused by accidents arising out of and in the course of employment are permanent in nature and partial in character, and if so, to what extent and duration the physical efficiency of the workman has been impaired, is a question of both law and fact to be determined by the workmen’s compensation commissioner and the district court on appeal. Upon appellate *524 review, this court is limited to questions o£ law (G. S. 1959 Supp. 44-556), which, in the final analysis, means that its duty is to determine whether the findings of the district court are supported by substantial, competent evidence, keeping in mind, however, that the workmen’s compensation commissioner and the district court on appeal have been designated within the limitations of the •Workmen’s Compensation Act to determine the degree of impairment, the existence, extent and duration of which is a question of fact for determination by the district court. In determining the question of law, this court is required to review all the testimony in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, and if, when so considered, the record contains any evidence which supports the judgment of the district court, that judgment must be affirmed.

In light of the foregoing rule, we summarize the pertinent testimony: The claimant was employed by the respondent as a “roughnecking floor hand.” On August 22, 1957, while helping another member of the drilling crew lift a rack, weighing approximately 450 pounds, claimant suffered a catch in his low back and they had to lay the rack down. He testified his back “just caught”; that he had a burning sensation and could not straighten up; that after resting awhile he could straighten up. He continued to work until August 29, 1957, but his back kept getting worse. On the latter date he went to see Dr. Waldorf, at Greensburg, Kansas, who gave him a shot and diathermy treatment; he returned the next day and the same treatment was administered. On Sunday, August 31, 1957, the claimant could not get out of bed without help and he was admitted to the Kiowa County Hospital. Prior to his injury on August 22, 1957, the claimant had never experienced any trouble with his back.

The claimant was in the hospital for nineteen days where he received medicine for constant pain, diathermy treatments, and was placed in a pelvic traction in an attempt to reduce the pain. His condition was diagnosed as a strain in the low back, and spondylolisthesis was indicated by x-ray.

The claimant lived in Chandler, Oklahoma, and wanted to return to his home. Dr. Waldorf was reluctant to release him, but did so only upon the condition that he would go directly to another doctor in Oklahoma. The claimant’s wife drove him home and the only way he could ride was to lie down in the back seat.

The insurance carrier was contacted and an appointment was made with Dr. Henry J. Freede, an orthopedist, in Oklahoma City. *525 On September 21, 1957, Dr. Freede was of the opinion the claimant had suffered a lumbo sacral strain and recommended the continued use of the medicine and heat application prescribed by Dr. Waldorf. Dr. Freede instructed the claimant to return in ten days. However, in three days the claimant was directed by the insurance carrier to report to Dr. Freede’s office. When the claimant reported, Dr. Freede asked him why he was there and claimant told him the insurance company had requested him to come. The doctor then asked, “are you trying to get a settlement out of them?” The claimant replied that he was not interested in a settlement and only wanted to secure proper medical treatment to be relieved of his pain. Dr. Freede called the insurance carrier which stated it was sending a representative to his office. Claimant waited several hours and no one appeared. Three days later the insurance carrier advised the claimant that Dr. Freede had changed his opinion and now felt claimant’s temporary total disability had ended; that there was no permanent disability resulting from his injury, and that he could return to work. Claimant then made use of the professional services of Dr. Seelig, his home town doctor, in an attempt to reduce the pain.

The claimant made timely claim for compensation and stated on the form provided for the workmen’s compensation commissioner that the nature and extent of the injury to his back was diagnosed as spondylolisthesis. After filing the claim, the insurance carrier immediately began making weekly compensation payments to claimant.

The insurance carrier requested the claimant to submit to a myelograph which would necessitate the drawing off of some spinal fluid and the injection of an iodine fluid to determine by x-ray whether there was a back injury. Claimant was reluctant to consent as doctors had advised him such tests in the lumbar area were of no value and were dangerous to the body. However, desiring to reduce the pain and suffering, the claimant consented and a Dr. Rutledge of Oklahoma City ran the myelograph and informed claimant there was no injury to his back.

Claimant again went to Dr. Seelig who prescribed cortisone shots and taped his back and ordered a wide brace which tended to give him relief.

Later, the insurance carrier requested the claimant to submit to a physical examination by Dr. Charles K. Wier, of Wichita, which the claimant did in April, 1958. Dr. Wier was of the opinion an *526 exploratory operation should be performed to determine whether claimant’s pain was from a definite back injury. At the request of the insurance carrier, the claimant entered a hospital in Wichita and submitted to the back operation on May 20, 1958. Dr. Wier testified he found no ruptured disc but that around the nerve root between the fourth and fifth lumbar on the left “numerous adhesions were present between the dura and the ligamentum flava,” which very likely had been the area of claimant’s trouble, also, that other adhesions were found around the nerve root. He further testified that due to the instability between the fourth and fifth lumbar he did a typical Hibbs fusion in that area. On December 1, 1958, he examined the claimant and released him for light standing-up desk work, and on December 21, 1958, he advised the insurance carrier he was of the opinion the claimant had a 15 percent partial permanent disability.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lott-Edwards v. Americold Corp.
6 P.3d 947 (Court of Appeals of Kansas, 2000)
Bahr v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc.
663 P.2d 1144 (Court of Appeals of Kansas, 1983)
Gawith v. Gage's Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc.
476 P.2d 966 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1970)
Piper v. Kansas Turnpike Authority
451 P.2d 152 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1969)
Kuhn v. Grant County
439 P.2d 155 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1968)
Phillips v. Helm's Inc.
439 P.2d 119 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1968)
Ochoa v. Swift & Co.
436 P.2d 412 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1968)
Knight v. Hudiburg-Smith Chevrolet, Olds., Inc.
435 P.2d 3 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1967)
Casebeer v. Casebeer
433 P.2d 399 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1967)
Scammahorn v. Gibraltar Savings & Loan Assn.
416 P.2d 771 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1966)
Gish v. Western Star Milling Co.
396 P.2d 357 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1964)
Peschka v. Wilkinson Drilling Co.
386 P.2d 509 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1963)
Landes v. Smith
368 P.2d 302 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1962)
Fleming v. National Cash Register Co.
363 P.2d 432 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
350 P.2d 788, 186 Kan. 523, 1960 Kan. LEXIS 305, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/place-v-falcon-seaboard-drilling-co-kan-1960.