1 WO 2
6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8
9 PivotHealth Holdings LLC, No. CV-24-01786-PHX-SHD 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 Lucas B. Horton, 13 Defendant. 14
15 Pending before the Court is Defendant Lucas Horton’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack 16 of Jurisdiction (the “Motion”). (Doc. 12.) For the following reasons, the Court denies the 17 Motion. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff PivotHealth Holdings, LLC (“Pivot”), an Arizona-organized limited 20 liability company with its principal place of business in Arizona, makes short-term health 21 insurance coverage available for individual consumers. (Doc. 1 ¶ 7.) Horton is an 22 individual residing in Texas. (Doc. 12 at 11–12.) 23 This litigation arises out of a previous lawsuit (the “Underlying Action”) filed by 24 Horton against Pivot. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 29, 43.) In the Underlying Action, Horton alleged that 25 either Pivot or an agent acting on Pivot’s behalf engaged in illegal telemarketing behavior 26 by calling Horton without authorization between September and October 2022. (Id. ¶ 16; 27 Doc. 12 at 7.) Horton purchased a health insurance policy in response to one of these calls, 28 allegedly to discover who was responsible. (Doc. 1 ¶ 17; Doc. 18 at 8.) The caller 1 recommended a Pivot-brand policy. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18.) Horton then emailed Pivot a draft 2 complaint for violating various laws, including the Telephone Consumer Protection Act 3 (“TCPA”), and identified Arizona as Pivot’s primary place of business. (Id. ¶ 19; Doc. 16- 4 3 at 3–4.) In a later email to Pivot, Horton claimed it had also violated Texas Business and 5 Commerce Code § 301.052, which requires sellers to provide a refund policy to consumers 6 before charging them, and alleged that he requested a refund (the “Refund Demand”) days 7 after purchasing his policy and Pivot did not grant a refund. (Doc. 16-1 at 13–14.) 8 In December 2022, Horton filed the Underlying Action in the Northern District of 9 Texas. (Doc. 16 at 3, 6.) After Pivot filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, that 10 court granted Horton’s motion to transfer his case to the District of Arizona. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11 30, 34; Doc. 12 at 11.) Horton continued to litigate his case against Pivot in Arizona, 12 including by producing the Refund Demand to Pivot. (Doc. 1 ¶ 36.) Pivot alleges that 13 Horton forged this Refund Demand. (Id. ¶ 39.) 14 In April 2024, Horton voluntarily dismissed the Underlying Action with prejudice. 15 (Id. ¶ 41.) The parties disagree about the reason for this. Pivot asserts this was to “conceal 16 the fact [Horton] forged the Refund Demand.” (Id. ¶ 42.) Horton responds this was 17 because the case was in Arizona and Pivot “lied in discovery, making it impossible for the 18 case to continue.” (Doc. 18 at 1.) 19 Pivot then brought this action in July 2024 seeking damages stemming from the 20 Underlying Action and asserting claims for wrongful institution and continuation of civil 21 proceedings and abuse of process. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 44–59.) In response, Horton filed the Motion 22 and argues that (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Pivot’s claims, (2) this 23 Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Horton, and (3) venue is improper. (Doc. 12.) 24 II. DISCUSSION 25 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 26 Under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move 27 to dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The party asserting jurisdiction 28 bears the burden of establishing that subject matter jurisdiction exists. Kokkonen v. 1 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 2 1. Standing 3 Because Article III’s standing requirements limit federal courts’ subject matter 4 jurisdiction, a plaintiff’s standing to bring a claim may be challenged by a 12(b)(1) motion 5 to dismiss. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1121–22 (9th 6 Cir. 2010). “On a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, a district court must accept as 7 true all material allegations in the complaint, and must construe the complaint in the 8 nonmovant’s favor.” Id. at 1121 (citation omitted). “The Court may not speculate as to 9 the plausibility of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. The Constitutional minimum of standing 10 requires three elements: (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact; (2) a causal 11 connection between the injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) a likelihood that the 12 injury would be “redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 13 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (quotation marks omitted). The elements of Article III standing 14 must “be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the 15 burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive 16 stages of the litigation.” See id. at 561. At the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff need 17 only plead general factual allegations, as courts presume these “embrace those specific 18 facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Id. The Court addresses each element in 19 turn. 20 a. Injury-in-fact 21 Horton argues that Pivot did not suffer any concrete damages because any legal 22 costs it incurred resulted from defending its own illegal actions—i.e., violating the TCPA 23 and Texas state law by either calling Horton without authorization or having an agent call 24 on Pivot’s behalf. (Doc. 12 at 7.) Horton also argues that Pivot’s alleged damages to its 25 reputation are meritless as (1) Pivot is an unknown company and (2) a TCPA lawsuit would 26 not harm a company’s reputation. (Id. at 7–8.) 27 The Court finds that Pivot has sufficiently alleged injury-in-fact at this stage in the 28 litigation. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (plaintiff’s general pleading allegations regarding 1 standing are sufficient at motion to dismiss stage). An injury-in-fact must be (a) concrete 2 and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, rather than hypothetical. Friends of the 3 Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000). “Central to 4 assessing concreteness is whether the asserted harm has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm 5 traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts,” such as 6 monetary harm and various intangible harms, including reputational harm. TransUnion 7 LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 417 (2021). Here, Pivot plausibly alleges monetary harm 8 in its pleadings. Pivot alleges that because of Horton’s wrongful conduct in initiating the 9 Underlying Action and forging the Refund Demand, it suffered damages including 10 “employee time, costs, and legal fees” incurred in responding to and defending against 11 Horton’s claims. (Doc. 1 ¶ 52; Doc. 16 at 11.) Pivot also plausibly alleges its reputation 12 was harmed by Horton naming it as a defendant in a federal suit in the Underlying Action. 13 (Doc. 1 ¶ 6; Doc. 16 at 11.) These allegations are concrete and particularized injuries 14 sufficient to establish standing. 15 b. Causation 16 Horton’s argument that he did not cause any of Pivot’s alleged injuries because they 17 resulted from Pivot’s own actions also goes to the question of causation. (Doc. 12 at 7.) 18 Horton further contends that if Pivot did suffer any damages, these were caused by whoever 19 illegally called Horton rather than by Horton himself, because he was merely pursuing his 20 legal rights by filing the Underlying Action. (Doc. 18 at 12.) 21 For a sufficient causal connection between the injury and the complained-of 22 conduct, the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged action and not 23 the result of “the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 504 24 U.S. at 560. Accepting Pivot’s allegations as true, the injuries alleged here—monetary 25 harm resulting from its attorneys and employees responding to and defending against 26 Horton’s claims, and reputational harm resulting from Horton’s federal lawsuit—were a 27 “direct and proximate result of [Horton’s] wrongful conduct in initiating the Underlying 28 Action” and forging the Refund Demand (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 52, 59), and not the result of “the 1 independent action of some third party” who called Horton, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. “At 2 this stage of the proceedings, [the Court does] not speculate as to the plausibility of [these] 3 allegation[s], . . . or as to [their] sufficiency to establish liability.” Bernhardt v. County of 4 Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 869 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Thus, looking solely 5 at the face of the complaint, Pivot adequately alleges causation. 6 c. Redressability 7 Horton also argues Pivot does not have standing because a judgment would not 8 redress “the injured party here, who is [Horton]” rather than Pivot, as he contends he 9 suffered damages resulting from the unlawful phone calls, being billed by Pivot for 10 insurance, and now responding to this lawsuit. (Doc. 18 at 12.) 11 The standing analysis focuses on whether Pivot’s injury can likely be redressed by 12 a favorable decision, not Horton’s injury. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (plaintiff must 13 have suffered an “injury in fact” that is likely to be redressed). Pivot’s requested relief is 14 to “recover the damages it suffered because of [Horton’s] malicious prosecution and abuse 15 of process, punitive damages to deter similar claims, and equitable relief barring [Horton] 16 from filing future lawsuits pro se without leave from this Court.” (Doc. 1 ¶ 6.) If granted, 17 this relief would redress Pivot’s allegations of monetary and reputational injury stemming 18 from Horton wrongfully initiating the Underlying Action. Therefore, Pivot has adequately 19 pled redressability. 20 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Pivot has standing. 21 2. Diversity Jurisdiction—Amount in Controversy 22 A federal district court has “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter 23 in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs” and 24 the parties are diverse. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When a plaintiff originally files in federal 25 court, “the amount of controversy is determined from the face of the pleadings.” Crum v. 26 Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). “The sum claimed by the 27 plaintiff controls so long as the claim is made in good faith.” Id. 28 Horton argues that Pivot cannot satisfy the $75,000 amount in controversy 1 threshold. (Doc. 12 at 4.) In support, he cites the standard for removal to federal court to 2 argue that in the same way a defendant can establish the $75,000 threshold for removal, a 3 defendant should be able to establish that a claim does not meet the $75,000 threshold. (Id. 4 at 5.) This case, however, is not a removal case. As Pivot notes, the correct standard for 5 whether a case should be dismissed for failure to meet the amount in controversy is the 6 “legal certainty” standard. See Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. 7 Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To justify dismissal, it must appear to a 8 legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” (quotation 9 marks omitted)). Under this standard, “a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction unless 10 upon the face of the complaint, it is obvious that the suit cannot involve the necessary 11 amount.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 12 Horton then argues that the amount in controversy “could not possibly be $75,000” 13 because not much time was invested in the first lawsuit, Pivot caused its own attorneys’ 14 fees because of its alleged TCPA violations, the Refund Demand is a small part of the case 15 and would not have taken time to investigate, and Pivot does not have a reputation to 16 damage because its online reviews are negative. (Doc. 12 at 5–6.) But these contentions 17 are essentially asking the Court to resolve the merits of this action, which is not appropriate 18 at the pleading stage. See Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983) 19 (“[W]here the jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question 20 of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits, the 21 jurisdictional determination should await a determination of the relevant facts on either a 22 motion going to the merits or at trial.”); see also Healthcare Inc. v. Doyle, 2025 WL 23 1094309, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2025) (finding that defendant’s factual attack to refute plaintiff’s 24 alleged amount in controversy was essentially a request for the court to resolve the merits 25 of the action, which was premature at the pleading stage). 26 In its complaint, response to Horton’s Motion, and attached affidavit, Pivot explains 27 in good faith that it incurred more than $75,000 in damages from attorneys’ fees and 28 reputational harm. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11, 52, 58; Doc. 16 at 10; Doc. 16-1 at 2 ¶ 5.) These 1 allegations are sufficient to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement because it is not 2 legally certain that the amount in controversy is less than $75,000. 3 B. Personal Jurisdiction 4 “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining the bounds of their 5 jurisdiction over persons.” Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2017) 6 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014)). “Arizona law permits the 7 exercise of personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted under the United States 8 Constitution.” Id. (citing Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a)). Accordingly, whether this Court has 9 personal jurisdiction over Horton “is subject to the terms of the Due Process Clause of the 10 Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 11 “Constitutional due process requires that defendants have certain minimum contacts 12 with a forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions 13 of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Minimum contacts 14 exist “if the defendant has continuous and systematic general business contacts with a 15 forum state (general jurisdiction), or if the defendant has sufficient contacts arising from 16 or related to specific transactions or activities in the forum state (specific jurisdiction).” Id. 17 at 1142 (quotation marks omitted). “In giving content to that formulation, [courts have] 18 long focused on the nature and extent of the defendant’s relationship to the forum State.” 19 Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021) (quotation marks 20 omitted). 21 Here, Horton argues that this Court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over him. 22 (Doc. 12 at 9.) “The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name 23 ‘purposeful availment.’” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (citation omitted). This means 24 that the defendant “must take some act by which [he] purposefully avails [himself] of the 25 privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 26 These contacts “must be the defendant’s own choice and not random, isolated, or 27 fortuitous,” such as by “exploi[ting] a market in the forum State or entering a contractual 28 relationship centered there.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). The 1 Court may not consider “the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside” in the forum 2 State, but instead the “defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself.” Walden v. Fiore, 3 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014). Further, even if the defendant did take some action in the forum 4 State, the plaintiff’s claims must also “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with 5 the forum.” Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 362 (quotation marks omitted). In other words, 6 there must be a “strong relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” 7 Id. at 365 (quotation marks omitted). 8 In this Circuit, the test for specific jurisdiction is as follows: 9 (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 10 consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege 11 of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 12 protections of its laws; 13 (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and 14 (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial 15 justice, i.e., it must be reasonable. 16 Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142. “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs 17 of the test.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of 18 the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to present a compelling case 19 that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 20 1. Purposeful Direction 21 The first prong of the test for specific personal jurisdiction involves an assessment 22 of whether a defendant purposefully directed his activities toward the forum state or 23 purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities there. Id. Because 24 Pivot’s malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims sound in tort, we undertake the 25 “purposeful direction” test. See id. (courts generally apply the “purposeful availment” test 26 to contract claims and the “purposeful direction” test to tort claims). Purposeful direction 27 requires the defendant to have “(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the 28 forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum 1 state.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The proper question is not where the plaintiff 2 experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him 3 to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 290. “[I]n the absence of an 4 evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional 5 facts.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990). 6 a. Intentional Act 7 The intentional act requirement connotes an “intent to perform an actual, physical 8 act in the real world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or consequence of that 9 act.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004). 10 Here, Pivot has made a prima facie showing that Horton committed intentional acts by 11 transferring the Underlying Action to and litigating in this Court in Arizona. (Doc. 16 at 12 2.) 13 b. Express Aiming 14 For the express aiming analysis, we look at whether “the defendant’s allegedly 15 tortious action was expressly aimed at the forum.” Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1214 16 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the precise form 17 of analysis depends largely upon the “specific type of tort or other wrongful conduct at 18 issue,” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 807, our focus is on Horton’s actions related to Pivot’s 19 claims of wrongful institution of civil proceedings and abuse of process. Pivot’s claims 20 are based on Horton allegedly litigating “knowingly frivolous claims in bad faith” and 21 disclosing the forged refund demand in Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 1.) The tort must also “involve 22 the forum state itself, and not just have some effect on a party who resides there.” Morrill, 23 873 F.3d at 1145. Horton argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction because he has 24 never been to, has no connection to, and has never had contact with Arizona. (Doc. 12 at 25 9, 15.) 26 The Court disagrees. It does not matter that Horton has not physically been to 27 Arizona, as “physical presence in the forum is not a prerequisite to jurisdiction.” See 28 Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. (citation omitted). But “physical entry into the State—either by 1 the defendant in person or through an agent, goods, mail, or some other means—is certainly 2 a relevant contact.” Id. (emphasis added and citation omitted). In a recent opinion, the 3 Ninth Circuit concluded that a defendant’s conduct satisfied the “express aiming” factor 4 reasoning that its use of electronic means established an “entry into the [forum] state” and 5 “certainly [was] a relevant contact.” Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 2025 WL 1154075, at *11 6 (9th Cir. 2025). Similarly, Horton’s alleged conduct in this forum—transferring the case 7 here, preparing a discovery plan, moving to amend his complaint, attempting to issue a 8 subpoena, and disclosing the Refund Demand (Doc. 16 at 14)— created sufficient relevant 9 contacts with Arizona to find that Horton expressly aimed his actions at this forum, even 10 if they were undertaken electronically. See id. 11 Horton’s alleged conduct individually targeting Pivot further supports this 12 conclusion. A defendant individually targets a plaintiff when the defendant engages in 13 “wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the 14 forum state.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 15 2017) (quotation marks omitted). Horton is correct that to establish jurisdiction, “Pivot 16 cannot simply allege that . . . [Horton] knew Pivot was an Arizona company” and therefore 17 he “could have foreseen harm in the forum.” (Doc. 12 at 15–16.) But while individual 18 targeting “will not, on its own, support the exercise of specific jurisdiction,” it is “relevant 19 to the minimum contacts inquiry.” Axiom Food, Inc., 874 F.3d at 1070. Here, in addition 20 to its arguments regarding Horton’s tortious actions aimed at Arizona, Pivot also alleges 21 that Horton knew his claims would harm an Arizona company because Horton’s draft 22 complaint identified Pivot’s address in Arizona. (Doc. 16 at 15; Doc. 1 ¶ 10.) 23 c. Harm Likely to be Suffered in the Forum State 24 For this same reason, Pivot has made a prima facie showing that Horton “cause[d] 25 harm that” he knew was “likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue 26 Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1209 (9th Cir. 2006). Pivot’s 27 allegations—that Horton knew it was based in Arizona and therefore that any harm caused 28 by his allegedly tortious activities would be felt in Arizona, (Doc. 16 at 15; Doc. 1 ¶ 10)— 1 are sufficient to meet the harm requirement, cf. BBK Tobacco & Foods LLP v. Cent. Coast 2 Agric. Inc., 2020 WL 3893563, at *5 (D. Ariz. 2020) (harm requirement satisfied where 3 defendant knew that plaintiff was based in Arizona and that any harm defendant caused 4 would be felt in Arizona as this was plaintiff’s principal place of business). 5 Horton relies on Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008), to argue 6 this Court lacks jurisdiction. (Doc. 12 at 11.) In Boschetto, a California plaintiff purchased 7 a car from non-resident defendants on eBay. 539 F.3d at 1014. The defendants 8 communicated via email with the plaintiff to arrange the car’s delivery. Id. After 9 discovering issues with the car, the plaintiff sued the defendants in California. Id. at 1015. 10 The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants’ “lone transaction for the sale of [the car]” was 11 insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over them because this was a “one-shot affair” 12 that did not create any ongoing obligations with the plaintiff in California.. Id. at 1017. 13 “[O]nce the car was sold the parties were to go their separate ways.” Id. Those facts are 14 dissimilar to the jurisdictional facts here. Horton created ongoing obligations with this 15 Court and Pivot by transferring the Underlying Action to Arizona. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 30, 34; Doc. 16 12 at 11.) And Horton continued to actively litigate his case in Arizona, (Doc. 16 at 14), 17 in contrast to the one “lone transaction” in Boschetto. Further, as Pivot points out, 18 Boschetto is also distinguishable as it was a contract-based case, and thus the Ninth Circuit 19 applied a different analytical framework. 539 F.3d at 1016 (following the purposeful 20 availment standard because the case sounded in contract). 21 This Court has personal jurisdiction over Horton by virtue of his decision to litigate 22 the Underlying Action in Arizona, as this “connects [Horton] to the forum in a meaningful 23 way.” See Walden, 571 U.S. at 290; cf. Yammine, 2022 WL 791203, at *3 (“By choosing 24 a particular forum in which to seek affirmative relief, plaintiff effectively waives any 25 objections to that forum based on personal inconvenience.”) (citing 6 Charles Alan Wright 26 & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1416 (3d ed. 2025)); id. (“Once a 27 plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of a federal court by filing a complaint, the court maintains 28 jurisdiction over the plaintiff for all subsequent proceedings . . . .”). In Verve, L.L.C. v. 1 Hypercom Corp., 2006 WL 8441358, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2006), plaintiff/counter-defendant 2 Verve filed a case against defendant/counter-plaintiff Hypercom in the Western District of 3 Texas. That court transferred the case to this Court over Verve’s objection. Id. at *4. The 4 Court later dismissed Verve’s claims, leaving only Hypercom’s counterclaims. Id. at *2. 5 When Verve moved to dismiss the counterclaims for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court 6 denied the request, stating that “[w]e had jurisdiction over Verve upon transfer of this case 7 and at the time the counterclaims were filed, and we retain jurisdiction over Verve with 8 respect to the counterclaims.” Id. at *4. Here, while Pivot brought its claims in a new suit 9 rather than through counterclaims, the claims still stem from the Underlying Action. And 10 Horton himself invoked this Court’s jurisdiction in the Underlying Action by choosing to 11 transfer his case here. By doing so, he purposely directed his allegedly tortious conduct at 12 this forum. See Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142; cf. Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 13 284 U.S. 448, 451 (1932) (by suing in federal district court, the plaintiff “submitted itself 14 to the jurisdiction of the court with respect to all the issues embraced in the suit”). 15 Horton argues that he did not choose to direct his activities at Arizona—rather, Pivot 16 forced him to do so. (Doc. 12 at 11–12.) He contends Pivot caused him to file the 17 Underlying Action by illegally calling him and caused him to transfer the case to Arizona 18 by moving to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Id.) But “[h]ow [Horton] came to file in 19 this District does not change the fact that [Horton] filed in this District, invoked the 20 jurisdiction of this District, and consented to personal jurisdiction in this District.” 21 Yammine, 2022 WL 791203, at *3. 22 For the reasons explained above, the Court is not persuaded by Horton’s argument 23 that he did not create any “link between [himself] and the forum,” and rather, Pivot is the 24 only link. (Doc. 12 at 15, 17.) Horton’s combined acts of purposefully availing himself 25 of this Court’s jurisdiction in the Underlying Action, litigating that action in Arizona, and 26 individually targeting a forum-resident satisfy the purposeful direction test. 27 2. Forum-Related Conduct 28 To satisfy the second prong, Pivot “must show that [it] would not have suffered an 1 injury ‘but for’ [Horton’s] forum-related conduct.” Menken v. Emm, 503. F.3d 1050, 1058 2 (9th Cir. 2007). Horton’s forum-related conduct consisted of transferring the Underlying 3 Action to Arizona and continuing to litigate his claims in this Court while allegedly 4 knowing they were frivolous and false. But for these actions, Pivot would not have suffered 5 its claimed injuries. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 52, 59.) Because Pivot’s claims for wrongful institution 6 and continuation of civil proceedings and abuse of process arise out of these purposeful 7 contacts, the forum-related conduct prong is satisfied. 8 3. Reasonableness 9 As the first two prongs of the effects test have been satisfied, Horton must “set forth 10 a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Picot, 780 11 F.3d at 1214. In determining reasonableness, courts must consider seven factors: (1) the 12 extent of the defendants’ purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the 13 burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the 14 sovereignty of the defendants’ state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the 15 dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of 16 the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence 17 of an alternative forum. CE Distrib., LLC v. New Sensor Corp., 380 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th 18 Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 19 The first factor weighs strongly in Pivot’s favor. As discussed, Horton purposefully 20 directed his activities at Arizona and interjected himself into Arizona’s affairs by choosing 21 this forum in which to litigate the Underlying Action. While Horton argues he would not 22 have sued if not for Pivot’s actions, that does not change the fact he transferred the 23 Underlying Action to this District. (See Doc. 18 at 18.) See Yammine, 2022 WL 791203, 24 at *3. 25 To justify dismissal based on the second factor, the defendant must prove the 26 “inconvenience is so great as to constitute a deprivation of due process.” Panavision Int’l, 27 L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1323 (9th Cir. 1998). Horton argues he would be unfairly 28 burdened by this Court asserting jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s claims are unsubstantiated, 1 and he has childcare responsibilities in Texas. (Doc. 12 at 11–13.) Pivot responds that 2 Horton was “willing to litigate the Underlying Action in this Court when Pivot was the 3 defendant” and cannot now claim this imposes “such a burden as to deny him his due 4 process.” (Doc. 16 at 17.) While it would be more burdensome for Horton to litigate in 5 Arizona rather than Texas, “with the advances in transportation and telecommunications 6 and the increasing interstate practice of law, any burden is substantially less than in days 7 past.” CE Distrib., 380 F.3d at 1112. This factor weighs slightly in favor of Horton but is 8 not so great an inconvenience as to deprive him of due process. 9 The third factor is neutral as there are no issues regarding sovereignty. 10 The fourth factor weighs in favor of Pivot, as “Arizona has a strong interest in 11 protecting its residents from torts that cause injury within the state, and in providing a 12 forum for relief.” Brainerd v. Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1260 (9th 13 Cir. 1989). 14 When evaluating the fifth factor, courts “have looked primarily at where the 15 witnesses and the evidence are likely to be located.” Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 16 11 F.3d 1482, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993). Because witnesses and evidence are located in both 17 Arizona and Texas, neither forum has a clear efficiency advantage. Therefore, this factor 18 is neutral. 19 The sixth factor is not weighed heavily. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324. But we find 20 it is slightly in favor of Pivot, as it presumably chose this District because it thought it 21 would receive convenient and effective relief here. 22 The seventh factor favors Horton, as while it may be inconvenient for Pivot to 23 litigate in Texas, it is an alternative forum. 24 Weighing these seven considerations, Horton has not met his burden to present a 25 compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable. See Panavision, 26 141 F.3d at 1324 (“[W]e conclude that although some factors weigh in [defendant’s] favor, 27 he failed to present a compelling case that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction in 28 California would be unreasonable.”). 1 In sum, all of the requirements for the exercise of specific, personal jurisdiction are 2 met. 3 C. Venue 4 Venue is proper in “a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or 5 omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). In determining 6 where a substantial part of the events occurred in a tort action, “the locus of the injury [i]s 7 a relevant factor.” See Myers v. Bennett L. Offs., 238 F.3d 1068, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2001). 8 Once a defendant has challenged venue, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that 9 venue is proper in the chosen district. Piedmont Label Co. v. Sun Garden Packing Co., 10 598 F.2d 491, 496 (9th Cir. 1979). The court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor 11 of the non-moving party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party.” 12 Mach 1 Air Servs. Inc. v. Bustillos, 2013 WL 1222567, at *9 (D. Ariz. 2013) (quotation 13 marks omitted). A plaintiff’s choice of venue is generally given substantial weight and a 14 defendant typically “must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting 15 the plaintiff’s choice of forum.” Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 16 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). 17 Horton argues that under Arizona Revised Statute § 12-401, a person cannot be sued 18 outside of the county in which they reside. (Doc. 12 at 4.) He also contends that all of the 19 alleged events occurred in Texas rather than Arizona, such as the Refund Demand and his 20 deposition. (Id.) 21 First, because Pivot brought this action in federal court, federal law rather than 22 Arizona law determines venue, so the statute Horton cites does not apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 23 1391(a)(1) (“[T]his section shall govern the venue of all civil actions brought in district 24 courts of the United States . . . .”). Second, while some events giving rise to Pivot’s claims 25 did occur in Texas, “[s]ubstantial does not mean the majority of or even the most events 26 giving rise to the claims; it’s a qualitative, rather than a quantitative, assessment.” Deutsch 27 v. Anna Deutsch Tr. dated Sept. 3, 1991, 2023 WL 2691451, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2023) (citation 28 omitted). Pivot argues that a substantial part of Horton’s wrongful conduct took place in ! this District because “Horton spent four months litigating his frivolous claims in this Court, ... forced Pivot to defend against his false claims on the merits,” forced it “to incur more than $90,000 while the case was pending in this Court,” and “prepared and disclosed the 4 forged Refund Demand” while litigating in this Court. (Doc. 16 at 17-18.) Pivot has met > its burden of proving that a substantial part of events occurred in the District of Arizona, 6 and therefore the Court finds that venue is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). Accordingly, 8 IT IS ORDERED denying Horton’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12). 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED setting a status conference on Horton’s Motion for 10 Issuance of Subpoena (Doc. 17) and Pivot’s Motion for Sanctions and In Person Hearing i (Doc. 25) for Wednesday, July 16, 2025, at 10:00 a.m., to be conducted via Zoom before 12 Judge Sharad H. Desai. The parties will receive connection information by email in 13 advance of the hearing. The parties shall have their calendars on hand and be prepared to discuss potential dates for a hearing on the Motion for Sanctions and In Person Hearing 15 (Doc. 25). 16 Dated this 7th day of July, 2025. 17 18 19 20 21 0 H le Sharad H. Desai United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28
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