Pio v. John B. Gilliland Construction, Inc.

560 P.2d 247, 276 Or. 975, 1976 Ore. LEXIS 720, 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2477
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 16, 1976
Docket75-100, SC 24422
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 560 P.2d 247 (Pio v. John B. Gilliland Construction, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pio v. John B. Gilliland Construction, Inc., 560 P.2d 247, 276 Or. 975, 1976 Ore. LEXIS 720, 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2477 (Or. 1976).

Opinions

[977]*977McAllister, j.

This is a suit by the assignee of the trustees of trust funds established under the terms of a labor agreement to collect from an employer contributions to such funds and for an accounting to determine the amounts due. The trial court found for the defendants and entered a decree dismissing the suit. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

The basic issue is whether a Memorandum Agreement dated June 29, 1972 was binding on the defendant John B. Gilliland Construction, Inc., or John B. Gilliland personally for the term stated in the agreement or only during the construction by Gilliland, Inc., of a bridge in Baker.

Defendant Gilliland, Inc., is a corporation engaged in construction work, mainly bridge construction. Since the defendant John B. Gilliland is president and sole owner of John B. Gilliland Construction, Inc., we will refer to the defendants jointly as Gilliland.

On June 29, 1972 Gilliland was engaged in the construction of a bridge on Campbell Street in Baker. On that date John B. Gilliland signed his name on a Memorandum Agreement with the Oregon State Council of Carpenters and Southwest Washington District Council of Carpenters, hereinafter referred to as the Union. The Memorandum Agreement required Gilliland to comply with all the terms of a Master Agreement and agreements establishing certain trust funds and requiring Gilliland to make contributions to certain trust funds therein designated.1

[978]*978The agreement further provided that:

”7. This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect until May 31, 1973, and shall continue from year to year thereafter unless either party shall give written notice to the other of a desire to change or cancel it at least sixty days prior to May 31, 1973 or May 31 of any succeeding year. * * *”

Gilliland contends that when he signed the agreement it was agreed by him and the representative of the Union, Harold Hansen, that it would be applicable only to the Baker job and that Gilliland would not be required to make any payments to the Union on account of wages earned by carpenters employed on any subsequent job. In other words, Gilliland contends that the agreement expired upon completion of the Baker job. Hansen testified that he did not agree with Gilliland that the Memorandum Agreement would apply only to the Baker job.

Gilliland, in his brief in this court, contends that the Memorandum Agreement is not binding on him because his signature was not affixed on the line designated for the signature of an authorized representative of the company.

We reproduce here the second page of the Memorandum Agreement on which the signatures appear:

[979]*979

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Pio v. John B. Gilliland Construction, Inc.
560 P.2d 247 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
560 P.2d 247, 276 Or. 975, 1976 Ore. LEXIS 720, 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2477, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pio-v-john-b-gilliland-construction-inc-or-1976.