Pinson v. Unknown Party

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: September 17, 2024
• Docket: 4:13-cv-02059
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Jeremy Pinson, No. CV-13-02059-TUC-BGM

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Unknown Party, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is Defendant Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Motion for Summary 16 Judgment. (Doc. 215.) The motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. 231, 235.) For the 17 reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion is granted, and the case is dismissed. 18 BACKGROUND1 19 Since 2006, Plaintiff Jeremy Pinson has been incarcerated with the Federal Bureau 20 of Prisons (the “Bureau”) and housed at various institutions throughout the country. (Docs. 21 216, ¶¶ 2-4; 216-1 at 7-14.) From February 2011 through October 2014, Pinson was 22 intermittently housed at the administrative security facility in Florence, Colorado 23 (“ADX”). (Doc. 216-1 at 11.2) While housed at ADX, Pinson met fellow inmates, Charles 24 Harris, Richard McBee, and Erwin Villatoro. (Doc. 232-1, ¶ 2.) Pinson also met Bureau 25

26 1 The facts in the background section are stated in the light most favorable to Pinson as the nonmoving party. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 2002). 27 2 The Court draws the reasonable inference that the administrative maximum security 28 facility in Florence, Colorado, is designated as “FLM” on the Inmate History worksheet. (See Doc. 216, ¶ 4.) 1 Special Investigative Lieutenant Charles Alvarez. (Id. ¶ 4.) Pinson again encountered 2 Alvarez while housed at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado (“USP- 3 Florence”).3 (Id.) Pinson met fellow inmate Christopher Coates while she was housed at 4 the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri (“SPG”), and was 5 subsequently housed with Coates at USP-Florence.4 (Id. ¶ 3.) 6 Pinson traces Harris, McBee, Villatoro, Coates, and Lieutenant Alvarez back to the 7 United States Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona (“USP-Tucson”), where she alleges that in 8 2010, Alvarez and another Bureau official paid the inmates to spread rumors that she was 9 a snitch. (See Doc. 16 at 3.) Pinson also alleges that the Bureau officials showed the 10 inmates “documents verifying my cooperation with law enforcement[,] which are not 11 publicly available and which could only be accessed by [Bureau] employees from files 12 maintained by the [Department] of Justice and its agencies.” (Id. at 5.) Pinson adds that 13 she did not authorize the release of this information. (Id.) 14 Pinson asserts that Harris, McBee, Villatoro, and Coates all informed her that 15 Bureau officials had told them about, or “revealed,” confidential documents in Pinson’s 16 inmate file that identified her as a cooperating informant. (Doc. 232-1, ¶¶ 8-10, 12, 16.) 17 Pinson also asserts that in 2013, an inmate who assaulted her with feces at ADX informed 18 her that he did so because USP-Tucson inmates told him of the documents in Pinson’s file. 19 (Id. ¶ 7.) Pinson explains that another federal prisoner, Gary Lee Long, provided her with 20 a declaration while he was confined at USP-Tucson. (Id. ¶ 13.) Long’s declaration states 21 that while he was previously confined at the facility, Alvarez and another official were 22 responsible for the “dissemination of negative information identifying inmate Pinson as a 23 snitch.” (Doc. 232-1 at 12.) Long asserts that the Bureau officials “made such statements 24 to myself and in my presence to other unknown named inmates.” (Id. ¶ 4.) 25

26 3 The Court infers that Pinson is referring to USP-Florence when she uses the term “U.S. Penitentiary High in Florence, CO.” (See Doc. 232-1, ¶¶ 1, 3-4, 14.) USP-Florence is the 27 only high-security federal prison in Florence, Colorado. Federal Bureau of Prisons - List 28 of Facilities, https://www.bop.gov/locations/list.jsp (last visited Sept. 11, 2024). 4 Pinson is transgender and uses female pronouns. (See Doc. 215, n.1 at 2.) 1 Finally, Pinson proclaims that in 2016, she personally met with Alvarez and asked 2 him why he had revealed her private information to other inmates. (Doc. 232-1, ¶ 14 at 6.) 3 According to Pinson, Alvarez admitted that he and another Bureau official were motivated 4 by Pinson’s negative stories about the Bureau in a prison publication and shared her 5 information to discredit her among the prison population. (Id.) Pinson asserts that Alvarez 6 ended the conversation by assuring her that the system would protect him because he is a 7 federal agent and she is an inmate. (Id.) Pinson also proclaims that Bureau staff regularly 8 share information with their counterparts in other institutions if both departments share a 9 common intelligence gathering target such as a gang or a prisoner-centered publication. 10 (Id. ¶ 15.) Pinson seeks compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and costs 11 for the alleged violation of her rights under the Privacy Act. (See Doc. 16 at 6.) 12 PROCEDURAL HISTORY 13 On November 5, 2014, Pinson filed her first amended complaint in this action. 14 (Doc. 16.) In the first amended complaint, Pinson raised two constitutional Bivens claims 15 and a Privacy Act claim. (Id. at 3-5.) 16 Upon screening, the Court misconstrued Pinson’s Privacy Act claim as a Bivens 17 claim, dismissed the Bureau, and allowed Pinson’s Bivens claims to proceed. (Doc. 18.) 18 On September 6, 2016, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 19 individual Bureau defendants and closed the case. (Doc. 66.) Pinson appealed. (Doc. 68.) 20 On October 4, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 21 reversed judgment on one of Pinson’s Bivens claims and instructed the Court to consider 22 her Privacy Act claim in the first instance on remand. (Doc. 76-1 at 1-3.) 23 On May 30, 2018, the Court reinstated Pinson’s Privacy Act claim ruling that she 24 sufficiently stated a claim under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b) and 552a(g)(1)(D). (Doc. 80 at 4-5.) 25 On May 3, 2019, a new case management schedule on the claim, which allowed 26 limited discovery and included a dispositive motion schedule, was issued. (Doc. 105) 27 On November 15, 2019, the Bureau indicated that it would not be filing a summary 28 judgment motion on Pinson’s Privacy Act claim. (Doc. 124 at 2.) 1 On March 12, 2020, the Court ruled that no further discovery would be permitted 2 and that it would appoint pro bono counsel to assist Pinson at trial. (Doc. 136.) 3 On November 3, 2020, the Court appointed pro bono counsel and indicated that it 4 would allow limited discovery for the fair presentation of the case at trial. (Doc. 150.) 5 On April 27, 2021, the Court granted Pinson’s request for additional time to file 6 trial-related motions or engage in settlement discussions with the Bureau. (Doc. 157.) 7 From January 10, 2022, until April 4, 2024, the parties were engaged in various 8 stages of settlement discussions. (See Docs. 163, 219.) 9 On February 28, 2022, upon consent of the parties, the Court transferred the case to 10 the undersigned Magistrate Judge for the purpose of conducting trial. (Doc. 165.) 11 On August 4, 2022, the Court granted the Bureau’s unopposed request for leave to 12 file an Egbert motion on Pinson’s remaining Bivens claim. (Doc. 179.) 13 On February 9, 2023, the Court dismissed Pinson’s Bivens claim based on Pinson’s 14 concession that Egbert precluded relief on the claim. (Doc. 189.) 15 On November 2, 2023, the parties requested the reopening of discovery, an amended 16 dispositive motion deadline, and resetting of the pending trial date. (Doc. 205 at 1-2.) 17 On November 9, 2023, the Court reopened discovery, issued an amended dispositive 18 motion briefing schedule, and set a new trial date. (Doc. 208.) 19 On April 5, 2024, the Bureau filed its motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 215.) 20 On June 6, 2024, Pinson’s appointed counsel withdrew from the case, and Pinson 21 was permitted to proceed pro se. (Doc. 230.) 22 On July 9, 2024, Pinson filed her summary judgment response, (Doc. 231); and on 23 July 22, 2024, the Bureau filed its reply, (Doc. 235.) 24 This Order follows. 25 LEGAL STANDARD 26 A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 27 dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The 1 movant bears the initial responsibility of providing the basis for its motion and identifying 2 those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate 3 the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A genuine 4 dispute of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 5 verdict for the nonmoving party;” and material facts are facts “that might affect the 6 outcome of the suit” under law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 7 At summary judgment, a district court’s function is not to weigh the evidence or 8 make credibility determinations, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. 9 Id. at 255. The court must believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw all justifiable 10 inferences in her favor. Id. However, if the moving party “meets its initial burden of 11 identifying for the court the portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate 12 the absence of any genuine issue of material fact …. the nonmoving party must set forth, 13 by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, specific facts showing that there is a 14 genuine issue for trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 15 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up). “Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits 16 and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary 17 judgment.” Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). 18 Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing 19 sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which 20 that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 21 DISCUSSION 22 The Bureau brings its summary judgment motion asserting that it is entitled to 23 judgment as a matter of law because Pinson fails to establish the necessary elements of a 24 Privacy Act violation under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D). (Doc. 215 at 7-13.) It specifically 25 argues that: (i) Pinson’s central inmate file is exempt from the Act; (ii) Pinson fails to 26 demonstrate that Bureau officials disclosed information from her inmate file; (iii) Pinson 27 fails to demonstrate that the alleged disclosure caused an adverse effect; and (iv) Pinson 28 fails to demonstrate that she suffered actual damages as a result of the alleged disclosure. 1 (Id. at 7-13.) In granting summary judgment in the Bureau’s favor, the Court addresses its 2 first and last arguments. 3 I. Disclosure of Inmate Record Information Not Exempt from Act 4 The Bureau first asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because its 5 entire Inmate Central Records System (“ICRS”) is exempt from the Privacy Act. (Doc. 6 215 at 7-8.) The Bureau extrapolates that since the Department of Justice exempts the 7 ICRS from the civil remedies provision of the Act, Pinson has no cause of action for the 8 unlawful disclosure of information within the system. (Id. at 8.) The Court disagrees. 9 The Privacy Act of 1974, codified in part at 5 U.S.C. § 552a, was designed to 10 “protect the privacy of individuals through regulation of the collection, maintenance, use, 11 and dissemination of information by federal agencies.” Rouse v. U.S. Dep't of State, 567 12 F.3d 408, 413 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). It provides agencies with “detailed instructions 13 for managing their records and provides for various sorts of civil relief to individuals 14 aggrieved by failures on the Government's part to comply with the requirements” of the 15 Act. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 618 (2004). The Act expressly prohibits agencies from 16 disclosing “any record ... contained in a system of records by any means of communication 17 to any person” without the subject's permission. Hurt v. D.C. Ct. Servs. & Offender 18 Supervision Agency, 827 F. Supp. 2d 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)). 19 The civil remedies provision of the Act, codified at subsection 552a(g)(1), “links 20 particular violations of the Act to particular remedies in a specific and detailed manner.” 21 Cell Assocs., Inc. v. Nat'l Insts. of Health, Dep't of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 579 F.2d 1155, 22 1158 (9th Cir. 1978). Subsection 552a(g)(1) “lists four types of agency misconduct that 23 give rise to civil remedies and it then states the civil remedies applicable to each.” Id. 24 Pinson claims that the Bureau failed to comply with the nondisclosure provision of the Act, 25 which is codified at subsection 552a(b). (See Doc. 231 at 12.) If an agency violates the 26 Act’s nondisclosure provision, the plaintiff’s claim falls under the Act’s “catch-all” 27 provision, which is codified at subsection 552a(g)(1)(D). Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 28 494 F.3d 1106, 1122 (D.D.C. 2007). Subsection 552a(g)(1)(D) links to the civil remedy 1 provision codified at 552a(g)(4). Cell Assocs., 579 F.2d at 1159. Subsection 552a(g)(4) 2 provides for “damages, costs, and attorney fees, where the agency acted in a manner that 3 was intentional or willful.” Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). 4 While the Act provides remedies for four categories of violations of an individual’s 5 privacy rights, it also allows certain agencies to “promulgate regulations exempting 6 themselves from provisions of the Act.” Fendler v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550, 7 553 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)). Relevant to the issue here, the Department 8 of Justice has promulgated regulations exempting the Bureau’s ICRS from certain 9 provisions of the Act. Id. Specifically, 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(j) (2013) exempts the system of 10 records from subsections 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G), (H), and (I), (5), 11 (8); (f); and (g). However, the regulation does not exempt the system from the Act’s 12 nondisclosure provision, which is codified at subsection 552a(b). See 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(j). 13 Additionally, the Act itself expressly precludes an agency from exempting its 14 records from the nondisclosure provision of the Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (“The head of 15 any agency may promulgate rules … to exempt any system of records within the agency 16 from any part of this section except subsection[ ] (b)”). Since the Act precludes any agency 17 from exempting its systems of records from the Act’s nondisclosure provision, and the 18 Bureau’s own regulation does the same, the Bureau cannot circumvent the Act’s preclusion 19 by exempting its system from the civil remedy provisions of the Act. See Fendler, 846 20 F.2d at 554 (concluding that the Bureau cannot invoke its own regulation to impliedly 21 exempt itself from liability of a non-exemptible substantive provision of the Act). 22 The Bureau argues, nonetheless, that it is not liable for any violation of the Act’s 23 nondisclosure provision because regulation 16.97(j) exempts its ICRS from the civil 24 remedy provision of the Act. (Doc. 215 at 7.) The Bureau concludes that since the ICRS 25 is exempt from the civil remedy provision of the Act, the system must also be exempt from 26 the Act’s substantive provisions as well. (Id. at 8.) As discussed above, this argument is 27 unavailing, and the case law the Bureau identifies to support its argument is clearly 28 distinguishable from the issue at hand. See Lynn v. Lappin, 593 F. Supp. 2d 104, 107 1 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphasis added) (cleaned up) (dismissing Privacy Act claim because the 2 DOJ properly exempted the Bureau’s ICRS “entirely from the access and amendment 3 requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)”); Brown v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 602 F. Supp. 2d 4 173, 175 (D.D.C. 2009) (cleaned up) (emphasis added) (dismissing Privacy Act 5 maintenance claim and ruling that “an individual cannot sue the [Bureau] for damages 6 under the Privacy Act for information not maintained or incorrectly maintained in the 7 BOP’s Inmate Central Records System.”); Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351 8 (9th Cir. 1986) (summarily affirming dismissal of Privacy Act maintenance claim because 9 DOJ exempted FBI’s system of records from subsection 552a(g) pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 10 16.96(e)); Scaff-Martinez v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 160 F. App'x 955, 956 (11th Cir. 2005) 11 (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s claims against the Bureau for (i) failure to maintain 12 accurate records; (ii) expungement of false information from file; and (iii) amendment of 13 inaccurate file under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(d) and 552a(e)(5)). 14 More importantly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit squarely 15 rejected an analogous argument raised by the Bureau over three decades ago. In Fendler 16 v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1988), the Bureau tried, and 17 failed, to use a nearly identical argument to exempt its system of records from a different 18 provision of the Act. Id. at 553-54. There, the Bureau had created an internal file on a 19 prisoner which included an allegedly inaccurate presentence report. Id. The Bureau then 20 provided a copy of the file to the parole commission for a release date determination. Id. 21 The prisoner filed suit alleging that the Bureau violated the Act by failing to correct the 22 inaccurate report and other internally generated documents. Id. The prisoner also alleged 23 that the commission set a release date later than what was warranted because the 24 commission relied on the Bureau’s inaccurate information. Id. 25 Like here, the Bureau argued that it was not liable for a substantive violation of the 26 Act because its own federal guidance exempted it from the civil remedies provision of the 27 statute. See id. at 553 (labeling the Bureau’s challenge to subsection (g)(1) as an attack on 28 the Act’s “enforcement provision”). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, ruling: 1 Clearly each subsection of (g)(1) enforces a separate substantive provision of section 552a. The [Bureau] would have us read its exemption from 2 “subsection (g)” literally, to encompass each of subsections (g)(1)(A), 3 (g)(1)(B), and (g)(1)(C) …. [W]e cannot give the exemption this reading.

4 The Privacy Act sets forth certain requirements which agencies must satisfy 5 if they wish to exempt themselves from the provisions of the Act. In order for an agency to exempt itself from the provisions of the Privacy Act, it must 6 follow the procedure set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j). According to section 7 552a(j), an agency can exempt certain record systems from section 552a's requirements by promulgating regulations, as the Bureau of Prisons has done. 8 Subsection (j) also mandates, though, that the agency state its reasons for 9 exempting the records when it adopts the regulation. It is this latter requirement which prevents the Bureau of Prisons from relying on regulation 10 16.97(a) to impliedly exempt itself from subsection (e)(5) in this case. 11 The Bureau of Prisons has set forth a justification for exempting an agency 12 from subsection (g) in regulation 16.97(b)(9). 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(b)(9) 13 explains that exemption from subsection (g) is justified “because exemption from provisions of subsection (d) will render provisions of this subsection 14 inapplicable.” The Bureau of Prisons' reason for exempting itself from subsection (g), then, has nothing to do with enforcement of subsection (e)(5), 15 nor with subsection (g)(1)(C), (e)(5)'s enforcement provision. Rather, the 16 exemption from subsection (g) can only be understood as applying to subsections (g)(1)(A) and (g)(1)(B), the enforcement provisions for 17 subsection (d). In light of the Bureau of Prisons' clearly expressed 18 justification for exemption from subsection (g), we cannot find that the Bureau of Prisons intended any implied exemption from subsection (e)(5). 19 …. 20 … Thus we conclude that the Bureau of Prisons cannot escape liability by relying on the exemptions provided for in regulation 16.97. 21

22 Id. at 553-54 (internal citations omitted). 23 Review of the regulation at issue here, 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(j), indicates that the ICRS 24 is exempt from the civil remedy provision of the Act “only to the extent that information 25 in this system is subject to exemption [under] 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2) and/or (k)(2).” 28 C.F.R. 26 § 16.97(k). That is to say that the civil remedy exemption only applies to those provisions 27 already exempt from the Act under subsections 552a(j) and/or 552a(k). As the Court 28 previously noted, see supra p. 7, subsection 552a(j) precludes an agency from exempting 1 its systems of records from the nondisclosure provision of the Act. Because the Bureau 2 fails to adequately support its implied exemption assertion, and due to the fact that the 3 Ninth Circuit has flatly rejected an analogous argument, the Court concludes that Pinson 4 maintains a cognizable cause of action for the alleged unlawful disclosure of information 5 contained in the Bureau’s ICRS, and the Bureau’s argument is denied. 6 II. Pinson Fails to Establish Actual Damages 7 While the Court concludes that Pinson maintains a cause of action under the Privacy 8 Act for the unlawful disclosure of records from her inmate file, it agrees with the Bureau 9 that Pinson fails to establish actual damages in the form of pecuniary or economic harm 10 from the alleged violation of the Act. (See Docs. 215 at 12-13; 235 at 11.) Pinson’s failure 11 to establish an essential element of her claim is dispositive of this case because Pinson 12 “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to her 13 case, and on which she will bear the burden of proof at trial.” See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. 14 As such, the Bureau’s summary judgment motion is granted, and the case is dismissed. 15 To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff seeking relief under the nondisclosure 16 provision of the Privacy Act must establish that: (i) “the information is covered by the Act 17 as a ‘record’ contained in a ‘system of records’;” (ii) “the agency disclosed the information 18 improperly;” (iii) “the disclosure had an adverse effect on the plaintiff;” (iv) “the disclosure 19 was willful or intentional;” and (v) “the plaintiff suffered actual damages.” Haiping Su v. 20 Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., No. 5:09-CV-02838, 2013 WL 1663608, at *4 (N.D. 21 Cal. Apr. 17, 2013) (citing Stafford v. Social Sec. Admin., 437 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1117 22 (N.D. Cal. 2006)); cf. Rose v. United States, 905 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1990) (ruling 23 that subsection (g)(1)(C) of the Act is “violated when the plaintiff shows 1) that the 24 government failed to fulfill its record keeping obligation, 2) which failure proximately 25 caused the adverse determination, 3) that the agency failed intentionally or willfully to 26 maintain the records, and 4) that the plaintiff suffered actual damages.”). 27 The Supreme Court has adopted an interpretation of “actual damages” under the 28 Privacy Act that is limited to “proven pecuniary or economic harm.” F.A.A. v. Cooper, 1 566 U.S. 284, 300 (2012). The Court’s ruling forecloses recovery for nonpecuniary harm, 2 “even if such harm can be proved[;]” and damages in the form of mental and emotional 3 distress, reputational harm, shame, mortification, and injury to feelings fail to qualify for 4 relief under the Act. Id. at 301; see also Haiping Su, 2013 WL 1663608, at *4. Under the 5 Act, a federal agency’s liability is limited “to harm that can be substantiated by proof of 6 tangible economic loss.” Cooper, 566 U.S. at 303. 7 Here, Plaintiff fails to argue, much less demonstrate, that she suffered tangible 8 economic loss as a result of the Bureau’s alleged unlawful dissemination of information 9 that was located in her inmate file. (See Docs. 231-32.) Plaintiff only alludes to damages 10 in the form of reputational harm and a subsequent assault on her with feces by another 11 inmate. (See Doc. 16 at 3 (“I was labeled a snitch nationwide and in late 2013 was assaulted 12 with feces by an irate prisoner”).) While these damages may afford Pinson relief for 13 constitutional Bivens claims, see Pinson v. Unknown Party, 698 F. App'x 445, 446 (9th Cir. 14 2017) (reiterating that labeling a prisoner a snitch may violate the prisoner’s right to be 15 protected from violence while in custody), they are insufficient to survive summary 16 judgment on a Privacy Act claim, see Glass v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 279 F. Supp. 3d 279, 281 17 (D.D.C. 2017) (cleaned up) (concluding that a plaintiff’s “vague description of the harms 18 allegedly sustained as a result of [an agency’s] disclosure cannot support a demand for 19 actual damages that must be limited to proven pecuniary or economic harm”). While the 20 record confirms that Pinson was assaulted with feces in 2013, it also demonstrates that she 21 was evaluated by a medical provider the same day, she failed to suffer any physical injuries 22 from the assault, and she was provided with clean clothes and shower supplies free of 23 charge. (See Doc. 139 at 12, 16, 35-36.) Accordingly, Pinson fails to establish actual 24 damages for the alleged unlawful disclosure of records within her inmate file, and the 25 Bureau’s summary judgment motion is granted. 26 CONCLUSION 27 Plaintiff Jeremy Pinson filed this action over a decade ago alleging constitutional 28 Bivens claims and a violation of the Privacy Act. Pinson’s Bivens claims were ultimately 1 || dismissed, and the Court was left to decide her Privacy Act claim under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). After briefing on the claim, the Court concludes that while Pinson maintains a cause of || action for a violation of the nondisclosure provision of the Act, she fails to establish that 4|| she suffered actual damages as a result of the alleged violation. Accordingly, the Bureau || of Prison’s summary judgment motion is granted, and the case is dismissed. 6 7 Dated this 16th day of September, 2024. 8 9 10 Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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