Pinpoint Consumer Targeting Services, Inc. v. United States

59 Fed. Cl. 74, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 379, 2003 WL 22995125
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedDecember 18, 2003
DocketNo. 02-714C
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 59 Fed. Cl. 74 (Pinpoint Consumer Targeting Services, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pinpoint Consumer Targeting Services, Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 74, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 379, 2003 WL 22995125 (uscfc 2003).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

HODGES, Judge.

This is an action for breach of contract. Plaintiff claims that the United States Defense Commissary Agency did not use its best efforts to assist PinPoint in promoting its government-licensed coupon program. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and defendant filed a counterclaim for unpaid royalties. The meaning of “best [75]*75efforts” as used in the License Agreement controls this case. We grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment and enter judgment for defendant on its counterclaim.

I. SUMMARY

A.

The Department of Defense operates commissaries for military personnel and their families through the Defense Commissary Agency, sometimes known as DeCA. See 32 C.F.R § 383a. The Agency’s mission is to “[pjrovide an efficient and effective worldwide system of commissaries for the resale of groceries and household supplies at the lowest practical price (consistent with quality) to members of the Military Services, their famines, and other authorized patrons, while maintaining high standards of quality, facilities, products and service.” 32 C.F.R. § 383a.3.1

Commissaries differ little from civilian grocery stores or supermarkets except for their lower prices. See 10 U.S.C. § 2486(a) (stating that commissaries sell merchandise similar to that sold in commercial grocery stores). Federal law requires that commissaries provide consistently low prices, currently cost plus five percent. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2486(c)-(d). The five percent markup covers the cost of building new facilities and maintaining current ones. DeCA manages 281 commissaries for military personnel and retirees, and their families. A family of four saves more than $2400 per year on an average of thirty percent lower prices at commissaries. See Vision Statement of the Defense Commissary Agency, Defendant’s Appendix p. 648. Commissaries “enhance the quality of life for America’s military and their families ____[and] help the United States recruit and keep the best and brightest men and women in the service of their country.” Id.

DeCA advertised in a January 1999 industry magazine for “energetic, innovative and aggressive companies to develop, implement and maintain high quality professional in-store advertising programs [including] coupon dispensers or advertisements on checkout order dividers.” Plaintiff PinPoint responded to DeCA’s advertisement with a proposal to print manufacturers’ coupons on the reverse side of register tapes for government commissaries. PinPoint had been in the marketing business since 1995, focusing on selling advertising on cash register tapes. Plaintiff agreed to pay a license fee to the Agency and to provide the register tapes at no cost. The coupon program was to require very little administrative support from the Government.2

The Government accepted PinPoint’s offer and the parties entered a two-year License Agreement. The Agreement granted plaintiff a license to print register tape coupons for government commissaries world wide. Plaintiff could renew the license for two years. It could terminate the program upon sixty-days notice if it could not sell at least fifty percent of available coupon space. DeCA and PinPoint inaugurated the Register Tape Coupon Program on September 1, 2000.3

B.

Plaintiff claims that defendant breached the License Agreement by refusing to use its best efforts as required by the contract. PinPoint asked defendant to take various actions to promote the Coupon Program but DeCA did not think that some were appropriate for the Government to undertake. The parties could not agree fully on measures that DeCA should take to support plaintiffs Program during the term of the License Agreement. Nevertheless, PinPoint asked the Contracting Officer in November 2001 to extend its license for another two [76]*76years. The Contracting Officer urged PinPoint to decide whether it was willing to conduct an extension of the Coupon Program on defendant’s terms. That is, he wanted an understanding from PinPoint that DeCA had fulfilled its obligations under the License Agreement.

C.

Plaintiff contends that defendant’s marketing strategy undermined PinPoint’s Coupon Program. DeCA used both High-Low and Eveiyday Low Price or EDLP strategies during the license period. The effect of an EDLP strategy can be that vendors may have less money available for advertising. The Coupon Program was a form of advertising, so plaintiff believes that DeCA’s use of EDLP meant the possibility of less participation by vendors in plaintiffs Program.

D.

The parties held a meeting to address PinPoint’s concerns in early February 2002. Plaintiff wrote DeCA after the meeting to suggest efforts that defendant could make to improve the Program. The Agency agreed to several of these requests but felt that some efforts would violate ethics regulations applicable to DeCA and to government employees generally.4

Defendant’s Executive Director for Operations and Product Support recommended that DeCA not renew the Coupon Program with PinPoint. The Contracting Officer agreed and notified PinPoint in March 2002 that it would not renew the Program.5 PinPoint filed a claim with the Contracting Officer on April 11, 2002 and the Contracting Officer has not responded. See 41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(5). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 609(a).

E.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” RCFC 56(c). The parties do not dispute any factual issues necessary for the court to rule whether defendant made its best efforts to assist plaintiff.6 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1987) (citations omitted).

The parties agree that summary judgment is the proper vehicle for resolving this case. This does not relieve the court of the need to assess the Record to insure that genuine or material facts are not in dispute. Cross-motions for summary judgment call upon the court to evaluate each party’s motion on its own merit, taking care to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration. DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1322 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (citations omitted); Gart v. Logitech, Inc.,

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59 Fed. Cl. 74, 2003 U.S. Claims LEXIS 379, 2003 WL 22995125, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pinpoint-consumer-targeting-services-inc-v-united-states-uscfc-2003.