Pincus Hueter v. Kruse
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEVEN JAY PINCUS HUETER, Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:20-cv-03686 (TNM)
LEALAIALOA FRITZ MICHAEL KRUSE, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Steven Jay Pincus Hueter, proceeding pro se, sues over 70 defendants, including federal and American Samoa government officials. See Third Am. Compl. at 11–20, ECF No. 104. 1 He mainly challenges government actions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. See generally id. Before the Court is Hueter’s request to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. See Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Fourth Am. Compl. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 95. He proposes adding many new claims and defendants. Because Hueter’s proposed amendments are futile, the Court will deny his motion.
I.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amended pleadings. Once a party has amended its pleading once as of right, it “may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. With that said, “the Court may deny a
1 All page citations refer to the page numbers that the CM/ECF system generates.
motion to amend if such amendment would be futile.” De Sousa v. Dep’t of State, 840 F. Supp. 2d 92, 113 (D.D.C. 2012). “An amendment would be futile if it . . . fails to state a legal theory, or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.
The Court is mindful that Hueter is proceeding pro se. As a general matter, “[p]ro se litigants are allowed more latitude than litigants represented by counsel to correct defects in service of process and pleadings.” Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Indeed, the Court has allowed Hueter wide latitude to amend his complaint several times already. Ultimately, though, “the grant or denial of leave to amend is committed to a district court’s discretion.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
II.
At this point, the Court addresses only the claims and arguments newly raised in Hueter’s proposed Fourth Amended Complaint: (1) that Defendants have discriminated and conspired against him in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–42; (2) that he is entitled to declaratory relief against judicial officials in American Samoa under the Declaratory Judgment Act; (3) that Defendants have violated the False Claims Act; (4) that F. Michael Kruse, Chief Justice of American Samoa, has injured him under 28 U.S.C. § 351; and (5) that several newly added Defendants improperly used CARES Act funds. See, e.g., Pl.’s Proposed Fourth Am. Compl. at 32–35, 116, ECF No. 95-1. None would survive a motion to dismiss.
First, Hueter’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 fail because there is no private right of action under these criminal statutes. See, e.g., McCray v. Holder, 391 F. App’x 887, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (concluding that “district court correctly held that there is no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242”); Rockefeller v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals Off., for Tenth Cir. Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[T]he plaintiff is precluded from
asserting any claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 371 because, as criminal statutes, they do not convey a private right of action.”).
Second, judicial immunity bars Hueter’s claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02. Hueter brings these claims against “Defendants Justices and Judges of the Judiciary of American Samoa,” Proposed Fourth Am. Compl. at 34, demanding relief for violations of his constitutional rights which occurred during judicial proceedings before the American Samoan courts. See id. But these “necessarily arose in the context of [the judges’] rulings and determinations in Plaintiff’s various cases before them.” Jenkins v. Kerry, 928 F. Supp. 2d 122, 134 (D.D.C. 2013). And “such claims are not cognizable because a judge acting in his or her judicial capacity—i.e., performing a function normally performed by a judge—is immune from suit on all judicial acts, as long as the judge was not acting in the complete absence of jurisdiction.” Id. (cleaned up); Fogle v. Walton-Pratt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 114, 119 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). The declaratory relief Hueter requests “is instead available by way of a direct appeal of the judge’s order.” Jenkins, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 135; cf. Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986) (“Challenges to rulings made during the course of judicial proceedings should be made by appeal in those cases.”).
Third, Hueter is not qualified to pursue claims under the False Claims Act (“FCA”). The FCA, see 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–32, “is an anti-fraud statute that prohibits the knowing submission of false or fraudulent claims to the federal government,” United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003). The statute authorizes a private individual, as a relator, “to bring [a qui tam] action in the Government’s name, and to recover a portion of the proceeds of the action, subject to the requirements of the statute.” U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).
“[P]ro se parties may not pursue [qui tam] actions on behalf of the United States.”
Walker v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2015); Yellen v. U.S. Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 301 F. Supp. 3d 43, 49 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). The United States is “the real party in interest” in such an action, “and a pro se plaintiff is not qualified as a lay person to represent the interests of the United States in court proceedings.” Cobb v. California, No. 15-cv-176, 2015 WL 512896, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2015) (cleaned up); accord Jones v. Jindal, 409 F. App’x 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of qui tam complaint “because a pro se plaintiff may not file a qui tam action pursuant to the False Claims Act”). Hueter appears to acknowledge as much. See, e.g., Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Leave to File Fourth Am. Compl. at 44, ECF No. 112 (“Plaintiff’s Qui Tam claims, when represented by Counsel . . . may be separated as a distinct Complaint, and substantially succeed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted . . . .”).
Fourth, 28 U.S.C. § 351 does not apply. Hueter alleges that Chief Justice Kruse injured him, but the statute on which he relies applies to federal courts, not legislative ones. See 28 U.S.C. § 351(d) (defining “judge” to “mean[] a circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge”). And in any event, the statute does not create a private cause of action. Rather, it provides a procedure by which persons “may file with the clerk of the court of appeals for the circuit a written complaint” about a federal judge’s conduct. Id. § 351(a); cf. Ponton v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals, No. 10-cv-2213-JBS, 2011 WL 1045035, at * 3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2011) (“To recognize Plaintiff’s claim of a right to prosecute a disciplinary case against a judicial officer would be to convert a general procedural statute for court administration into a private right of action, which is something the Congress has not done in 28 U.S.C. § 351”).
Finally, Hueter lacks standing to pursue claims against two companies and individuals associated with them for their alleged misappropriation, misuse, or failure to return CARES Act funds. Proposed Fourth Am. Compl. at 116; see also id. at 28–30 (naming new defendants).
The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to deciding “Cases” and “Controversies.”
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