Pincus Hueter v. Kruse

District Court, District of Columbia·Decided July 20, 2021·No. Civil Action No. 2020-3686·Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

STEVEN JAY PINCUS HUETER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:20-cv-03686 (TNM)

LEALAIALOA FRITZ MICHAEL KRUSE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Plaintiff Steven Jay Pincus Hueter, proceeding pro se, sues over 70 defendants, including

federal and American Samoa government officials. See Third Am. Compl. at 11–20, ECF No.

104. 1 He mainly challenges government actions related to the COVID-19 pandemic. See

generally id. Before the Court is Hueter’s request to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. See

Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File Fourth Am. Compl. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 95. He proposes adding

many new claims and defendants. Because Hueter’s proposed amendments are futile, the Court

will deny his motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs amended pleadings. Once a party has

amended its pleading once as of right, it “may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s

written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 provides that “[t]he court

should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. With that said, “the Court may deny a

1 All page citations refer to the page numbers that the CM/ECF system generates. motion to amend if such amendment would be futile.” De Sousa v. Dep’t of State, 840 F. Supp.

2d 92, 113 (D.D.C. 2012). “An amendment would be futile if it . . . fails to state a legal theory,

or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

The Court is mindful that Hueter is proceeding pro se. As a general matter, “[p]ro se

litigants are allowed more latitude than litigants represented by counsel to correct defects in

service of process and pleadings.” Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 876 (D.C. Cir.

1993). Indeed, the Court has allowed Hueter wide latitude to amend his complaint several times

already. Ultimately, though, “the grant or denial of leave to amend is committed to a district

court’s discretion.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

II.

At this point, the Court addresses only the claims and arguments newly raised in Hueter’s

proposed Fourth Amended Complaint: (1) that Defendants have discriminated and conspired

against him in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–42; (2) that he is entitled to declaratory relief

against judicial officials in American Samoa under the Declaratory Judgment Act; (3) that

Defendants have violated the False Claims Act; (4) that F. Michael Kruse, Chief Justice of

American Samoa, has injured him under 28 U.S.C. § 351; and (5) that several newly added

Defendants improperly used CARES Act funds. See, e.g., Pl.’s Proposed Fourth Am. Compl. at

32–35, 116, ECF No. 95-1. None would survive a motion to dismiss.

First, Hueter’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 fail because there is no private

right of action under these criminal statutes. See, e.g., McCray v. Holder, 391 F. App’x 887, 888

(D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (concluding that “district court correctly held that there is no

private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242”); Rockefeller v. U.S. Ct. of Appeals Off.,

for Tenth Cir. Judges, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2003) (“[T]he plaintiff is precluded from

2 asserting any claims pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 242 and 371 because, as criminal statutes, they do

not convey a private right of action.”).

Second, judicial immunity bars Hueter’s claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28

U.S.C. §§ 2201–02. Hueter brings these claims against “Defendants Justices and Judges of the

Judiciary of American Samoa,” Proposed Fourth Am. Compl. at 34, demanding relief for

violations of his constitutional rights which occurred during judicial proceedings before the

American Samoan courts. See id. But these “necessarily arose in the context of [the judges’]

rulings and determinations in Plaintiff’s various cases before them.” Jenkins v. Kerry, 928 F.

Supp. 2d 122, 134 (D.D.C. 2013). And “such claims are not cognizable because a judge acting

in his or her judicial capacity—i.e., performing a function normally performed by a judge—is

immune from suit on all judicial acts, as long as the judge was not acting in the complete absence

of jurisdiction.” Id. (cleaned up); Fogle v. Walton-Pratt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 114, 119 (D.D.C.

2018) (same). The declaratory relief Hueter requests “is instead available by way of a direct

appeal of the judge’s order.” Jenkins, 928 F. Supp. 2d at 135; cf. Lewis v. Green, 629 F. Supp.

546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986) (“Challenges to rulings made during the course of judicial proceedings

should be made by appeal in those cases.”).

Third, Hueter is not qualified to pursue claims under the False Claims Act (“FCA”). The

FCA, see 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–32, “is an anti-fraud statute that prohibits the knowing submission

of false or fraudulent claims to the federal government,” United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty.

Health Sys., Inc., 342 F.3d 634, 640 (6th Cir. 2003). The statute authorizes a private individual,

as a relator, “to bring [a qui tam] action in the Government’s name, and to recover a portion of

the proceeds of the action, subject to the requirements of the statute.” U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM

Corp., 659 F.3d 1204, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).

3 “[P]ro se parties may not pursue [qui tam] actions on behalf of the United States.”

Walker v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2015); Yellen v. U.S. Bank,

Nat’l Ass’n, 301 F. Supp. 3d 43, 49 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). The United States is “the real party in

interest” in such an action, “and a pro se plaintiff is not qualified as a lay person to represent the

interests of the United States in court proceedings.” Cobb v.

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