[122]*122BUTTLER, J.
Petitioners filed a petition for a statutory way of necessity over a road that runs across objectors’ land. ORS 376.150 to 376.200. The county court denied,the petition. The circuit court reviewed de novo and granted the petition. However, it restricted the use of the way to the historical use by petitioners and expressly excluded use by anyone who might obtain any of petitioners’ property through partition or subdivision. It also ordered that the width of the way be the width of the existing road.1 Petitioners appeal, arguing that, although the circuit court correctly granted the way, it imposed restrictions that are not authorized by statute. Objectors cross-appeal, contending that petitioners are not entitled to a statutory way of necessity, because they have an existing easement. We review de novo,2 ORS 19.125(3), Witten v. Murphy, 71 Or App 511, 513, 692 P2d 715 (1984), rev den 298 Or 773 (1985), and, because we agree with objectors and the [123]*123county court, we reverse on the cross-appeal, rendering the appeal moot.
Petitioners own land on the north bank of the John Day River in Grant County. Objectors own land to the east of that of petitioners on the south bank between the river and Highway 26. Petitioners seek a way of necessity over a road known as John Day Lane that runs along the west border of objectors’ land from Highway 26 to a bridge that crosses the river to the southeast corner of petitioners’ land. That bridge was constructed in 1938 under an agreement between petitioners’ predecessors in interest and objectors’ predecessors in interest. When petitioners bought their property in 1979, they believed that they could use the 1938 bridge under that agreement, and they did so until 1984.
Before petitioners purchased the land, it was under common ownership with the land across the river immediately to the souÚi that is now owned by Matuna.3 When they purchased, petitioners acquired an easement approximately one-half mile long across Matuna’s land, west of the proposed way of necessity, to State Highway 26. The bridge that had permitted crossing the river from the easement across Matuna’s land to petitioners’ land, however, had washed out in 1974. Although petitioners had planned originally to replace the bridge and had bought material to do it, they have not. In 1980, the width of the river at the site of the collapsed bridge was about 48 feet. At the time of trial, it had widened to about [124]*124105 feet. There is a divergence of opinion as to the cost of replacing the bridge: Petitioners’ expert testified that it would cost about $106,000, and objectors’ expert said that it would cost about $23,500.
In 1984, petitioners sought to partition their land. The partition was approved, subject to proof of legal access to the property. Shortly thereafter, petitioners were notified by objectors that they no longer had permission to use objectors’ road and the 1938 bridge. Petitioners then sought a declaratory judgment entitling them to do so under the 1938 agreement. The circuit court found that the road was not “an approach” within the meaning of that agreement and denied relief. We affirmed without opinion. Pike v. Wyllie, 85 Or App 555, 736 P2d 1030, rev den 304 Or 55 (1987). Petitioners then initiated this proceeding to establish a statutory way of necessity. Because the 1979 legislature completely revised the statutory scheme providing for ways of necessity, we address the cross-appeal first to determine whether petitioners are entitled to a way of necessity under the new law.
Before the 1979 revision of the ways of necessity law, former ORS 376.105 provided, in part:
“Whenever it appears to any county court by the sworn petition of any person that the farm or residence of such person is not reached conveniently by any public road provided by law, and that it is necessary that the public and such person have ingress to and egress from the farm or residence of such person, the county court shall: * * (Emphasis supplied.)
The statute went on to set out the procedure for initiating the process by which a way of necessity could be obtained.4
In 1979, SB 769 was proposed to amend certain provisions and to repeal others relating to ways of necessity. Section 1 of that bill originally provided:
“If the farm or residence of any person is not reached conveniently by any public road provided by law and it is necessary that the public and the person have access to the [125]*125farm or residence, the person may file a sworn petition in the circuit court of the county in which the farm or residence is located.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In testimony before the Senate Local Government Committee, Jack Sollis, of the Oregon Department of Transportation, pointed out some problems with the bill, including section 1 quoted above:
“The provisions of Section 1 on line 5 ‘if the farm or residence of any person is not reached conveniently by any public road provided by law’ the term ‘conveniently’ is very ambiguous and capable of being construed in a very broad way by the courts. ‘Conveniently’ could mean that it would merely cost more to build a road through property owned by the individual requesting the way of necessity over his own land, but it would be more convenient to build it across somebody elses land because it is cheaper. ‘Conveniently’ could also be construed by the courts as meaning that it would be not only less costly, but more convenient to build a road a half of a mile over other property rather than a road a mile long over the individual’s property that would be more circuitous.” (Emphasis in original.)
The witness suggested implicitly that the concept of convenience be eliminated and that the entire law on ways of necessity be rewritten, rather than changed by amendment of the existing statutes. Eventually, those suggestions, as well as almost all of that witness’ suggestions, were accepted.
The original bill also provided that, “if the court is satisfied that establishment of access is just, the court shall declare the road or gateway to be a public road * * (Emphasis supplied.) That provision was also eliminated. As enacted, the new law, ORS 376.155, requires that, to establish a way of necessity, a landowner must file a petition with the governing body of the county in which the land is located that must contain:
“(2) * * * all of the following information:
U* * * * *
“(j) Evidence that the petitioner does not have an existing easement or right to an easement to provide access to a public road.” ORS 376.155.
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[122]*122BUTTLER, J.
Petitioners filed a petition for a statutory way of necessity over a road that runs across objectors’ land. ORS 376.150 to 376.200. The county court denied,the petition. The circuit court reviewed de novo and granted the petition. However, it restricted the use of the way to the historical use by petitioners and expressly excluded use by anyone who might obtain any of petitioners’ property through partition or subdivision. It also ordered that the width of the way be the width of the existing road.1 Petitioners appeal, arguing that, although the circuit court correctly granted the way, it imposed restrictions that are not authorized by statute. Objectors cross-appeal, contending that petitioners are not entitled to a statutory way of necessity, because they have an existing easement. We review de novo,2 ORS 19.125(3), Witten v. Murphy, 71 Or App 511, 513, 692 P2d 715 (1984), rev den 298 Or 773 (1985), and, because we agree with objectors and the [123]*123county court, we reverse on the cross-appeal, rendering the appeal moot.
Petitioners own land on the north bank of the John Day River in Grant County. Objectors own land to the east of that of petitioners on the south bank between the river and Highway 26. Petitioners seek a way of necessity over a road known as John Day Lane that runs along the west border of objectors’ land from Highway 26 to a bridge that crosses the river to the southeast corner of petitioners’ land. That bridge was constructed in 1938 under an agreement between petitioners’ predecessors in interest and objectors’ predecessors in interest. When petitioners bought their property in 1979, they believed that they could use the 1938 bridge under that agreement, and they did so until 1984.
Before petitioners purchased the land, it was under common ownership with the land across the river immediately to the souÚi that is now owned by Matuna.3 When they purchased, petitioners acquired an easement approximately one-half mile long across Matuna’s land, west of the proposed way of necessity, to State Highway 26. The bridge that had permitted crossing the river from the easement across Matuna’s land to petitioners’ land, however, had washed out in 1974. Although petitioners had planned originally to replace the bridge and had bought material to do it, they have not. In 1980, the width of the river at the site of the collapsed bridge was about 48 feet. At the time of trial, it had widened to about [124]*124105 feet. There is a divergence of opinion as to the cost of replacing the bridge: Petitioners’ expert testified that it would cost about $106,000, and objectors’ expert said that it would cost about $23,500.
In 1984, petitioners sought to partition their land. The partition was approved, subject to proof of legal access to the property. Shortly thereafter, petitioners were notified by objectors that they no longer had permission to use objectors’ road and the 1938 bridge. Petitioners then sought a declaratory judgment entitling them to do so under the 1938 agreement. The circuit court found that the road was not “an approach” within the meaning of that agreement and denied relief. We affirmed without opinion. Pike v. Wyllie, 85 Or App 555, 736 P2d 1030, rev den 304 Or 55 (1987). Petitioners then initiated this proceeding to establish a statutory way of necessity. Because the 1979 legislature completely revised the statutory scheme providing for ways of necessity, we address the cross-appeal first to determine whether petitioners are entitled to a way of necessity under the new law.
Before the 1979 revision of the ways of necessity law, former ORS 376.105 provided, in part:
“Whenever it appears to any county court by the sworn petition of any person that the farm or residence of such person is not reached conveniently by any public road provided by law, and that it is necessary that the public and such person have ingress to and egress from the farm or residence of such person, the county court shall: * * (Emphasis supplied.)
The statute went on to set out the procedure for initiating the process by which a way of necessity could be obtained.4
In 1979, SB 769 was proposed to amend certain provisions and to repeal others relating to ways of necessity. Section 1 of that bill originally provided:
“If the farm or residence of any person is not reached conveniently by any public road provided by law and it is necessary that the public and the person have access to the [125]*125farm or residence, the person may file a sworn petition in the circuit court of the county in which the farm or residence is located.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In testimony before the Senate Local Government Committee, Jack Sollis, of the Oregon Department of Transportation, pointed out some problems with the bill, including section 1 quoted above:
“The provisions of Section 1 on line 5 ‘if the farm or residence of any person is not reached conveniently by any public road provided by law’ the term ‘conveniently’ is very ambiguous and capable of being construed in a very broad way by the courts. ‘Conveniently’ could mean that it would merely cost more to build a road through property owned by the individual requesting the way of necessity over his own land, but it would be more convenient to build it across somebody elses land because it is cheaper. ‘Conveniently’ could also be construed by the courts as meaning that it would be not only less costly, but more convenient to build a road a half of a mile over other property rather than a road a mile long over the individual’s property that would be more circuitous.” (Emphasis in original.)
The witness suggested implicitly that the concept of convenience be eliminated and that the entire law on ways of necessity be rewritten, rather than changed by amendment of the existing statutes. Eventually, those suggestions, as well as almost all of that witness’ suggestions, were accepted.
The original bill also provided that, “if the court is satisfied that establishment of access is just, the court shall declare the road or gateway to be a public road * * (Emphasis supplied.) That provision was also eliminated. As enacted, the new law, ORS 376.155, requires that, to establish a way of necessity, a landowner must file a petition with the governing body of the county in which the land is located that must contain:
“(2) * * * all of the following information:
U* * * * *
“(j) Evidence that the petitioner does not have an existing easement or right to an easement to provide access to a public road.” ORS 376.155.
To emphasize those requirements, ORS 376.180 provides:
[126]*126“A way of necessity established under ORS 376.150 to 376.200 shall:
<<* * * * *
“(8) Not be established if the property for which the way of necessity is sought has an existing enforceable access to a public road;
“(9) Not be established if the petitioner for the way of necessity could acquire an easement for access to a public road through other legal action[.]”
The new statutory requirement could not be more clear: One is not entitled to a way of necessity if he has “an existing enforceable access to a public road.” That is, if the petitioners have a legally enforceable easement for access to a public road, they may not obtain a way of necessity. As petitioners recognize, they do have an enforceable easement over the property of their grantors that gives them access to a public road. They contend, however, as does the dissent, that the problem is that it does not provide them reasonable access to a public road. Nowhere in the 1979 statutory scheme is there a reference to “reasonable” access. It is no longer sufficient that the petitioner not have “convenient” access or that the court finds that it would be “just” to establish a way of necessity. For this court to import either of those limitations into the disqualification when the person has an enforceable easement is to undo what the legislature did in 1979 when it eliminated the concept of “convenient” or “just” access to a public road. The legislature could have completely eliminated statutory ways of necessity, as one witness suggested. It did not do that, but it narrowed substantially the circumstances in which a way of necessity may be obtained.
Petitioners’ enforceable easement exists, notwithstanding the fact that it is in a state of disrepair. The fact that it will cost petitioners more money to replace the bridge on the easement does not detract from the fact that they have a legally enforceable easement5 that gives them access to a public road. For that reason, the statute forbids the granting of a [127]*127way of necessity. None of the authorities cited by petitioners disposes of this question under the present, substantially more restrictive statutory scheme.
Witten v. Murphy, supra, presented the converse of this case. There, we recognized that, if the petitioners had had either an enforceable easement or had the right to acquire an easement, they could not obtain a way of necessity under the 1979 statutory scheme. The issue was whether they had either. We held that they did not have an enforceable easement or access, because they did not own land abutting a public road,6 and that they could not acquire an easement for access through other legal action, because their use of a road across the land of others had been permissive, precluding an easement by prescription, and that they could not acquire an implied easement over the land of their grantor and others, because the others’ grantor was not the petitioners’ grantor. See Thompson v. Schuh, supra, n 5. Here, petitioners concede that they have an enforceable easement for access to a public road.
Reversed on cross-appeal and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment denying petitioners’ petition for a way of necessity; appeal dismissed as moot.