Pierre Damond Hall v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 6th District (Texarkana)
• Decided: April 27, 2026
• Docket: 06-25-00131-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00131-CR

PIERRE DAMOND HALL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 124th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 55963-B

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin Concurring Opinion by Justice van Cleef, Joined by Chief Justice Stevens MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pierre Damond Hall pled guilty to the third-degree felony offense of possession of a

controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of one gram or more but less than four

grams, and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision. See TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.1022 (“Penalty Group 1-B”), 481.115(c) (Supp.). The State filed a

motion to revoke Hall’s deferred adjudication community supervision, alleging that he tested

positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine and failed to complete an outpatient-treatment

program. The trial court revoked Hall’s community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and

sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. Hall appeals. But he appeals neither his

adjudication of guilt nor his prison sentence. Instead, Hall appeals a $1,550.00 fine. Hall does

so at taxpayer expense; he appeals via appointed counsel, i.e., taxpayer-provided counsel. There

is, however, no constitutional right to taxpayer-provided counsel to contest a fine.

This raises issues addressed herein.

I. Anders1 Liberty-Interest Protection

Hall’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief stating, “Counsel for Appellant has not

found any issues for review. Th[e] brief is written according to Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

[738] (1967).” The brief examined possible avenues for reversing the adjudication and sentence

but set forth counsel’s basis for believing that, on the law and the facts of Hall’s case, those

avenues would prove fruitless. In the same brief, however, counsel asked that the trial court’s

judgment be reformed to delete a fine that was not orally pronounced at sentencing.

1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

2 Our Court,2 and others,3 do not consider a fine to be “reversible” error for purposes of

Anders. There is reason for this. The right to appointed counsel springs from the constitutional

liberty interest. “This Court has held that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant is told

of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty.” Rothgery v.

Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008) (emphasis added); see Gonzalez v. State, 616 S.W.3d

585, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Consequently, there is no constitutional right to appointed

counsel regarding fines. See Empy v. State, 571 S.W.2d 526, 527–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).

“In bringing an appeal as of right from his conviction, a criminal defendant is attempting to

demonstrate that the conviction, with its consequent drastic loss of liberty, is unlawful.” Penson

v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 85 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396

(1985). “[T]he Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only

that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has

afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense.” Scott v. Illinois, 440

U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (emphasis added).

2 See Allen v. State, No. 06-20-00072-CR, 2021 WL 55640, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Jan. 7, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding no reversible error on Anders review, examining a fine as non- reversible error, and reforming the trial court’s judgment to delete the fine); Thomas v. State, No. 06-19-00238-CR, 2020 WL 1467025, at *1–2 (Tex. App.–Texarkana Mar. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). 3 See e.g., Whitmore v. State, No. 12-22-00261-CR, 2023 WL 4882910, at *2 (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31, 2023, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (finding “no reversible error” for purposes of Anders review, then reforming the trial court’s judgment to delete a fine.); Aaron v. State, No. 13-20-00295-CR, 2021 WL 1134310, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same). However, not all of our sister courts share this view. “Because he challenged the assessment of a fine, which is part of the sentence imposed, appointed counsel raised a non-frivolous merits issue involving reversible error.” Palacio v. State, 685 S.W.3d 160, 163 (Tex. App.—Waco 2023, no pet.) (citing Cummins v. State, 646 S.W.3d 605, 619 n.10 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d)). 3 In sum, Anders protects the constitutional liberty interest. See Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d

684, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“the core Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to

appellate counsel for indigent criminal defendants that Anders was intended to vindicate”).

When appointed counsel’s “good-faith review of the law and record suggests to [her] no

plausible grounds for appeal, appointed counsel’s ‘duty to withdraw is based upon [her]

professional and ethical responsibilities as an officer of the court not to burden the judicial

system with false claims, frivolous pleadings, or burdensome time demands.’” Kelly v. State,

436 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding)). The “Anders brief” is an adjunct of appointed

counsel’s motion to withdraw. See id. “The purpose of the Anders brief is to satisfy the

appellate court that the appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw is, indeed, based upon a

conscientious and thorough review of the law and facts . . . .” Id. The defendant has a right to

file a pro se response in opposition to the Anders brief. Id. at 319.

The Court may not grant the motion to withdraw until it has performed its own evaluation

of the record. Id. (citing Penson, 488 U.S. at 82–83).

Counsel filed a motion with this Court seeking to withdraw as counsel in this appeal. We

have conducted an independent review of the entire record and the Anders brief. We affirm the

trial court’s judgment. Hall’s appointed counsel has filed a brief stating that he reviewed the

record and found no genuinely arguable issues that could be raised on appeal. The brief outlines

the procedural history of the case and summarizes the evidence presented during the trial court

proceedings. Since counsel has provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating

4 why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced, that evaluation meets the requirements of

Anders. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 743–44 (1967); Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19.

On January 14, 2026, appellate counsel mailed to Hall copies of the brief, motion to

withdraw, and appellate record. Hall was informed of his right to review the record and file a

pro se response. By letter dated January 15, 2026, this Court informed Hall that his pro se

response was due on or before January 30, 2026. On February 11, 2026, we further informed

Hall that the case would be set for submission on March 4, 2026. We received neither a pro se

response from Hall nor a motion requesting an extension of time in which to file such a response.

We have reviewed the entire appellate record and Hall’s pro se response and have

independently determined that no reversible error exists. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In the Anders context, once we determine that no reversible

error exists, we must affirm the trial court’s judgment. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826–27.

II. “Nonreversible Error”

As noted above, Hall’s appellate counsel challenges a $1,550.00 “Fine” found in the

judgment. We find the fine unsupported by this record and modify the judgment to delete it. In

any plain-speaking use of the word, this is a “reversal” of the fine. However, as noted above,

Anders has its own argot, in which “reversible error” and “nonreversible error” are used to

signify that which must be included in an Anders brief, and that which merely may be. See

Allen, 2021 WL 55640, at *1–2. In light of this distinction, we address questions raised by an

Anders brief that finds no “reversible error” but raises “nonreversible error.”

5 “[W]hen an accused receives deferred adjudication, no sentence is imposed. Then, when

guilt is adjudicated, the order adjudicating guilt sets aside the order deferring adjudication,

including the previously imposed fine.” Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App.

2004). Consequently, when a trial court determines that it is time to put an end to deferred

adjudication, any fine must be orally pronounced at the adjudication hearing. See id.; Ramirez v.

State, No. 06-24-00003-CR, 2024 WL 2197229, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 16, 2024, no

pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Funk v. State, Nos. 12-25-00003-CR & 12-25-

00004-CR, 2025 WL 2985044, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Tyler Oct. 22, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication). “A fine is punitive in nature and is part of a defendant’s sentence.”

Anastassov v. State, 664 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). “A fine is not a court cost or

fee; it is part of the punishment.” Id. at 823.

Here, a fine of $1,550.00 is found in the order placing Hall on deferred adjudication as

well as in the judgment of conviction. The fine was part of the written plea agreement which

brought about the order of deferred adjudication. The trial court accepted that plea agreement

and orally pronounced the fine when placing Hall on deferred adjudication. But that

pronouncement does not count when the trial court puts deferred adjudication to an end and

proceeds to adjudication. Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502. There was no oral pronouncement of the

fine at the adjudication hearing.

Before deciding what this Court will do about the fine, we pause to note three things.

First, Hall’s brief did not put forward a standard of review for our evaluation of the fine.

6 Second, there are exception(s) to the oral pronouncement requirement; the oral

pronouncement requirement can be subject to countervailing considerations. See Ette v. State,

559 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“We hold that the $10,000 fine assessed by the

jury may be properly imposed despite the trial judge’s failure to orally pronounce it.”).

Third, the State did not file a brief, and therefore this Court does not have the benefit of

the State’s view regarding the fine, the standard of review, and whether any exception to oral

pronouncement applies in this case. We do not, however, categorize this as a failure by the

State. At this point in time, what the Court has before it is a motion to withdraw by Hall’s

appointed counsel and a brief in support of that motion. See Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 318–19. In

other words, we do not have a typical appellant’s brief, and, therefore, it is unclear whether the

State has the right or the duty to respond to a motion asserting that the conviction and sentence

should stand. In the ordinary course of things, the State would have no reason to oppose such a

motion.4

Our court has not spoken to the State’s briefing rights and duties in the course of Anders

“reversible error” liberty interest review. The Waco Court of Appeals, however, has held that

“the State’s right to file a responsive brief will commence upon the filing of a pro se response by

an appellant.” Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, order)

(per curiam). This has the practical effect in many cases that the State never has a right to file a

brief because, in many cases, there is no pro se response to the Anders brief. Cummins, 646

4 But see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14(k) (Supp.) (“If at any time before, during, or after trial the [S]tate discovers any additional document, item, or information required to be disclosed under Subsection (h), the [S]tate shall promptly disclose the existence of the document, item, or information to the defendant or the court.”). 7 S.W.3d at 610 (“[T]he State’s right to respond is rarely triggered.”). In light of this, the Waco

Court of Appeals has crafted its own approach for handling Anders briefs that also present “non-

reversible” error.5

Our court has not committed to the Cummins approach or any formalized approach.

However, we agree with our sister court that, “[i]n recent years . . . we began to receive a

growing number of Anders briefs that also requested modifications to the judgment.” Id.

This increase in requests for modifications to the judgment raises concerns.

As Professors Dix and Dawson have explained in their treatise,

States have a legitimate interest in being able to develop and implement procedures which identify frivolous appeals and permit resolution of them without the cost of providing the defendant-appellant with counsel’s help in preparing and submitting a full merits brief. Such procedures must also, of course, protect other appellants with nonfrivolous appeals from being denied their right to full assistance of counsel in pursuing those nonfrivolous appeals.

42 GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON, TEXAS PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 24.148, at 327 (2d ed.2001).

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 407 n.12 (emphasis added).

In other words, there is a costs/benefits balance to be struck in this field. See id. Time

and expense spent on one thing (such as a $1,550.00 fine) takes away from other things (such as

5 In Cummins, the Waco court stated,

[W]hen this type of brief is filed—an Anders brief also asserting nonreversible error, which we later refer to as an Allison brief—this Court will conduct an independent review of the record for reversible error involving the defendant’s conviction and sentence and then treat the briefed nonreversible error as a merits issue. Because there is a merit-based argument made by appellant, the State is entitled and expected to file a brief responding to the alleged nonreversible error.

Cummins, 646 S.W.3d at 612. 8 review of liberty interest matters in Hall’s case, or review of liberty interest matters for other

defendants). See id.; Teague v. State, No. 06-24-00165-CR, 2026 WL 1052862, at *20–22

nn.40–41 & 49 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Apr. 20, 2026, no pet. h.) (not designated for

publication) (Rambin, J., concurring).

Consideration of balancing factors does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel. “Not every restriction on counsel’s time or opportunity to investigate or to consult with

his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to

counsel.” Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). In the context of motions for continuance,

for example, “[t]rial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not

the least of their problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same

place at the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling

reasons.” Id. When assessing whether to grant a continuance, “courts may not ignore the

concerns of victims.” Id. at 14. The concerns of the entire judicial system also factor into the

balance. “The spectacle of repeated trials to establish the truth about a single criminal episode

inevitably places burdens on the system in terms of witnesses, records, and fading memories, to

say nothing of misusing judicial resources.” Id. at 15 (emphasis added).

We do two things:

In this case, we modify the trial court’s judgment to delete the complained-of fine.

9 For future cases, we inform the State that when an Anders brief raises non-liberty interest

matters,6 the State may respond.

III. Conclusion

We therefore modify the trial court’s judgment to delete the challenged $1,550.00 “Fine.”

We affirm the trial court’s judgment, as modified.7

Jeff Rambin Justice

CONCURRING OPINION

I respectfully concur with the opinion of Justice Rambin. While I reach the same result, I

do so by a different analysis.

In my view, appointed appellate counsel and retained appellate counsel have the same

duties and scope of representation, as defined at the outset of the representation. Nothing in the

record hints at a limit to appointed appellate counsel’s scope of representation. Accordingly, the

6 Here the non-liberty interest matter was a fine. In future cases, it may be something else such as a cost, a fee, or a reimbursement. Via this footnote, however, we do not enumerate every potential non-liberty interest matter which might be raised in conjunction with an Anders brief. 7 Since we agree that this case presents no reversible error, we also, in accordance with Anders, grant counsel’s request to withdraw from further representation of appellant in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant desire to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, appellant must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review (1) must be filed within thirty days from either the date of this opinion or the date on which the last timely motion for rehearing was overruled by this Court, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2, (2) must be filed with the clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3, and (3) should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, see TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4. 10 general duties of appellate counsel, in all criminal appeals, include considering and, if necessary,

addressing all aspects of the conviction, including a fine.

Accordingly, I concur with the opinion of Justice Rambin.

Charles van Cleef Justice

Date Submitted: March 4, 2026 Date Decided: April 27, 2026

Do Not Publish