Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp.

76 F. App'x 293
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedSeptember 23, 2003
DocketNo. 03-1302
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 76 F. App'x 293 (Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 76 F. App'x 293 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Opinion

RADER, Circuit Judge.

On summary judgment, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts determined that Dyax Corp. did not infringe U.S. Patent Nos. 4,359,535 (the ’535 patent), 4,528,2661 (the ’266 patent), and 5,866,363 (the ’363 patent). Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., 226 F.Supp.2d 314 (D.Mass.2002); Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp., Civ. Action No. 00-11370-RGS, 2003 WL 1562239 (D.Mass. Feb. 25, 2003). This court affirms.

I.

In its Markman ruling, the district court construed two phrases appearing only in the ’363 patent: “from about 4 to about 12” and “at least about 10% of all possible peptide sequences” Pieczenik, 226 F.Supp.2d at 321. In addition to the two phrases in the claims of the ’363 patent, the district court construed one claim term, “oligonucleotide,” in the claims of the ’363, ’535, and ’266 patents. Pieczenik, 226 F.Supp.2d at 322. After the district court construed the claims, Dr. Pieczenik moved for partial summary judgment of [295]*295infringement of the ’363 patent. Dyax, in turn, cross-moved for summary judgment of noninfringement of all three asserted patents. Apparently conceding noninfringement of the ’535 and ’266 patents in light of the district court’s claim construction, Dr. Pieczenik did not oppose Dyax’s cross-motions for summary judgment of noninfringement of those patents. Accordingly, the district court granted Dyax’s motion on the ’535 and ’266 patents.

Dr. Pieczenik, however, did not concede noninfringement of the ’363 patent. Nevertheless, Dr. Pieczenik did not dispute the facts introduced by Dyax, and thus the district court deemed those facts admitted. It, therefore, granted summary judgment on the asserted claims of the ’363 patent, explaining:

Because it is undisputed that (1) Dyax’s phage libraries do not meet the “about 4 to about 12” claim limitation (according to the affidavit of Robert Ladner, Dyax’s Chief Scientific Officer, the smallest Dyax library is 18 nucleotide triplets in length, while the largest exceeds 100 nucleotide triplets), and (2) that Dyax’s phage libraries do not meet the “at least about 10% of all possible peptide sequences” claim limitation (according to the Ladner affidavit the actual number for all libraries is less than one trillionth of the possible peptide sequences), there can be no literal infringement.

Pieczenik, Civ. Action No. 00-11370-RGS, 2003 WL 1562239, *2 (D.Mass. Feb. 25, 2003). The district court also determined that Dyax’s accused products would not infringe the ’363 patent under the doctrine of equivalents.

II.

A determination of infringement requires two steps. “First, the court determines the scope and meaning of the patent claims asserted. [Second,] the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing device.” Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed.Cir.1998) (en banc) (citations omitted). Step one, claim construction, is an issue of law, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970-71 (Fed. Cir.1995) (en banc), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996), that this court reviews without deference, Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456. Step two, comparison of the claim to the accused device, is a question of fact that requires the patent holder to establish that the accused device includes every claim limitation or its equivalent. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997). Summary judgment is appropriate where the record shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This court reviews a grant of summary judgment by a district court de novo. Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 1355-56 (Fed.Cir.2000).

Dr. Pieczenik’s appeal focuses solely on the district court’s claim construction. This court understands that Dr. Pieczenik argues for the construction of three terms, only one of which coincides with the terms that the district court addressed. Specifically, Dr. Pieczenik appeals the constructions of “combinatorial libraries,” “having,” and “oligonucleotide.”

“In construing claims, the analytical focus must begin and remain centered on the language of the claims themselves, for it is that language that the patentee chose to use to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which patentee regards as his invention.” Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 256 [296]*296F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed.Cir.2001) (quotation omitted). The terms used in the claims bear a “heavy presumption” that they mean what they say and have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words by persons skilled in the relevant art. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed.Cir.2002). With respect to the ordinary meaning of the words, a court may consult a dictionary, encyclopedia, or treatise. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 (Fed.Cir.2002). Moreover, “[a]bsent an express intent to impart a novel meaning, claim terms on take their ordinary meaning.” Elektra Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307 (Fed.Cir.2000).

As previously noted, Dr. Pieczenik’s appeal invokes two terms that were not addressed by the district court: “combinatorial libraries” and “having.” As an initial matter, this court notes that “combinatorial libraries” does not appear in any of the claims of the asserted patents. Because claim construction requires focus on particular claim language, this court is reticent to construe a term not present in the claims, especially a term not construed by the district court. Accordingly, Dr. Pieczenik’s challenge with respect to “combinatorial libraries” fails. Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed.Cir.1999) (“[O]nly those terms need be construed that are in controversy, and only to the extent necessary to resolve the controversy.”).

Dr.

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Related

Pieczenik v. Dyax Corporation
120 F. App'x 310 (Federal Circuit, 2004)
Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp
541 U.S. 959 (Supreme Court, 2004)

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